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Winston Churchill. The River War (History of the War in Sudan)
The River War (History of the War in Sudan)
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Table of Contents
Chapter I: The Rebellion of the Mahdi
Chapter II: The Fate of the Envoy
Chapter III: The Dervish Empire
Chapter IV: The Years of Preparation
Chapter V: The Beginning of the War
Chapter VI: Firket
Chapter VII: The Recovery of the Dongola Province
Chapter VIII: The Desert Railway
Chapter IX: Abu Hamed
Chapter X: Berber
Chapter XI: Reconnaissance
Chapter XII: The Battle of the Atbara
Chapter XIII: The Grand Advance
Chapter XIV: The Operations of the First of September
Chapter XV: The Battle of Omdurman
Chapter XVI: The Fall of the City
Chapter XVII: 'The Fashoda Incident'
Chapter XVIII: On the Blue Nile
Chapter XIX: The End of the Khalifa
Appendix
Declaration Relative to the British and French Spheres of Influence in Central Africa
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Winston Churchill
Chapter II: The Fate of the Envoy
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It was all this and no more. It was not the reason of the revolt. It strengthened, it characterised, but it did not cause. ('I do not believe that fanaticism exists as it used to do in the world, judging from what I have seen in this so-called fanatic land. It is far more a question of property, and is more like Communism under the flag of religion.'—GENERAL GORDON'S JOURNALS AT KHARTOUM, bk.i. p.13.) Those whose practice it is to regard their own nation as possessing a monopoly of virtue and common-sense, are wont to ascribe every military enterprise of savage peoples to fanaticism. They calmly ignore obvious and legitimate motives. The most rational conduct is considered mad. It has therefore been freely stated, and is to some extent believed, that the revolt in the Soudan was entirely religious. If the worst untruths are those that have some appearance of veracity, this impression must be very false indeed. It is, perhaps, an historical fact that the revolt of a large population has never been caused solely or even mainly by religious enthusiasm.
The reasons which forced the peoples of the Soudan to revolt were as strong as the defence which their oppressors could offer was feeble. Looking at the question from a purely political standpoint, we may say that upon the whole there exists no record of a better case for rebellion than presented itself to the Soudanese. Their country was being ruined; their property was plundered; their women were ravished; their liberties were curtailed; even their lives were threatened. Aliens ruled the inhabitants; the few oppressed the many; brave men were harried by cowards; the weak compelled the strong. Here were sufficient reasons. Since any armed movement against an established Government can be justified only by success, strength is an important revolutionary virtue. It was a virtue that the Arabs might boast. They were indeed far stronger than they, their persecutors, or the outside world had yet learned. All were soon to be enlightened.
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