Cybersecurity and Third-Party Risk
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Оглавление
Gregory C. Rasner. Cybersecurity and Third-Party Risk
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Illustrations
Guide
Pages
Cybersecurity and Third‐Party Risk. Third Party Threat Hunting
Introduction
Who Will Benefit Most from This Book
Looking Ahead in This Book
Special Features
Chapter 1 What Is the Risk?
The SolarWinds Supply‐Chain Attack
The VGCA Supply‐Chain Attack
The Zyxel Backdoor Attack
Zyxel Patch Release
Other Supply‐Chain Attacks
Problem Scope
Compliance Does Not Equal Security
Third‐Party Breach Examples
Third‐Party Risk Management
Cybersecurity and Third‐Party Risk
The Morris Worm
Business or Technology Risk and Cybersecurity Risk
Cybersecurity Third‐Party Risk as a Force Multiplier
Conclusion
Chapter 2 Cybersecurity Basics
Cybersecurity Basics for Third‐Party Risk
Exposed Credentials
Cybersecurity Frameworks
Due Care and Due Diligence
Internal Security Standards versus External Security Standards
Cybercrime and Cybersecurity
Types of Cyberattacks
Analysis of a Breach
The Third‐Party Breach Timeline: Target
Inside Look: Home Depot Breach
Author's Note: Applies to Any Size
Conclusion
Chapter 3 What the COVID‐19 Pandemic Did to Cybersecurity and Third‐Party Risk
The Pandemic Shutdown
Timeline of the Pandemic Impact on Cybersecurity
Post‐Pandemic Changes and Trends
Working from Home and Cybersecurity
“But we have a firewall… .”
Regulated Industries
An Inside Look: P&N Bank
SolarWinds Attack Update
Conclusion
Chapter 4 Third‐Party Risk Management
Data Security Is Not Data Privacy
Third‐Party Risk Management Frameworks
ISO 27036:2013+
NIST 800‐SP
NIST 800‐161 Revision 1: Upcoming Revision
NISTIR 8272 Impact Analysis Tool for Interdependent Cyber Supply‐Chain Risks
Acquisition Security Framework (ASF)
The Cybersecurity and Third‐Party Risk Program Management
Kristina Conglomerate (KC) Enterprises
KC Enterprises' Cyber Third‐Party Risk Program
Scope
Three (or Four) Lines of Defense for Risk Management
Policy Statement and Objectives
Cybersecurity Program
Classification of Information Assets
Incident Response
Awareness and Training
Third‐Party Security and Risk
Definition and Scope
Objectives
Governance
Inside Look: Marriott
Conclusion
Chapter 5 Onboarding Due Diligence
Intake
Data Privacy
Cybersecurity
Amount of Data
Country Risk and Locations
Connectivity
Data Transfer
Data Location
Service‐Level Agreement or Recovery Time Objective
Fourth Parties
Software Security
KC Enterprises Intake/Inherent Risk Cybersecurity Questionnaire
Cybersecurity in Request for Proposals
Data Location
Development
Identity and Access Management
Encryption
Intrusion Detection/Prevention System
Antivirus and Malware
Data Segregation
Data Loss Prevention
Notification
Security Audits
Cybersecurity Third‐Party Intake
Data Security Intake Due Diligence
Production Data in Lower‐Level Environments
Next Steps
Ways to Become More Efficient
Systems and Organization Controls Reports
Chargebacks
Go‐Live Production Reviews
Connectivity Cyber Reviews
Inside Look: Ticketmaster and Fourth Parties
Conclusion
Chapter 6 Ongoing Due Diligence
Low‐Risk Vendor Ongoing Due Diligence
Moderate‐Risk Vendor Ongoing Due Diligence
High‐Risk Vendor Ongoing Due Diligence
“Too Big to Care”
A Note on Phishing
Intake and Ongoing Cybersecurity Personnel
Ransomware: A History and Future
Asset Management
Vulnerability and Patch Management
802.1x or Network Access Control (NAC)
Inside Look: GE Breach
Conclusion
Chapter 7 On‐site Due Diligence
On‐site Security Assessment
Scheduling Phase
Investigation Phase
Assessment Phase
On‐site Questionnaire
Reporting Phase
Remediation Phase
Virtual On‐site Assessments
On‐site Cybersecurity Personnel
On‐site Due Diligence and the Intake Process
Vendors Are Partners
Consortiums and Due Diligence
Conclusion
Chapter 8 Continuous Monitoring
What Is Continuous Monitoring?
