The Philosopher's Toolkit

The Philosopher's Toolkit
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A new edition of the bestselling guide to the study of philosophy: the ideal intellectual ‘toolkit’ for sharpening analytical skills and building philosophical acuity Whether used as a guide to basic principles or a resource for key concepts and methods,  The Philosopher's Toolkit  equips readers with all the intellectual ‘tools’ necessary for engaging closely with philosophical argument and developing fluency in the methods and language of philosophical inquiry. Featuring accessible explanations, practical examples, and expert guidance, this text empowers readers to understand traditional philosophical thinking and to engage with new ideas. Focuses on the practical methods and concepts necessary for philosophical inquiry Presents a versatile resource for both novice and advanced students in areas of philosophy, critical theory, and rhetoric Adopts a pluralistic approach to teaching philosophy, making this a suitable resource for many courses Delivers extensive cross-referenced entries, recommended readings, and updated online resources Covers an array of topics, from basic tools of argumentation to sophisticated philosophical principles Fully revised and updated to include new topics and entries as well as expanded recommended reading lists to encourage further study

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Julian Baggini. The Philosopher's Toolkit

Table of Contents

Guide

Pages

THE PHILOSOPHER’S

A Compendium of PhilosophicalConcepts and Methods

Acknowledgements

Alphabetical Table of Contents

Preface

1 Basic Tools for Argument

1.1 Arguments, premises, and conclusions

Argument and inference

Argument vs explanation

The place of reason in philosophy

Premises and conclusions

Grounds for premises and Agrippa’s trilemma?

SEE ALSO

READING

1.2 Deduction

SEE ALSO

READING

1.3 Induction

Defining induction

The problem of induction

A misleading similarity

Assuming the uniformity of nature?

A deeper complexity

A groundless ground?

SEE ALSO

READING

1.4 Validity and soundness

Defining validity

The truth machine

Soundness

Importance of validity

SEE ALSO

READING

1.5 Invalidity

SEE ALSO

READING

1.6 Consistency

Apparent and real inconsistency: the abortion example

Exceptions to the rule?

Poetic, religious, or philosophical inconsistency?

Consistency ≠ truth

SEE ALSO

READING

1.7 Fallacies

Formal fallacies

Informal fallacies

SEE ALSO

READING

1.8 Refutation

Refutation tools

Inadequate justification

Conceptual problems

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

1.9 Axioms

Defining axioms

Axiomatic vs natural systems of deduction

First type of axiom

Second type of axiom

Axioms for all?

SEE ALSO

READING

1.10 Definitions

Free trade example

Too narrow or too broad?

A rule of thumb

A long tradition

SEE ALSO

READING

1.11 Certainty and probability

Types of certainty

The sceptical problem

Objective and subjective probability

Certainty and validity

Philosophical theories

SEE ALSO

READING

1.12 Tautologies, self‐contradictions, and the law of non‐contradiction

Valid arguments as tautologies

Law of non‐contradiction

Self‐refuting criticism

SEE ALSO

READING

2 More Advanced Tools

2.1 Abduction

The problem of enumerative induction

SEE ALSO

READING

2.2 Hypothetico‐deductive method

The problem of assumptions

Testability problems: universal claims, technical limits, and ravens

SEE ALSO

READING

2.3 Dialectic

Plato: oneness and otherness, collection, and division

Hegelian dialectic

Dialectical materialism

SEE ALSO

READING

2.4 Analogies

Analogies in reasoning

Argument, illustration, intuition

Strong and weak: the fallacy of false analogy

SEE ALSO

READING

2.5 Anomalies and exceptions that prove the rule

Weakening the rule

Amending and defending a rule

Fallacy of accident

SEE ALSO

READING

2.6 Intuition pumps

Use of the tool

Problems

SEE ALSO

READING

2.7 Logical constructions

Type 1: the Internet

Type 2: the average Briton

A complication: holism and individualism, realism and nominalism

SEE ALSO

READING

2.8 Performativity and speech acts

Meaning, acting, and performing

Gender and identity

The emperor has no clothes?

