Understanding Peacekeeping

Оглавление

Alex J. Bellamy. Understanding Peacekeeping

CONTENTS

Guide

List of Illustrations

List of Maps

List of Boxes

List of Tables

Pages

Understanding Peacekeeping

Abbreviations

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Peacekeeping in global politics

Enduring themes

Structure of the book

1Peace Operations in Global Politics

1.1 Westphalian and post-Westphalian order

1.2 Theorizing peace operations in global politics

Liberal peace

Box 1.1 Advocates of liberal peace

Culture and peace operations

Box 1.2 The global cultural determinants of peace operations

Cosmopolitanism

Peacekeeping as liberal imperialism

Critical theory

1.3 The impacts of peace operations on armed conflict

Conclusion

2Who Deploys Peace Operations?

2.1 The universe of modern peace operations

2.2 States as peacekeepers

2.3 International organizations as peacekeepers

2.4 United Nations peace operations

The legal framework for UN peace operations

Box 2.1 ‘Uniting for peace’ in the UN General Assembly

The bureaucratic framework for UN peace operations

Box 2.2 Assembling a United Nations peacekeeping operation

The financial framework for UN peace operations

2.5 Partnership peacekeeping

Conclusion

3Peace Operations during the Cold War

3.1 United Nations peace operations during the Cold War

3.2 Non-UN peace operations during the Cold War

Conclusion

4Peace Operations during the 1990s

4.1 The transformation of peace operations

4.2 The nature of the transformation

4.3 Failures and retreat

Box 4.1 Boutros-Ghali on the failure of UN peace operations

4.4 Lessons learned?

Conclusion

5Peace Operations in the Twenty-First Century

5.1 Peacekeeping reborn: 1999–2002

5.2 The Brahimi Report

Box 5.1 The Brahimi Report and the future of peace operations

5.3 Peace operations after the Brahimi Report

The West African cluster

The East African cluster

5.4 The rise of stabilization

Conclusion

6Prevention

6.1 Preventing violent conflict and preventive deployments

Box 6.1 Ken Menkhaus’s conflict prevention chain

Box 6.2 Proposals for UN standing forces: a very short history

6.2 Preventive deployments in practice

Preventing war in Macedonia: UNPREDEP and beyond

Preventing Electoral Violence in Democratic Republic of the Congo (2006)

6.3 The politics of preventive deployment

Conclusion

7Observation

7.1 From observation to traditional peacekeeping

Box 7.1 Hammarskjöld’s principles for the conduct of UNEF I

7.2 Observation in practice

UNEF I in Egypt (1956–1967)

Box 7.2 UNEF I’s mandate

UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964–present)

UNDOF in the Golan Heights (1974–present)

UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea (2000–8)

7.3 Problems

8Assistance

8.1 Assisting war-to-peace transitions

8.2 Assistance in practice

ONUSAL in El Salvador (1991–4)

Box 8.1 UN responsibilities under the Chapultepec Accords

UNTAC in Cambodia (1991–3)

UNAMIR in Rwanda (1993–4)

Box 8.2 UNAMIR: small and cheap

IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia (1995–2004)

UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (1998–2005)

8.3 Key challenges

9Enforcement

9.1 What is peace enforcement?

Box 9.1 Security Council action under Chapter VII

9.2 Peace enforcement in practice

ONUC in Congo (1960–4)

UNITAF and UNOSOM II in Somalia (1992–5)

Multinational Forces in Haiti (1994–5 and 2004)

INTERFET in East Timor (1999–2000)

AMISOM in Somalia (2007–present)

Force Intervention Brigade in DR Congo (2013–present)

9.3 Key challenges

10Stabilization

10.1 Stabilization in theory

10.2 Stabilization in practice

ISAF in Afghanistan (2001–14)

MONUC and MONUSCO in DR Congo (1999–present)

Stabilizing Mali (2012–present)

Stabilizing Central African Republic (2012–present)

10.3 Key challenges for stabilization

11Administration

11.1 Transitional administrations in theory

Box 11.1 Institutionalization before liberalization: six priorities

11.2 Transitional administrations in practice

Administering New Guinea (1962–3)

Administering Bosnia (1996–present)

Administering Kosovo (1999–present)

Box 11.2 Security Council Resolution 1244 and the transitional administration in Kosovo

Administering East Timor (1999–2002)

11.3 Key challenges

12Force Generation

12.1 The force-generation process

Box 12.1 Training United Nations peacekeepers

Box 12.2 Key capability gaps in UN peacekeeping operations, May 2017

12.2 Why do states provide peacekeepers?

Realist-inspired explanations

Liberal explanations

The impure public goods approach

Bureaucratic and civil–military relations explanations

Conclusion

13Regionalization

13.1 Regionalization and trends in peace operations

Box 13.1 Boutros-Ghali on the UN and regional arrangements, 1992

13.2 The strengths and weaknesses of regional peace operations

Potential advantages

Potential disadvantages

13.3 Regional peace operations in practice

ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia (1990–7)

