A Companion to Chomsky
Реклама. ООО «ЛитРес», ИНН: 7719571260.
Оглавление
Группа авторов. A Companion to Chomsky
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Illustrations
Guide
Pages
Blackwell Companions to Philosophy
A Companion to Chomsky
Notes on Contributors
Acknowledgments
1 Synoptic Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Part I: Historical Development of Linguistics
1.3 Part II: Contemporary Issues in Syntax
1.4 Part III: Comparisons with Other Frameworks
1.5 Part IV: Processing and Acquisition
1.6 Part V: Semantics, Pragmatics, and Philosophy of Language
1.7 Part VI: Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind
1.8 Part VIII: Methodological and Other Explanatory Issues
Endnotes
References
2 Biographical Sketch
Endnote
References
3 From the Origins of Government and Binding to the Current State of Minimalism1
3.1 Setting the Scene
3.2 Some Context: The Emerging Idea of Principles and Parameters
3.3 Principles and Parameters: Solving Plato's Problem
3.4 Government and Binding
3.5 The Minimalist Program: Untying the Descriptive vs. Explanatory Knot
3.6 Current Tendencies
3.6.1 Features and the Hierarchy of Features
3.6.2 The Nature of Phrase Structure Representations: Labels and Labeling
3.6.3 Extensions of the Theory: Multilingualism
3.7 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
4 The Enduring Discoveries of Generative Syntax
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Shaping the Research Methodology of Generative Linguistics
4.3 Generative Syntax Through the Lens of Nonlocal Dependencies
4.3.1 Nonlocal Dependencies and Hierarchical Structure
4.3.2 A Typology of Nonlocal Dependencies
4.3.3 A Typology of Gaps
4.3.4 Section Summary
4.4 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
5 The Chomsky Hierarchy1
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Rewriting Grammars
5.2.1 Unrestricted Rewriting Grammars
5.2.2 Restrictions on Grammars
5.3 Type 3 Grammars: Finite State Grammars
5.4 Type 2 Grammars: Context‐Free Grammars
5.5 Beyond Context‐Free Grammars
5.6 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
6 Naturalism, Internalism, and Nativism: What The Legacy of The Sound Pattern of EnglishShould Be
6.1 Basics of SPE Phonology
6.2 Internalism in Phonology
6.3 Anti‐Internalism and Rejection of Nativism
6.4 What Is Innate?
6.5 Naturalism in Phonology
6.6 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
7 Language as a Branch of Psychology: Chomsky and Cognitive Science1
7.1 Background. 7.1.1 Graduate School
7.1.2 What Do They Know and When Do They Know It?
7.2 A First Look at the Input to the Child: Non‐Effects of Motherese
7.3 Acquisition in the Face of Input Deprivation
7.3.1 Deaf Children
7.3.2 Blind Children
7.3.3 Nicaraguan Sign Language: No Linguistic Input
7.4 Syntactic Bootstrapping: Verbs of a Feather Flock Together
7.10 Thoughts about the Future
7.11 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
8 The Architecture of the Computation1
8.1 The Computational Task
8.2 Computation and Syntax
8.3 A Minimalist Architecture
8.4 Summary
Endnote
References
