Оглавление
Carl von Clausewitz. The Art of War in 19th Century
The Art of War in 19th Century
Table of Contents
Napoleon's Maxims of War
PREFACE
MAXIM I
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MAXIM II
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MAXIM III
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MAXIM IV
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Clausewitz's On War
INTRODUCTION
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
NOTICE
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE AUTHOR
BRIEF MEMOIR OF GENERAL CLAUSEWITZ (BY TRANSLATOR)
BOOK I. ON THE NATURE OF WAR
CHAPTER I. What is War?
1. INTRODUCTION
2. DEFINITION
3. UTMOST USE OF FORCE
4. THE AIM IS TO DISARM THE ENEMY
5. UTMOST EXERTION OF POWERS
6. MODIFICATION IN THE REALITY
7. WAR IS NEVER AN ISOLATED ACT
8. WAR DOES NOT CONSIST OF A SINGLE INSTANTANEOUS BLOW
9. THE RESULT IN WAR IS NEVER ABSOLUTE
10. THE PROBABILITIES OF REAL LIFE TAKE THE PLACE OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE EXTREME AND THE ABSOLUTE
11. THE POLITICAL OBJECT NOW REAPPEARS
12. A SUSPENSION IN THE ACTION OF WAR UNEXPLAINED BY ANYTHING SAID AS YET
13. THERE IS ONLY ONE CAUSE WHICH CAN SUSPEND THE ACTION, AND THIS SEEMS TO BE ONLY POSSIBLE ON ONE SIDE IN ANY CASE
14. THUS A CONTINUANCE OF ACTION WILL ENSUE WHICH WILL ADVANCE TOWARDS A CLIMAX
15. HERE, THEREFORE, THE PRINCIPLE OF POLARITY IS BROUGHT INTO REQUISITION
16. ATTACK AND DEFENCE ARE THINGS DIFFERING IN KIND AND OF UNEQUAL FORCE. POLARITY IS, THEREFORE, NOT APPLICABLE TO THEM
17. THE EFFECT OF POLARITY IS OFTEN DESTROYED BY THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DEFENCE OVER THE ATTACK, AND THUS THE SUSPENSION OF ACTION IN WAR IS EXPLAINED
18 A SECOND GROUND CONSISTS IN THE IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES
19. FREQUENT PERIODS OF INACTION IN WAR REMOVE IT FURTHER FROM THE ABSOLUTE, AND MAKE IT STILL MORE A CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES
20. THEREFORE, THE ELEMENT OF CHANCE ONLY IS WANTING TO MAKE OF WAR A GAME, AND IN THAT ELEMENT IT IS LEAST OF ALL DEFICIENT
21. WAR IS A GAME BOTH OBJECTIVELY AND SUBJECTIVELY
22. HOW THIS ACCORDS BEST WITH THE HUMAN MIND IN GENERAL
23. WAR IS ALWAYS A SERIOUS MEANS FOR A SERIOUS OBJECT. ITS MORE PARTICULAR DEFINITION
24. WAR IS A MERE CONTINUATION OF POLICY BY OTHER MEANS
25. DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF WARS
26. THEY MAY ALL BE REGARDED AS POLITICAL ACTS
27. INFLUENCE OF THIS VIEW ON THE RIGHT UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY HISTORY, AND ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEORY
