Error, Illusion, Madness

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Bento Prado Jr.. Error, Illusion, Madness

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations

Guide

Pages

Series Title. Critical South

Error, Illusion, Madness

Copyright Page

Dedication

Publisher’s Note

Quote

Foreword No Proper Place of Its Own Vladimir Safatle

Is there such a thing as a point of view of the periphery?

A common place without a proper grammar

Persuasion

Phusis

Notes

Preface

Notes

1 Error, Illusion, Madness*

I

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IV

Error, Illusion, Madness. Commentary by Arley Ramos Moreno

Note

Notes

2 Descartes and the Last Wittgenstein The Dream Argument Revisited*

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IV

Note

Notes

3 Wittgenstein Culture and Value*

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IV

Note

Notes

4 The Plane of Immanence and Life

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III

Acknowledgments

Translator’s note

Values and the Plane of Immanence. Commentary by Arley Ramos Moreno

Notes

5 Relativism as a Counterpoint*

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IV

Bento Prado Jr.’s Lecture on Relativism. Commentary by Sérgio Cardoso

Neither Apel nor Rorty. Commentary by Paulo Eduardo Arantes

Note

Notes

6 On Deleuze An Interview*

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Notes

7 Bergson, 110 Years Later*

Note

Notes

Bibliography

Extras

Index

POLITY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT

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The publication of this series is supported by the International Consortium of Critical Theory Programs funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

Series editors: Natalia Brizuela and Leticia Sabsay

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However, one of Bento Prado’s major critical strategies consisted in inquiring into the structure of subjectivity presupposed by philosophical positions that wished to salvage some form of normativity immediately accessible to the subject. Such deconstructions of normativity, which went as far as claiming that the common person is no more than a “pedagogical project,” were in fact initial moves in a redimensioning of experience, since the abandonment of a normative horizon led to the acknowledgment of the “unavoidable ambiguity of experience and the discursive anarchy that it opens.”20

But how are we to understand this “discursive anarchy”? Such a defense of the ambiguity of experience, of the search for an irreducible heterogeneity, a defense that supposes a discursive anarchy that resists conceptual unification, could seem at first to be merely a profession of irrationalistic—or at the very least relativistic—faith. The case supporting that accusation appears to grow when we take into account the way in which Bento Prado used to assert the impossibility of providing a positive foundation for the universalizing criteria of judgment. Seeking support in a reading of Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, Bento Prado insisted that the universalization of criteria and systems of rules was not exactly the object of a more or less transparent communicational understanding. Rather it was an object of persuasion, and whoever says “persuasion” says more than just recognition of a better argument—and, against the wishes of some “conversational” conceptions of philosophy, recognizes no neutral arena in which the claims to truth of metaphysical interpretations could be tested.

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