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Andrew Ward. Kant
CONTENTS
Guide
List of Tables
Pages
KANT. The Three Critiques
Preface
Abbreviations and Conventions
Acknowledgments
1 A General Introduction to Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Philosophy, and its Relation to Scientific Knowledge and Transcendent Metaphysics
Kant’s Copernican revolution
Hume’s scepticism about causation and Kant’s Copernican revolution
Metaphysics
2 The Division of Judgments, and the Status of Mathematics and Natural Science
The division of judgments
The status of judgments in pure mathematics and in pure natural science
Mathematics
Criticism of the thesis that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori
Natural science
The role of mathematics and natural science in Kant’s overall strategy
3 The Transcendental Aesthetic: The Nature of Space and Time
Space and time
The Metaphysical and Transcendental Expositions of space
Metaphysical Exposition
Transcendental Exposition
Time is a pure (or a priori) intuition
Two Problems about Kant’s Account of Space and Time
What has the Transcendental Aesthetic achieved?
4 The Transcendental Analytic: How Our Experience – Our Knowledge of Objects in Space and Time – is Made Possible
Analytic of Concepts
Metaphysical Deduction
Transcendental Deduction. Introduction
Exposition
Summary
Analytic of Principles
The Principles of Pure Understanding
The Axioms of Intuition
The Analogies of Experience
First Analogy
Criticism of the First Analogy
The Second and Third Analogies
Criticism of the Second and Third Analogies
The Self’s Existence in Time and its Relation to our Knowledge of Objects in Space
Nature, Scepticism and the Possibility of Experience
Has Kant answered Hume?
Synthetic a Priori Judgments and the Possibility of Experience
The Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena
5 The Transcendental Dialectic: Why No Theoretical Knowledge in Transcendent Metaphysics is Possible
The Paralogisms of Pure Reason
The Antinomy of Pure Reason
The Mathematical Antinomies
The First Antinomy
The Second Antinomy
Concluding comments on the Mathematical Antinomies
The Dynamical Antinomies. The Third Antinomy
Criticism of the Third Antinomy
Fourth Antinomy
The Ideal of Pure Reason: Three Speculative Arguments for the Existence of God
The Ontological Argument
The Cosmological Argument
The Physico-Theological Argument (the Design Argument)
Conclusion to the Dialectic
6 The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason: Reason, not Sentiment, as the Foundation of Morality, and how Freedom of the Will is Proved
The Humean Theory of Morals
Kant’s Opposing Strategy (the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason)
Review of the Kantian and Humean Moral Systems
Kant’s Antipathy to the Humean Moral System
The Feeling of Respect
No Deduction of the Moral Law: Instead, a Proof of our Transcendental Freedom
Can Reason Alone be Practical? Hume versus Kant
Summary of the Conclusions of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason
7 The Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason: How Morality Establishes the Existence of God and the Immortality of the Soul
How is any Knowledge of the Transcendent Possible?
8 The Importance of Kant’s Copernican Revolution to his Moral Philosophy
9 The Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment: Defending a Third Way between an Empiricist and a Traditional Rationalist Theory of Taste and Beauty
The Judgment of Taste: Analysis and Justification
The Finality of Nature as the Bridge between the Realms of Nature and of Freedom
The Sublime
Fine Art
10 The Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment: Why the Judgment of Taste and our Attitude to Natural Beauty Require a Copernican Revolution in Aesthetics
11 A Kantian or an Empiricist Theory of Taste?
12 Teleology and the Principle of the Finality of Nature
Bibliography. I. Texts in English Translation
II. A Selection of Secondary Literature
General
Critique of Pure Reason
Critique of Practical Reason
Critique of Judgment
Index. A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
W
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Andrew Ward
Going along with the emphasis on idealism, I attempt to explain a number of Kant’s central views – those concerning our knowledge of objects in space and time, the ground of our moral obligations and our judgments of beauty – as, in part, reactions to the scepticism and empiricism of Hume. The latter’s views and, more to the point, the arguments that he provides for them are generally both clear and invigorating. While Kant’s views are nearly always invigorating, his reasons for holding them are seldom clear, at least when considered out of context. By placing some of his key philosophical ideas alongside those of Hume, the aim is to elucidate Kant’s arguments and, thereby, to offer an assessment of his conclusions.
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So far, we have concentrated on the first stage of Kant’s Copernican revolution: the investigation of how the judgments in pure mathematics and natural science can exist (as they actually do). But we saw that he also maintains that metaphysics is essentially made up of judgments which have the same status as those in mathematics and natural science. With metaphysics, however, it is by no means clear that its central claims can be known to be true: the protracted and indecisive debates about every one of them strongly suggests that they cannot. In the section of the First Critique entitled ‘Transcendental Dialectic’, he turns to the second stage of his Copernican revolution: the investigation of whether the central claims of metaphysics can be substantiated. He concludes that our theoretical reason is unable to show any of them to be true or false.
His ground for reaching this conclusion is closely connected with the first stage of his Copernican project. For Kant’s explanation of how judgments in pure mathematics and natural science can hold with necessity and universality, while yet not being analytically true, is that they make our experience, our empirical knowledge of spatio-temporal objects, possible. (I have tried to illustrate this with the particular case of the law of causality: this law is held to make possible our experience of change of states among spatio-temporal objects.) But the central (positive) claims of metaphysics – that the soul is immortal, that we possess free will, and that God exists – have no relationship to sense experience. They entirely transcend it: they can neither be shown to make sense experience possible nor, given their status, be confirmed or disconfirmed through sense experience. Since, as he argues, these are the only ways by which theoretical reason can establish any non-analytic judgment, he concludes that we cannot prove or disprove the central claims of metaphysics by theoretical means.
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