28. RESULT FOR THEORY
CHAPTER II. Ends and Means in War
CHAPTER III. The Genius for War
CHAPTER IV. Of Danger in War
CHAPTER V. Of Bodily Exertion in War
CHAPTER VI. Information in War
CHAPTER VII. Friction in War
CHAPTER VIII. Concluding Remarks, Book I
BOOK II. ON THE THEORY OF WAR
CHAPTER I. Branches of the Art of War
CHAPTER II. On the Theory of War
1. THE FIRST CONCEPTION OF THE “ART OF WAR” WAS MERELY THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
2. TRUE WAR FIRST APPEARS IN THE ART OF SIEGES
3. THEN TACTICS TRIED TO FIND ITS WAY IN THE SAME DIRECTION
4. THE REAL CONDUCT OF WAR ONLY MADE ITS APPEARANCE INCIDENTALLY AND INCOGNITO
5. REFLECTIONS ON MILITARY EVENTS BROUGHT ABOUT THE WANT OF A THEORY
6. ENDEAVOURS TO ESTABLISH A POSITIVE THEORY
7. LIMITATION TO MATERIAL OBJECTS
8. SUPERIORITY OF NUMBERS
9. VICTUALLING OF TROOPS
10. BASE
11. INTERIOR LINES
12. ALL THESE ATTEMPTS ARE OPEN TO OBJECTION
13. AS A RULE THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS
14. THE DIFFICULTY OF THEORY AS SOON AS MORAL QUANTITIES COME INTO CONSIDERATION
15. THE MORAL QUANTITIES MUST NOT BE EXCLUDED IN WAR
16. PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY OF A THEORY FOR THE CONDUCT OF WAR
17. FIRST SPECIALITY.—MORAL FORCES AND THEIR EFFECTS. (HOSTILE FEELING.)
18. THE IMPRESSIONS OF DANGER. (COURAGE.)
19. EXTENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF DANGER
20. OTHER POWERS OF FEELING
21. PECULIARITY OF MIND
22. FROM THE DIVERSITY IN MENTAL INDIVIDUALITIES ARISES THE DIVERSITY OF WAYS LEADING TO THE END
23. SECOND PECULIARITY.—LIVING REACTION
24. THIRD PECULIARITY.—UNCERTAINTY OF ALL DATA
25. POSITIVE THEORY IS IMPOSSIBLE
26. MEANS LEFT BY WHICH A THEORY IS POSSIBLE (THE DIFFICULTIES ARE NOT EVERYWHERE EQUALLY GREAT)
27. THEORY MUST BE OF THE NATURE OF OBSERVATIONS NOT OF DOCTRINE
28. BY THIS POINT OF VIEW THEORY BECOMES POSSIBLE, AND CEASES TO BE IN CONTRADICTION TO PRACTICE
29. THEORY THEREFORE CONSIDERS THE NATURE OF ENDS AND MEANS—ENDS AND MEANS IN TACTICS
30. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ALWAYS ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS
31. LOCALITY
32. TIME OF DAY
33. WEATHER
34. END AND MEANS IN STRATEGY
35. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ATTEND THE APPLICATION OF THE MEANS OF STRATEGY
36. THESE FORM NEW MEANS
37. STRATEGY DEDUCES ONLY FROM EXPERIENCE THE ENDS AND MEANS TO BE EXAMINED
38. HOW FAR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MEANS SHOULD BE CARRIED
39. GREAT SIMPLIFICATION OF THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIRED
40. THIS EXPLAINS THE RAPID GROWTH OF GREAT GENERALS, AND WHY A GENERAL IS NOT A MAN OF LEARNING
41. FORMER CONTRADICTIONS
42. ON THIS ACCOUNT ALL USE OF KNOWLEDGE WAS DENIED, AND EVERYTHING ASCRIBED TO NATURAL TALENTS
43. THE KNOWLEDGE MUST BE MADE SUITABLE TO THE POSITION
44. THE KNOWLEDGE IN WAR IS VERY SIMPLE, BUT NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, VERY EASY
45. OF THE NATURE OF THIS KNOWLEDGE
46. SCIENCE MUST BECOME ART
CHAPTER III. Art or Science of War
1.—USAGE STILL UNSETTLED (POWER AND KNOWLEDGE. SCIENCE WHEN MERE KNOWING; ART, WHEN DOING, IS THE OBJECT.)
2. DIFFICULTY OF SEPARATING PERCEPTION FROM JUDGMENT (ART OF WAR.)
3. WAR IS PART OF THE INTERCOURSE OF THE HUMAN RACE
4. DIFFERENCE
CHAPTER IV. Methodicism
CHAPTER V. Criticism
CHAPTER VI. On Examples
BOOK III. OF STRATEGY IN GENERAL
CHAPTER I. Strategy
OBSERVATION
1. POSSIBLE COMBATS ARE ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR RESULTS TO BE LOOKED UPON AS REAL ONES
2. TWOFOLD OBJECT OF THE COMBAT
3. EXAMPLE
4. WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER THINGS
CHAPTER II. Elements of Strategy
CHAPTER III. Moral Forces
CHAPTER IV. The Chief Moral Powers
CHAPTER V. Military Virtue of an Army
CHAPTER VI. Boldness
CHAPTER VII. Perseverance
CHAPTER VIII. Superiority of Numbers
CHAPTER IX. The Surprise
CHAPTER X. Stratagem
CHAPTER XI. Assembly of Forces in Space
CHAPTER XII. Assembly of Forces in Time
CHAPTER XIII. Strategic Reserve
CHAPTER XIV. Economy of Forces
CHAPTER XV. Geometrical Element
CHAPTER XVI. On the Suspension of the Act in War
CHAPTER XVII. On the Character of Modern War
CHAPTER XVIII. Tension and Rest
The Dynamic Law of War
BOOK IV. THE COMBAT
CHAPTER I. Introductory
CHAPTER II. Character of a Modern Battle
CHAPTER III. The Combat in General
CHAPTER IV. The Combat in General (continuation)
CHAPTER V. On the Signification of the Combat
CHAPTER VI. Duration of Combat
CHAPTER VII. Decision of the Combat
