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Группа авторов. Bioethics
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Illustrations
Guide
Pages
BLACKWELL PHILOSOPHY ANTHOLOGIES
Bioethics. An Anthology
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Notes
Introduction
1 Abortion and Infanticide
I Abortion and Infanticide
II Terminology: “Person” versus “Human Being”
III The Basic Issue: When is a Member of the Species Homo sapiens a Person?
IV Some Critical Comments on Alternative Proposals
V Refutation of the Conservative Position
VI Summary and Conclusions
Notes
2 A Defense of Abortion
Notes
3 The Wrong of Abortion
Embryos and Fetuses are Complete (though Immature) Human Beings
No‐Person Arguments: The Dualist Version
No‐Person Arguments: The Evaluative Version
The Argument that Abortion is Justified as Non‐intentional Killing
References
Further reading
Notes
4 Why Abortion is Immoral
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Notes
Introduction
Assisted Reproduction
Prenatal Screening, Sex Selection, and Cloning
5 The McCaughey Septuplets God's Will or Human Choice?1
Notes
6 The Meaning of Synthetic Gametes for Gay and Lesbian People and Bioethics Too
Controversial Parenthood
Protecting Children from Some Possible Parents
Conclusions
References
7 Rights, Interests, and Possible People
Notes
8 Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having Children Be Immoral?
Huntington’s Disease
Possible Children and Potential Parents
Notes
9 Sex Selection and Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis
Background
The General Ethical Debate
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Sex Selection: Joining the Particular Issues
Recommendations
10 Sex Selection and Preimplantation Diagnosis: A Response to the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Reproductive Medicine
Introduction
References
11 Why We Should Not Permit Embryos to Be Selected as Tissue Donors
Children as Things
What Kind of Ethics Do We Need?
12 The Moral Status of Human Cloning: Neo‐Lockean Persons versus Human Embryos
Introduction
1 A Crucial Concept: neo‐Lockean Persons. 1.1 John Locke’s concept of a person
1.2 The concept of a neo‐Lockean person
1.3 Distortions of the concept of a neo‐Lockean person
1.4 Neo‐Lockean persons and the right to life
2 Cloning to Produce Human Organisms that Will Never Become Persons. 2.1 Cloning for medical purposes or scientific research
2.2 Cloning to produce a human organ bank
2.3 Arguments Against Such Cloning
2.3.1 Appeals to immaterial minds or souls
2.3.2 Appeals to potentialities
2.3.3 The appeal to a future like ours
2.3.4 Against human organ banks?
3 Cloning to Produce Persons
3.1 Is cloning that aims at producing future persons intrinsically wrong?
3.1.1 Does a person have a right to a genetically unique nature?
3.1.2 The “Open Future” Argument
3.1.3 Causing psychological distress
3.1.4 Failing to treat individuals as ends in themselves
3.1.5 Interfering with personal autonomy
3.2 Consequentialist objections to cloning to produce persons
3.2.1 Cloned persons would have lives less worth living because of reduced life expectancy
3.2.2 The low rate of success objection
3.2.3 Brave New World objections
3.3 Arguments in favor of cloning to produce persons
3.3.1 Cloning to avoid the transmission of hereditary diseases
3.3.2 Happier and healthier individuals
3.3.3 Enabling individuals to have a genetically related child who otherwise could not do so
3.3.3.1 Infertility
3.3.3.2 Children for homosexual couples
3.3.4 Cloning to save existing persons
3.3.5 More satisfying childrearing: Individuals with desired traits
3.3.6 Using self‐knowledge to increase the chance that childrearing will go well for both oneself and one’s children
3.3.7 Benefiting society: Producing people who have the potential for making significant contributions to human well‐being
3.3.8 furthering scientific knowledge: Psychology, the causes of traits of character, and the rearing of children
Conclusion
References
Note
Introduction
13 Questions about Some Uses of Genetic Engineering
Avoiding the Debate about Genes and the Environment
Methods of Changing the Genetic Composition of Future Generations
The Positive–Negative Distinction
The View that Overall Improvement is Unlikely or Impossible
The Family and Our Descendants
Risks and Mistakes
Not Playing God
The Genetic Supermarket
A Mixed System
Values
Notes
14 The Moral Significance of the Therapy–Enhancement Distinction in Human Genetics
Introduction
Somatic versus Germline Interventions
The Concepts of Health and Disease
The Goals of Medicine
Our Humanness
The Rights of the Unborn
Eugenics
Conclusion: The Significance of the Distinction
Notes
15 In Defense of Posthuman Dignity
Transhumanists vs. Bioconservatives
Two Fears about the Posthuman
Is Human Dignity Incompatible with Posthuman Dignity?
