Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue

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Rev Fr Dr Robert Afayori. Christology in Christian-Muslim Dialogue

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CHAPTER TWO. RICOEUR AND THE HERMENEUTICS. OF THE SELF AND OTHER. 2.1 The Meaning and the. Development of Hermeneutics. Over the past hundred and fifty (150) years or more, the concept “Hermeneutics” has been approached from diverse perspectives by many scholars as a consequence of its far-reaching developmental processes and subsequent embracement of variegated subjects in the Sciences and Humanities. However, any understanding or meaning associated with the concept irrespective of the particular area of concern or approach never eludes the general understanding that hermeneutics is, “the theory or the philosophy of the interpretation of meaning.”136 The driving force for such an understanding may be the consequence of the etymology of the concept itself. It comes from the Greek verb hermeneuein (transliterated) meaning “to translate” or “to interpret” and its noun hermeneias meaning “translation” or “interpretation” 136 Josef Bleicher. Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as methods, philosophy and critique. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley. 1980, p.1. The history of hermeneutics goes back to the name Hermes,137 the mythological Greek deity who was known to be a messenger of the gods to humanity. As a messenger, Hermes did not only announce the message of the gods to humanity, but he also acted as an “interpreter” by rendering this message in the most intelligible and meaningful way to his subjects. His role was therefore the transmutation or the rendition of what was an unfamiliar, alien, and transcended human understanding to the limits of the familiar and human intelligibility. From this etymological perspective then, we could say that the origin of the modern words “hermeneutics” and “hermeneutical” suggests the process of “bringing to understanding” that which transcends human comprehension.138. 137 In his article “The Relevance of Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics to Thirty-six Fields of Human Activity”, Richard E. Palmer asserts that, as a messenger of the gods, Hermes carried messages from Zeus to everybody else. In doing so, he had to bridge the ontological gap between the thinking of the gods and that of the humans. He equally bridged the difference between the following: the invisible and the visible; the unconscious and the conscious. http:/www.mac.edu/richardpalmer/relevance.html (29/10/11) 138 Richard Palmer. Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. 1969, p.13. As an interpretive process, Richard E. Palmer intimates that the ancient Greek usage of the verb Hermeneuein in the light of the distinctive role played by Hermes points to three basic directions of meaning; namely: (1) hermeneuein as, “to express aloud in words”; (2) hermeneuein as, “to explain a situation”; and (3) hermeneuein as, “to translate”.139 Although these three dimensions find their singular expression in the verb; “to interpret”, they nonetheless point to three nuanced but significant subjects in the very art of interpretation and understanding in the “Hermes process”.140 These significant subjects are interpretation as oral recitation, interpretation as rational explanation, and interpretation as the translation of a foreign language.141 These three dimensions of the “Hermes process” in the light of the ancient Greek usage set the direction for the unfolding development of the concept as they occupied the attention of various interlocutors from ancient Greek philosophy if not earlier, to our contemporary time. 139 Richard Palmer. Hermeneutics. 1969, p.12-32. 140 In the light of Hermes’ role as a mediator, Palmer conceives the “Hermes process” as the rendition of something strange, unfamiliar and separated from time, space and experience to the horizons of the familiar, present and comprehensible (see, Richard Palmer. E. Hermeneutics. 1969, p.14) 141 Richard Palmer. Hermeneutics. 1969, p.12-32. Whereas we acknowledge that within the context of ancient Greek philosophy, we find some hermeneutical underpinnings in the Socratic and particularly Platonic dialogues in which a contrast is made between hermeneutic knowledge and Sophia,142 Aristotle also gave the term a further push in his work on the relationship between logic and semantics in Peri Hermeneias,143 laying the foundation for further theorizing on interpretation and semantics. In the middle ages, the Platonic reflection on hermeneutics as religious knowledge emerged more significantly as an important aspect of Biblical studies, later encompassing studies like ancient and classical culture.144. 142 Plato identifies hermeneutic knowledge as religious knowledge and Sophia as knowledge of the truth-value of utterances. The question is: could Plato’s association of hermeneutic knowledge to religious truths not be influence by the concept’s etymological underpinnings as we demonstrated above? 143 In Peri Hermeneias, Aristotle narrowed the meaning of hermeneutics to the determination of the truths and falsities of assertions. But Richard Palmer affirms that hermeneuein, hermeneias and their cognates were widely used in ancient Greek to mean interpretation in several senses such as: (1) oral interpretation of Homer and the classic texts; (2) the translation of one language to another; and (3) the exegesis of text. 144 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hermeneutics. (29/10/11) The focus of hermeneutics in this period was more on legal and theological methodology ensuring the rightful application of civil law, canon law and Biblical interpretation. From this period, hermeneutics sporadically emerged and advanced in its development as the theory of interpretation of authoritative literature under conditions in which the original meaning of a text was either disputed or remained hidden due to temporal distance and linguistic differences. In such fashion, the need for interpretative explications to render the text more transparent became relevant.145 Understood in this sense, Josef Bleicher intimates that the concept was employed in three capacities: “one, to assist discussions about the language of a text giving rise to philology; two, to facilitate exegesis of Biblical literature; three, to guide jurisdiction.”146. 145 Josef Bleicher. Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as methods, philosophy and critique. 1980, p.11. 146 Bleicher, Josef. Contemporary Hermeneutics. 1980, p.11: For a more comprehensive treatment of hermeneutics considered as philology, exegesis and a guide to civil law, confer p.12-13 of the above book by Josef Bleicher. As it is not our intention to present a thesis on the historical development and meaning of hermeneutics in this introductory section, we nonetheless want to assert that the whole process of “the art of understanding and interpretation” as hermeneutics went through a period of gradual, continuous, unfolding and grasping of a deeper meaning of the concept forming different strands of hermeneutic systems which range from the simple to the complex, from particular to universal, from the ancient to the contemporary, without each necessarily repudiating the other. For in Ast and Wolf, we find that hermeneutics turned into the philological rules of interpretation of a particular text.147 Schleiermacher crystallized these rules to form a universal hermeneutic for the interpretation of any text. Dilthey builds on this universal character of hermeneutics to produce his Geisteswissenschaften.148 Here, Dilthey’s aim was to develop an objectively valid interpretation of “expressions of inner life” with concrete, historical, and lived experiences as the starting points, over against speculative expressions149 through his typology of experience-expression-explanation. While Dilthey saw his hermeneutics as finding an historically oriented methodology for the Geisteswissenschaften, Heidegger sought to study hermeneutics within the larger context of ontology, the hermeneutics of Dasein150 – an agenda whose primary aim was to go beyond the roots of western conception of being and to make visible the presuppositions that they shared. In Heidegger, hermeneutics turned phenomenological. 147 Ast and Wolf’s philological rules gave rise to what we call regional hermeneutics in which the methodology for textual interpretation was determined by the type of text to be interpreted. Thus, literary text gave rise to philological hermeneutics, legal text to juridical hermeneutics, sacred text to biblical hermeneutics (see, Ormiston, Gayle, L. & Schrift, Alan, D. (editors). Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur. 1990, p.11). Josef Bleicher. Contemporary Hermeneutics. 1980, p.14. 148 Geisteswissenschaften was traditionally a division of the faculty in German Universities that covered subjects such as Philosophy, Philology, Social Science, History, Theology and Jurisprudence; what is today called the humanities. However, in the medieval period, Philosophy encompassed these subjects including the natural sciences and Mathematics under the category of Naturwissenschaften. Dilthey argued for a separation between Philosophy and the Historical sciences (the human sciences) from that of the Natural Science and Mathematics (Naturwissenschaften). He placed the human sciences under the category of Geisteswissenschaften with their unique methodology (see, R. Palmer, Hermeneutics. 1969, p.98-99) 149 Dilthey’s reason for such a starting and ending point is his argument that, “Behind life itself, our thinking cannot go”. Our thinking and questioning are all done within the context of our existential experiences. This should not be bypassed in preference to the realm of ideas (see, R. Palmer, Hermeneutics. 1969, p.98-99) 150 Dasein is a concept that Heidegger used to conceive of existence. It stands for “Being-in-the-world”. In his hermeneutical phenomenology, he sees existence as taking place in a world that is already given, which we take for granted. Many of the elements that shape Dasein are hidden and require interpretation for existence to be understood. His whole project was therefore to uncover these hidden phenomena of Dasein. (see, Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, (trans. Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E) p.183-194) With Heideggerian hindsight, Gadamer asserted that any understanding we have of ourselves or of the world is based on a prior understanding. In opposition to Schleiermacher and Dilthey, Gadamer asserted that hermeneutics is not a method of understanding, but the attempt to clarify the conditions that make understanding possible. Among these conditions are prejudice and the fore conceptions in the mind of the interpreter.151 Gadamer defined hermeneutics as the dialogical encounter between the reader and the text, often personified as the thou of the encounter. In this way, he identifies dialogical conversations as the dialectics of question and answer which eventually leads to the fusion of horizons between the text and the reader. As a consequence, Gadamer “represents a radical reworking of the idea of hermeneutics that constitutes a break with the preceding hermeneutical tradition, and yet also reflects back on that tradition.”152 In Gadamer, hermeneutic turned philosophical. 151 Gadamer. Truth and Method (second edition). 1989, p.307. 152 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Hans-Georg Gadamer. