You CAN Stop Stupid

You CAN Stop Stupid
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Описание книги

Stopping Losses from Accidental and Malicious Actions Around the world, users cost organizations billions of dollars due to simple errors and malicious actions. They believe that there is some deficiency in the users. In response, organizations believe that they have to improve their awareness efforts and making more secure users. This is like saying that coalmines should get healthier canaries. The reality is that it takes a multilayered approach that acknowledges that users will inevitably make mistakes or have malicious intent, and the failure is in not planning for that. It takes a holistic approach to assessing risk combined with technical defenses and countermeasures layered with a security culture and continuous improvement. Only with this kind of defense in depth can organizations hope to prevent the worst of the cybersecurity breaches and other user-initiated losses. Using lessons from tested and proven disciplines like military kill-chain analysis, counterterrorism analysis, industrial safety programs, and more, Ira Winkler and Dr. Tracy Celaya's  You CAN Stop Stupid provides a methodology to analyze potential losses and determine appropriate countermeasures to implement.  Minimize business losses associated with user failings Proactively plan to prevent and mitigate data breaches Optimize your security spending Cost justify your security and loss reduction efforts Improve your organization’s culture Business technology and security professionals will benefit from the information provided by these two well-known and influential cybersecurity speakers and experts.

Оглавление

Ira Winkler. You CAN Stop Stupid

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Illustrations

Guide

Pages

You CAN Stop Stupid. Stopping Losses from Accidental and Malicious Actions

Introduction

What Is Stupid?

Do You Create Stupidity?

How Smart Organizations Become Smart

Not All Industries Are as Smart

Deserve More

Reader Support for This Book

How to Contact the Publisher

How to Contact the Authors

I Stopping Stupid Is Your Job

1 Failure: The Most Common Option

History Is Not on the Users’ Side

Today's Common Approach

Operational and Security Awareness

Technology

Governance

We Propose a Strategy, Not Tactics

2 Users Are Part of the System

Understanding Users' Role in the System

Users Aren't Perfect

“Users” Refers to Anyone in Any Function

Malice Is an Option

What You Should Expect from Users

3 What Is User-Initiated Loss?

Processes

Culture

Physical Losses

Crime

User Malice

Social Engineering

User Error

Inadequate Training

Technology Implementation

Design and Maintenance

User Enablement

Shadow IT

Confusing Interfaces

UIL Is Pervasive

II Foundational Concepts

4 Risk Management

Death by 1,000 Cuts

The Risk Equation

Value

Monetary Value

Opportunity Value

Reputation Value

Value to Potential Attackers

Threats

Vulnerabilities

Physical Vulnerabilities

Operational Vulnerabilities

Personnel Vulnerabilities

Technical Vulnerabilities

THE TWO WAYS TO HACK A COMPUTER

Countermeasures

Protection, Detection, and Reaction

Accept, Avoid, Mitigate, Transfer

TIME'S ROLE IN COUNTERMEASURES

Types of Countermeasures

Physical Countermeasures

Operational Countermeasures

Personnel Countermeasures

Technical Countermeasures

Risk Optimization

Risk and User-Initiated Loss

5 The Problems with Awareness Efforts

Awareness Programs Can Be Extremely Valuable

Check-the-Box Mentality

Training vs. Awareness

The Compliance Budget

Shoulds vs. Musts

SOMMELIER VS. GRANDMA

When It's Okay to Blame the User

Awareness Programs Do Not Always Translate into Practice

Structural Failings of Awareness Programs

Further Considerations

6 Protection, Detection, and Reaction

Conceptual Overview

Protection

Detection

Reaction

Mitigating a Loss in Progress

Mitigating Future Incidents

Putting It All Together

7 Lessons from Safety Science

The Limitations of Old-School Safety Science

Most UIL Prevention Programs Are Old-School

The New School of Safety Science

Putting Safety Science to Use

Safety Culture

The Need to Not Remove All Errors

When to Blame Users

We Need to Learn from Safety Science

8 Applied Behavioral Science

The ABCs of Behavioral Science

Antecedents

Passive Antecedents vs. Active Antecedents

ADDRESSING BACKGROUND NOISE

The Importance of Motivation

Behaviors

Consequences

THE ANTECEDENT WHO CRIED WOLF

Gamification

Analyzing Consequences

E-TIP Overview

Engineering Behavior vs. Influencing Behavior

9 Security Culture and Behavior

BEHAVIORAL MOTIVATION

ABCs of Culture

Types of Cultures

Subcultures

What Is Your Culture?

Improving Culture

Determining a Finite Set of Behaviors to Improve

Behavioral Change Strategies

WILL BEHAVIORAL CHANGE STICK?

Traditional Project Management

Change Management

Is Culture Your Ally?