Queering and jamming performances

SEE ALSO

READING

2.9 Reduction

Simplified water

Application in philosophy

The many and the one

Ethics

Ordinary language opposition

A heuristic device

SEE ALSO

READING

2.10 Representation

The mirror of nature

Correspondence of content

Formal or structural correspondence

Intention and action

Pragmatic and functionalist approaches

SEE ALSO

READING

2.11 Thought experiments

Experimental method

Possible worlds and Twin Earth

Mapping the conceptual universe

SEE ALSO

READING

2.12 Useful fictions

Different from most thought experiments

Use in explanation

Caution!

SEE ALSO

READING

3 Tools for Assessment

3.1 Affirming, denying, and conditionals

Fallacy of affirming the consequent

Fallacy of denying the antecedent

SEE ALSO

READING

3.2 Alternative explanations

Free‐will example

Good advice for prosecutors

SEE ALSO

READING

3.3 Ambiguity and vagueness

‘A’ cause for ‘everything’

Two types of ambiguity and two related fallacies: equivocation and amphiboly

Ambiguity ≠ vagueness

Two types of vagueness: degree and context

Clarity and rationality

SEE ALSO

READING

3.4 Bivalence and the excluded middle

Too simple?

Fuzzy logic

SEE ALSO

READING

3.5 Category mistakes

Mind and will examples

SEE ALSO

READING

3.6 Ceteris paribus

Limiting the unusual

In decision procedure

In counterargument

SEE ALSO

READING

3.7 Circularity

Definition

The Cartesian circle

Breaking the circle: merely apparent circularity

Hermeneutical circles, conceptual wholes, and coherence

The inductive circle?

SEE ALSO

READING

3.8 Composition and division

Parts and wholes, players and teams

Holism and individualism

SEE ALSO

READING

3.9 Conceptual incoherence

Woman’s true nature example

Incoherence vs confusion

SEE ALSO

READING

3.10 Contradiction/contrariety

Dialetheism, paraconsistent logics, and extra‐logical discourses

SEE ALSO

READING

3.11 Conversion, contraposition, obversion

SEE ALSO

READING

3.12 Counterexamples

Good = pleasant example

Importance of the strange

Limits of modification

SEE ALSO

READING

3.13 Criteria

Wittgenstein and criteria

SEE ALSO

READING

3.14 Doxa/para‐doxa

Arguing, disrupting, and transforming

Follow the bliss

SEE ALSO

READING

3.15 Error theory

Demanded by revision itself

Flat Earth example

Plausibility not soundness

SEE ALSO

READING

3.16 False dichotomy

Example: Austin and sensation

SEE ALSO

READING

3.17 False cause

Some metaphysical issues

SEE ALSO

READING

3.18 Genetic fallacy

Origin vs justification

General application

Example of evolutionary psychology

Caveat

Some historical uses

The upshot

SEE ALSO

READING

3.19 Horned dilemmas

Definition

Mill example

Defensive strategies

SEE ALSO

READING

3.20 Is/ought gap

The logical point

The meta‐ethical point

Back to logic

SEE ALSO

READING

3.21 Masked man fallacy

The property of ‘being known’

Descartes example

SEE ALSO

READING

3.22 Partners in guilt

Strengths and weaknesses of the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

3.23 Principle of charity

The main point

Problem of interpretive imperialism

Avoids straw men

Plato example

SEE ALSO

READING

3.24 Question‐begging

Descartes example

Assumptions and implications

SEE ALSO

READING

3.25 Reductios

A powerful tool

Complexities

SEE ALSO

READING

3.26 Redundancy

Redundancy vs refutation

SEE ALSO

READING

3.27 Regresses

Fodor example

The sceptical regress

Not a slippery slope

SEE ALSO

READING

3.28 Saving the phenomena

The critical point

The demands of explanation

Limitations of the critical point

Levels of explanation

SEE ALSO

READING

3.29 Self‐defeating arguments

Examples

Commonplace in philosophy

SEE ALSO

READING

3.30 Sufficient reason

Schopenhauer’s fourfold

Reasons and causes

Hume’s doubts

SEE ALSO

READING

3.31 Testability

Testability and science

Falsifiability to the rescue?