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/ (18/02/2012) The Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics on prejudice and the fusion of horizons met some opposition from Critical hermeneutics. This hermeneutic system emerged from a renewed fidelity to the Cartesian certainty and the influential theories of Karl Marx, Wilhelm Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud153 giving rise to the growth of critical theorists such as Jürgen Habermas, Emilio Betti, Eric D. Hirsch, Karl-Otto Apel and Jacque Derrida. At this point, we may find a tension between philosophical hermeneutics and critical hermeneutics on the one hand, and the challenge of deconstruction on the other. The tension lies in whether or not it is enough to espouse hermeneutics as a methodological search for objective knowledge or if it transcends methods to embrace the conditions that make understanding possible? The other side of the quandary is whether from the deconstructive perspective, it is even possible to talk at all about critical hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics. 153 These three masters indicated that textuality can be infiltrated by powers and forces that are extraneous to it. For Marx, it can be warped by capitalist and class-based ideologies; Nietzsche, by cultural norms; and Freud, the unconscious. These extraneous powers and forces according to them, are capable of penetrating deep into the text by weaving into its linguistic fabric. It is in response to the above tension that we properly locate Paul Ricoeur’s contributions to hermeneutics meaning and development. While affirming the Gadamerian model of conversation in hermeneutics, Ricoeur also argues for the introduction of relevant explanatory methods which can challenge or even correct one’s initial understanding of the other, “by showing how certain structures and other linguistic, cultural, social, economic, religious, historical networks embedded in texts can be decoded through the use of the relevant methods.”154 The purpose was not to replace Gadamer’s model, but to enrich it. For Ricoeur, while dialogical conversation is at the beginning and at the end of hermeneutics, the explanation serves to interrupt the process to uncover the meaning “behind texts” to facilitate understanding. This temporary interruption is what Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of suspicion which is allied to critical theory. While the Ricoeurean hermeneutics of suspicion relies on methods such as the structuralist, historical-critical, semantic, formal and aesthetic methods, the purpose is to help spot and to heal the problem disrupting the conversation between reader and text to facilitate understanding.155. 154 David Tracy. “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue”. 2010, p.11. 155 David Tracy. “Western Hermeneutics and Interreligious Dialogue”. 2010, p.12. In this way, Ricoeur develops a unique form of hermeneutics. With a Hegelian influence, he employs a methodology he calls “refined dialectics”, in which “he weaves together heterogeneous concepts and discourses to form a composite discourse in which new meanings are created without diminishing the specificity and difference of the constitutive terms.”156 Like Hegel, this dialectic involves identifying key oppositional terms in a debate, and then proceeding to articulate their synthesis into a new and more developed concept. Unlike Hegel, the Ricoeurean synthesis does not have the uniformity of a Hegelian synthesis but demonstrates how the meanings of two seemingly opposed terms are implicitly informed by each other. Here, the terms maintain their differences at the same time that a “common ground” is formed: teasing out a unity of continuity in discontinuity, convergence in divergence, and a similarity in difference.157 It is along these lines that the concept of the “hermeneutic process” in this study is built. In this way, we conceptualize hermeneutics as that method, theory and praxis of interpretation which seeks to comprehend the meaning of a text that is obscured by temporal or cultural distance. A “text” here can either be spoken or written words. It is a theory because it deals with the epistemological validity and the possibility of understanding and interpretation; a method because it demonstrates how the project of understanding and interpretation is made possible; and praxis because it engages in the actual process of interpretation and understanding of “text”. Yet, all these layers in the meaning of the concept remain unachievable without particular concern for the conditions that make understanding possible. 156 Atkins Kim. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Paul Ricoeur”. (02/02/2012) 157 Atkins, Kim. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “Paul Ricoeur”. (02/02/2012) In consequence, the hermeneutic issues we shall raise in this study will be particularly Ricoeurean. First of all, the hermeneutic discourse on selfhood and otherness in this chapter is guided by how Ricoeur presents the attestation of the self as a bridge between the self and the other. The interest here is not only to demonstrate how Ricoeur’s notion of attestation creatively mediates the epistemological gap created by the impasse between Descartes’ cogito and Nietzsche’s demolition of it, but more so, to show how attestation serves to remove dialogue from an argumentative and confrontational context into the mutual sharing between the self and the other. The purpose is to facilitate learning and understanding of the self and the other. As we indicated before, the results of this exercise in learning could lead to the eradication of prejudices and stereotypes one has about the other; it could also lead to a sharpened awareness of the fastidiousness of one’s own religious beliefs and their significance; or it could also lead to the discovery of common values. In this way, the study asserts that Christian-Muslim attestations to their faith convictions about the identity and the mission of Jesus Christ traverses the problem of parallel monologues and creates the space for mutual understanding and learning. Secondly, through idem, ipse and narrative identities, Ricoeur also demonstrates the essential constitution of our identities, how they are formed and how others contribute to the enrichment of our identities and we theirs. For Ricoeur, literary narratives and life histories are not exclusive from each other because narratives are always part of us before they are exiled from life into writing and return to life along the multiple paths of appropriation.158 For Ricoeur, in narrating our history, we find that, “whole sections of our lives are part of the life history of others – that is, of my parents, my friends, my companions in work and in leisure.”159 Hence, in narrating the story of one’s life, one finds others who are co-authors to one’s narrative identity. “Learning to narrate oneself is also learning how to narrate oneself in other ways.”160 Situating these aspects of personal identity within the context of dialogue as an exercise in learning, we shall demonstrate how they apply to the identities of the Christian and the Muslim and how they set the context for Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology. 158 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p.163. 159 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p.161. 160 Paul Ricoeur. The Course of Recognition. 2005, p.101. 2.2 Attestation as Mediation in the Crisis of the Cogito. Reflexivity “refers to the capacity to reflect on oneself, to take responsibility for oneself and to act upon oneself. These reflexive acts of the self are basic features of selfhood.”161 However, as we shall see, the concept of the self together with the possibilities and the limits of reflexivity are highly contested in both philosophical and theological discourses. In other words, while the modern emphasis on reflexivity laid the foundations for “a self-transparent, self-grounding knowing subject who is also an autonomous lawgiver and sufficient moral agent”,162 others think that this emphasis on reflexivity has severely distorted our understanding of human existence, deepening our egocentricity and nurturing the illusions of the self. In Oneself as Another, whereas Ricoeur views Descartes, Kant and Husserl among others as espousing the philosophies of the exalted subject,163 he presents Nietzsche as Descartes’ a “privileged adversary” whose critique of the self, shatters and humiliates the philosophies of the “exalted cogito”. In Ricoeur’s view, the aftermath of Nietzsche’s assault on the “exalted cogito” left it in a critical condition. For Ricoeur, the philosophies of the “exalted cogito” overlook the distortions that may be inherent in self-interpretation. While being a reminder of the possibility of self-deception, Nietzsche’s “shattered cogito” only leads to the all-consuming abyss of suspicion. With this impasse, Ricoeur introduces attestation as a new form of the certainty of the self. The attestation of the self, “is a matter of identifying oneself, of recognizing who one is and of taking responsibility for oneself.”164. 161 Brian Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.23. 162 Brian Gregor. A Philosophical anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.23. 163 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself As Another. 1992, p.4. 164 Brian Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross. 2013, p.25. In the Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes constructs a hypothesis of an all-encompassing metaphysical doubt to indicate the disproportions within a particular area of certainty.165 To dramatize the doubt he creates the hypothesis of the great deceiver or an evil genius as the one behind every conceivable thought in me. He then concludes that there must be a “cogito” for the evil genius to deceive, otherwise it would be an empty enterprise. Hence, “if the cogito can arise out of this extreme condition of doubt, it is because someone is doing the doubting.”166 This led to the philosophy of the Cartesian certainty – “cogito ergo sunt” (the philosophies of the exalted cogito). It is this kind of philosophy that Kant and Husserl among others would later develop. For instance, Husserl asserted that consciousness is determined by intentionality. To be conscious is to be conscious that I am a ‘true’ being – definitively decided or a definitively decidable being. So, if I abstain from believing or accepting the already established philosophical foundations and my experience of the world around me, “I do so now as the ego that philosophizes and exercises the aforesaid abstention.”167 In a Kantian sense, Husserl also reckons that, “all reality is pure phenomena”168 – the only data from which we can begin. They appear in the mind and in the form of unchanging and invariable types and essences.169 Through epoché,170 intentional consciousness effects an eidetic intuition which makes objects present to the subject. Thus, epoché is, “the radical and the universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: as ego and with my own conscious life, in and by which the entire objective world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me.”171. 165 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.5. 166 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.5. 167 Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations.1999, p.19. 168 Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations 1999, p20. 169 Michael Barnes. Theology and the Dialogue of Religions. 2002, p.74. 170 Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations.1999, p.20-21. 171 Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations.1999, p.20-21. Consequently, Husserl asserted that this state of being reveals a transcendental ego whose intentional act is the source of objective knowledge of the world. In this way, “anything belonging to the world, any spatiotemporal being, exists for me – that is to say, is accepted by me – in that I experience it, perceive it, remember it, think of it somehow, judge it, value it, desire it or the like.”172 Thus, the other is for me absolutely nothing other than the way I conceive it to be in my conscious cogito. This emphasis on the cogito led to Michael Barnes’ assertion that the Husserlian Egology implies that, “the world is ordered round me as the centre. Temporally and spatially, I am at the centre with everything and everyone, near and far, dependent on me insofar as they appear to me.”173 Here, the cogito is posited as the exclusive claimant of truth, the archetypal of religious exclusivism. It is the self who gives meaning to the other without reference to the other’s self-understanding. 