The Philosopher's Toolkit
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Julian Baggini. The Philosopher's Toolkit
Table of Contents
Guide
Pages
THE PHILOSOPHER’S
A Compendium of PhilosophicalConcepts and Methods
Acknowledgements
Alphabetical Table of Contents
Preface
1 Basic Tools for Argument
1.1 Arguments, premises, and conclusions
Argument and inference
Argument vs explanation
The place of reason in philosophy
Premises and conclusions
Grounds for premises and Agrippa’s trilemma?
SEE ALSO
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1.2 Deduction
SEE ALSO
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1.3 Induction
Defining induction
The problem of induction
A misleading similarity
Assuming the uniformity of nature?
A deeper complexity
A groundless ground?
SEE ALSO
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1.4 Validity and soundness
Defining validity
The truth machine
Soundness
Importance of validity
SEE ALSO
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1.5 Invalidity
SEE ALSO
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1.6 Consistency
Apparent and real inconsistency: the abortion example
Exceptions to the rule?
Poetic, religious, or philosophical inconsistency?
Consistency ≠ truth
SEE ALSO
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1.7 Fallacies
Formal fallacies
Informal fallacies
SEE ALSO
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1.8 Refutation
Refutation tools
Inadequate justification
Conceptual problems
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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1.9 Axioms
Defining axioms
Axiomatic vs natural systems of deduction
First type of axiom
Second type of axiom
Axioms for all?
SEE ALSO
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1.10 Definitions
Free trade example
Too narrow or too broad?
A rule of thumb
A long tradition
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1.11 Certainty and probability
Types of certainty
The sceptical problem
Objective and subjective probability
Certainty and validity
Philosophical theories
SEE ALSO
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1.12 Tautologies, self‐contradictions, and the law of non‐contradiction
Valid arguments as tautologies
Law of non‐contradiction
Self‐refuting criticism
SEE ALSO
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2 More Advanced Tools
2.1 Abduction
The problem of enumerative induction
SEE ALSO
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2.2 Hypothetico‐deductive method
The problem of assumptions
Testability problems: universal claims, technical limits, and ravens
SEE ALSO
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2.3 Dialectic
Plato: oneness and otherness, collection, and division
Hegelian dialectic
Dialectical materialism
SEE ALSO
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2.4 Analogies
Analogies in reasoning
Argument, illustration, intuition
Strong and weak: the fallacy of false analogy
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2.5 Anomalies and exceptions that prove the rule
Weakening the rule
Amending and defending a rule
Fallacy of accident
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2.6 Intuition pumps
Use of the tool
Problems
SEE ALSO
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2.7 Logical constructions
Type 1: the Internet
Type 2: the average Briton
A complication: holism and individualism, realism and nominalism
SEE ALSO
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2.8 Performativity and speech acts
Meaning, acting, and performing
Gender and identity
The emperor has no clothes?
Queering and jamming performances
SEE ALSO
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2.9 Reduction
Simplified water
Application in philosophy
The many and the one
Ethics
Ordinary language opposition
A heuristic device
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2.10 Representation
The mirror of nature
Correspondence of content
Formal or structural correspondence
Intention and action
Pragmatic and functionalist approaches
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2.11 Thought experiments
Experimental method
Possible worlds and Twin Earth
Mapping the conceptual universe
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2.12 Useful fictions
Different from most thought experiments
Use in explanation
Caution!
SEE ALSO
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3 Tools for Assessment
3.1 Affirming, denying, and conditionals
Fallacy of affirming the consequent
Fallacy of denying the antecedent
SEE ALSO
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3.2 Alternative explanations
Free‐will example
Good advice for prosecutors
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3.3 Ambiguity and vagueness
‘A’ cause for ‘everything’
Two types of ambiguity and two related fallacies: equivocation and amphiboly
Ambiguity ≠ vagueness
Two types of vagueness: degree and context
Clarity and rationality
SEE ALSO
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3.4 Bivalence and the excluded middle
Too simple?
Fuzzy logic
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3.5 Category mistakes
Mind and will examples
SEE ALSO
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3.6 Ceteris paribus
Limiting the unusual
In decision procedure
In counterargument
SEE ALSO
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3.7 Circularity
Definition
The Cartesian circle
Breaking the circle: merely apparent circularity
Hermeneutical circles, conceptual wholes, and coherence
The inductive circle?