The Pacific Islands Forum and the Solomon Islands (2003–17)

ECOMIG in The Gambia (2017–present)

Conclusion

14Privatization

14.1 The private security industry and peace operations

Box 14.1 The International Stability Operations Association (ISOA)

14.2 The costs and benefits of privatizing peace operations

Box 14.2 Bancroft Global Development’s support to AMISOM in Somalia

Potential benefits

Potential costs

14.3 A future of privatized peace enforcement?

Box 14.3 Executive Outcomes in Angola, 1993–5

Conclusion

15Use of Force

15.1 The evolution of force in peace operations

15.2 Key questions about using force in peace operations

Does using force break the UN’s basic principles of peacekeeping?

Should peacekeepers use offensive military force?

Can peacekeepers use military force effectively?

Is there a sensible international division of labour for using force in peace operations?

What have been the main unintended consequences of peacekeepers using military force?

Conclusion

16Civilian Protection

16.1 The rise and evolution of POC mandates

16.2 Consequences of POC mandates

16.3 Tensions and challenges raised by POC mandates

POC and impartiality

POC and consent

POC and peace processes

POC and force protection

POC and (lack of) preparedness

16.4 Assessing and reforming the UN’s POC record

Assessing POC results

Reforming POC missions

Conclusion

17Gender

17.1 Peace operations and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda

17.2 Increasing women’s participation in peace operations

17.3 Sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations

Box 17.1 Barriers to the deployment of uniformed women in peace operations

Military cultures

Impunity and a lack of accountability

Economic inequalities and a foreign military presence

Conclusion

18Policing

18.1 The evolution of policing in peace operations

Box 18.1 United Nations police mandated tasks, most to least frequent, 1995–2013

Box 18.2 Types of police peacekeepers

18.2 Approaches to policing in peace operations

Capacity-building

Traditional policing

Box 18.3 Traditional policing in ONUMOZ

Multidimensional activities

Executive policing

Box 18.4 Executive policing in Kosovo

18.3 Challenges facing police peacekeepers

Conclusion

19Organized Crime

19.1 Organized crime and peace operations: growing convergence

Box 19.1 Blue helmets and black markets in the siege of Sarajevo

19.2 Peacekeepers and organized crime

Peacekeepers confront varied forms of organized crime

Peacekeepers have varied effects on organized crime

Peacekeepers adopt varied responses to organized crime

19.3 Responding to organized crime

Analysis and assessment

Mandating and deploying the right tools

Curtailing the flow of illicit resources

Conclusion

20Exit

20.1 Exit in theory and practice

Successor mission(s)

Cut and run

Expulsion

Sequencing

Designated timetable

Benchmarking

20.2 Political challenges

20.3 Operational challenges

20.4 Economic challenges

Conclusion

AppendixPeace Operations, 1947–2019

References

Index

A

B

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D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

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M

N

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P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Y

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Отрывок из книги

Third edition

PAUL D. WILLIAMS WITH ALEX J. BELLAMY

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Peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture, and they are disinclined to pursue strategies that deviate from these norms. In short, the design and conduct of peacekeeping missions reflect not only the interests of the key parties and the perceived lessons of previous operations, but also the prevailing norms of global culture, which legitimize certain kinds of peacekeeping policies and delegitimize others … [G]lobal culture constrains … peacekeeping by limiting the range of strategies that peacekeepers can realistically pursue. Peacekeeping agencies seem willing to rule out normatively unacceptable strategies a priori without even considering the potential effectiveness of these strategies as techniques for fostering peace, which is the stated goal of peacekeeping; and concerns about international propriety appear, at least on some occasions, to take precedence over considerations of operational effectiveness. (Paris 2003: 442–3, 451)

A second variant is Séverine Autesserre’s work on the culture underpinning what she calls ‘Peaceland’ – the ideational world inhabited by international peacebuilders in which expatriates from a multitude of different countries have come to share ‘a common collection of practices, habits, and narratives that shape their every attitude and action’ (2014: 1–2). Autesserre’s ethnographic approach shows how the everyday cultures of foreign peacekeepers, peacebuilders and aid workers have cohered to create a ‘politics of knowledge’ about how to build peace in foreign lands. The culture of Peaceland is reinforced by the tendency to bunkerize the deployment of foreign personnel and keep them generally separated from the locals via various security procedures. It also often dismisses local expertise and instead privileges personnel who possess technical, thematic knowledge. And yet, ironically, many of the organizations that comprise Peaceland operate with a ‘culture of secrecy’. Autesserre concludes that the seemingly mundane elements of Peaceland’s everyday culture have a significant impact by inhibiting the effectiveness of peace operations.

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