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Harry G. Frankfurt. Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility / Alternative Möglichkeiten …
Inhalt
[6]Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
[8]I
II
III
IV
V
[7]Alternative Möglichkeiten und moralische Verantwortung
[9]I
II
III
IV
V
[45]Zu dieser Ausgabe
[46]Literaturhinweise
[50]Nachwort. 1 Freiheit, Verantwortung und Anderskönnen
2 Die Herausforderung des Determinismus
3 Kompatibilismus und Inkompatibilismus
4 Frankfurts Angriff auf das Prinzip alternativer Möglichkeiten
5 Das Jones-Black-Beispiel
Frankfurts Argument
6 Das eigene Wollen als Bedingung von Verantwortung
[70]7 Freiheitsfunken
8 Die Dilemma-Verteidigung
[74]9 Zurückweisungen der Dilemma-Verteidigung
10 Moralische Verantwortung und Determinismus: Letzturheberschaft und Kontrolle
11 Ausblick: Die Freiheitstheorie
12 Implikationen und Grenzen von Frankfurts Freiheits- und Verantwortungstheorie
[93]Über Harry G. Frankfurt
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Harry G. Frankfurt
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
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Aus dem amerikanischen Englisch übersetzt und herausgegeben von Julius Schälike
Another possibility is that Jones2 was stampeded by the threat. Given that threat, he would have performed that action regardless of what decision he had already made. The threat upset him so profoundly, moreover, that he completely forgot his own earlier decision and did what was demanded of him entirely because he was terrified of the penalty with which he was threatened. In this case, it is not relevant to his having performed the action that he had already decided on his own to perform it. When the chips [16]were down he thought of nothing but the threat, and fear alone led him to act. The fact that at an earlier time Jones2 had decided for his own reasons to act in just that way may be relevant to an evaluation of his character; he may bear full moral responsibility for having made that decision. But he can hardly be said to be morally responsible for his action. For he performed the action simply as a result of the coercion to which he was subjected. His earlier decision played no role in bringing it about that he did what he did, and it would therefore be gratuitous to assign it a role in the moral evaluation of his action.
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