172 Edmund Husserl. Cartesian Meditations 1999, p.20-21. 173 Michael Barnes. Theology and the Dialogue of Religions. 2002, p.74. Opposed to this Husserlian Egology is the Levinasian emphasis on the infinity and the ethical transcendent of the other. For Levinas “infinity remains ever exterior to thought and overflows the thoughts that think it.”174 The self’s relation with the other is a “relation without relation”. This is because the other who is, first of all, not reducible to the same, remains unknowable, is outside the totality of the same and calls Egology to question. Secondly, when the “I” encounters the other, the “I” is called back to the meaning of its freedom – a freedom which is founded by the other. Here, the genuine freedom of the “I” is based on its responsibility and its obligation towards the other.175 In other words, the ethical responsibility of the “I” is to guard the infinite other against any systematic determination of moral principles. These set of priori principles are considered as violations to the alterity of the other. 174 Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. 1969, p.195. 175 Emmanuel Levinas. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. 1969, p.79. While Levinas’ conception of the infinite other more or less dethrones the Husserlian cogito, Ricoeur presents a Nietzschean position176 in Oneself as Another which shatters the exalted Cogito’s hyper-certainty as mere illusions. Nietzsche’s attack against the above foundational claim to philosophy is based on his critique of language in which philosophy expresses itself. For Nietzsche, language is figurative and is thus reputed to be deceitful. It is a paradox in a double sense: “first, in that, from the opening lines, life, apparently taken in a referential and nonfigural sense, is taken as the source of the fable by which it sustains itself.177 Secondly, language is paradoxical in that, “Nietzsche’s own discourse on truth as a lie ought to be drawn into the abyss of the paradox of the liar. But Nietzsche is precisely the thinker who assumes this paradox to the end.”178 Thus for Nietzsche, this turn is, “missed by the commentators who take the apology of life, of the will to power, to be the revelation of a new immediacy, substituted in the very place and with the same foundational claims of the cogito.”179. 176 Ricoeur presents the views of Nietzsche, Freud and Marx as representing what he calls the “hermeneutic of suspicion” because of the way they attempt to expose false consciousness. Even though he refers to them collectively as the masters of suspicion; in Oneself as Another (1992), Ricoeur presents Nietzsche alone as Descartes “privileged Adversary”. (See, Brian Gregor. A Philosophical anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.24) 177 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.12. 178 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.12. 179 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.12. In consequence, Nietzsche asserted that the Cartesian certainty is an illusion because in Descartes’ effort to establish an Archimedean point from which he can freely inspect the world, certain forces, certain will to power, already conditions the way Descartes regards the data.180 The cogito therefore, “flatters itself that it can gain a transparent view of itself, that it can set itself on display and the reflection but this self-consciousness is actually self-deception.”181 For Nietzsche, the human being is an animal who has cultivated the illusions of culture and civilization but the bestial nature remains and this is what underlines the cogito.182 Thus, truth is not the correspondence between signs and reality as the cogito implies. “Reality is just a matter of conventions that we fit to our preferences”,183 and so truth is the obligation to lie according to these conventions. There is no factual reality beyond these conventions. All we have are interpretations.184. 180 Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of morals and Ecce Homo. 1968, p.119-130. 181 Brian Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.24. 182 Brian Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.24. 183 Brian. Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.24. 184 Brian. Gregor. A Philosophical Anthropology of the Cross: The Cruciform Self. 2013, p.24. From the discourses above, one finds a dialectic tension between Descartes’ “exalted cogito” and Nietzsche’s “shattered cogito”.185 Even though Ricoeur agrees with Nietzsche’s criticism of the Cartesian tradition (the hermeneutics of suspicion), he does not give in to the Nietzscheans total dissolution of the cogito. According to Ricoeur, one may not be able to attain an absolute certainty about the cogito but one can reach some degree of certainty about it through attestation.186 He defines attestation as a kind of belief, “but not a doxic belief in the sense in which doxa (belief) has less standing than episteme.”187 Whereas, “a doxic belief is implied in the grammar of ‘I believe that’, attestation belongs to the grammar of ‘I believe in’.”188 It connotes the sense of credence, a belief-in and trust. It is linked with testimony, “inasmuch as it is in the speech of the one giving testimony that one believes.”189 In other words, “when I attest to something, I not only believe that, but I believe in something. It is more a statement of confidence and conviction than knowledge and certainty.”190 Here, Ricoeur places attestation at an equal distance between the “exalted cogito” and the “shattered cogito”. This however does not suggest that it is placed in an exact midpoint between the two. Rather, it implies that attestation occupies an epistemic and ontological position beyond the alternatives provided by the exalted cogito and its demolition.191 To express it symbolically, Greisch asserts that Ricoeur’s idea of attestation implies that the cogito of attestation is neither a triumphant cogito as with the Cartesians or a crushed cogito as per Nietzsche but a wounded cogito that is capable of believing in itself.192. 185 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.16. 186 For Ricoeur, “attestation defines the sort of certainty that hermeneutics claim, not only with respective to the epistemic exaltation of the cogito in Descartes, but also with respect to its humiliation in Nietzsche and his successors”. (See Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.21) 187 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.21. 188 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.21. 189 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.21. 190 David Kaplan. Ricoeur’s Critical Theory. 2003, p.92. 191 Jean Greisch. “Testimony and Attestation” in Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. 1996, p.84-85. 192 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.86. This concept of attestation serves as the basis for Ricoeur’s development of the hermeneutics of the self. For Ricoeur, “attestation is fundamentally the attestation of the self.”193 It is a “trust in the power to say, in the power to do, in the power to recognize oneself as a character in a narrative, in the power, and finally, to respond to an accusation in the form of the accusative.”194 Attestation is “assurance of being oneself acting and suffering.”195 This assurance remains the ultimate recourse against all suspicion. It provides the epistemological response to the question: “What knowledge does the self-have about itself?” In response, the self is seen as the being that is both an agent and a patient. Ontologically, if it is asked: “who is the self?” For Ricoeur, the self is “the assurance – the credence and the trust – of existing in the mode of selfhood.”196 According to Ricoeur, this assurance or confidence is the ultimate recourse against all suspicion; even if it is always in some sense received from another, it is always self-attestation. “It is a self-attestation that every – linguistic, praxis, narrative and prescriptive – will preserve the question ‘who?’ from being replaced by the question ‘what?’ or ‘why?’”197 Attestation is credence without any guarantee but also a trust greater than any suspicion. The certainty of attestation is not a scientific one but a trust, a confidence, an assurance that cannot be demolished completely by suspicion. 193 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.22. 194 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.22. 195 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.22. 196 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.302. 197 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another.1992, p.23. Within the context of Christian-Muslim dialogue, Christology is one of the most contentious theological subjects which divides the two religions irreconcilably. This is because whereas Christians believe that Jesus Christ is the “Son of God” (human and divine), Muslims believe that this very Jesus is only a “Prophet” of Allah bereft of divine connotations. The Islamic doctrine of the Tawhid (the oneness of God) serves as the basis from which God is understood as absolutely transcendent. Since there is only one God (Surah 5: 73) in Islam, Jesus only functions as the “Messenger” or as a “Prophet” of Allah within the context of the Tawhid. This underscores the Islamic truth claims on Christology. In contrast, the Christian experience of God as the Holy Trinity also serves as the formidable grounds on which Jesus Christ is understood as the “Son of God” (the second person of the Holy Trinity) Consequently, when one focuses on the right claim to Christological truths between Christianity and Islam, one only creates the hotbed for theological confrontations. As Pratt put it, “not only have internal theological debates and discussions been hotbeds of high emotions and deep dissent but such engagement between the religions … have been equally, if not more so, contentious and fraught”198in the history of Christian-Muslim relations. As religions of belief, the theologies of Islam and Christianity constitute self-enclosed systems of meaning and doctrine which can only be measured by their internal logic and coherence.199 Here, the truth claims that one religious tradition cannot be used as the standard of measurement for the truthfulness of another. The attempts to engage the two traditions in such forms of dialogue only leads to a parallel monologue or the context of claim and counterclaim, and in the end, the mutual dismissal of the other’s viewpoint.200. 198 Douglas Pratt. The Challenge of Islam. 2005, p.203. 199 Catherin Cornille. “Meaning and Truth in Dialogue between Religions” in Depoortere, F &Lambkin, M. (Eds.). The Question of Theological Truth. Philosophical and Interreligious Perspectives. 2012, p.137-139. 200 Catherine Cornille. “Meaning and Truth in Dialogue between Religions”. 