Why We Need Posthuman Dignity
Notes
16 Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene‐Editing Technologies in Human Embryos
17 Genome Editing and Assisted Reproduction: Curing Embryos, Society or Prospective Parents?
Introduction: Genetic Diseases, Genome Editing and Existing Alternatives
PGD and Assisted Reproduction
CRISPR and Assisted Reproduction
Assisted Reproduction and PGD, or Assisted Reproduction and CRISPR?
The Case for Genome Editing: Two Sets of Arguments
Selection versus Therapy
Curing Embryos, Society or Prospective Parents?
Reproductive autonomy, child welfare and the interests of society
Societal interests and the costs of introducing genome editing in the context of assisted reproduction
Conclusions: Context Matters
References
Notes
18 Who's Afraid of the Big Bad (Germline Editing) Wolf?
References
19 An Ethical Pathway for Gene Editing
Notes
Introduction
Killing and Letting Die
Newborns
Brain Death
Advance Directives
Voluntary Euthanasia and Medically Assisted Suicide
Notes
20 The Sanctity of Life
1 Direct Objections and Side‐Effects
2 Stating the Principle of the Sanctity of Life
3 The Boundary between Life and Death
4 ‘Being Alive Is Intrinsically Valuable’
5 ‘Being Conscious Is Intrinsically Valuable’
6 ‘Being Human Is Intrinsically Valuable’
7 The Concept of a ‘Life Worth Living’
8 Is the Desire to Live the Criterion of a Worthwhile Life?
9 Length of Life
10 The ‘No Trade‐Off’ View
11 The Social Effects of Abandoning the Sanctity of Life
References
21 Declaration on Euthanasia: Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
I The Value of Human Life
II Euthanasia
III The Meaning of Suffering for Christians and the Use of Painkillers
IV Due Proportion in the Use of Remedies
Conclusion
Notes
22 Active and Passive Euthanasia
Reference
23 The Morality of Killing: A Traditional View
The Morality of Killing
24 Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?
2
3
4
Notes
25 Why Killing is Not Always Worse – and Sometimes Better – Than Letting Die
I
II
III
Notes
26 Moral Fictions and Medical Ethics
The Concept of Moral Fictions
Exposing the Moral Fictions. Suicide
Causation
Intention
Moral responsibility
Differential moral assessment
The Moral Work of Moral Fictions
Abandoning the Moral Fictions
Notes
27 Can a Physician Ever Justifiably Euthanize a Severely Disabled Newborn?
The Case of the Ill‐fated Newborn
References
28 No to Infant Euthanasia
References
29 Physicians Can Justifiably Euthanize Certain Severely Impaired Neonates
Discussion. Infants lack decision‐making capacity
Sanctity of life versus quality of life
Quality‐of‐life ethic and infanticide
Quality‐of‐life ethic and terminal sedation
Parental and health care professionals’ interests matter
Resource allocation justice
Slippery slope concerns
Unfair discrimination against the disabled?
Human dignity
Conclusions
References
30 You Should Not Have Let Your Baby Die
31 After‐Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?
Introduction
Abortion and After‐Birth Abortion
The Newborn and the Fetus are Morally Equivalent
The Fetus and the Newborn are Potential Persons
Adoption as an Alternative to After‐Birth Abortion?
