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P. M. S. Hacker. Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNATIONS OF NEUROSCIENCE
Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Tables
List of Plates
Guide
Pages
Foreword to the Second Edition
Notes
Foreword to the First Edition
Notes
Acknowledgements to the Second Edition
Acknowledgements to the First Edition
Introduction to the First Edition
Introduction to the Second Edition
Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots. Preliminaries to Part I. 1 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots
Galen
Nemesius
Thomas Willis
Clinico-pathological correlations in the nineteenth century
Single neuron investigations and fMRI in the twentieth century:primacy of behaviour
Misascription of psychological attributes to parts of the cortex andto neurons
2 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots
Psychological attributes are attributes of the sentient creature as a whole
Notes
1 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System
1.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius:The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine
1.2 Fernel and Descartes:The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine
1.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath
1.4 The Concept of a Reflex:Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall
1.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig
1.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington
1.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on thefunctioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasivelyby Ogawa and Sokolof
1.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers
Notes
2 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and His Protégés. 2.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact
2.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism
2.3 John Eccles and the ‘Liaison Brain’
2.4 Wilder Penfield and the ‘Highest Brain Mechanism’
Notes
3 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience. 3.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience
3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes
3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience
3.4 Replies to Objections
Notes
4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity
4.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being
4.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity
4.3 The Inner
4.4 Introspection
4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect
4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity
4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned
4.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature
Notes
Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis. Preliminaries to Part II. 1 Brain–Body Dualism
2 The Project
3 The Category of the Psychological
Notes
5 Sensation and Perception. 5.1 Sensation
5.2 Perception
5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities
5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz
5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem
5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr’s theory of vision
Notes
6 The Cognitive Powers
6.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability
6.1.1 Ability and know-how
6.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge
6.2 Memory
6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory
6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces
Notes
7 The Cogitative Powers
7.1 Belief
7.2 Thinking
7.3 Imagination and Mental Images
7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery
Notes
8 Emotion. 8.1 Affections
8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey
8.2.1 Neuroscientists’ confusions
8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions
Notes
9 Volition and Voluntary Movement. 9.1 Volition
9.2 Libet’ s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny
9.3 Refutations and Clarifications
9.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive
List 9.1Varieties of ignorance in performance
9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically, Mechanically, from Force of Habit
9.6 Taking Stock
Notes
10 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness. 10.1 Consciousness and the Brain
10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness
10.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness
10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms
10.3.1 A partial analysis
Notes
11 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia, Neural Correlates of Consciousness. 11.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness
11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States
11.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief andunconscious activities of the brain
11.3 Qualia
11.3.1 ‘How it feels’ to have an experience
11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like …
11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience
11.3.4 Thises and thuses
11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia
Notes
12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory. 12.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi
12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory
12.1.2 The ambiguity of ‘information’
12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again
12.2 Global Workspace Theory
12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene’ s example
12.2.2 On Dehaene’ s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing
12.3 On Finding One’ s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools
12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation
12.5 Where to Find the Explanations
Notes
13 Puzzles about Consciousness. 13.1 A Budget of Puzzles
13.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality
13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience
13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness
13.5 The Problem of Awareness
13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals
Notes
14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language. 14.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self
14.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James
14.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness
14.4 The Illusion of a ‘Self’
14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection
14.5.1 Thought and language
14.6 Self-Consciousness
Notes
15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking. 15.1 Concepts and Concept Possession
15.1.1 Beginning again
15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression
15.3 What Do We Think In?
Notes
16 Reductionism. 16.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism
16.2 Reduction by Elimination
16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical?
16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory?
16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human
16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits
Notes
17 Methodological Reflections
17.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation
17.2 The ‘Poverty of English’ Argument
17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy
17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation
17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience
17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do
17.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do
17.5 Why It Matters
Notes
Appendix 1 Daniel Dennett
1 Dennett’ s Methodology and Presuppositions
2 The Intentional Stance
3 Heterophenomenological Method
4 Consciousness
Notes
Appendix 2 John Searle
1 Philosophy and Science
2 Searle’ s Philosophy of Mind
3 Unified Field Theory
4 The Traditional Mind–Body Problem
Notes
Appendix 3 Further Replies to Critics
1 The Mereological Principle
2 Essentialism
3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games
4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence
5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change, Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism
Notes
Afterword to the Second Edition
Index
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