SEE ALSO
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3.8 Composition and division
Parts and wholes, players and teams
Holism and individualism
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3.9 Conceptual incoherence
Woman’s true nature example
Incoherence vs confusion
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3.10 Contradiction/contrariety
Dialetheism, paraconsistent logics, and extra‐logical discourses
SEE ALSO
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3.11 Conversion, contraposition, obversion
SEE ALSO
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3.12 Counterexamples
Good = pleasant example
Importance of the strange
Limits of modification
SEE ALSO
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3.13 Criteria
Wittgenstein and criteria
SEE ALSO
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3.14 Doxa/para‐doxa
Arguing, disrupting, and transforming
Follow the bliss
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3.15 Error theory
Demanded by revision itself
Flat Earth example
Plausibility not soundness
SEE ALSO
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3.16 False dichotomy
Example: Austin and sensation
SEE ALSO
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3.17 False cause
Some metaphysical issues
SEE ALSO
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3.18 Genetic fallacy
Origin vs justification
General application
Example of evolutionary psychology
Caveat
Some historical uses
The upshot
SEE ALSO
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3.19 Horned dilemmas
Definition
Mill example
Defensive strategies
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3.20 Is/ought gap
The logical point
The meta‐ethical point
Back to logic
SEE ALSO
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3.21 Masked man fallacy
The property of ‘being known’
Descartes example
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3.22 Partners in guilt
Strengths and weaknesses of the tool
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3.23 Principle of charity
The main point
Problem of interpretive imperialism
Avoids straw men
Plato example
SEE ALSO
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3.24 Question‐begging
Descartes example
Assumptions and implications
SEE ALSO
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3.25 Reductios
A powerful tool
Complexities
SEE ALSO
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3.26 Redundancy
Redundancy vs refutation
SEE ALSO
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3.27 Regresses
Fodor example
The sceptical regress
Not a slippery slope
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3.28 Saving the phenomena
The critical point
The demands of explanation
Limitations of the critical point
Levels of explanation
SEE ALSO
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3.29 Self‐defeating arguments
Examples
Commonplace in philosophy
SEE ALSO
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3.30 Sufficient reason
Schopenhauer’s fourfold
Reasons and causes
Hume’s doubts
SEE ALSO
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3.31 Testability
Testability and science
Falsifiability to the rescue?
Relation of the two principles
Testability and holism
SEE ALSO
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4 Tools for Conceptual Distinctions
4.1 A priori/a posteriori
A priori knowledge and the ‘always‐already’
Origin vs method of proof
A posteriori knowledge
Historical importance
Critique of the distinction
SEE ALSO
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4.2 Absolute/relative
Two views of time
Application: ethics and social science
Three cautions
Political import
SEE ALSO
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4.3 Analytic/synthetic
Psychology or logic?
Quine and containment
SEE ALSO
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4.4 Belief/knowledge
The offspring of Theaetetus 201d–210a
The ethics of belief
SEE ALSO
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4.5 Categorical/modal
SEE ALSO
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4.6 Cause/reason
Reasons and causes in the natural order
Reason, causes, and human action
SEE ALSO
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4.7 Conditional/biconditional
The treachery of ‘if’
SEE ALSO
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4.8 De re/de dicto
Necessity
Use and mention
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4.9 Defeasible/indefeasible
Defeasibility and knowledge
SEE ALSO
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4.10 Entailment/implication
Entailment
Implication
Good advice
SEE ALSO
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4.11 Endurantism/perdurantism
Different parts in different locations
Objects as worms or noodles
Accounting for meaningful language about past and future
The persistence of things through time
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4.12 Essence/accident
Historical modifications
Political uneasiness
A contextual approach
SEE ALSO
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4.13 Internalism/externalism
Thought and meaning
Reasons
Justification
SEE ALSO
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4.14 Knowledge by acquaintance/description
Russell’s approach
Knowledge as usage
Using this tool
SEE ALSO
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4.15 Mind/body
The long pedigree of mind, soul, intellect
Different qualities
The hard problem
What it’s like to be a bat
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4.16 Necessary/contingent
Events and claims
Determinism, Spinoza, and necessity
Quine and contingency
Example: the existence of God
Problem: the future and the excluded middle
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4.17 Necessary/sufficient
One or many, joint or separate
Application in definition
SEE ALSO
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4.18 Nothingness/being
The long shadow of Parmenides
The problem of the absolute vacuum
Transcendentals and being as nothing
Negative facts
Existential freedom
SEE ALSO
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4.19 Objective/subjective
Objectivity and ethics
Knowledge, perspectivism, and the hermeneutic circle
SEE ALSO
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4.20 Realist/non‐realist
Varieties of realism
Varieties of non‐realism
À la carte
SEE ALSO
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4.21 Sense/reference
Not so easy
SEE ALSO
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4.22 Substratum/bundle
A basis for inherence and particularity, an explanation for language
The senselessness of substrata
SEE ALSO
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4.23 Syntax/semantics
Uses in logic
Importance in artificial intelligence
SEE ALSO
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4.24 Universal/particular
Realists and nominalists about universals
What makes universals particular?