Conclusions
References
32 Does a Human Being Gain the Right to Live after He or She is Born?
References
33 Hard Lessons: Learning from the Charlie Gard Case
Parents’ Role In Decision‐Making for Children: We Need to Clarify Harm
Box 1 Case summary and timeline21–23
Decisions for Adults Versus Decisions for Children: Allow Adults to Choose Treatment for Themselves even if Suboptimal
Experimental Treatment: We Should Have A Lower Threshold For Allowing Access Where Patients Have No Other Options, And Allow Earlier Innovative Treatment
The Role of Resources: We Need to Talk about Limited Resources
The Role of the Courts: We Need a Fair, Expedient Way of Resolving Disputes
Ethical Decisions versus Clinical Decisions: Allow and Support Reasonable Disagreement
Medical Tourism: Allow Families to Travel Unless Illegal or Risks Significant Harm
Box 2 Some of the key factual and ethical questions arising from the Charlie Gard case
Challenging Normative and Conceptual Issues: Need for Further Ethical Analysis
Reflective Equilibrium, Reasons and Evidence: Need for Humility and Transparency
References
34 A Definition of Irreversible Coma
Characteristics of Irreversible Coma
Other Procedures
Legal commentary
Comment
Summary
Reference
35 The Challenge of Brain Death for the Sanctity of Life Ethic
I Introduction
II The Origins of the New Definition of Death
III Death as the Irreversible Loss of Integrated Organic Functioning
IV What do the Standard Tests for Brain Death Show?
V President George W. Bush’s Council on Bioethics Enters the Debate
VI The significance of irreversible unconsciousness
VII The Centrality of Ethics
VIII Conclusion
References
Notes
36 The Philosophical Debate
I Position One: There Is No Sound Biological Justification for Today’s Neurological Standard
II Position Two: There Is a Sound Biological Justification for Today’s Neurological Standard
A The Work of the Organism as a Whole
B Comparison with the UK Standard
References
Notes
37 An Alternative to Brain Death
Some Common but Mistaken Assumptions about Death
An Alternative Understanding of Death
Reference
38 Life Past Reason
Autonomy
Notes
39 Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy
Advance Directives and Precedent Autonomy
Critical and Experiential Interests: Problems with the Model
The State’s Interest in Margo’s Life
Notes
40 The Note
Statement
41 When Self‐Determination Runs Amok
Self‐Determination
Killing and Allowing to Die
Calculating the Consequences
Euthanasia and Medical Practice
42 When Abstract Moralizing Runs Amok
Notes
43 Physician‐Assisted Death and Severe, Treatment‐Resistant Depression
Terminology
Terminal Illness
Defining and Identifying Treatment‐Resistant Depression
Can Patients with Severe Major Depressive Disorder Be Competent to Request Assisted Dying?
Role Responsibility
Slippery‐Slope Concerns
Public Policy Considerations
Notes
44 Are Concerns about Irremediableness, Vulnerability, or Competence Sufficient to Justify Excluding All Psychiatric Patients from Medical Aid in Dying?
Introduction
Irremediableness. What are treatment outcomes like for patients with treatment resistant depression?
Discerning between irremediable and remediable cases
Irremediableness cannot be understood as certainty that no treatment will succeed
Defending irremediableness that admits of false positives
Does the availability of MAID for non‐terminal patients negatively impact care?
Vulnerability
Why are psychiatric patients especially vulnerable?
Is vulnerability a useful concept?
Does vulnerability shift the burden of proof?
Assessing Competence
Can physicians effectively perform capacity assessments?
Arbitrarily high capacity test score cut‐offs as an alternative to a ban
The Netherlands
Opposition to the Dutch system
Physician disagreement
Specific concerns about capacity assessment in the Netherlands
Trust in physicians
Conclusion
References
Notes
Introduction
45 In a Pandemic, Should We Save Younger Lives?:
YES – Peter Singer
NO – Lucy Winkett
YES
NO
YES
NO
46 The Value of Life
I The Moral Significance of Age
The anti‐ageist argument
The fair innings argument
Numbers of lives and numbers of years
Extra life‐time versus extra lives
The fallacy of life‐time views
Worthwhile life‐time
Fair innings or no ageism?
Notes
47 Bubbles under the Wallpaper: Healthcare Rationing and Discrimination
Bubbles under the Wallpaper
Example
A Rights‐Based Approach?
Randomness to the Rescue?
Conclusion
References
Notes
48 Rescuing Lives: Can’t We Count?
Notes
49 Should Alcoholics Compete Equally for Liver Transplantation?
Should Patients with ARESLD Receive Transplants?
Nonrenewable resource
Comparison with cardiac transplantation
Expensive technology
General guideline proposed
Objections to Proposal
Alcoholism: How is it similar to and different from other diseases?
Are we discriminating against alcoholics?