9 Merge and Features: The Engine of Syntax1
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Merge
9.2.1 The Necessity of Merge
9.2.2 Movement as Internal Merge
9.2.3 The Central Role of Merge
9.2.4 Free Merge and Triggered Merge
9.3 Features. 9.3.1 Features in Syntax
9.3.2 Agree
9.3.3 Labels
9.4 Feature Movement
9.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
10 On Chomsky's Legacy in the Study of Linguistic Diversity
10.1 Introduction
10.2 The “Neglect” Period of Aspects
10.3 The “Limiting” Period of LGB
10.4 The “Denying” Phase of The Minimalist Program
References
11 Parameters and Linguistic Variation
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Parameters: An Evolving Notion
11.3 Word Order Variation. 11.3.1 Head‐Complement Orders
11.3.2 Spec‐Head Orders and Universal 20
11.3.3 The Final‐over‐Final Condition
11.4 Argument Expression
11.5 Conclusions and Outlook
Endnotes
References
Chapter 12 Constraints on Grammatical Dependencies
12.1 Overview
12.2 Constraints
12.3 Constraints That Do Not Meet the Requirements. 12.3.1 Island Conditions
12.3.2 The Empty Category Principle
12.4 Constraints That Meet the Requirements
12.4.1 Relativized Locality Constraints. 12.4.1.1 The A‐over‐A Principle
12.4.1.2 The Superiority Condition
12.4.2 Rigid Locality Constraints
12.4.2.1 The Strict Cycle Condition
12.4.2.2 The Phase Impenetrability Condition
Endnotes
References
13 Chomsky's Influence on Historical Linguistics: From Universal Grammar to Third Factors
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Generative Grammar and Historical Linguistics
13.3 From Principles and Parameters to Third Factors
13.4 Change Due to Labeling Pressure
13.5 Change Due to Indeterminacy
13.6 Conclusions
Endnotes
References
14 Second Language Acquisition
14.1 Introduction
14.2 Poverty of the Stimulus and UG Parameters
14.3 Subjacency, the Empty Category Principle, and Structure Preservation
14.4 The Limits of the Input
14.5 Conclusions
Endnotes
References
15 Multilingualism and Chomsky's Generative Grammar
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Bilingualism and Parameter Setting
15.3 Multilingualism and the I‐language/E‐language Debate
15.4 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
16 The View from Declarative Syntax1
16.1 Introduction
16.2 Factoring Apart Structure and Information. 16.2.1 The Legacy of EST: A Core Set of Generalizations
16.2.1.1 Structures and Operations
16.2.1.2 Rules and Representations
16.2.2 Dimensions of Analysis
16.3 Design Features of a Grammatical Framework
16.3.1 Levels of Adequacy
16.3.2 Syntactic Structures and Syntactic Properties
16.4 Salient Properties
16.4.1 Lexicalist
16.4.2 Features
16.4.2.1 The Representation of Grammatical Information
16.4.2.2 Feature Theory
16.4.2.3 The Role of Features in Grammatical Analysis
16.4.3 Structures. 16.4.3.1 Heads and Headed Structures
16.4.3.2 Phrase Structures Are Not Isomorphic to Clausal Information
16.5 Conclusion
Endnote
References
17 How Statistical Learning Can Play Well with Universal Grammar
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Statistical Learning Mechanisms in Small Humans