2012, p.138. In this way, what is required today is the kind of Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology which allows the self and the other to tell their stories about the life and the mission of Jesus Christ in a mutual atmosphere of give and take – a conversation which is neither defined by the Cartesian style of the “exalted cogito” nor shaped by the Nietzschean sense of it. Instead, what is needed is the Ricoeurean sense of attestation whereby Christians and Muslims attest to their respective truth claims on Christology within the overall process of dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other. Here, the question is not who is right about Christology but what can be learnt from the stories and testimonies of belief that the other tells about the identity and the mission of Jesus Christ in their tradition-specific context. In other words, attestation in Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology focuses on the mutual sharing of testimonies of one’s beliefs about Jesus, while maintaining some degree of openness to learn from the other’s testimonies of faith in Jesus. The purpose is to learn from and about the other and to grow as a consequence of this learning. This process of religious learning and growth is at the heart of the discipline of interreligious learning. As an exercise in learning from and about the other, dialogue guided by the Ricoeurean notion of attestation is far more likely to succeed than the often argumentative and confrontational forms of dialogue based on truth-claims. A dialogue between two competing “exalted cogitos” lead to dialogical aporias. While we argue for the case of attestation as the appropriate context for Christian-Muslim dialogue as an exercise in learning from and about the other, this form of dialogue also raises epistemological and ethical questions in respect of the relationship between the self and the other. In other words, if learning about the other leads to learning about oneself, then the question is: how can the other’s self-enclosed systems of belief that become the context for reflection about one’s beliefs? As Barnes put it, “how precisely is faith deepened – and what is learnt?”201 Furthermore, what becomes of the identity of the other after this learning? Does it remain the same or is it a matter of becoming and growing – and thus of change and transformation?202 If the latter pertains, how does it occur without the self, losing itself? 201 Michael Barnes. Interreligious Learning. 2012, p. x. 202 Marianne Moyaert. Fragile Identities. 2011, p.2. We shall respond to these questions with the aid of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the self, expressed in idem, ipse and narrative identities. By engaging these three aspects of personal identity, we shall argue that they disclose the possibilities of the intertwinement of personal narratives in contexts where they are considered exclusive of each other. By engaging in this form of dialogue as an exercise in learning, one might be surprised, to borrow Leirvik’s words, at how “dialogical overtones in Bakhtin’s sense may strike a note anywhere in the scale between parody, polemics and affirmations.”203 We shall first of all, argue that such a disclosure is in itself an exercise in learning about a subject which has remained contentious in Christian-Muslim relations (Christology). Secondly, while being committed to their traditions and open to learn from the traditions of the other, when the content of these disclosures lead to the common cognition of common values which require collective actions in response to them, then dialogue as an exercise in learning is all the more successful on the basis of its goal. Here, the other’s tradition-specific understanding of Christology does not change per se. What may change as a consequence of the dialogue is their mutual interrelationship – which is transformed from disparate actions to collective action. As a starting point, let us first of all, see how Ricoeur’s views on idem, ipse and narrative identities prepare the grounds for the possibility of Christian-Muslim conversations on Christology. 203 See, Oddbjørn Leirvik. The Images of Jesus Christ in Islam. 2011, p.16; Bakhtin, Mikhail. Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. 1986, 92, p.93-107. 2.3 The Two Poles of Personal Identity. In Oneself as Another, Ricoeur identifies two modes of personal identity: idem-identity and ipse-identity. While idem-identity is characterized by sameness or the permanent features of things, ipse-identity concerns the self-constancy needed for keeping one’s word. For Ricoeur, these two modes of identity define two modes of permanence in time.204 Ricoeur presents character as conveying the equivocalness or double valence of the mode of identity as sameness and selfhood. Hence, the self is the embodiment of idem-identity and ipse-identity; and narrative identity holds together the dialectics of idem-identity and ipse-identity in the person. Let us begin this hermeneutic journey by examining Ricoeur’s notion of idem, ipse and narrative identities. 204 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.116. 2.3.1 The Mode of the Self as an Idem-identity. In real life experience we normally distinguish one person from another by their appearances. For Ricoeur, their body and their character which differentiates them from one another, gives them a specific identity. Ricoeur identifies this form of identity as sameness or idem-identity. Identity here is viewed as either a state of being the same or a state of being oneself or one thing and not another. According to Ricoeur, idem-identity is a constituent of personal identity, which is stable and sedimented in the person. Ricoeur presents four criteria by which sameness can be understood: numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity, and permanence in time.205. 205 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.116-118. Numerical identity connotes the sense of oneness or unity as opposed to plurality. In other words, “we say that two occurrences of a thing, designated by an invariable noun in ordinary language, that they do not form two different things but ‘one and the same’ thing.”206 For Ricoeur, the first component of this notion of identity corresponds to the notion of identification whereby the same thing can be reidentified twice, thus making cognition recognition: that is, identifying the same thing twice, n times.207 Qualitative identity however relates to similarity over difference. According to Ricoeur, qualitative identity relates to the category of extreme resemblance where for instance, “we say that x and y are wearing the same suits – clothes that are so similar that they are interchangeable with no noticeable difference”.208 These two components of identity apply when we speak of the physical identity of a person. “We have no trouble recognizing someone who simply enters and leaves, appears, disappears and reappears.”209 Hence, qualitative identity helps us to resolve problems where numerical identity fails. For instance, in a case where one is unsure about whether or not two appearances correspond to “one and the same thing” as indicated earlier, one can resort to the criterion of qualitative identity to ascertain their resemblance.210. 206 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.116. 207 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.116. 208 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.16. 209 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.116-117. 210 Paul Ricoeur. “Narrative Identity” in Philosophy Today 35: 1 (1991), p.74. However, Ricoeur asks the question; “how do we know that the person standing here in court is the author of a crime committed ten years ago?” For Ricoeur, this question exposes the weakness in qualitative identity because changes may have occurred in the appearance of the person after ten years. Thus, temporal distance and the changes that occur within it weakens the idea of qualitative identity due to its reliance on the criterion of similitude. This suggests the need for another criterion of identity, one which belongs to the third component of the notion of identity, namely uninterrupted continuity.211 For Ricoeur, it is uninterrupted continuity which helps us to identify persons or things in spite of change over time. This explains why we can say that an oak tree is the same from the acorn to the fully developed tree. This form of continuity, “rests upon the ordered series of small changes, which, taken one by one, threaten resemblance without destroying it.”212 In this way, Ricoeur sees time within the context of uninterrupted continuity as, “a factor of dissemblance, of diversity and of difference. The threat of time “represents identity that is not entirely dissipated unless we can posit at the basis of similitude and uninterrupted continuity, a principle of permanence in time.”213. 211 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.117. 212 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.117. 213 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.117. The principle of permanence in time could be seen in a tool which maintains its structure despite the replacement of all its parts, or in the genetic code of a biological individual. What remains permanent in these two subjects is their structure, and their “structure” for Ricoeur, reflects the sense of permanence in time.214 Permanence in time is viewed by Ricoeur as the most complete criterion of identity as sameness. While numerical and qualitative identity do not properly appropriate the problem of the passage of time, uninterrupted continuity takes into consideration the time problematic but leaves identity as sameness with the difficulty of following the trajectory of a thing through time. However, the criterion of permanence in time resolves the time problematic in that it focuses on the structure of a thing, which remains the same through time. 214 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.117. Having considered the four criteria that determine idem-identity as sameness, Ricoeur then seeks to find out whether there is a form of permanence in time which is not simply the schema of the category of substance. In other words, “is there a form of permanence in time which can be connected to the question who? inasmuch as it is irreducible to the question what? Is there a form of permanence in time that is a response to the question ‘whom am I?’”215 For Ricoeur, while the response to the question (who?), directs us to person, the question (what?) focuses on things. In this way, Ricoeur indicates that when we speak of ourselves, we in fact have two models of permanence in the time available to us. These are: “character” and “keeping one’s word”. The polarity between these two models of permanence in time with respect to persons results from the fact that, “the permanence of character expresses the mutual overlapping of the problematic of idem and ipse, while “faithfulness in keeping one’s word” marks the extreme gap between the permanence of the self and that of the same.216 As we shall later discover, Ricoeur will present narrative identity as the mediation between the poles of character where idem and ipse tend to coincide. However, he indicates that it is in self-maintenance that selfhood frees itself from sameness. 215 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.118. 216 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.118. According to Ricoeur, character expresses another kind of sameness which constitutes an aspect of personal identity. He defines character as, “the set of distinctive marks which permit the reidentification of a human individual as being the same”217 or “the set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognised.”218 As a set of permanent dispositions, whereas character gives to personal identity the stability which is proper to identity as sameness, also expresses a dimension of ipseity through the permanent dispositions in the person who answers the question “who am I”? In this way, character demonstrates an overlap between idem-identity and ipse-identity. If we understand character as the set of permanent dispositions in a person, then character reflects the sense of numerical identity in that it can be identified and re-identified as “one and the same thing” in a person. It also expresses qualitative identity because it defines the features in the individual which allows for easy comparison of one character with another. For example, one could say to his long-time friend: “you really haven’t changed after all these years.” Uninterrupted continuity also helps us to see the same person we knew some years ago despite some changes in them (physical or psychological). The permanence in time of character is situated within “the set of distinctive marks” that remain constant in the person. 217 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.119. 