Political suspicions about universals
SEE ALSO
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4.25 Thick/thin concepts
Use in moral theory
SEE ALSO
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4.26 Types/tokens
Origins
Identity
SEE ALSO
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5 Tools of Historical Schools and Philosophers
5.1 Aphorism, fragment, remark
Not a trivial history
The pithy point
SEE ALSO
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5.2 Categories and specific differences
Speaking, thinking, being
The critical power of difference
SEE ALSO
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5.3 Elenchus and aporia
Refutation and recognition
The discoveries of doubt
Aporia and deconstruction
SEE ALSO
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5.4 Hegel’s master/slave dialectic
Domination, its inversion, and its overcoming
The political import
SEE ALSO
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5.5 Hume’s fork
The first type
The second type
Sceptical import
SEE ALSO
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5.6 Indirect discourse
Kierkegaard’s ‘indirect communication’
What can be said and what can only be shown
SEE ALSO
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5.7 Leibniz’s law of identity
Mind–brain example
Space and time, different but indiscernible?
Problems of personal identity
Problem of change
SEE ALSO
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5.8 Ockham’s razor
Principle of method
Metaphysical principle
Simplicity vs completeness
SEE ALSO
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5.9 Phenomenological method(s)
Reduction and epochē
To what end?
What it’s like to be …
SEE ALSO
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5.10 Signs and signifiers
Peirce and Saussure: the science of signs
Baudrillard and Bakhtin: the politics of signs
Keep the terminology straight
SEE ALSO
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5.11 Transcendental argument
Defining it
The status of the given
The quality of transcendental reasoning
Copernican revolution
SEE ALSO
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6 Tools for Radical Critique
6.1 Class critique
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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6.2 Différance, deconstruction, and the critique of presence
Wider import
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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6.3 Empiricist critique of metaphysics
Critique of meaning and intelligibility
Critique of truth
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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6.4 Feminist and gender critiques
Wide‐ranging implications
A recognition of complexity
Queering gender
Using the tool
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6.5 Foucaultian critique of power
Archaeological method
Genealogical method
Microphysics of biopower
Normalisation
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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6.6 Heideggerian critique of metaphysics
Forgetfulness of Being
Not a thing but no‐thing
Using the tool
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6.7 Lacanian critique
Using the tool
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6.8 Critiques of naturalism
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6.9 Nietzschean critique of Christian–Platonic culture
The cure
Using the tool
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6.10 Pragmatist critique
Metaphysics and religion
Using the tool
SEE ALSO
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6.11 Sartrean critique of ‘bad faith’
Examples
Using the tool
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7 Tools at the Limit
7.1 Basic beliefs
Variations on a theme
Can God be basic?
SEE ALSO
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7.2 Gödel and incompleteness
Precisely what?
General application
SEE ALSO
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7.3 Hermeneutic circle
A hermeneutic wheel?
A hermeneutical dialectic: parts to wholes and wholes to parts
SEE ALSO
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7.4 Philosophy and/as art
Philosophy as art
Art as philosophical argument
Art as philosophy through its own special tools
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7.5 Mystical experience and revelation
Hostility to mysticism
What if?
SEE ALSO
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7.6 Paradoxes
Paradox Type 1: when reason contradicts experience
Paradox Type 2: when reason itself leads to a contradiction
Paradox type 3: when experience contradicts reason
The value of paradoxes
SEE ALSO
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7.7 Possibility and impossibility
Logical impossibility
Physical impossibility
Other kinds of possibility
Application
SEE ALSO
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7.8 Primitives
Example of ‘good’
Observation statements and ostensive definition
Holism
SEE ALSO
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7.9 Self‐evident truths
Laws of logic
Analytic statements
Observation statements
Clear, distinct, and adequate ideas
SEE ALSO
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7.10 Scepticism
History
Positive scepticism
The problem of the criterion
Too high a standard?
SEE ALSO
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7.11 Underdetermination and incommensurability
Examples
The indeterminacy of radical translation
Incommensurability
SEE ALSO
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Index
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Peter S. Fosl is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of PPE at Transylvania University, Kentucky. He is author of Hume’s Scepticism (2020), co‐author of The Critical Thinking Toolkit (Wiley Blackwell, 2016) and The Ethics Toolkit (Wiley Blackwell, 2007), editor of The Big Lebowski and Philosophy (Wiley Blackwell, 2012), and co‐editor of Philosophy: The Classic Readings (Wiley Blackwell, 2009).
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Consistency, like contradiction and contrariety, are about comparing two or more different statements. A single sentence can, however, be self‐contradictory when it makes an assertion that is necessarily false – often by conjoining two inconsistent sentences, such as p and not‐p (1.12). You might call such a sentence self‐inconsistent. (Compare this with the idea of the paraconsistent in 3.10.)
All this can be boiled down to a simple formulation: two or more statements are consistent when it’s logically possible for them all to be true (a) in the same sense and (b) at the same time. Two or more statements are inconsistent when it is not possible for them all to be true in the same sense and at the same time.
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