Relation of the two principles

Testability and holism

SEE ALSO

READING

4 Tools for Conceptual Distinctions

4.1 A priori/a posteriori

A priori knowledge and the ‘always‐already’

Origin vs method of proof

A posteriori knowledge

Historical importance

Critique of the distinction

SEE ALSO

READING

4.2 Absolute/relative

Two views of time

Application: ethics and social science

Three cautions

Political import

SEE ALSO

READING

4.3 Analytic/synthetic

Psychology or logic?

Quine and containment

SEE ALSO

READING

4.4 Belief/knowledge

The offspring of Theaetetus 201d–210a

The ethics of belief

SEE ALSO

READING

4.5 Categorical/modal

SEE ALSO

READING

4.6 Cause/reason

Reasons and causes in the natural order

Reason, causes, and human action

SEE ALSO

READING

4.7 Conditional/biconditional

The treachery of ‘if’

SEE ALSO

READING

4.8 De re/de dicto

Necessity

Use and mention

SEE ALSO

READING

4.9 Defeasible/indefeasible

Defeasibility and knowledge

SEE ALSO

READING

4.10 Entailment/implication

Entailment

Implication

Good advice

SEE ALSO

READING

4.11 Endurantism/perdurantism

Different parts in different locations

Objects as worms or noodles

Accounting for meaningful language about past and future

The persistence of things through time

SEE ALSO

READING

4.12 Essence/accident

Historical modifications

Political uneasiness

A contextual approach

SEE ALSO

READING

4.13 Internalism/externalism

Thought and meaning

Reasons

Justification

SEE ALSO

READING

4.14 Knowledge by acquaintance/description

Russell’s approach

Knowledge as usage

Using this tool

SEE ALSO

READING

4.15 Mind/body

The long pedigree of mind, soul, intellect

Different qualities

The hard problem

What it’s like to be a bat

SEE ALSO

READING

4.16 Necessary/contingent

Events and claims

Determinism, Spinoza, and necessity

Quine and contingency

Example: the existence of God

Problem: the future and the excluded middle

SEE ALSO

READING

4.17 Necessary/sufficient

One or many, joint or separate

Application in definition

SEE ALSO

READING

4.18 Nothingness/being

The long shadow of Parmenides

The problem of the absolute vacuum

Transcendentals and being as nothing

Negative facts

Existential freedom

SEE ALSO

READING

4.19 Objective/subjective

Objectivity and ethics

Knowledge, perspectivism, and the hermeneutic circle

SEE ALSO

READING

4.20 Realist/non‐realist

Varieties of realism

Varieties of non‐realism

À la carte

SEE ALSO

READING

4.21 Sense/reference

Not so easy

SEE ALSO

READING

4.22 Substratum/bundle

A basis for inherence and particularity, an explanation for language

The senselessness of substrata

SEE ALSO

READING

4.23 Syntax/semantics

Uses in logic

Importance in artificial intelligence

SEE ALSO

READING

4.24 Universal/particular

Realists and nominalists about universals

What makes universals particular?

Political suspicions about universals

SEE ALSO

READING

4.25 Thick/thin concepts

Use in moral theory

SEE ALSO

READING

4.26 Types/tokens

Origins

Identity

SEE ALSO

READING

5 Tools of Historical Schools and Philosophers

5.1 Aphorism, fragment, remark

Not a trivial history

The pithy point

SEE ALSO

READING

5.2 Categories and specific differences

Speaking, thinking, being

The critical power of difference

SEE ALSO

READING

5.3 Elenchus and aporia

Refutation and recognition

The discoveries of doubt

Aporia and deconstruction

SEE ALSO

READING

5.4 Hegel’s master/slave dialectic

Domination, its inversion, and its overcoming

The political import

SEE ALSO

READING

5.5 Hume’s fork

The first type

The second type

Sceptical import

SEE ALSO

READING

5.6 Indirect discourse

Kierkegaard’s ‘indirect communication’

What can be said and what can only be shown

SEE ALSO

READING

5.7 Leibniz’s law of identity

Mind–brain example

Space and time, different but indiscernible?