218 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. Ricoeur identifies character as constituted by two main factors: habits and acquired identifications.219 Habits are the sedimentations of practices in a person. These sedimented practices somewhat form a “second nature” in the person. According to Ricoeur, what we do and learn by doing affect our habits and our habits define to some extent, who we are and guide our orientations. They are formed without the conscious attention to the question; “who to be?” Habits have a twofold valence: those that are formed and habits that are acquired.220 These two forms of habits give character a history – “a history in which sedimentation tends to cover over the innovation which preceded it, even to the point of abolishing the latter.”221 Character also relates to “the acquired identifications by which the other enters into the composition of the same.”222 These acquired identifications denote the values, norms, ideals, models and heroes in which a person or a community assumes as proper and recognize itself by.223 These identifications clearly display how one takes on otherness and makes it one’s own. In other words, through acquired identifications, what was initially alien to a person or the community now becomes part of oneself. In this way, the person or the community begins to understand these identifications as necessary for their survival. This sense of necessity elicits an element of loyalty that is incorporated into character and makes it turn towards fidelity and hence, towards maintaining the self. How does this aspect of identity apply in the case of the Christian and the Muslim tradition-specific understandings of Christology? 219 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. 220 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. 221 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. 222 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. 223 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.121. Raymond Brown indicates that Christology, “discusses the evaluation of Jesus Christ in respect of who he was and the role he played in the divine plan.”224 Within this evaluative context, while Christians believe that Jesus is God and the “Son of God”, Muslims believe that he is only a “Prophet” or the “Messenger” of Allah. These different theological evaluations of Jesus along with other religious doctrines contribute to defining the horizons which shape the Christian and the Muslim belief and understandings of Christology. If Ricoeur points out that idem-identity denotes sameness – that is, the set of lasting dispositions which one does not choose but by which one is recognised, then Muslims and Christians equally share this dimension of sameness within their respective views on Christology – referred to here as their “tradition-specific understandings of Christology. Here, sameness constitutes the religious practices, rites, symbols, customs and traditions which the adherent does not choose but from which his or her religious identity is derived. As Moyaert indicated, Christian identity for instance means the, “identification with particular Christian norms, values, doctrines, Biblical texts, rituals and the like.”225. 224 Raymond Brown. Introduction to New Testament Christology. 1994, p.3. 225 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p.79. Christians believe in the Holy Trinity because of their experience of God as the Father, the Son (Jesus Christ) and the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is therefore constitutively part of the “deposit of faith” that has been handed on from the Apostles to successive generations of Christians. This deposit of faith which is passed on to every Christian through formal education (catechises) contributes to forming and shaping the identity of the Christian. Within this doctrine, Jesus Christ is only understood as the “Son of God” and the “Saviour of the World”. Hence, the Bible, the norms and practice of Christian ritual, all give expression to this belief in Jesus Christ as the “Son of God”. This defines the idem aspects of Christian identity. In Islam too, belief in the Qur’an, the profession of the Shahada and observing the five pillars of the religion among other religious practices shape the identity of the Muslim. For instance, the obligation to the Tawhid forms the root of Islamic monotheism. The confession that “there is no god but One God” (Surah 5: 73) is a fundamental statement of Islamic belief and all Muslims are identified by that confession. Hence, the Shahada and the Tawhid which inform many Islamic faith practices define the idem-dimension of the Muslim’s identity. They are the same for all Muslims within their tradition-specific contexts. As Moyaert observes, “idem is not added to the faith commitment but is constitutive of it.”226. 226 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p.79. In this way, “by reading certain texts, adhering to certain rules, agreeing with specific doctrines and by performing certain religious practices which rather remain stable, the believer (Christian or Muslim) submits his or her life to God.”227 Although sedimented in the believer, this idem dimension of religious identity is delicate in the sense that it is the immediate aspect of every religion which could be in danger of being lost in the face of religious plurality and interreligious dialogue. As a consequence, Ricoeur notes in a different context that some religions tend towards a “protective withdrawal” from the religious other because of the fear of losing this aspect of their identity.228 Within the context of dialogue as an exercise in learning, we agree with Moyaert that, “there is thus no single reason to formulate a negative judgement about the idem dimension of religious identity.”229 Whereas for Moyaert, the reason is that, “the idem aspect is not added to faith commitment but is constituted of it”, for us, another compelling reason also lies in the fact that religious truths are self-enclosed systems of meaning (Trinity vis-a-vis Tawhid) which can only be measured by their internal coherence. Hence, no particular system (whether Islam or Christianity) can be used as a standard of measurement for the truthfulness of the other. The idem-identity of the Christian or the Muslim very often forms their second nature – the sedimented part of their identity which the faithful believer protects at all cost. It is for this reason that interreligious learning emphasizes caution and respect for the religious beliefs of the other. If idem aspect of religious identity refers to the unchanging aspects of the religions, what defines their ipseity? 227 Marianne Moyaert. “Fragile Identities.» 2011, p.254. 228 Paul Ricoeur. “Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe.” 1996, p.4. 229 Marianne Moyaert. “Fragile Identities.” 2011, p.255. 2.3.2 The Mode of the Self as an Ipse Identity. According to Ricoeur, when the question “who are you?” is asked, people may respond to this by appealing to the “what?” of themselves. For instance, when asked, “who are you as a Muslim?” the response is likely to be, “I believe in the one God and in Muhammad as his Messenger.” Of course, this response reflects the Muslim confession of the Shahada which is at the heart of Islamic faith. However, while every Muslim confesses the Shahada, not all Muslims live out the Shahada in the same way. In other words, there are varying degrees in their submission to the will of Allah. The same applies to Christians in their confession of faith in God as the Holy Trinity. One always finds variations in the living out of what is confessed as faith in Christianity. Thus, we could say that it is not just the mere confession of faith in God that matters for the believer but also the living out of what is confessed – this makes one truly Christian or Muslim. In this way, even though we often answer to the “who?” of ourselves by appealing to the “what”, the “what?” dimension of ourselves (idem) does not fully express who we are as Muslims or Christians. There is more to the Christian or to the Muslim way of life than just the mere confession of religious beliefs and following religious practices. This suggests that there is another aspect of identity which reflects, for instance, the Muslim’s degree of commitment to the confession of the Shahada. This concept of commitment is directly linked to the Muslim’s promise to keep and to live the Shahada in every circumstance. Here, when I promise to observe the Shahada, I affirm that in times of changes, disappointments and motivations that lead me to contrary alternatives in respect of my belief in the one God and in Muhammad as his Messenger, I will still hold firm to this belief. Ricoeur identifies this dimension of the self-maintenance of the believer as ipseity or ipse-identity. According to Ricoeur, ipse-identity is another mode of personal identity which conforms to the criteria of permanence in time. It is defined by the self-constancy necessary for keeping one’s promise or faithfulness to one’s word.230 For Ricoeur, a person’s commitment to what he or she promises, even in the face of danger, disappointments, uncertainties, and new opportunities, demonstrates that the person is reliable and can be counted on.231 In Marianne Moyaert’s view, Ricoeur believes that this reliability and self-constancy is the condition for lasting relationships because, “people are not characters; they are relational beings. A human being becomes a person only when others can count on him or her.”232 While with character the identity of the self is supported by habits and acquired identifications, in keeping one’s promise, the self is affirmed without the need for the permanence entailed in character. Keeping one’s promise, “does not appear as a challenge to time, a denial of change: even if my desires were to change, even if I were to change my opinion or my inclination, ‘I will hold firm.’”233 Here, it is not necessary for promise to be placed in the context of being-towards-death, but its ethical justification suffices for itself – “a justification which can be derived from the obligation to … respond to the trust that the other places in my faithfulness.”234. 230 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.119. 231 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.124. 232 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p.78. 233 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.124. 234 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.124. In consequence, while sameness refers to the sedimentations of the self, that is habits and attitudes that are part of us, promise-keeping sometimes breaks with the past and affirms an identity that is grounded on the innovations of the present. For instance, my promise to start praying regularly and going to Church every Sunday after fifty years of not doing so, demonstrates a break with my way of life in the past and a commitment to a new beginning which presents a future challenge. This challenge is that despite the disruptions in the history of my sameness (that is, my cultivated habits of not praying regularly and not going to Church every Sunday), because of my promise to be faithful, I will hold firm to the promise made. Here, the break between idem and ipse identities lies in the fact that the sameness of one’s life now gives way to a new way of life defined by the promise to be faithful to God through regular prayers and attending Sunday services. How then is ipse identity related to the question of religious identity? Even though we mentioned that to be a Christian or a Muslim, is to adhere to the doctrines, rites, customs and practices of Christianity or Islam (idem-identity), these idem aspects of the religions do not define the totality of the identity of the Christian or the Muslim. Mere conformity to the idem-dimension of the religion is not enough. It demands a certain sense of commitment which goes deeper than mere conformity to rituals. As Moyaert implied, religious identity also implies a relationship with God – a commitment to God which is expressed through the practice of faith.235 This commitment establishes a living relationship between the believer and God such that one continuously chooses to be in that relationship amidst changes, disappointments or contrary motivations. This is what Ricoeur calls, “the self-constancy necessary for keeping one’s promise.”236 Here, Moyaert explains that through this commitment, the believer binds his or her life to God, as it were and says, “‘whatever happens, I promise to remain faithful to you.’”237. 