Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)

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Brown Thomas. Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3)

LECTURE I. – (Introduction.)

LECTURE II. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND TO THE SCIENCES IN GENERAL

LECTURE III. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND TO THE SCIENCES AND ARTS MORE STRICTLY INTELLECTUAL

LECTURE IV. RELATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND TO THE CULTIVATION OF MORAL FEELING

LECTURE V. ON THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL INQUIRY IN GENERAL

LECTURE VI. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

LECTURE VII. ON POWER, CAUSE, AND EFFECT

LECTURE VIII. ON HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY

LECTURE IX. RECAPITULATION OF THE FOUR PRECEDING LECTURES; AND APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF PHYSICAL INQUIRY TO THE STUDY OF MIND, COMMENCED

LECTURE X. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED

LECTURE XI. APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF PHYSICAL INQUIRY, TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND, CONCLUDED. – ON CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ON MENTAL IDENTITY

LECTURE XII. ON CONSCIOUSNESS, CONTINUED, – ON MENTAL IDENTITY, – IDENTITY IRRECONCILABLE WITH THE DOCTRINE OF MATERIALISM, – DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PERSONAL IDENTITY AND MENTAL IDENTITY, – OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF MENTAL IDENTITY STATED

LECTURE XIII. ON THE DIRECT EVIDENCE OF MENTAL IDENTITY; AND OBJECTIONS ANSWERED

LECTURE XIV. CONTINUATION OF THE ANSWER TO OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF MENTAL IDENTITY

LECTURE XV. CONSIDERATION OF THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST MENTAL IDENTITY, CONTINUED; OPINION OF MR LOCKE RESPECTING IDENTITY; SOURCE OF HIS PARADOX ON THIS SUBJECT; AND REFLECTIONS SUGGESTED BY IT

LECTURE XVI. ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF MIND

LECTURE XVII. CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF MIND. – CLASS I. EXTERNAL STATES. – INTRODUCTORY

LECTURE XVIII. ON THE MORE DEFINITE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF MIND IN GENERAL

LECTURE XIX. BRIEF NOTICE OF THE CORPOREAL PART OF THE PROCESS, IN SENSATION

LECTURE XX. PARTICULAR CONSIDERATION OF OUR SENSATIONS. – NAMELESS TRIBES OF SENSATIONS – SENSATIONS OF SMELL – OF TASTE – OF HEARING

LECTURE XXI. ON HEARING – CONTINUED

LECTURE XXII. ON THE FEELINGS ASCRIBED TO THE SENSE OF TOUCH, – AND ANALYSIS OF THESE FEELINGS

LECTURE XXIII. ANALYSIS OF THE FEELINGS USUALLY ASCRIBED TO THE SENSE OF TOUCH, CONTINUED

LECTURE XXIV. THE SAME SUBJECT, CONTINUED

LECTURE XXV. ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSATION AND PERCEPTION, – AND BETWEEN THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF MATTER

LECTURE XXVI. ON DR REID'S SUPPOSED CONFUTATION OF THE IDEAL SYSTEM; HYPOTHESIS OF THE PERIPATETICS REGARDING PERCEPTION; AND OPINIONS OF VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS ON THE SAME SUBJECT

LECTURE XXVII. EXAMINATION OF DR REID'S SUPPOSED CONFUTATION OF IDEALISM, CONCLUDED

LECTURE XXVIII. ON DR REID'S SUPPOSED PROOF OF A MATERIAL WORLD – ON VISION – AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEELINGS ASCRIBED TO IT

LECTURE XXIX. ANALYSIS OF THE FEELINGS ASCRIBED TO VISION, CONTINUED

LECTURE XXX. HISTORY OF OPINIONS REGARDING PERCEPTION

LECTURE XXXI. HISTORY OF OPINIONS REGARDING PERCEPTION, CONCLUDED – ON THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS COMBINED WITH DESIRE, OR ON ATTENTION

LECTURE XXXII. ON THE EXTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF MIND COMBINED WITH DESIRE, CONTINUED. – ON THE INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF MIND. – CLASSIFICATION OF THEM

LECTURE XXXIII. ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA, BY LOCKE – BY CONDILLAC – BY REID – A NEW CLASSIFICATION

LECTURE XXXIV. CLASSIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFECTIONS OF MIND, CONTINUED, – ON SIMPLE SUGGESTION, – ADVANTAGES RESULTING FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF SUGGESTION, – ON MR HUME'S CLASSIFICATION OF THE CAUSES OF ASSOCIATE FEELINGS