Reasons Patients with ARESLD Should Have a Lower Priority on Transplant Waiting Lists
Fairness
Policy considerations regarding public support for liver transplantation
Should Any Alcoholics Be Considered for Transplantation? Need for Further Research
Comment
References
Introduction
50 Organ Donation and Retrieval: Whose Body is it Anyway?
Note
51 The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales
References
52 Ethical Issues in the Supply and Demand of Kidneys
Brief Background: The Status Quo Systems of Kidney Procurement
Anti‐Market Considerations
Does a Market Ban Necessarily Decrease the Supply of Available Organs?
Vulnerability
Weak Agency
Equal Status Considerations
The Integrity of the Body
Policy
Notes
53 The Survival Lottery
Note
Introduction
Experimentation with Humans
Experimentation with Animals
Academic Freedom and Research
Notes
54 Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research
A Boundaries between Practice and Research
B Basic Ethical Principles
1 Respect for persons
2 Beneficence
3 Justice
C Applications
1 Informed consent
2 Assessment of risks and benefits
3 Selection of subjects
Notes
55 Scientific Research is a Moral Duty
Do No Harm
Fairness
The Moral Imperative for Research
Do Universal Moral Principles Deny This Claim?
Is There an Enforceable Obligation to Participate in Research?
Mandatory Contribution to Public Goods
Benefit Sharing
A New Principle of Research Ethics
On Whom Does the Obligation to Participate in Research Fall?
Me and My Kind
Children and the Incompetent
Inducements to Participate in Research
Conclusion
Notes
References
56 Participation in Biomedical Research is an Imperfect Moral Duty: A Response to John Harris
The Principle of Beneficence
The Principle of Fairness
Conclusions
Notes
References
57 Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce Perinatal Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Developing Countries
Asking the Wrong Research Question
Inadequate Analysis of Data from ACTG 076 and Other Sources
Defining Placebo as the Standard of Care in Developing Countries
Justifying Placebo‐Controlled Trials by Claiming They Are More Rapid
Toward a Single International Standard of Ethical Research
References
58 We’re Trying to Help Our Sickest People, Not Exploit Them
59 Pandemic EthicsThe Case for Risky Research1
The Principle of Risk Parity
Applying the Principle of Risk Parity to COVID‐19 Research – Three Examples
Notes
References
60 Duties towards Animals
61 A Utilitarian View
Note
62 The Harmful, Nontherapeutic Use of Animals in Research is Morally Wrong
Methods
Some Distracting Issues not Discussed in Detail
Activists’ behavior
“Rights”
“Equality,” “importance,” “status” and “standing”
Some Objections: “Animal Experimentation is Morally Permissible Because …”
“Scientific” arguments
“Necessary condition” arguments
“Group‐based” arguments
“Benefits” arguments
“Necessity” arguments
“No alternatives” arguments
“Necessary condition” arguments
Group‐based arguments
A Positive, Cumulative Case in Defense of Animals
References
63 The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research
Arguments Against the Use of Animals in Scientific Research
Claim: Humans do not benefit from animal research
Claim: Animal research has a very low success rate
Absolute interpretation
Relative interpretation
Claim: Researchers must prove animals are necessary for their work
Claim: Animal models are not predictive of human responses
Claim: Basic research is knowledge for knowledge’s sake
Claim: Alternatives to animal research already exist
Ethics of Animal Research
The Moral Status of Animals
Rejecting the Extremes of the Spectrum
Equal Consideration of Equal Interests
Human Ability to Challenge Nature and Suffering is Unique
Utilitarian Considerations
What About Marginal Cases?
Human Relationships Are Unique: The Human Family
Assuming Responsibility and Stewardship
Conclusion
References
64 Ethical Issues When Modelling Brain Disorders in Non‐Human Primates
Introduction
Trends in Disease Modelling Post‐CRISPR
Methodological Starting Point
Animal welfare
Available alternatives
Expectation of benefit
Conclusion
Notes
References
65 On Liberty
Chapter II: Of The Liberty of Thought and Discussion
66 Should Some Knowledge Be Forbidden?: The Case of Cognitive Differences Research
1 Introduction
2 A Case Study: The Right to Equality versus the Right to Freedom of Research
3 Past Precedents
4 The Third Precedent
5 Conclusion
References
67 Academic Freedom and RaceYou Ought Not to Believe What You Think May Be True
1 An Intelligible Hypothesis
2 Not Believing What You Think May Be True
3 Not Discussing What Some Think To Be True
4 Not Using Science to Investigate the Truth
5 From Advice to Sanctions
6 The Dead Hand of Ignorance
7 The Appeal to Paradigms of Irrationality
8 Compromises
9 The Bright Light of Knowledge
10 Armageddon
11 Some History and Rhetoric
References
Further Reading
Introduction
Reference
68 Ethics and Infectious Disease
I Distribution of Research Resources
II The Ethical Importance of Infectious Disease
1 Consequences
2 Difficult ethical questions
3 Justice
III Why the Neglect?