235 Marianne Moyaert. “Fragile Identities.” 2011, p.255. 236 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.119. 237 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality.” 2010, p.80. Consequently, ipse-identity grows from the creative involvement of the adherent in co-fashioning his or her identity within the community of faith on the one hand and on the other, his or her experience of life and their encounter with others. In this way, faithfulness to God is not merely limited to idem-identity but it goes beyond just the traditions to seek God where God can be found. In other words, to be a Christian for instance, implies as Moyaert put it, “encountering God in reading the Bible, in performing daily rituals and maintaining the tradition on the one hand and on the other hand, letting God break open the tradition so that God’s transcendence does not become fastened down to it.”238 It is being open to where God calls and sends; for God’s transcendence means God speaks where God wills, and this could be both within and without one’s religious traditions. It is this inspiration which sometimes stimulates the self to want to know and learn from what God is saying in the traditions of the religious other. Since these two poles of identity are operative in the same person, Ricoeur asserts that narrative identity keeps the two poles dialectically creative in the fashioning of one’s identity. What then is narrative identity? 238 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality”. 2010, p.80. 2.4 Narrative Identity in the Formation of Personal Identity. According to Ricoeur, personal identity is constituted by the two poles of identity we have discussed above. The self is the embodiment of these two poles and narrative identity holds them together in the self. Ricoeur believes that there is a relationship between narrative and life. According to him, human life becomes more readable when interpreted in the context of the stories people tell about themselves.239 Hence, life can be understood narratively. In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur demonstrates how narrative identity evolves through his theory of the “threefold mimesis”.240 Although he takes up the same project in Oneself as Another, we shall follow closely how this theory serves to elucidate his concept of narrative identity as a mediating principle. The clarity that Oneself as Another brings to this context also remains significant to the discourse since Ricoeur reckons that his work in Oneself as Another somewhat serves to clarify some of the issues raised in time and narrative.241. 239 Paul Ricoeur. “Narrative Identity” in Philosophy Today. 35: 1 (1991), p.73. 240 What is significant in Ricoeur’s “theory of mimesis” is that Ricoeur shows the essential relationship between time and narrative. For him, time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative, and a narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes the condition of temporal existence (Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.3, 52) 241 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.140. According to Ricoeur, the life of a person or a community is understood through the narratives that they tell about themselves. Narratives are essentially temporal because they can only be mediated through temporal experience.242 In his analysis of Aristotle’s Poetics that extends beyond tragedy, Ricoeur focused his attention on emplotment and mimetic activity to demonstrate the relationship between time and narrative and how human actions are prefigured, configured and refigured narratively.243 For Ricoeur, “imitating or representing is a mimetic activity inasmuch as it produces something, namely, the organization of events by emplotment.”244 The plot is the model of concordance which is characterized by completeness, wholeness and an appropriate magnitude.245 Concordance also includes discordance in the sense of the phenomenon of a tragic action which Aristotle calls reversal. In tragedy, reversal turns good fortunes into bad ones, yet this direction can also be reversed. Hence, the art of composition consists in turning discordance into concordance.246 Ricoeur demonstrates this through the theory of the threefold mimesis – mimesis1 refers to prefiguration, mimesis2 refers to configuration and mimesis3 relates to refrigeration or the reader’s reception of the narrative composition. 242 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.3. 243 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.140-160. 244 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.34. 245 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.38. 246 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.43. Without the intention to go into the details of these mimetic activities,247 what is significant to note in mimesis1 is that many events and incidences occur in our lives (prefiguration of narratives). So, to compose a plot of our lives, it is first necessary to take into consideration its semantic, symbolic and temporal structure. In mimesis2, Ricoeur shows that the events and the incidents which occur in our lives only make meaning when they are composed into narratives (narrative configuration). In other words, mimesis2 constitutes the configuration of actions that are accomplished through “emplotment.”248 Understood as “a well-constructed history”, emplotment connotes the synthesis of heterogeneous elements like the agent, the action, accidental or anticipated configurations, interactions, means, and the outcomes that are found in a story. Thus, configuration as emplotment refers to the art of composition which mediates between concordance and discordance through the, “synthesis of the heterogeneous which accounts for the diverse mediations performed by the plot.”249 Here, the world of action configured by emplotment has an ontological status of “being-as”,250 and “being-as” implies that the world of the narrative is the real world as it is given. But this world can only be reached when the text is received by the reader (mimesis3) 247 For more information on Ricoeur’s presentation on the mimetic activities as described, read Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.34-43) 248 “Emplotment” is a borrowed term from Aristotle’s concept of “composition” which has a double meaning. On the one hand, it could mean a “fable,” yet on the other, it also means a “plot” in the sense of a “well-constructed history.” Ricoeur borrows the second meaning. (see, Paul Ricoeur. “Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator” in Facts and Values. 1986, p.122 & Oneself as Another. 1992, p.141-143) 249 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.141. 250 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.80. Hence, mimesis3 refers to the reception of the narrative by the reader. It concerns the moment when the narrative is received through dialogue. According to Ricoeur, narratives achieve their full development only in the intersection between the world of the text and the world of the reader – that which Gadamer in a different context calls the fusion of horizons.251 Here, the world of the text unfolds itself through the mediation of the world of the reader. The reader fulfils the meaning of the text by dwelling in the text’s world.252 As Ricoeur puts it, what is interpreted in the text, “is the proposing of a world that I might inhabit and into which I might project my own most powers.”253 In other words, by reading the narrative, the reader is enriched by the text’s world of possibilities. This triggers a mutual dialogue between the world of the text and the world of the reader, which leads to the “fusion of horizons” of the reader and the text. The continual interaction between narrative and reader (implied in the interaction within mimesis1, mimesis2 and mimesis3) gives rise to what one might call the circular mimetic movement (the hermeneutic circle) in which the prefigured experience of mimesis1 is configured in mimesis2 and re-figured in mimesis3 in a circular or more accurately, in a spiral form.254 In other words, the experience which comes from the world of action (already mediated by narrative) is configured in narration which in turn re-figures the world of experience. This leads to a continuous enrichment of the world of action. 251 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Truth and Methods. 1990, p.306-307, p.374-375. 252 Paul Ricoeur. “Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator” in Facts and Values. 1986, p.126. 253 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.81. 254 Paul Ricoeur talks of a “hermeneutic arc” that recognizes the need for a starting point in the hermeneutic process. (See, Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.72; Kevin Vanhoozer. (editor). Postmodern Theology. 2003, p.81-82) Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity presupposes this mimetic activity – a narrated experience that is mediated by emplotment and re-figured through the reception of narratives. In other words, “to state the identity of an individual or a community is to answer the question, ‘who did this?’ ‘Who is the agent or the author?’”255 For Ricoeur, the answer to this question resides in narratives. To answer the question who? means to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the who and the identity of this who is a narrative identity.256 As a transition from narrative to character, Ricoeur asserts that emplotment is not only applicable to a narrative but also to a character, and personal identity is comparable to the “emplotment of characters”.257 The emplotment of characters consists in the different elements which are commonly present in the story of one’s life: a person’s interaction with others, the actions that a person performs and his or her physical and psychological features which together constitute the identity of the person. 255 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative III. 1988, p.246. 256 Paul Ricoeur. Time and Narrative Volume I. 1984, p.246. 257 Ricoeur sees narrative identity, not just as the “emplotment of action,” but also as the “emplotment of characters” where “an emplotted character is someone seeking his or her identity.” (Paul Ricoeur. “Pastoral Praxeology, Hermeneutics, and Identity” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination. 1995, p.309) Hence, narrative identity is understood as the formation of one’s identity by the integration of one’s life experiences into an internalized evolving story of the self which provides the individual with a sense of unity and purpose. It is not a stable or a seamless identity but a continuous effort whereby a self-reinterpreting identity is repeated in response to different encounters with different others. Ricoeur emphasized here that, “the art of storytelling is the art of exchanging experience.”258 As a result, by narrating the stories of our lives, we soon realize that we are subjects in others’ stories and others are subjects in our stories.259 We discover that our narratives are essentially interwoven with other narratives such that we find ourselves as characters in others’ narratives and histories – we are our parents’ child, our partner’s partner, our friends’ friend – and they are characters in our narratives.260 So, through our encounter with others, we facilitate the articulation and the direction of their narratives and they ours. In this way, identity is continually being formed and the self is involved in this formation in a productive way. It is this productive dimension of the formation of the self which leads to the enrichment of the self. As Moyaert put it, “every believer is called upon to give account to his or her commitments. In and through narration, the believer expresses his or her steadfast fidelity to his or her faith; his or her religious belonging is a continuous choice.”261 Here, narrating the story of one’s life is a form of attestation to one’s faithfulness.262. 258 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.164. 259 Paul Ricoeur. Oneself as Another. 1992, p.141. 260 Paul Ricoeur. “Pastoral Praxeology, Hermeneutics, and Identity” in Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative and Imagination. 1995, p.310. 261 Marianne Moyaert. “Absorption or Hospitality”. 2010, p.82

