Оглавление
Jean-Claude Amiard. Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Tables
Guide
Pages
Disarmament and Decommissioning in the Nuclear Domain
Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation. 1.1. Introduction
1.2. The first countries to acquire the atomic bomb
1.3. The NPT
1.3.1. The functioning of the Treaty
1.3.2. Revision of the NPT
1.3.3. Successes of the NPT
1.3.4. Failures of the NPT
1.3.5. Future nuclear-weapon states
1.4. Other nuclear non-proliferation treaties
1.4.1. The CTBT Treaty
1.4.2. The TPNW
1.4.3. The Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
1.4.4. Regional disarmament treaties
1.5. Disarmament controls
1.5.1. Principle and practice of disarmament controls
1.5.1.1. General
1.5.1.2. Technologies at the service of disarmament
1.5.2. NPT controls
1.5.2.1. NPT guarantees
1.5.2.2. The various types of collaboration between states to verify disarmament
1.5.2.3. Practical implementation of NPT safeguards
1.5.2.4. Minor concealments under the NPT
1.5.2.5. The case of North Korea
1.5.2.6. The case of Iran
1.6. Actions of NGOs
1.6.1. The main actions of NGOs for disarmament
1.6.2. NGOs and the Nobel Peace Prize
1.7. The military denuclearization of a state
1.7.1. South Africa: the example of the complete denuclearization of a country
1.7.2. Other states that have renounced nuclear weapons
1.8. Conclusions
2. Disarmament of Atomic Weapons. 2.1. Introduction
2.2. Limitations on the number of nuclear weapons
2.2.1. Bilateral disarmament agreements and treaties between the Americans and Soviets
2.2.1.1. The SALT l agreements
2.2.1.2. The ABM Treaty
2.2.1.3. The SALT II agreement
2.2.1.4. The INF Treaty
2.2.1.5. The START I agreement
2.2.1.6. The Lisbon Protocol
2.2.1.7. The START II treaty
2.2.1.8. The SORT treaty
2.2.1.9. The New START or START III treaty
2.2.2. Delivery of nuclear supplies
2.2.3. Controlling the delivery systems of atomic weapons
2.2.4. The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC)
2.2.5. The disarmament of France
2.3. Nuclear deterrent forces
2.3.1. Land forces of nuclear deterrence
2.3.2. Air forces of nuclear deterrence
2.3.3. Oceanic nuclear deterrent forces
2.3.4. Nuclear weapon manufacturing sites
2.3.5. Nuclear weapon deployment and storage sites
2.3.6. The state of stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile materials
2.4. Disarmament controls
2.4.1. Controls of the CTBT
2.4.2. Bilateral controls
2.5. Conclusions
3. International Recommendations and National Policies in Decommissioning. 3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Definitions of terms for end-of-life operations of a BNI
3.1.2. Stages in the life of a BNI
3.2. General principles of decommissioning and dismantling
3.2.1. The necessity and goals of decommissioning
3.2.2. IAEA recommendations
3.2.3. NEA work and publications
3.2.4. Decommissioning and dismantling strategies
3.2.4.1. Immediate dismantling or decontamination (DECON)
3.2.4.2. Deferred dismantling or secure storage (SAFSTOR)
3.2.4.3. Containment or entombment (ENTOMB)
3.2.4.4. The choice of strategy
3.2.4.5. The end-state choice
3.2.5. Decommissioning planning
3.2.5.1. The decommissioning process
3.2.5.2. The decommissioning schedule
3.2.5.3. The decommissioning and dismantling stage statuses defined by the IAEA
3.2.6. Duration of decommissioning
3.3. Lessons from the past
3.3.1. Experience in decommissioning
3.3.2. Structuring and organization of companies
3.3.3. Ongoing decommissioning challenges
3.3.4. Management of the unexpected in dismantling
3.3.5. The transmission of information
3.4. The decommissioning and dismantling policies of the various states
3.4.1. US policy
3.4.2. Russia’s policy
3.4.3. Germany’s policy
3.4.4. UK policy
3.4.5. France’s policy
3.4.5.1. EDF
3.4.5.2. CEA
3.4.5.3. Orano
3.4.5.4. The French doctrine of decommissioning and dismantling
3.4.6. China
3.4.7. Sweden
3.4.8. Japan
3.4.9. Other states
3.4.9.1. Brazil
3.4.9.2. South Korea
3.4.9.3. Canada
3.4.9.4. Switzerland
3.4.9.5. Italy
3.4.9.6. Taiwan
3.4.9.7. Various other states
3.5. Conclusions
4. Procedures and Technologies Involved in Decommissioning. 4.1. Introduction
4.2. The cost of dismantling
4.2.1. International recommendations
4.2.2. The American example
4.2.3. The British example
4.2.4. The French example