1 High tech medicine
2 Optimism in medicine
3 ‘The other’
4 Complexity
5 Apparent ease
6 Religious hijacking
Conclusion
Notes
69 XDR‐TB in South Africa: No Time for Denial or Complacency
The Threat to Regional and Global Health
The True Extent of the Problem
Factors Fuelling the Outbreak
Factors That Could Undermine Efforts to Tackle the Outbreak
Is There a Role for Involuntary Detention?
Conclusion
References
70 Clinical Ethics During the Covid‐19 PandemicMissing the Trees for the Forest
Introduction
Clinical Ethics Challenges Arising in the Care of Covid‐19 Patients
Treatment of Covid‐19 patients as a means to an end
Working with uncertain evidence and unproven therapies
Duty to care versus right to protection
Rationing of scarce resources in pandemic situations
Dignity in death
Clinical Ethics Considerations in the Care of “Non‐Covid‐19” Patients
Moral Distress of Healthcare Providers
References
71 The Moral Obligation to be Vaccinated:Utilitarianism, Contractualism, and Collective Easy Rescue
Introduction
From Collective to Individual Responsibility
The Utilitarian Approach: Group Beneficence and Imperceptible Contributions
The Deontological Approach
Vaccination and the generalization test
Vaccination and contractualism
Duty of Easy Rescue and Fairness: A Further Argument for an Individual Moral Obligation to be Vaccinated
Easy rescue, collective obligations, and the individual duty to be vaccinated
High cost vaccinations
Conclusion
Notes
References
72 Taking Responsibility for Responsibility
Responsibility for Health
The Social Determinants of Health
Taking Responsibility for Responsibility
Notes
References
Introduction
When do Doctors have a Duty to Treat?
Confidentiality
Truth‐Telling
Informed Consent and Patient Autonomy
Notes
73 What Healthcare Professionals Owe Us: Why Their Duty to Treat During a Pandemic is Contingent on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
Introduction
What Healthcare Professionals Owe Us
Neoliberalism and the Fetishisation of ‘Efficiency’
Implications for Healthcare Professionals’ Obligations
Conclusion
References
74 Conscientious Objection in Health Care
Introduction
What is Conscientious Objection?
Assessing Approaches to Conscientious Objection in Health Care. Conscience absolutism
Incompatibilism
The Patients’ Interests First Principle (PIFP)
The Scope of Professional Practice Principle (SOPPP)
Reasonable accommodation
Are specific actions required?
Is alternative service required?
Is a public justification required?
Conscientious Objection vs. Obstruction
Conclusion
Notes
75 Conscientious Objection in Medicine: Accommodation versus Professionalism and the Public Good
Introduction
Conscience – What Is It, and Does It Matter?
Conscience Claims – Should They be Reasonable and Genuine?
Conscience and Professionalism
Voluntariness and Monopoly
Equality of Opportunity
Diversity
Equal Citizenship
Peaceful Co‐existence
Conclusion
References
76 Confidentiality in Medicine: A Decrepit Concept
Two Aspects of Medical Confidentiality. Confidentiality and third‐party interests
