Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History

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Paul Vinogradoff. Villainage in England: Essays in English Mediaeval History

PREFACE

INTRODUCTION

FIRST ESSAY. THE PEASANTRY OF THE FEUDAL AGE

CHAPTER I. THE LEGAL ASPECT OF VILLAINAGE. GENERAL CONCEPTIONS

CHAPTER II. RIGHTS AND DISABILITIES OF THE VILLAIN

CHAPTER III. ANCIENT DEMESNE

CHAPTER IV. LEGAL ASPECT OF VILLAINAGE. CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER V. THE SERVILE PEASANTRY OF MANORIAL RECORDS

CHAPTER VI. FREE PEASANTRY

CHAPTER VII. THE PEASANTRY OF THE FEUDAL AGE. CONCLUSIONS

SECOND ESSAY. THE MANOR AND THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

CHAPTER I. THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND THE HOLDINGS

CHAPTER II. RIGHTS OF COMMON

CHAPTER III. RURAL WORK AND RENTS

CHAPTER IV. THE LORD, HIS SERVANTS AND FREE TENANTS

CHAPTER V. THE MANORIAL COURTS

CHAPTER VI. THE MANOR AND THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

APPENDIX

I

II

III

IV

V

VI

VII

VIII

IX

X

XI

XII

XIII

XIV

XV

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When the time comes for writing a history of the nineteenth century, one of the most important and attractive chapters will certainly be devoted to the development of historical literature. The last years of a great age are fast running out: great has been the strife and the work in the realm of thought as well as in the material arrangement of life. The generations of the nineteenth century have witnessed a mighty revival of religious feeling; they have attempted to set up philosophical systems as broad and as profound as any of the speculations of former times; they have raised the structure of theoretical and applied science to a height which could hardly have been foreshadowed some two hundred years ago. And still it is to historical study that we have to look as the most characteristic feature of the period. Medieval asceticism in its desperate struggle against the flesh, and Puritanism with its sense of individual reconciliation with God, were both more vigorous forms of religious life than the modern restorations of faith and Church, so curiously mixed up with helplessness, surrender of acquired truth, hereditary instincts, and utilitarian reflection. In philosophy, Hegel's metaphysical dialectic, Schopenhauer's transformation of Kant's teaching, and the attempts of English and French positivism at encyclopaedical science may be compared theoretically with Plato's poetical idealism or with the rationalistic schools of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But it would be difficult to deny, that in point of influence on men's minds, those older systems held a more commanding position than these: Hegel seems too arbitrary and phantastical, Schopenhauer too pessimistic, positivism too incomplete and barren as to ultimate problems to suit the practical requirements of philosophy; and people are already complaining of the decay of philosophical study. In science, again, the age of Darwin is certainly second to none, but it has to share its glory with the age of Newton, and it may be reasonably doubted whether the astronomer, following in the footsteps of Galileo and Kepler, was not actuated by even greater thirst and pride of knowledge than the modern biologist or geologist. It is otherwise with regard to history.

Students of science are wont to inveigh against the inexact character of historical research, its incoherence and supposed inability to formulate laws. It would be out of place here to discuss the comparative value of methods and the one-sided preference given by such accusers to quantitative analysis; but I think that if these accusers were better acquainted with the subject of their attacks, or even more attentive to the expressions of men's life and thought around them, they would hardly dare to maintain that a study which in the short space of a century has led to a complete revolution in the treatment of all questions concerning man and society, has been operating only by vague assumptions and guesses at random. An investigation into methods cannot be undertaken in these introductory pages, but a general survey of results may be attempted. If we merely take a single volume, Tocqueville's Ancien Régime, and ask ourselves whether anything at all like it could have been produced even in the eighteenth century, we shall have a sense of what has been going on in the line of historical study during the nineteenth. Ever since Niebuhr's great stroke, historical criticism has been patiently engaged in testing, sifting, and classifying the original materials, and it has now rendered impossible that medley of discordant authorities in which eighteenth-century learning found its confused notions of Romans in French costume, or sought for modern constitutional ideas as manifest in the policy of the Franks. Whole subjects and aspects of social life which, if treated at all, used to be sketchily treated in some appendix by the historian, or guessed at like a puzzle by the antiquarian, have come to the fore and are recognised as the really important parts of history. In a word, the study of the past vacillates no longer between the two extremes of minute research leading to no general results and general statements not based on any real investigation into facts. The laws of development may still appear only as dim outlines which must be more definitely traced by future generations of workers, but there is certainly a constant progress of generalisation on firmly established premises towards them.

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If protection against the lord had been the only object of the procedure in cases of ancient demesne, one does not see why there should be a 'little writ' at all, as there was a remedy against the lord's encroachments in the writ of 'Monstraverunt,'180 pleaded before the king's justices. As it is, the case of disseisin by the lord, to whom the manor had come from the crown, was treated simply as an instance of disseisin, and brought under the operation of the writ of right, while the 'Monstraverunt' was restricted to exaction of increased services and change of customs181. The latter writ was a very peculiar one, in fact quite unlike any other writ. The common-law rule that each tenant in severalty has to plead for himself did not apply to it; all join for saving of charges, albeit they be several tenants182. What is more, one tenant could sue for the rest and his recovery profited them all; on the other hand, if many had joined in the writ and some died or withdrew, the writ did not abate for this reason, and even if but one remained able and willing to sue he could proceed with the writ183. These exceptional features were evidently meant to facilitate the action of humble people against a powerful magnate184. But it seems to me that the deviation from the rules governing writs at common law is to be explained not only by the general aim of the writ, but also by its origin.

In form it was simply an injunction on a plaint. When for some reason right could not be obtained by the means afforded by the common law, the injured party had to apply to the king by petition. One of the most common cases was when redress was sought for some act of the king himself or of his officers, when the consequent injunction to the common law courts or to the Exchequer to examine the case invariably began with the identical formula which gave its name to the writ by which privileged villains complained of an increase of services; monstravit or monstraverunt N.N.; ex parte N.N. ostensum est:—these are the opening words of the king's injunctions consequent upon the humble remonstrations of his aggrieved subjects185. Again, we find that the application for the writ by privileged villains is actually described as a plaint186. In some cases it would be difficult to tell on the face of the initiatory document, whether we have to do with a 'breve de monstraverunt' to coerce the manorial lord, or with an extraordinary measure taken by the king with a view to settling his own interests187.

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