17.2.1 Some Ways of Doing Statistical Learning. 17.2.1.1 Reinforcement Learning
17.2.1.2 The Tolerance and Sufficiency Principles
17.2.1.3 Bayesian Inference
17.2.2 Why Statistical Learning in Small Humans Shouldn't Alarm People Who Like UG
17.3 When Statistical Learning Complements UG
17.4 When Statistical Learning Refines What's in UG
17.4.1 A Bias for the Subset Hypothesis
17.4.2 Linguistic Knowledge for Syntactic Islands
17.5 Concluding Thoughts
Endnote
References
18 Chomsky and Usage‐Based Linguistics1
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Usage‐Based Linguistics
18.2.1 Some Tenets of Usage‐Based Linguistics
18.2.2 Usage‐Based Linguistics and Functional Linguistics
18.3 Chomsky and Usage‐Based Linguistics: The Short Story
18.4 Chomsky and Usage‐Based Linguistics: The Long Story
18.4.1 The Explananda of Linguistic Theory
18.4.2 Grammar Design and Architecture
18.4.3 Semantics
18.4.4 Language Acquisition and Innately Provided Linguistic Constructs
18.4.5 Functional Explanation
18.4.6 Sources of Data
18.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
19 Sentence Processing and Syntactic Theory
19.1 Introduction
19.2 Ambiguity Resolution and Reanalysis
19.3 Filler‐Gap Dependency Processing
19.4 Anaphoric Relations
19.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
20 Neuroscience and Syntax
20.1 Introduction
20.2 Language as a Biological System
20.3 The Early Days: Neuropsychological Evidence for Syntax in the Brain
20.4 Functional Imaging of Syntactic Computations
20.5 Functional and Structural Connections of the Syntactic Network
20.6 Ontogeny
20.7 Phylogeny
20.8 Conclusion
Conflicts of Interest
Acknowledgments
Endnote
References
21 Universal Grammar and Language Acquisition
21.1 Introduction
21.2 Principle C
21.3 Logical Form
21.4 Principle C in Child Language
21.5 Declarative Sentences
21.5.1 Cleft Sentences
21.5.2 Italian Sentences with Null Pronouns and Quantificational NPs
21.5.3 Crossover Questions
21.5.4 Discourse Sequences
21.6 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
22 Chomsky and Signed Languages
22.1 Introduction and History
22.2 Syntax and Modularity
22.3 Acquisition and Emergence
22.4 Consequences and Implications
References
23 Atypical Acquisition1
23.1 Introduction
23.2 Atypical Acquisition 1: Learners Deprived of Language Input
23.3 Atypical Acquisition 2: Learners with Neuro Atypical Profiles
23.4 Conclusions
Endnotes
References
24 Chomsky and the Analytical Tradition
24.1 Introduction
24.2 Formal Beginnings
24.3 Chomsky and Formality
24.4 Objectivity, Analysis, and Explanation
24.5 No Homeric Struggle
Endnotes
References
25 Chomsky on Meaning and Reference
25.1 Introduction
25.2 Data: Ambiguity and Absence
25.3 Strings and Constituents
25.4 Lexical Meanings without Classical Extensions
25.5 Complexities of Use
Endnotes
References
26 Chomsky on Semantics1
26.1 Skepticism and Autonomy
26.2 Syntax‐Semantics Interface
26.3 Chomskian Semantics?
26.4 Reference and Truth Conditions
26.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
27 Chomsky and Pragmatics1
27.1 Introduction
27.2 Chomsky's Importance for Pragmatics as Cognitive Science
27.3 Chomsky's Views on Pragmatics
27.3.1 Pragmatic Competence
27.3.2 The Creative Aspect of Language Use
27.3.3 Against Pragmatic Theory
27.4 Critique of Chomsky's Conception of Pragmatics. 27.4.1 The Aims and Scope of Pragmatics
27.4.2 What Might a Theory of Ostensive Communication Look Like?
27.5 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
28 Nativism
28.1 Introduction
28.2 Plato's Problem, or Brute Biology?
28.3 Innate and Learned!
28.4 Statistical Approaches
28.4.1 Goodman's Problem of “Grue” (Projection Nativism)
28.4.2 Bayesianism and “Predicate Nativism”
28.4.3 Modal Nativism
28.5 Quine's Problem of Superficialism and a Solution
28.6 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
29 The Deep Forces That Shape Language and the Poverty of the Stimulus
29.1 Introduction
29.2 The Amalgamation of Linguistic Phenomena
29.2.1 any
29.2.2 How any and or Are Related
29.2.3 Licensing and Scope
29.3 Questions and Statements
29.4 Cross‐Linguistic Evidence
29.5 The Ubiquity of Evidence
29.6 When Children Ignore the Primary Linguistic Data
29.7 Conclusion
Endnote
References
30 Chomsky on the Evolution of the Language Faculty: Presentation and Perspectives for Further Research
30.1 Introduction
30.2 The Faculty of Language: Then and Now
30.3 Language Is Not Primarily a Tool for Communication
30.3.1 Language Uniqueness
30.3.2 Language as a Tool for Thought
30.3.3 Affordances
30.4 Conclusion: Extending the FLN
Endnotes
References
31 Chomsky and Intentionality
31.1 Introduction