Vendor Security‐Rating Tools
Installation of Malware
Exposure of Sensitive Information
Denial of Service
Legal Trouble
Much Easier Attacks
The Discovery Phase
The Investigation Phase
The Reporting and Closure Phases
Inside Look: Health Share of Oregon's Breach
Enhanced Continuous Monitoring
Software Vulnerabilities/Patching Cadence
Fourth‐Party Risk
Data Location
Connectivity Security
Production Deployment
Continuous Monitoring Cybersecurity Personnel
Third‐Party Breaches and the Incident Process
Third‐Party Incident Management
Inside Look: Uber's Delayed Data Breach Reporting
Inside Look: Nuance Breach
Conclusion
Chapter 9 Offboarding
Access to Systems, Data, and Facilities
Physical Access
Return of Equipment
Contract Deliverables and Ongoing Security
Update the Vendor Profile
Log Retention
Inside Look: Morgan Stanley Decommissioning Process Misses
Inside Look: Data Sanitization
Conclusion
Chapter 10 Securing the Cloud
Why Is the Cloud So Risky?
Introduction to NIST Service Models
Author's Note
Vendor Cloud Security Reviews
The Shared Responsibility Model
Inside Look: Cloud Controls Matrix by the Cloud Security Alliance
Security Advisor Reports as Patterns
Increased Oversight of Cloud and Cybersecurity Risks by Regulators and Governments
Inside Look: The Capital One Breach
Conclusion
Chapter 11 Cybersecurity and Legal Protections
Legal Terms and Protections
About Negotiations and Conflict
Cybersecurity Terms and Conditions
Offshore Terms and Conditions
Hosted/Cloud Terms and Conditions
Data Center Tiers
Privacy Terms and Conditions
A Note on Risk Acceptances
Inside Look: Heritage Valley Health vs. Nuance
Conclusion
Chapter 12 Software Due Diligence
The Secure Software Development Lifecycle
Lessons from SolarWinds and Critical Software
Inside Look: Juniper
On‐Premises Software
Cloud Software
Open Web Application Security Project Explained
OWASP Top 10
OWASP Web Security Testing Guide
Open Source Software
Software Composition Analysis
Inside Look: Heartbleed
Mobile Software
Testing Mobile Applications
Code Storage
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures Explained
Conclusion
Chapter 13 Network Due Diligence
Third‐Party Connections
Personnel Physical Security
Hardware Security
Software Security
Out‐of‐Band Security
Cloud Connections
Vendor Connectivity Lifecycle Management
Zero Trust for Third Parties
Internet of Things and Third Parties
Trusted Platform Module and Secure Boot
Inside Look: The Target Breach (2013)
Conclusion
Chapter 14 Offshore Third‐Party Cybersecurity Risk
Onboarding Offshore Vendors
Ongoing Due Diligence for Offshore Vendors
Physical Security
Offboarding Due Diligence for Offshore Vendors
Inside Look: A Reminder on Country Risk
Country Risk
KC's Country Risk
Conclusion
Chapter 15 Transform to Predictive
The Data
Vendor Records
Due Diligence Records
Contract Language
Risk Acceptances
Continuous Monitoring
Enhanced Continuous Monitoring
How Data Is Stored
Level Set
A Mature to Predictive Approach
The Predictive Approach at KC Enterprises
Use Case #1: Early Intervention
Use Case #2: Red Vendors
Use Case #3: Reporting
Conclusion
Chapter 16 Conclusion
Advanced Persistent Threats Are the New Danger
Cybersecurity Third‐Party Risk
Index
(ISC)2®
About the Author
About the Technical Editor
Acknowledgments
Foreword
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
Отрывок из книги
Gregory C. Rasner
This book is designed to provide a detailed look into the problems and risks, then give specific examples of how to create a robust and active Cybersecurity Third‐Party Risk Management program. It begins by covering the basics of the due diligence processes and the vendor lifecycle, with models and illustrations on how to create these basic but necessary steps. Then it goes more in depth about the next parts in the creation of a mature program: cyber legal language, offshore vendors, connectivity security, software security, and use of a predictive reporting dashboard.
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Cybersecurity as a field is also very young, though it is older than TPRM. Cybersecurity is often thought to have begun after the first cyberattack was thwarted in 1986 in the Soviet Union, when Marcus Hess hacked into 400 military servers and the Pentagon. Intending to sell the information to the KGB, Hess was foiled by American Clifford Stoll.
In the 1970s, several attacks occurred on the early internet. For example, Bob Thomas created the first computer worm named Creeper, which traveled between early APRANET terminals with the message “I'M THE CREEPER: CATCH ME IF YOU CAN.” Also, in the same decade, Ray Tomlinson created the worm, Reaper, the first antivirus software that could find copies of Creeper and delete them. However, the one that finally illustrated the need for information security at the doorstep of the novice IT industry was the Morris Worm.
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