10 User Metrics

The Importance of Metrics

The Hidden Cost of Awareness

Types of Awareness Metrics

Compliance Metrics

Engagement Metrics

Attendance Metrics

Likability Metrics

Knowledge Level

Behavioral Improvement

Tangible ROI

Intangible Benefits

Day 0 Metrics

Deserve More

11 The Kill Chain

Kill Chain Principles

The Military Kill Chain

The Cyber Kill Chain and Defense in Depth

Deconstructing the Cyber Kill Chain

Phishing Kill Chain Example

Other Models and Frameworks

APPLICATIONS OF MITRE ATT&CK

Applying Kill Chains to UIL

12 Total Quality Management Revisited

TQM: In Search of Excellence

Exponential Increase in Errors

Principles of TQM

What Makes TQM Fail?

Other Frameworks

Product Improvement and Management

Kill Chain for Process Improvement

COVID-19 Remote Workforce Process Activated

Applying Quality Principles

III Countermeasures

13 Governance

Defining the Scope of Governance for Our Purposes

Operational Security or Loss Mitigation

Physical Security

Personnel Security

Traditional Governance

Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines

In the Workplace

Security and the Business

Analyzing Processes

Grandma's House

14 Technical Countermeasures

SOFTWARE AS A SERVICE

Personnel Countermeasures

Background Checks

Continuous Monitoring

Employee Management Systems

Misuse and Abuse Detection

Data Leak Prevention

Physical Countermeasures

Access Control Systems

Surveillance and Safety Systems

Point-of-Sale Systems

Inventory Systems and Supply Chains

Computer Tracking Systems

Operational Countermeasures

Accounting Systems

Customer Relationship Management

Operational Technology

Workflow Management

Cybersecurity Countermeasures

The 20 CIS Controls and Resources

Anti-malware Software

Whitelisting

Firewalls

Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems

Managed Security Services

Backups

Secure Configurations

Automated Patching

Vulnerability Management Tools

Behavioral Analytics

Data Leak Prevention

Web Content Filters/Application Firewalls

Wireless and Remote Security

Mobile Device Management

Multifactor Authentication

Single Sign-On

Encryption

Nothing Is Perfect

Putting It All Together

15 Creating Effective Awareness Programs

What Is Effective Awareness?

Governance as the Focus

Where Awareness Strategically Fits in the Organization

The Goal of Awareness Programs

Changing Culture

Defining Subcultures

Interdepartmental Cooperation

The Core of All Awareness Efforts

Process

Business Drivers

Culture and Communication Tools

Computer-Based Training

Phishing Simulations

Newsletters

Knowledge Base

Posters

Monitor Displays and Screensavers

Mouse Pads, Coffee Cups, and More

Special Events

Meetings

Ambassadors

Putting It Together

Metrics

Gamification

Gamification Criteria

Structuring Gamification

Gamification Is Not for Everyone

Getting Management's Support

Awareness Programs for Management

Demonstrate Clear Business Value

Enforcement

Experiment

IV Applying Boom

16 Start with Boom

What Are the Actions That Initiate UIL?

Start with a List

Order the List

Metrics

Governance

User Experience

Prevention and Detection

Awareness

Feeding the Cycle

Stopping Boom

17 Right of Boom

Repeat as Necessary

What Does Loss Initiation Look Like?

What Are the Potential Losses?

Preventing the Loss

Compiling Protective Countermeasures

Detecting the Loss

Before, During, and After

Mitigating the Loss

Determining Where to Mitigate

Avoiding Analysis Paralysis

Your Last Line of Defense

18 Preventing Boom

Why Are We Here?

Reverse Engineering

Governance

Awareness

Consider the Compliance Budget

Technology

Step-by-Step

19 Determining the Most Effective Countermeasures

Early Prevention vs. Response

Start with Governance

Understand the Business Goal

Removing the User

Start Left of Boom

Consider Technology

Prioritize Potential Loss

Define Governance Thoroughly

Matrix Technical Countermeasures

Creating the Matrix

Define Awareness

It's Just a Start

20 Implementation Considerations

You've Got Issues

Weak Strategy

Resources, Culture, and Implementation

Lack of Ownership and Accountability

One Effort at a Time

Change Management

Adopting Changes

Kubler-Ross Change Curve

J-Curve of Adoption or Diffusion of Innovation

Governance, Again

Business Case for a Human Security Officer

It Won't Be Easy

21 If You Have Stupid Users, You Have a Stupid System

A User Should Never Surprise You

Perform Some More Research

Start Somewhere

Take Day Zero Metrics

UIL Mitigation Is a Living Process

Grow from Success

The Users Are Your Canary in the Mine

Index

About the Authors

About the Technical Editors

Acknowledgments

Foreword

WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

Отрывок из книги

Ira Winkler

Dr. Tracy Celaya Brown

.....

There are a wide variety of decisions made in the implementation of technology. These design decisions drive the interactions and capabilities provided to the end users. Although it is easy to blame end users when they commit an act that inevitably leads to damage, if the design of the system leads them to commit the harmful action, it is hard to attribute the blame solely to the end user. Such is the case in attempting to blame the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines pilots of the doomed Boeing 737 MAX airplanes.

In the implementation of technology, there are many common design issues that essentially automate loss. Programming errors can cause the crash of major computer systems. If this happens to a financial institution, transactions can be blocked for hours. If it happens to an airline's schedule systems, planes can be grounded until the problem is resolved.

.....

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