Problems of personal identity

Problem of change

SEE ALSO

READING

5.8 Ockham’s razor

Principle of method

Metaphysical principle

Simplicity vs completeness

SEE ALSO

READING

5.9 Phenomenological method(s)

Reduction and epochē

To what end?

What it’s like to be …

SEE ALSO

READING

5.10 Signs and signifiers

Peirce and Saussure: the science of signs

Baudrillard and Bakhtin: the politics of signs

Keep the terminology straight

SEE ALSO

READING

5.11 Transcendental argument

Defining it

The status of the given

The quality of transcendental reasoning

Copernican revolution

SEE ALSO

READING

6 Tools for Radical Critique

6.1 Class critique

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.2 Différance, deconstruction, and the critique of presence

Wider import

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.3 Empiricist critique of metaphysics

Critique of meaning and intelligibility

Critique of truth

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.4 Feminist and gender critiques

Wide‐ranging implications

A recognition of complexity

Queering gender

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.5 Foucaultian critique of power

Archaeological method

Genealogical method

Microphysics of biopower

Normalisation

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.6 Heideggerian critique of metaphysics

Forgetfulness of Being

Not a thing but no‐thing

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.7 Lacanian critique

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.8 Critiques of naturalism

SEE ALSO

READING

6.9 Nietzschean critique of Christian–Platonic culture

The cure

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.10 Pragmatist critique

Metaphysics and religion

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

6.11 Sartrean critique of ‘bad faith’

Examples

Using the tool

SEE ALSO

READING

7 Tools at the Limit

7.1 Basic beliefs

Variations on a theme

Can God be basic?

SEE ALSO

READING

7.2 Gödel and incompleteness

Precisely what?

General application

SEE ALSO

READING

7.3 Hermeneutic circle

A hermeneutic wheel?

A hermeneutical dialectic: parts to wholes and wholes to parts

SEE ALSO

READING

7.4 Philosophy and/as art

Philosophy as art

Art as philosophical argument

Art as philosophy through its own special tools

SEE ALSO

READING

7.5 Mystical experience and revelation

Hostility to mysticism

What if?

SEE ALSO

READING

7.6 Paradoxes

Paradox Type 1: when reason contradicts experience

Paradox Type 2: when reason itself leads to a contradiction

Paradox type 3: when experience contradicts reason

The value of paradoxes

SEE ALSO

READING

7.7 Possibility and impossibility

Logical impossibility

Physical impossibility

Other kinds of possibility

Application

SEE ALSO

READING

7.8 Primitives

Example of ‘good’

Observation statements and ostensive definition

Holism

SEE ALSO

READING

7.9 Self‐evident truths

Laws of logic

Analytic statements

Observation statements

Clear, distinct, and adequate ideas

SEE ALSO

READING

7.10 Scepticism

History

Positive scepticism

The problem of the criterion

Too high a standard?

SEE ALSO

READING

7.11 Underdetermination and incommensurability

Examples

The indeterminacy of radical translation

Incommensurability

SEE ALSO

READING

Index

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Peter S. Fosl is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of PPE at Transylvania University, Kentucky. He is author of Hume’s Scepticism (2020), co‐author of The Critical Thinking Toolkit (Wiley Blackwell, 2016) and The Ethics Toolkit (Wiley Blackwell, 2007), editor of The Big Lebowski and Philosophy (Wiley Blackwell, 2012), and co‐editor of Philosophy: The Classic Readings (Wiley Blackwell, 2009).

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Consistency, like contradiction and contrariety, are about comparing two or more different statements. A single sentence can, however, be self‐contradictory when it makes an assertion that is necessarily false – often by conjoining two inconsistent sentences, such as p and not‐p (1.12). You might call such a sentence self‐inconsistent. (Compare this with the idea of the paraconsistent in 3.10.)

All this can be boiled down to a simple formulation: two or more statements are consistent when it’s logically possible for them all to be true (a) in the same sense and (b) at the same time. Two or more statements are inconsistent when it is not possible for them all to be true in the same sense and at the same time.

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