The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945

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David S. Nasca. The Emergence of American Amphibious Warfare, 1898–1945

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Titles in the Series

Progressives in Navy Blue: Maritime Strategy, American Empire, and the Transformation of U.S. Naval Identity, 1873–1898

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Upon conclusion of the war with Spain, the American political and military leadership understood that they only possessed half of the power projection capabilities required to be a major world power for the twentieth century. Based on the performance of the U.S. Navy, America understood that its efforts at modernization, training, and expanding its naval forces had paid dividends. Spanish naval power was completely crushed in less than three months because the United States invested the time and energy for the best guns and armor, powerful steam engines, and highly trained naval personnel. However, the ground aspect of the American military was missing, based on the ad hoc performance in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. While the deployment of Soldiers and Marines ashore was successful because of their grit and determination against Spanish ground forces, the American military clearly lacked the ability to efficiently execute amphibious warfare.

American forces were critically delayed because of their haphazard landing in the vicinity of Santiago, therefore giving the Spanish defenders time to rally and set up strong defensive positions to prevent the quick capture of Cuba’s capital. However, the U.S. Army would have faced a much worse situation if the Spanish defenders had attacked the American ground forces while they were assembling and preparing for the big push into Cuba’s capital. The lack of specialized troop transports built for quickly loading and unloading ground forces and logistical support was obvious; but in addition, little coordinated naval gunfire was available for troops on the beach, and no communication or unity of command existed between the landing force and the naval squadron tasked to supervise the debarkation. A. B. Feuer points out:

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