Confidentiality and the patient’s interest
The Role of Confidentiality in Medicine
Possible Solutions to the Confidentiality Problem
Afterthought: Confidentiality and Indiscretion
Conclusion
77 A Defense of Unqualified Medical Confidentiality
The Case of the Infected Spouse
Clearing the Ground: What Professional Obligations Are Not
Law
Personal morality
Personal values
The Concept of a Professional Obligation
The Duty to Diminish Risks to Third Parties
A Defense of Unqualified Confidentiality
Concluding Remarks
References
78 On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives
79 Should Doctors Tell the Truth?
80 On Telling Patients the Truth
Notes
81 On Liberty
82 From Schloendorff v. NewYork Hospital
83 Informed Consent: Its History, Meaning, and Present Challenges
The Historical Foundations of Informed Consent
The Concept of Informed Consent
Current Challenges to Informed Consent
The limits of the law in biomedical ethics
The quality of consent
Problems of broad consent
The regulation of consent and the research–treatment distinction
Conclusion
Notes
84 The Doctor–Patient Relationship in Different Cultures
“Physicians Treat Patients Badly”
Similarities and Differences
Conceptions of Autonomy: East and West
Truth‐Telling
Notes
85 Transgender Children and the Right to Transition: Medical Ethics When Parents Mean Well But Cause Harm
1 Introduction
2 Gender Dysphoria and Treatment for Transgender Youth. 2.1 Gender dysphoria and its consequences
2.2 Do children own their bodies?
2.3 Persisting and desisting
2.4 PBT is the best route, regardless
3 Psychological Harm and Epistemic Barriers
4 The Physical Risks
5 Justifying Intervention. 5.1 A child’s right to their body
5.2 Putting rights into practice
6 Spreading the Word and the Role of Schools
7 Objections and How to Answer Them
7.1 Parental rights to raise their children
7.2 Funding issues
7.3 Why not take it further?
8 Review and Concluding Remarks
References
Notes
86 Amputees by Choice
Editors’ Note
Notes
87 Rational Desires and the Limitation of Life‐Sustaining Treatment
The President’s Commission Report
Part I.What is Autonomy?
An argument for rational desiring
Two objections to vivid imagination
Two senses of rational desiring
Autonomy as a dispositional concept
Ulysses and the Sirens: an example of obstructive desire
One objection
Part II. “No Man Ever Threw Away Life, While It Was Worth Keeping”
Adaptation to disability
Hurdles to evaluation: loss aversion and contrast
Part III. Limitations of Treatment of Incompetent Patients
When is limitation of treatment in a patient’s best interests?
Limitation of Treatment of Competent Patients
Two Objections. 1. Respect only articulated desires?
2. Autonomy and false beliefs
Conclusion
Notes
Introduction
88 Valuing Disability, Causing Disability
I The Bad‐Difference/Mere‐Difference Distinction
II A Problem for the Mere‐Difference View?
III Causing a Nondisabled Person to Become Disabled
IV Causing a Nondisabled Person to Become Disabled Without Transition Costs
V Causing a Disabled Person to Exist Instead of a Nondisabled Person
VI Causing and “Curing”
VII Conclusion
Notes
89 Is Disability Mere Difference?
Introduction
Disability and Quality of Life
Disability and Society
The Indirect Strategy
Conclusion
References
90 Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion: A Challenge to Practice and Policy
Contrasting Medical and Social Paradigms of Disability
Prenatal diagnosis for disability prevention
Rationales for prenatal testing
Implications for People with Disabilities
Implications for Family Life
Implications for Professional Practice
References
91 Down Syndrome Screening Isn’t about Public Health: It’s about Eliminating a Group of People
92 I Would’ve Aborted a Fetus with Down Syndrome: Women Need that Right
Introduction
93 Neuroethics: Ethics and the Sciences of the Mind
The Ethics of Neuroscience
Memory Modification and Enhancement
References
Note
94 Engineering Love
95 Unrequited Love Hurts: Should Doctors Treat Broken Hearts?
Unrequited Love Hurts
Two Arguments Against the Medicalization of Unrequited Love
The peculiarity‐of‐heartbreak objection
If both a broken heart and a broken limb hurt, what is wrong with using drugs to ease the pain?
The arts objection
Conclusions
Acknowledgment
Notes
96 Stimulating Brains, Altering Minds
Empirical Evidence: Benefits and Risks
A Case Study
Autonomy and Identity
Conclusion
References
97 Authenticity or Autonomy? When Deep Brain Stimulation Causes a Dilemma
Introduction: Feelings of Authenticity and Alienation under Deep Brain Stimulation
A Patient’s Dilemma: Choosing between Mental Competence and Well‐Being
Authenticity or Autonomy? A Philosophical Reinterpretation
Is ‘Authenticity’ the New ‘Autonomy’ in Neuroethics?
Conclusions
References
98 On the Necessity of Ethical Guidelines for Novel Neurotechnologies
Novel Neurotechnologies and Their Future Use
Ethical and Societal Issues Raised by Novel Neurotechnologies
Developing Ethical Principles for Neurotechnologies
The Importance of Novel Neurotechnology for the Progress of Humankind
References
Index
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