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In my former Lecture, Gentlemen, I gave you a slight sketch of the departments into which the Philosophy of Mind divides itself, comprehending, in the first place, The physiology of the mind, considered as a substance capable of the various modifications, or states, which constitute, as they succeed each other, the phenomena of thought and feeling; secondly, The doctrines of general ethics, as to the obligation, under which man lies, to increase and extend, as widely as possible, the happiness of all that live; thirdly, The political doctrines, as to the means which enable him, in society with his fellow men, to furthermost successfully, and with the least risk of future evil, that happiness of all, which it is the duty of each individually to wish and to promote; and, fourthly, The doctrines of natural theology, as to the existence and attributes of that greatest of Beings, under whose moral government we live, and the foundations of our confidence that death is only a change of scene, which, with respect to our mortality indeed, may be said to be its close; but which, with respect to the soul itself, is only one of the events of a life that is everlasting.

Of these great divisions of our subject, the Physiology of the Mind, or the consideration of the regular series of phenomena which it presents, simply as states or affections of the mind, is that to which we are first to turn our attention. But, before entering on it, it may be useful to employ a few Lectures in illustrating the advantages, which the study of the mind affords, and the principles of philosophizing, in their peculiar application to it – subjects, which, though of a general kind, will, I trust, leave an influence that will be felt in all the particular inquiries in which we are to be engaged; preparing you, both for appreciating better the importance of those inquiries, and for prosecuting them with greater success.

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That we are not aware of any such influence, argues nothing; for to suppose us aware of it, would be to suppose us acquainted with the very errors which mislead us. Aquinas and Scotus, it is to be presumed, and all their contentious followers, conceived themselves as truly in the right path of physical investigation, as we do at this moment; and, though we are free from their gross mistakes, there may yet be others of which we are less likely to divest ourselves, from not having as yet the slightest suspicion of their existence. The question is not, Whether our method of inquiry be juster than theirs? – for, of our superiority in this respect, if any evidence of fact were necessary, the noble discoveries of these later years are too magnificent a proof to allow us to have any doubt, – but, Whether our plan of inquiry may not still be susceptible of improvements, of which we have now as little foresight, as the Scotists and Aquinists of the advantages which philosophy has received from the general prosecution of the inductive method? There is, indeed, no reason now to fear, that the observation of particular objects, with a view to general science, will be despised as incapable of giving any direct knowledge, and all real science be confined to universals. “Singularium datur scientia.” But, though a sounder view of one intellectual process may have banished from philosophy much idle contention, and directed inquiry to fitter objects, it surely does not therefore follow, that subsequent improvements in the philosophy of mind are to be absolutely unavailing. On the contrary, the presumption unquestionably is, that if by understanding better the simple process of abstraction, we have freed ourselves from many errors in our plans of inquiry, a still clearer view of the nature and limits of all the intellectual processes concerned in the discovery of truth, may lead to still juster views of philosophizing.

Even at present, I cannot but think that we may trace, in no inconsiderable degree, the influence of false notions, as to some of the phenomena of the mind, in misdirecting the spirit of our general philosophy. I allude in particular, to one very important intellectual process, – that by which we acquire our knowledge of the relation on which all physics may be said to be founded. He must have paid little attention to the history of philosophy, and even to the philosophy of his own time, who does not perceive, how much the vague and obscure notions entertained of that intermediate tie, which is supposed to connect phenomena with each other, have tended to favour the invention and ready admission of physical hypotheses, which otherwise could not have been entertained for a moment; – hypotheses, which attempt to explain what is known by the introduction of what is unknown; as if successions of phenomena were rendered easier to be understood merely by being rendered more complicated. This very unphilosophic passion for complexity, (which, unphilosophic as it is, is yet the passion of many philosophers,) seems, to me, to arise, in a great measure, from a mysterious and false view of causation; as involving always, in every series of changes, the intervention of something unobserved, between the observed antecedent and the observed effect; – a view which may very naturally be supposed to lead the mind, when it has observed no actual intervention, to imagine any thing which is not absolutely absurd, that it may flatter itself with the pleasure of having discovered a cause. It is unnecessary, however, to enlarge at present on this subject, as it must again come before us; when you will perhaps see more clearly, how much the general diffusion of juster views, as to the nature and origin of our notion of the connection of events, would tend to the simplification, not of our theories of mind only, but, in a still higher degree, of our theories of matter.

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