Inequality and the Labor Market

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Группа авторов. Inequality and the Labor Market

CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Figures

Table

ABBREVIATIONS

Sharon’s Perspective

Ben’s Perspective

Our Cooperation

Conclusion

ONE

Explaining the Weakening of Workers’ Bargaining Power

Employer Concentration

Collusion

Contracts

Asymmetric Information

The Weakening of Unions

Fissured Markets

Other Sources and Manifestations of the Weakening of Bargaining Power

Mounting Evidence

Why It Matters

The Broader Battle

Conclusion

Notes

References

TWO

The Failures of Antitrust and Labor Law

The Failure of Antitrust Law

The Failure of Labor Law

The Solutions in Antitrust and Labor Law

Conclusion

Notes

References

THREE

Explanations for Wage Stagnation and Inequality

Competitive Labor Markets in Theory and Practice

Labor Competition and the Macroeconomy

Strategies to Foster Greater Competition

Conclusion

Notes

References

FOUR

Employers can suppress wages when labor market competition is limited

The majority of U.S. labor markets are highly concentrated

Wages fall when labor market concentration increases

Strengthening Labor Antitrust Enforcement: Merger Reviews and Beyond

Conclusion

Notes

References

FIVE

Causes of Growing Labor Market Inequality

What New Evidence on Market Concentration Reveals about the Causes of Growing Labor Market Inequality

The lodestar for economic policy should be balanced, and not necessarily competitive, labor markets

The biggest change in relative power between typical workers and their employers has been a collapse in workers’ power

The collapse of workers’ power has been driven by conscious policy choices

Conclusion

Notes

References

SIX

Powerful Employers and Permissive Enforcers

Coercive Contracts

Federal Advocacy Versus Worker Power

Conclusion

Notes

SEVEN

Legal Background

Understanding the Problem

Boilerplate Noncompetes

Broad Noncompetes

Inequitable Noncompetes

Informally Enforced Noncompetes

Regulation of Noncompetes

State Attorneys General and Overuse of Noncompetes

Parens Patriae and General Statutory Grants of Authority

State Consumer Statutes

Statutory Provisions Specific to Noncompetes

State Attorneys General and Other Labor Market Restraints

Conclusion

Notes

EIGHT

Historical Background and Theoretical Arguments

Historical Background

Theoretical Arguments

Evidence on the Prevalence of Noncompetes

Evidence on the Relationship Between Noncompetes and Wages

Evidence from the Enforceability of Noncompetes

The Relationship between Noncompetes and Wages

The Externality Perspective

Policy Recommendations

1. Early Notification

2. Consideration for Noncompetes Entered Into after the Commencement of Employment

3. Ban Noncompetes for Certain Populations

Directions for Future Research

Conclusion

Notes

References

NINE

The Underappreciated Role of Transparency in Labor Market Competition

The Transparency Landscape

New Approaches to Encourage Transparency

Provide uniform coverage at the state level for worker discussions on pay

Continue an Obama-era policy to collect additional data through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Amend antitrust safe harbor to encourage sharing of compensation surveys

Facilitate reciprocal pay disclosure

Fund evaluations by the U.S. Department of Labor to better understand pay transparency

Conclusion

Notes

References

TEN

The Fissured Workplace

The Relationship between Fissuring and Antitrust

The Harms Caused by Anticompetitive Conduct in the Fissured Workplace

Treatment of Fissured Workplaces under the Antitrust Laws

A Framework for Addressing the Tension

Conclusion

Notes

References

ELEVEN

Forced Arbitration Prevents Workers from Seeking and Attaining Redress for Serious Workplace Violations

Forced Arbitration Has a Harmful Anticompetitive Impact

Federal, State, and Worker-Led Solutions

Conclusion

Notes

TWELVE

The Federal Labor Policy Landscape

The Federal Framework for Protecting Workers

Issues Limiting Labor Market Competition

1. Lack of Wage Transparency

2. Mandatory Arbitration

3. Minimum Wages and Overtime Protections

4. Employer Concentration

Integrating Data and Evidence into Labor Policy

The Evidence Act

The Department of Labor’s Chief Evaluation Office

Proposals to Increase Labor Market Competition at the Federal Level

Collect and link administrative data

Evaluate tax expenditures

Elevate and relocate the U.S. Department of Labor’s chief evaluation officer

Increase set-aside to 1 percent of U.S. Department of Labor program funds for evaluations

Prioritize evidence of effectiveness in all U.S. Department of Labor grant programs for both formula and competitive grants

Conclusion

Notes

References

THIRTEEN

Emerging Issues for Labor Policy at the State Level

Wage Transparency

Occupational Licensing

Noncompete Agreements

No-Poach Agreements and Wage Collusion

Forced or Mandatory Arbitration

Business Outsourcing and Overtime Violations

Other Areas for Reform

How States Can Bolster Labor Market Competition to Benefit Workers

1. Increase Data Collection and Sharing

2. Use Administrative Data to Perform Evaluations

3. Establish an Evaluation Policy for Assessing Programs

4. Create an Evaluation Office with the Authority to Evaluate Programs and Inform Policymaking

5. Build and Provide Public Access to an Inventory of Evidence-Based Programs

6. Set Aside 1 Percent of Funding for Evaluation

7. Use Evidence to Inform State Funding Decisions

Conclusion

Notes

References

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and the

Labor Market

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This book comes at a time when the American labor market is in the midst of unprecedented upheaval. Technological advances have made some occupations nearly obsolete while accelerating a shift toward gig work. The transition from the Obama administration to the Trump administration has meant, at least at the federal level, sharply diminished support for workers’ rights and weakened enforcement of labor law. And the descent into a global recession has driven a dramatic increase in the share of unemployed workers, a higher concentration of corporate power, and fading worker bargaining power all around.

These developments have heightened the need for increased attention to labor market competition. We hope that the wide-ranging set of analyses offered here will convince readers that the structural imbalance between worker and employer bargaining power is not inevitable. Indeed, diminished competition is a choice—and it is unfortunately one that policymakers increasingly embrace. The lessons from these pages reinforce the point that, once we understand these forces, we as a nation can make good decisions about what to do about them.

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