4.2.5. The Russian example
4.3. The production of radioactive waste
4.3.1. The channels planned for the management of radioactive waste
4.3.2. Material release thresholds
4.4. The environmental and health risks of dismantling
4.4.1. Assessment of environmental and health risks during decommissioning
4.4.2. Environmental impact studies
4.4.3. Total remediation of the site
4.4.3.1. International projects
4.4.3.2. Soil release thresholds
4.4.4. Health impacts of decommissioning
4.4.5. Social impacts of decommissioning
4.4.6. Regulatory provisions
4.5. Nuclear decommissioning techniques
4.5.1. Cutting techniques
4.5.2. Decontamination techniques
4.5.3. Automation or remote operation
4.5.4. Remediation processes for civil engineering structures
4.5.5. The main demolition techniques
4.6. Technical innovations in nuclear decommissioning
4.6.1. Research and development policies in the field of decommissioning
4.6.2. Industrial organization in the field of nuclear decommissioning
4.6.3. Management of radioactive contamination
4.6.3.1. Quantification of radioactive contamination
4.6.3.2. Radioactive decontamination
4.6.4. Numerical simulations in the field of nuclear decommissioning
4.6.4.1. Modeling the mobility of radionuclides
4.6.4.2. Numerical simulation of dismantling operations
4.6.4.3. Computerized decommissioning management
4.6.5. Cutting of large parts
4.6.5.1. Cutting with diamond saws
4.6.5.2. Cutting with a laser
4.6.6. Automation in the field of nuclear decommissioning
4.6.6.1. Visual inspection
4.6.6.2. Robotization
4.6.6.3. Satellite remote sensing
4.6.7. Estimating radiation doses
4.7. Conclusions
5. The Dismantling of Military Nuclear Facilities. 5.1. Introduction
5.2. The decommissioning of military plants at the beginning of the nuclear fuel cycle. 5.2.1. The decommissioning of military uranium enrichment plants
5.2.1.1. US military enrichment plants
The Y-12 plant in Oak Ridge
K25 closure and demolition in Oak Ridge
5.2.1.2. French military enrichment plants at Pierrelatte
5.2.1.3. British military enrichment plants
5.2.2. Decommissioning of plutonium-producing reactors
5.2.2.1. American plutonium-producing reactors
5.2.2.2. Soviet plutonium reactors
5.2.2.3. British Windscale plutonium reactors
5.2.2.4. French plutonium-producing reactors (G1, G2, G3)
5.2.3. Decommissioning of tritium-producing reactors
5.2.4. Decommissioning of fissile fuel fabrication plants
5.3. The decommissioning of military spent fuel reprocessing plants
5.3.1. The dismantling of US reprocessing plants
5.3.2. The UP1 plant in Marcoule, France
5.3.3. The dismantling of other military reprocessing plants around the world
5.4. Decommissioning and decontamination of military sites
5.4.1. US military facilities
5.4.1.1. The Hanford site
2015 vision
Cleaning of the River Corridor
Cleaning of the Central Plateau
Cleaning of waste tanks
Future activities after cleaning
5.4.1.2. The Oak Ridge site
5.4.1.3. The Savannah River site
5.4.1.4. The Los Alamos site
5.4.1.5. The Livermore site
5.4.1.6. The Idaho Falls site
5.4.2. The dismantling of Soviet and Russian military nuclear facilities
5.4.3. The dismantling of French military nuclear facilities
5.4.3.1. THE INBS PN
5.4.3.2. French test sites in the Sahara
5.4.3.3. The Centre d’expérimentations du Pacifique
5.4.3.4. The cost
5.4.4. The decontamination of the British site of Maralinga
5.5. The destruction of atomic weapons and their vectors
5.5.1. The deconstruction of atomic bombs
5.5.2. American disarmament
5.5.3. Russian disarmament: international collaboration
5.5.4. Disarmament of submarines and other military nuclear vessels
5.5.4.1. The American example
5.5.4.2. The Russian example
A huge fleet of submarines
A large number of naval reactors
Numerous installations
Dismantling is secondary
The fleet to be decommissioned
A threat of proliferation
International cooperation needed
Reactor disposal procedure
Dismantling status
Nuclear waste
5.5.4.3. The French example
5.5.5. Denuclearization of rocket bases
5.6. Conclusions
6. The Dismantling of Electronuclear Reactors. 6.1. Introduction
6.1.1. The various types of electronuclear reactors
6.2. The dismantling of graphite-moderated reactors
6.2.1. Decommissioning of French nuclear power reactors (UNGG)
6.2.1.1. Decommissioning planning for French UNGG reactors