CHAPTER VIII. Mutual Understanding as to a Battle
CHAPTER IX. The Battle 39
ITS DECISION
CHAPTER X. Effects of Victory
CHAPTER XI. The Use of the Battle
CHAPTER XII. Strategic Means of Utilising Victory
CHAPTER XIII. Retreat After a Lost Battle
CHAPTER XIV. Night Fighting
BOOK V. MILITARY FORCES
CHAPTER I. General Scheme
CHAPTER II. Theatre of War, Army, Campaign
1.—Theatre of War
2.—Army
3.—Campaign
CHAPTER III. Relation of Power
CHAPTER IV. Relation of the Three Arms
CHAPTER V. Order of Battle of an Army
1.—Division
2.—Combination of Arms
3.—The Disposition
CHAPTER VI. General Disposition of an Army
CHAPTER VII. Advanced Guard and Out-Posts
CHAPTER VIII. Mode of Action of Advanced Corps
CHAPTER IX. Camps
CHAPTER X. Marches
CHAPTER XI. Marches (Continued)
CHAPTER XII. Marches (continued)
CHAPTER XIII. Cantonments
CHAPTER XIV. Subsistence
1.—Living on the inhabitants, or on the community, which is the same thing
2.—Subsistence through exactions enforced by the troops themselves
3.—By regular requisitions
4.—Subsistence from Magazines
CHAPTER XV. Base of Operations
CHAPTER XVI. Lines of Communication
CHAPTER XVII. On Country and Ground
CHAPTER XVIII. Command of Ground
BOOK VI. DEFENCE
CHAPTER I. Offence and Defence
1.—Conception of Defence
2.—Advantages of the Defensive
CHAPTER II. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Tactics
CHAPTER III. The Relations of the Offensive and Defensive to Each Other in Strategy
CHAPTER IV. Convergence of Attack and Divergence of Defence
CHAPTER V. Character of the Strategic Defensive
CHAPTER VI. Extent of the Means of Defence
1.—Landwehr (Militia)
2.—Fortresses
3.—The People
4.—The National Armament,
5.—Allies
CHAPTER VII. Mutual Action and Reaction of Attack and Defence
CHAPTER VIII. Methods of Resistance
CHAPTER IX. Defensive Battle
CHAPTER X. Fortresses
CHAPTER XI. Fortresses (Continued)
CHAPTER XII. Defensive Position
CHAPTER XIII. Strong Positions and Entrenched Camps
CHAPTER XIV. Flank Positions
CHAPTER XV. Defence of Mountains
CHAPTER XVI. Defence of Mountains (Continued)
1. A mountain system as a battle-field
2. The influence of mountains on other parts of the country
3. Mountains considered in their aspect of a strategic barrier
4. Mountains in their relation to the provisioning of an army
CHAPTER XVII. Defence of Mountains (continued)
CHAPTER XVIII. Defence of Streams and Rivers
CHAPTER XIX. Defence of Streams and Rivers (continued)
CHAPTER XX. A. Defence of Swamps
B. Inundations
CHAPTER XXI. Defence of Forests
CHAPTER XX. The Cordon
CHAPTER XXIII. Key to the Country
CHAPTER XXIV. Operating Against a Flank
CHAPTER XXV. Retreat into the Interior of the Country
CHAPTER XXVI. Arming the Nation
CHAPTER XXVII. Defence of a Theatre of War
CHAPTER XXVIII. Defence of a Theatre of War—(continued)
CHAPTER XXIX. Defence of a Theatre of War (continued) Successive Resistance
CHAPTER XXX. Defence of a Theatre of War (continued) When no Decision is Sought for
SKETCHES FOR BOOK VII. THE ATTACK
CHAPTER I. The Attack in Relation to the Defence
CHAPTER II. Nature of the Strategical Attack
CHAPTER III. Of the Objects of Strategical Attack
CHAPTER IV. Decreasing Force of the Attack
CHAPTER V. Culminating Point of the Attack
CHAPTER VI. Destruction of the Enemy’s Armies
CHAPTER VII. The Offensive Battle
CHAPTER VIII. Passage of Rivers
CHAPTER IX. Attack on Defensive Positions
CHAPTER X. Attack on an Entrenched Camp
CHAPTER XI. Attack on a Mountain
CHAPTER XII. Attack on Cordon Lines
CHAPTER XIII. Manœuvring
CHAPTER XIV. Attack on Morasses, Inundations, Woods
CHAPTER XV. Attack on a Theatre of War with the View to a Decision
CHAPTER XVI. Attack on a Theatre of War without the View to a Great Decision
CHAPTER XVII. Attack on Fortresses
CHAPTER XVIII. Attack on Convoys
CHAPTER XIX. Attack on the Enemy’s Army in its Cantonments
CHAPTER XX. Diversion
CHAPTER XXI. Invasion
CHAPTER XXII. On the Culminating Point of Victory 59
SKETCHES FOR BOOK VIII. PLAN OF WAR
CHAPTER I. Introduction
CHAPTER II. Absolute and Real War
CHAPTER III. A. Interdependence of the Parts in War
B. On the Magnitude of the Object of the War, and the Efforts to be Made
CHAPTER IV. Ends in War More Precisely Defined. Overthrow of the Enemy
CHAPTER V. Ends in War More Precisely Defined (continued) Limited Object
CHAPTER VI. A. Influence of the Political Object on the Military Object
B. War as an Instrument of Policy
CHAPTER VII. Limited Object—Offensive War
CHAPTER VIII. Limited Object—Defence
CHAPTER IX. Plan of War when the Destruction of the Enemy is the Object