CHAPTER FIVE. CHRISTOLOGY IN ISLAM. 5.1 Introduction. In the preceding section, one gets the impression that Christology connotes a Christian theological articulation of the identity and the mission of Jesus Christ; particularly on how Jesus’ divinity and humanity are articulated within the same person as the “Saviour of the World”. So, the question then is: if Christology is essentially part of Christian theology, then can the notion of an “Islamic Christology” be theologically justified? If yes, what are the grounds for such a Christology? Although it is true that the Qur’an, the Hadiths, and many Islamic scholars and commentators perceive Jesus Christ as a “Prophet” and the “Messenger” of Allah, a human being without any divine attribution, Jesus is nonetheless highly respected in Islam and is given greater mention with honorific titles in the Qur’an than any of the prophets who preceded him.530 Parrinder affirms that the name Isa (Jesus) occurs twenty-five times in the Qur’an and by combining this name with titles such as the Messiah and the “Son of Mary” in the Qur’an, “Jesus is spoken of some thirty-five times.”531 From these references to Jesus in the Qur’an one finds that the Qur’an itself contains narratives about Jesus Christ who occupies a central place in Christian faith and theology. The Qur’an provides answers as to who Jesus was, how he came to be, and his mission. 530 Geoffrey Parrinder. Jesus in the Qur’an. 1965, p.16. 531 Geoffrey Parrinder. Jesus in the Qur’an. 1965, p.18. Consequently, if Christology concerns the study of Jesus Christ in respect of his identity and his mission, then Islam also has the resources that provide for this study within its own religious context. Hence an “Islamic Christology” focuses on the Islamic understanding of the identity and the role played by Jesus the Christ in the divine plan of Allah. It is from the perspective that Mahmoud Ayoub and other scholars define an Islamic Christology as, “an understanding of the role of Christ within the divine plan of human history, of Christ the man, one of the servants of God, but also of Christ, the ‘Word of God’, His Spirit and exalted friend.”532 For Ayoub therefore, these ideas are clearly stated in the Qur’an and therefore represents the framework within which an Islamic view about Jesus can be conceptualized. Whereas these views are in stark contra-distinction from the Christian understanding of Jesus Christ, the conception that Jesus is a “Prophet” or the “Messenger” of Allah represents the authentic Islamic understanding of him. So, the story that Islam has to share about who Jesus is and the mission he fulfilled is the justifiable ground for an “Islamic Christology.” 532 Irfan Omar (editor). A Muslim View of Christianity: Essays on Dialogue by Mahmoud Ayoub. 2007, p.134. However, before delving into the issues that speak of this Christological category, it is useful to draw attention to the interest and the focus of this section on Islamic Christology. Since the purpose of this section is to develop a Christology that is uniquely Islam, it will focus on identifying the prophetic role of Jesus within the context of the Qur’an and the Hadiths in the light of the overall Islamic conception of God, humanity and the world. From this standpoint, while Jesus would be identified as a Prophet of Allah, we would seek to answer the questions – how did Jesus fulfil this role as a prophet? and in what ways does he provide guidance to humanity in its response to God? We will therefore commence this section by firstly focusing on the theological framework within which an “Islamic Christology” can be situated. Here, we shall demonstrate how the fundamental Islamic faith principle on the obligation to the Tawhid (the Oneness of God) defines and shapes the Islamic theological comprehension of the identity and the mission of the Messiah, Jesus, the “Son of Mary” (Surah 4: 171). Secondly, since Islamic Christology is predominantly centred on Jesus as a “Prophet” and a “Messenger”, we shall focus on investigating the concept of prophecy in Islam, the role played by the prophets and the messengers of Allah, and the significant role Jesus plays within this context. Until then, let us briefly examine the meaning of Islam and how the Tawhid contributes to defining the theological context for understanding Islamic Christology. 5.2 Understanding the Meaning of Islam. The word “Islam” comes from the Arabic word (al-’islām) which literally means “to surrender” or “to submit”. In a religious sense, it means “the submission or the surrender of oneself to Allah (God).”533 Murata and Chittick point out that “Islam” carries a double connotation: the universal and the particular sense. From the universal sense, Islam means “‘submission to God’ as an undeniable fact of existence.”534 This means that since God is the creator and the sustainer of the universe, creation only functions properly if it submits itself to the will of the creator (God).535 Hence, from this universal perspective, every person who submits himself or herself to God is considered a Muslim. It is from this perspective that the Qur’an identifies Adam, Abraham, Jacob, Moses, Jesus (Surah 2: 131 – 133) and his disciples as Muslims (Surah 5: 111).536 However, the particular sense of the word Islam, refers to the specific religion established by Allah through the Prophet Muhammad. All believers in this established religion are thus called Muslims. Thus, from the universal and the particular senses of the word, we could surmise that the word Islam implies four basic meanings: (1) the submission of the whole of creation to God; (2) the submission of humanity to God through the guidance of His prophets; (3) the submission of humanity to Allah through the guidance of His Prophet Muhammad, (4) the submission of the followers of Muhammad to the will of Allah. Within these four facets of meaning, the last two senses of the word properly refer to Islam with the uppercase I as a religion. 533 Badru Kateregga & David Shenk. Islam and Christianity: A Muslim and a Christian in Dialogue. 1980, p.1. 534 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.3. 535 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.3. 536 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.4. From the context of the Hadith of Gabriel which concerns the discourse between Muhammad and the Angel Gabriel who assesses Muhammad’s understanding about the three dimensions of Islam; scholars tend to divide the religious beliefs of Islam into three dimensions: that is, (1) Islam (submission); (2) Iman (Faith); and (3) Ihsan (perfection or excellence). These dimensions sum up the Islamic religious worldview. It must be said here that the use of the word dimension is a heuristic device intended for a better understanding of Islam as a complex religious structure.537 To understand this complex structure theologically, one needs to approach it from its different parts (Islam, Iman and Ihsan), but be aware that it is the overall constitution of these parts that truly define the religion. Along these lines, the use of dimension is an attempt to understand the religion as a whole in respect of its different aspects, and its different aspects within the context of the whole. As Murata and Chittick put it, the parts are “separated only to suggest that they fit together as a whole.”538 In the discourse between Muhammad and the Angel Gabriel, Gabriel “cross-examines” the prophet about his comprehension of the message of the Qur’an. This cross-examination is found in the Hadith Jibril. The aspects of the Hadith which concerns these three dimensions read as follows: 537 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p. xxxii. 538 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p. xxxii “Umar ibn al-khattab said: One day when we were with God’s Messenger, a man with very white clothing and very black hair came up to us. No mark of travel was visible on him and none of us recognized him. Sitting down before the Prophet, leaning his knees against his and placing his hands on his thighs, he said, ‘Tell me, Muhammad about submission.’ He replied, ‘Submission means that you should bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is God’s Messenger, that you should perform the ritual prayer, pay the alms tax, fast during Ramadan and make the pilgrimage to the house if you are able to go there.’ The man said, ‘you have spoken the truth.’ He said, ‘Now tell me about faith.’ He replied, ‘Faith means that you have faith in God, his Angels, his Books, his Messengers and the Last Day and that you have faith in the measuring out, both its good and its evil.’ Remarking that he had spoken the truth, he then said, ‘Now tell me about doing what is beautiful.’ He replied, ‘Doing what is beautiful means that you should worship God as if you see him, for even if you do not see him, He sees you.”539. 539 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p. xxv. In this hadith, Islam as the first dimension consists of the confession of the Shahada, and observing the Salat, the Zakat, Ramadan and the Hajj. In other words, the first dimension relates to practice. It asks the question: “what do Muslims do?” In response, Muslims are supposed to submit themselves to the one and true God (the Tawhid). This form of religious monotheism makes the Shahada the most fundamental faith principle in Islamic religiosity. If Muslims see Jesus as the “Prophet of Allah”, this would be theologically justified within the context of the Tawhid. The second dimension (Iman) focuses on the faith of the Muslim. From Muhammad’s response to the Angel Gabriel, “Faith means that you have faith in God, his Angels, his Books, his Messengers and the Last Day and that you have faith in the Measuring Out, both its good and its evil.”540 Within these six articles of faith, it is the Tawhid which gives meaning to them because the rest of the other articles find their relevance in the light of God’s oneness. The third dimension (Ihsan) focuses on the translation of one’s faith into good deeds and action. Ihsan is used in the Qur’an as an action verb which means; “to do what is beautiful and good, to do something well, to do something perfectly, to gain perfection and virtuous qualities.”541 Here, perfection and virtuous qualities are measured by one’s degree of commitment to the one God. 540 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p. xxv. 541 Chittick Williams, C. Faith and Practice of Islam: Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Text. 1992, p.5. Consequently, while Islam directs one to the right practice of faith, Iman focuses on faith and the understanding of it. Ihsan however, is a call to perfection and excellence; a sense of virtuous living informed by the religious convictions derived from Islam and Iman. All these dimensions make no sense if they are devoid of the obligation to the Tawhid. As we mentioned earlier, these dimensions only represent the different aspects of Islam as a religion; for the more a person harmoniously integrates faith, works and perfection, the closer the person is drawn to the life of submission to the will of Allah. In short, the emphasis is that Islamic Christology finds its tradition-specific meaning in the light of the Tawhid. What precisely is the Tawhid and how does it determine the understanding of Qur’anic Christology? 