6.2.1.2. Technical challenges
6.2.1.3. Waste management
6.2.1.4. The Spanish UNGG reactor
6.2.2. The dismantling of British reactors
6.2.3. The dismantling of the RMBK sector
6.3. The dismantling of the pressurized water system (PWR)
6.3.1. The dismantling of German reactors
6.3.2. The dismantling of American reactors
6.3.3. The dismantling of French reactors
6.3.4. Reactor decommissioning in other countries
6.3.5. The dismantling of WWER reactors
6.4. Dismantling the heavy water sector
6.5. Dismantling of the boiling water reactor sector
6.6. Dismantling following a nuclear accident
6.6.1. IAEA and NEA recommendations
6.6.2. The dismantling of Three Mile Island
6.6.3. The dismantling of Chernobyl
6.6.4. The decommissioning of Fukushima
6.6.5. Decommissioning of other damaged nuclear facilities
6.7. Future reactor shutdowns
6.8. Conclusions
7. The Decommissioning of Research Reactors and Other Basic Nuclear Facilities. 7.1. Introduction
7.2. The dismantling of experimental reactors around the world
7.2.1. The main roles of experimental reactors
7.2.2. The global overview of experimental reactors
7.2.3. The main types of experimental reactors
7.2.4. Major incidents and accidents involving research reactors
7.2.5. Cost
7.2.6. Some examples of the decommissioning of experimental reactors
7.2.6.1. TRIGA reactors
7.2.6.2. Pool reactors
7.2.6.3. The WWER-S reactors
7.2.7. Heavy water research reactors (HWRR)
7.2.7.1. The dismantling of Ispra-1
7.2.7.2. The dismantling of the Chinese HWRR reactor
7.2.7.3. The decommissioning of the Indian Cirus reactor
7.2.8. Fast neutron reactors
7.2.9. Other research reactors
7.3. Decommissioning and dismantling of fourth-generation reactors
7.3.1. The dismantling of the fast neutron reactor (FNR) industry
7.3.1.1. The French example
7.3.1.2. The American example
7.3.2. High-temperature nuclear reactors
7.3.3. The other fourth-generation sectors
7.4. The dismantling of first-generation prototype reactors
7.4.1. PWR reactors. 7.4.1.1. Chooz A reactor in France
7.4.1.2. BR3 reactor in Belgium
7.4.2. The dismantling of the boiling water reactor (BWR) process
7.4.3. The dismantling of the gas reactor sector (AGR)
7.4.4. Dismantling the heavy water industry
7.4.5. The dismantling of prototype reactors from various sectors
7.5. The dismantling of basic nuclear fuel cycle facilities
7.5.1. The dismantling of extraction mines
7.5.2. The dismantling of enrichment plants
7.5.3. The dismantling of conversion and manufacturing plants
7.5.4. The dismantling of reprocessing plants
7.5.4.1. The European EUROCHEMIC plant
7.5.4.2. The German WAK plant
7.5.4.3. The French La Hague plants
7.5.4.4. The British Sellafield plant
7.6. Decommissioning of other basic nuclear facilities
7.6.1. The centers of nuclear studies
7.6.1.1. Examples of French study centers
7.6.1.2. Examples of US study centers
7.6.2. The centers of industrial operation. 7.6.2.1. French industrial operation centers
7.6.2.2. British industrial operation centers
7.6.3. Service facilities
7.6.4. Interim nuclear waste storage centers
7.6.5. Other BNIs in the dismantling stage
7.7. Conclusions
General Conclusions. C.1. The failure of non-proliferation
C.2. The rejection of the concept of nuclear deterrence
C.3. The failure of nuclear disarmament
C.4. An impressive dismantling market
C.5. International recommendations for decommissioning
C.6. National decommissioning policies
C.6.1. Decommissioning of nuclear power reactors
C.6.2. Decommissioning of experimental reactors
C.6.3. Decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities
C.6.4. Decommissioning of damaged reactors
C.7. Problems in dismantling of French power reactors
C.7.1. Sensitive radioactive waste management
C.7.2. Significant recourse to subcontracting
C.7.3. Undervalued decommissioning costs
C.7.4. Negative results from dismantling in France
C.8. Results of dismantling BNIs
C.9. Specificities of nuclear facility decommissioning
C.9.1. A period of latency with monitoring
C.9.2. Knowledge of the facility
C.9.3. Competent stakeholders
C.9.4. Innovative techniques and robotization
C.9.5. Companies specialized in dismantling
C.9.6. Various risks
List of Acronyms
References
Index. A, B, C
D, E, F
G, H, I
L, M, N
O, P, R
S, T
U, V, W
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