31.2 Intentionality
31.3 Chomsky's (Apparent) Intentionalism
31.4 Chomsky's Censure of the Intentional
31.5 Only an Apparent Inconsistency?
31.6 The Language Faculty Alone
31.7 Two Problems and Their Potential Resolution
31.8 The Need of Intentionality as a Common Coin
31.9 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
32 The Mind–Body Relation: Problem, Mystery, or What?
Endnotes
References
33 Chomsky's “Galilean” Explanatory Style1
33.1 Introduction
33.2 Idealization in the Sciences
33.2.1 Science as Quest for Underlying Structure
33.2.2 Superficial Generalizations and Explanatory Principles
33.2.3 Relation between Data and Theory
33.3 How the Galilean Style Works in Generative Linguistics
33.4 Criticisms of the Galilean Style in Linguistics
Endnotes
References
34 Chomsky and Fodor on Modularity1
34.1 Introduction: Conceptions of Modularity
34.2 The Two Programs. 34.2.1 Fodorian Modules: Encapsulated Processing Units
34.2.2 Chomsky: Competence Modules, Analytic Modules, and Mental Organs
34.2.3 Comparison of Chomsky's and Fodor's views
34.3 Evidence. 34.3.1 Examples
34.3.2 Alternatives
34.4 Conclusion
Endnotes
References
35 Linguistic Judgments as Evidence
35.1 Introduction
35.2 What They Are
35.3 Objections to Judgment Data
35.4 The Future of Judgment Data
Endnotes
References
36 Chomsky's Problem/Mystery Distinction
36.1 Introduction
36.2 What Mysteries Are Not
36.3 An Analogy with Language
36.4 Inductive Comfort
36.5 We Are Not Angels
36.6 Convergence
36.7 Conclusion
References
37 Knowledge, Morality, and Hope: The Social Thought of Noam Chomsky
37.1 What Can We Know? Rationalism Romanticized
37.1.1 Language and Human Nature
37.2 What Ought We to Do?
37.2.1 Conceptions of the State and Social Order
37.2.2 The Weaknesses of Chomsky's Anarchism
37.3 What, If Anything, May We Hope For?
37.4 Expanding the Domain of Freedom
Endnotes
References
38 Reflections
Endnotes
References
Author Index
Subject Index
WILEY END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT
Отрывок из книги
This outstanding student reference series offers a comprehensive and authoritative survey of philosophy as a whole. Written by today's leading philosophers, each volume provides lucid and engaging coverage of the key figures, terms, topics, and problems of the field. Taken together, the volumes provide the ideal basis for course use, representing an unparalleled work of reference for students and specialists alike. For the full list of series titles, please visit wiley.com.
Artemis Alexiadou is a Professor of English Linguistics at the Humboldt University in Berlin and Vice‐Director of the Leibniz‐Centre General Linguistics (ZAS). She has published on the syntax of noun phrases and nominalization, transitivity alternations, word order variation, Case and the EPP, and language mixing.
.....
Paul Pietroski's Chapter 25 explains in some detail the centrality to generative grammar of accounting for different readings in terms of underlying structures (discussed above). He also sets out some of the currents in modern philosophy of language that Chomsky opposes, in particular the truth‐conditional, referential conception of linguistic meaning found in the work of Donald Davidson and David Lewis, and Hilary Putnam's semantic externalism. He explains Chomsky's challenges to these views and shows how they point the way to an alternative, internalist conception of meaning.
In Chapter 26, Michael Glanzberg explores the influence that Chomsky has had on natural language semantics. He explains the extent and the specific targets of Chomsky's skepticism about semantics and the related issue of whether syntax is in some important sense ‘autonomous’ of semantics. He notes that much of the leading research on truth‐conditional semantics is generativist and indebted to Chomsky's methodology in syntax. But he goes on to explain Chomsky's reasons for skepticism about the foundations of such work, which seems to him to be committed to the existence of referents of words such as foible and average family, as when we talk about “the foibles of the average family.” Chomsky's point is not that it's impossible to devise workarounds for such problems, but that they suggest that, as we've already noted, the mechanisms of language in abstraction from its use don't involve reference, so linguistic semantics should be recast. Glanzberg also discusses what Chomsky sees as a more productive line of enquiry: the study of features within the I‐language, which both have syntactic effects and encode aspects of meaning. Chomsky's suggestions here have helped to foster the now thriving field of lexical semantics.10
.....