Counterterrorism and the State
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Dorle Hellmuth argues that the nature of state responses to terrorism is shaped by the particular governmental framework and process within which counterterrorism measures are decided. Using four Western democracies as case studies, Hellmuth measures effects of government structures on counterterrorism decision-making processes and outcomes. In doing so, she examines how similar or different the responses have been in four parliamentary and presidential systems, and clears up common misperceptions about domestic counterterrorism efforts on both sides of the Atlantic. Each of Hellmuth's four case studies reviews the official constitutional powers and informal relationships between executive and legislative branches, outlines decision-making processes leading to counterterrorism policies and reforms since 9/11, and summarizes how structural factors influenced those processes. By measuring and comparing structural effects, and by going beyond the common U.S. and British focus to include counterterrorism decision-making in Germany and France, Hellmuth shows that there are important similarities between those governments designed to constrain executive power (Germany and the United States) and those that facilitate executive power (France and Great Britain). Her analysis further demonstrates that in presidential systems executive and legislative branches have incentives to produce a steady stream of reforms, that presidents have more opportunities than leaders of parliamentary systems to expand their unilateral powers during times of crisis, and that choices designed to strengthen presidential positions influence the direction, nature, and scope of institutional reform. Understanding the nature, scope, and trends of national decision-making processes in Western democracies, Hellmuth contends, is imperative to identifying new mechanisms for containing transnational terrorist networks beyond national borders.
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Counterterrorism and the State
WESTERN RESPONSES TO 9/11
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On May 1, 2003, TTIC started operating under former CIA Deputy Executive Director John Brennan. Two months later, the joint venture had built a cadre of 100 analysts and liaison officials, one-third of its final capacity. Very quickly it became clear that TTIC would either carry out many of the functions intended for DHS or overlap with DHS’s IAIP in the area of threat-related analysis. TTIC was designed as the new focal point for terrorist threat analysis. As an interagency joint venture, it was supposed to ensure “rapid and unfettered sharing of relevant information across departmental lines … collaps[ing] bureaucratic barriers and clos[ing] inter-jurisdictional seams.”211 TTIC would also be responsible for compiling daily all-source terrorist threat assessments for the president and other members of the senior leadership—for the first time, the president would be able to rely on a single stream of intelligence on terrorism.
Lawmakers viewed the decision to create TTIC outside DHS as a violation of the new department’s statutory mandate. From a legislative point of view, DHS was created in part as an “intelligence fusion center” with the core responsibility of consolidating, analyzing and acting on all terrorist-related threat information.212 Placing the information fusion center outside the department seemed to violate a core purpose for creating it in the first place.213 Members of Congress also worried that the center had created an accountability vacuum. While TTIC as a whole reported to the CIA director, its various components continued to report to their respective agencies and departments. Asked about who would take responsibility “when some bit of intelligence is not properly viewed or vetted for what it is and something bad happens as a result,” TTIC Director John Brennan could only suggest that it would be “very case-specific.”214 Some lawmakers also feared that the work of the new center could violate the law that prohibits the CIA from law enforcement or internal security functions, since TTIC would also be responsible for the analysis of domestically collected information—a concern magnified by TTIC’s organizational affiliation with and physical proximity to the CIA.215
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