This Is Epistemology
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J. Adam Carter. This Is Epistemology
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations
Guide
Pages
THIS IS EPISTEMOLOGY
THIS IS EPISTEMOLOGY. AN INTRODUCTION
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
I.1 What Is Epistemology?
I.2 Overview of the Book's Themes
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Notes
1 THE REGRESS PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction: A Thought Experiment
1.2 Infinitism and the Regress Problem
1.3 Objections to Infinitism
1.4 Coherentism
1.5 Foundationalism
1.6 Objections to Foundationalism
1.7 Conclusion
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2 PERCEPTION. 2.1 Introduction
2.2 How to Stop an Epistemic Regress
2.3 How to Talk about Experience
2.4 Are We Ever Directly Aware of External Objects?
2.5 Against Naïve Realism
2.6 Evaluating Indirect Realism
2.7 The Return of Direct Realism
2.8 Does Experience Provide Us with Reasons to Believe?
2.9 Conclusion: Choosing a View
2.9.1 On Cartesian Foundationalism
2.9.2 On Modest Foundationalism
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3 THE A PRIORI. 3.1 Introduction
3.2 Negative Characterizations of A Priori Justification
3.2.1 In What Sense Is A Priori Justification Independent of “Experience”
3.3 In What Sense Is A Priori Justification “Independent” of Experience?
3.4 Positive Characterizations of A Priori Justification
3.5 Bealer on the A Priori
3.6 BonJour on the A Priori
3.7 Is There A Priori Justification?
3.8 Quine's Attack on the Analytic–Synthetic Distinction and Its Significance
3.9 Against the Reliability of Intuitions
3.10 Rationalism and Skepticism
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4 INFERENCE. 4.1 Introduction
4.2 Inference and the Scope of our Knowledge
4.3 The Problem of Induction
4.4 Solving the Problem
4.5 A Pragmatic Justification
4.6 No Justification? No Problem!
4.7 Deductive Reasoning and Closure
4.8 Against Closure
4.9 In Defense of Closure
4.10 Conclusion
4.A Appendix: When Does a Body of Evidence Justify Belief?
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5 ON KNOWING THE TRUTH. 5.1 Introduction
5.2 A Simple View
5.3 Gettier's Cases
5.4 Causation?
5.5 Modal Approaches
5.6 Ability
5.7 What If There Is No Analysis?
5.8 Conclusion
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6 MEMORY. 6.1 Introduction
6.2 Awareness of the Past
6.3 Memory and Knowledge
6.3.1 Russell on Memory and Knowledge
6.3.2 Malcolm on Memory and Knowledge
6.3.3 A Quick Recap
6.4 Memory and the Justification of Belief
6.5 Justifying Our Reliance on Memory
6.6 The Problem of Easy Knowledge
6.7 Conclusion
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7 TESTIMONY. 7.1 Introduction
7.2 Reductionism and Non‐Reductionism
7.2.1 Reductionism
7.2.2 Non‐Reductionism
7.2.2.2 Universalism and Non‐Reductionism
7.3 Testimony and Transmission
7.4 Caveat Emptor? On the Speaker's Responsibilities
7.5 Disagreement
7.6 Conclusion
7.A Appendix: Testimonial Injustice
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8 KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Knowing‐How and Knowing‐That. 8.2.1 Ryle's Regresses
8.2.2 Stanley and Williamson's Linguistically Motivated Intellectualism
8.2.3 Resisting Intellectualism: Arguments from Luck and Testimony
8.2.3.1 The Argument from Epistemic Luck
8.2.3.2 The Argument from Testimony
8.2.4 Anti‐anti‐intellectualism
8.3 Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?
8.3.1 Objectual Understanding and Knowledge
8.3.2 Understanding‐Why and Knowledge
8.4 Animal and Reflective Knowledge. 8.4.1 Sosa's Performance Normativity Framework and the Animal/Reflective Distinction
8.4.2 A Distinction Worth Drawing?42
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9 INTERNALISM VS. EXTERNALISM. 9.1 Introduction
9.2 An Early Argument for Externalism
9.3 Objections to Reliabilism and/or Externalism. 9.3.1 Strange and Fleeting Processes
9.3.2 The New Evil‐Demon Argument
9.3.3 An Evidentialist Argument
9.3.4 On Reasons and Evidence
9.3.5 Guidance
9.4 Arguments for Externalism. 9.4.1 The Truth‐Connection
9.4.2 The Problem of Stored Beliefs
9.4.3 Externalism about Norms
9.5 Conclusion
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10 THE ETHICS OF BELIEF. 10.1 Introduction
10.2 Plantinga's Peritrope
10.3 The Costs and Benefits of Ungrounded Belief
10.4 Ought and Ability
10.5 Ethics and Epistemology
10.6 Conclusion
10.A Appendix: When and Why the Evidence Is “Sufficient”
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11 SKEPTICISM
11.1 Introduction
11.2 An Argument for Radical Skepticism
11.3 Moore's Proof
11.4 Sensitivity
11.5 The Explanationist Reply
11.6 A Contextualist Solution
11.7 Darker Demonology: Schaffer's Demon
11.8 New Skepticism
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REFERENCES
Index
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According to the Supporting Justified Belief Rule, the entries that fit into the second and third categories won't be justified. You won't expect to find these entries in Your Book of Justified Beliefs. The fourth category is tricky. On the one hand, some of these entries might receive strong support from other entries and so you might think that the conflict doesn't really threaten them. Some of these entries might receive weak support and look bad in light of well‐supported entries. Let's set these aside for the time being.
1.44 The best candidates for entries in Your Book of Justified Beliefs will be those in the first group – viz. entries that fit with a significant number of other entries and do not conflict with any other entries. Question: could it be that all it takes for a belief to be justified is for it to fit into the first category? Could mutual support between beliefs be all that's required for these beliefs to be justified? This is indeed what the coherentist thinks. As Catherine Z. Elgin (1996) states the idea, beliefs that are justified are parts of a system where the parts are “reasonable in light of one another” (1996, p. 13).
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