5.3 Islamic Christology in the Light of the Tawhid. The word Tawhid has its Arabic roots from Wahid which means “God is one”. Hence, Tawhid takes on the meaning of, “recognizing and acknowledging that God is One.” It is “‘the assertion of divine unity’ or ‘the declaration of God’s oneness’”.542 This oneness of God is expressed in the first part of the Shahada which states that, “there is no god but God.” God here is seen as the creator and the sustainer of everything that exists. Thus, the confession that, “there is no god but one God” (Surah 5: 73) underscores Islamic monotheism where Allah remains the transcendent Being who is the creator and the source of everything in the world. He created the world in order that creation would submit to Him, by living according to His plan as the “master designer”. For God himself said in the Qur’an: “There is no god but I, so worship me” (Surah 21: 25). The Qur’an further emphasizes that, “God himself bears witness that there is no god but Him, and so do the Angels and those who have knowledge” (Surah 3: 18) 542 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.43. As the creator and the sustainer of the universe, Allah created everything for a purpose. He created humanity for the purpose of worshipping Him alone and being vicegerents to the rest of His creation. Consequently, to worship Allah alone is to have fundamentally fulfilled the purpose for one’s creation. In this way, Muslims conceive that all the prophets of Allah including Jesus, provided guidance in respect of the observance of the Tawhid – “there is no god but I. So, worship me” (Surah 21: 25). Worship here captures the sense of the total submission of the believer to Allah. It implies following what Allah commands through the guidance of His prophets. To submit oneself to anything apart from Allah is to follow misguidance. So, the statement, “there is no god but God” (Surah 5: 73; 4: 171) means that all gods whom people worship other than Allah are false: an act which is vehemently condemned in the Qur’an and by Muslims as Shirk. Within the Qur’an, Shirk means to give God Partners or worship others along with God or exclusive of God.543 This act is condemned in the Qur’an (see Surah 4: 36, 31: 13, 6:19 and 13: 36). Shirk is nothing but the opposite of the Tawhid. The Tawhid is the first principle and pillar of Islamic faith. 543 Shirk is not just the question of worshipping idols or physical objects. It also consists of following one’s own opinions and feelings apart from the message of Allah (Ibid, p.49-50) Consequently, the emphasis on the avoidance of, “associating others with God” forms a central tenet of Islamic faith understanding. To associate others with Allah would be to destroy the very foundations on which Islam rests. This explains why Shirk is viewed as a serious sin; for the Qur’an indicates that, “if someone associates any other with God, God will prohibit paradise to him” (Surah 5: 72). For Islam therefore, humanity was created to know that, “there is no god but God” and so to worship only Allah. Hence the Tawhid lies within human nature (fitra). Since the purpose of humanity is to worship only Allah, Allah sent His messengers to help humanity to fulfil this purpose. So, to associate others with Allah is to go against the most fundamental instincts of the human species. As Murata and Chittick put it, it is so to speak, “to betray human nature and even leave the domain of human existence.”544 The Tawhid therefore leaves no room for any Islamic theologizing about God outside the confines of strict monotheism. 544 Murata Sachiko & Chittick Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.50. It is in the light of this faith principle (the Tawhid) that Jesus is understood as only a “Prophet of Allah”. As a “Prophet of Allah” vis-a-vis the rest of the other line of prophets, the Qur’an describes Jesus as the “closest friend of Allah” (Surah 3: 45), “His Word directed to Mary and a Spirit from Him” (Surah 4: 171). The Qur’an therefore contain Christological titles such as Word of/from Allah, Spirit of Allah and the Messiah which resonate in Christian Christological discourses. Therefore, the tendency is to read Christian meanings into these titles, and thereby conclude that the Qur’anic ascription of these titles to Jesus is an inevitable admission of Jesus’ divinity. For Islamic faith and theology, these honorific titles mean nothing more than the fact that Jesus, the Messiah, the “Son of Mary”, is nothing more than a “Prophet” and the “Messenger” of Allah. Unlike Christian theology which conceived God within the context of the Holy Trinity (that is, three persons in One God), Islam does not admit to such theological constructions because of the obligation to the Tawhid. Islam perceives any attempt to articulate the nature of Allah outside His Oneness and transcendence as misguidance. For Islam, the fundamental truth about God is that He is One – “Your God is but one. So, submit to Him” (Surah 22: 34). This understanding (the Tawhid) is a non-negotiable faith principle. Hence, when engaging Muslims in dialogue, one must be aware of this aspect of the faith and respect the views which emanate as a consequence of it. However, let us see how the prophets functioned within the context of this divine unicity. 5.4 Prophets, Messengers and Prophetic Guidance. While prophecy forms the second part of the Shahada (Muhammadun rasul Allah), giving it a more specific context, Muhammad identifies the prophets as constitutively part of the articles of faith in his reply to the Angel Gabriel in the Hadith Jibril concerning Iman (faith). From this hadith, the Angel said to Muhammad, “Now tell me about faith. He replied: ‘faith means that you have faith in God, His Angels, His Books, His Messengers, the last day and the measuring out.’” Whereas the Angel commended Muhammad for getting it right; we can say that between the Hadith Jibril and the second part of the Shahada, demonstrates the interplay of the universality and particularity of prophecy within Islamic theology. But before we address this dialectic, let us first of all understand what “prophet” and “messenger” means in Islam. The word “Prophet” comes from the Arabic word Nabi which has two basic meanings: (1) to utter a word, a sound or to inform or to give news; and (2) to be elevated by God.545 For Murata and Chittick, both senses of the word Nabi, reflect the Islamic understanding of the word prophet; since in Islam a prophet is a person who is chosen by God and given a message which may either be personal or for an intended audience or both. The Qur’an employs four words to qualify this task: (1) al-Nabi (Prophet); (2) rasul (Messenger); (3) mursal (Envoy); and (4) ulu’l- ‘azm (possessor of steadfastness). Whereas envoy and messenger may be synonymous; prophet, messenger and the possessor of steadfastness, have fine distinctions. These differences are that the prophets are persons chosen by God with a message; they only “proclaim Allah’s news. They are not given Books.”546 The messengers however are the prophets who established religious communities, preserving their message in an oral or in written scripture. Thus, whereas messengers are prophets, not all prophets are messengers.547 The possessors of steadfastness are the five messengers who established the major religions in history (namely, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad).548. 545 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p133. 546 Badru Kateregga. & David Shenk. Islam and Christianity. 1980, p.34. 547 Mona Siddiqui. Christians, Muslims & Jesus. 2013, p.12. 548 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams. 1994, p.134. It is relevant to note here that unlike Christianity, Islam admits Adam as the first prophet of Allah in successive line with the prophet Muhammad as the final prophet. The admission of Adam into the line of prophecy contributes significantly to shaping and differentiating the Islamic worldview of human nature, sin and redemption. These views are not the same as the Christian notion of original sin (which humanity contracted through the fall in Genesis 3: 1-23) and the redemption which Jesus achieved through the Paschal Mystery. Here, Mona Siddiqui indicates that, Islam’s biggest parting with Christian doctrine lies in the fact that, it does not have that sense of alienation from God as in the fall, and the subsequent reconciliation with God through the redemption brought about by the death and the resurrection of Jesus Christ.549 If Islam rejects the belief that Jesus died on the cross, or that his death and resurrection have no soteriological significance, this is directly influenced by its theology of human nature, sin and redemption. We deem that knowledge of this theological turn is very significant for Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christology as an exercise in learning. Let us see how Adam, as the first prophet of Allah, sets the stage for a fundamental distinction between the Christian and the Islamic theology of redemption, and how this contributes in defining the prophetic role of Jesus. 549 Mona Siddiqui. Christians, Muslims & Jesus. 2013, p.218. 5.4.1 Adam, Iblis and the Fall: The Question of Original Sin. The Qur’an, like the Judeo-Christian scriptures also presents Adam as the first human being to be created by God. In Qur’anic usage Adam stands for: (1) what it means to be human; (2) the problem of human nature in keeping the Tawhid; and (3) the reason for prophetic guidance to humanity. Murata and Chittick identify the Qur’anic use of the word Trust (Amana) as that which sums up the distinctive characteristics between humanity and the rest of creation (Surah 33: 72).550 Trust refers to the task of “care-taking” or the human vocation to be vicegerents to the whole of creation. According to the Qur’an, this “care-taker” task was not only given to Adam but to all his descendants, who unanimously agreed to the divine injunction as they said; “Yes, we bear witness to God as our Lord” (Surah 7: 172). This event is commonly called the “Covenant of Alast”,551 whereby humanity made a compact with God to acknowledge the Tawhid. This covenant established an innate disposition in humanity to acknowledge the Tawhid. This innate disposition is often referred to as the fitra.552. 550 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.135. 551 “The Covenant of Alast” refers to a primordial covenant between each human being and God referred to in Surah 7: 172. (See, Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. 1994, p.136; Lakhani, Ali, M. The Sacred Foundation of Justice in Islam. 2006, p.7) 552 “Fitra” is commonly translated as “primordial nature” or “innate disposition” to observe the Tawhid (See, Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. 1994, p.137) However, the verse on Trust (Surah 33: 72)553 concludes that the human being is “ignorant, a great wrongdoer”. For Murata and Chittick, this verse “refers to the children of Adam who did not live up to the Trust.” Although one might agree with this interpretation, it is rather plausible to trace the root of this “wrongdoing” to the events leading to the fall of Adam and Eve in the Garden (Surah 15: 39-43). In this narrative, Iblis (Satan) is said to have previously disobeyed God (Surah 2: 34 and 7: 11 – 12) and was to be subjected to punishment (Surah 7: 13). However, Iblis who is an evil spirit or a jinni made a deal with God for the postponement of his punishment until the Day of Resurrection (Surah 7: 14 – 15). This postponement seems to buy him time to lead all God’s loyal servants astray.554 According to the Qur’an God agrees to Iblis’ deal, aware that, “Iblis shall have no authority over them, except those who choose to follow him” (Surah 15: 43) 553 “We offered the Trust to the heavens, and the Earth and the mountains, but they refused to carry it and were afraid of it. And the human beings carried it. Surely, he is very ignorant and a great wrongdoer.” 554 Surah 7: 16 – 18 – “And Iblis said, ‘because you have put me in the wrong, I will lie in wait for them all on the straight path. I will come after them at their front and their back, from their right and their left – and you will find that most of them are ungrateful’. And God said, ‘get out! You are disgraced and are banished. I swear, I shall fill hell with you and all who follow you.’” Now, the option of the “choice to follow Iblis” in the above text demonstrates that although humanity has the innate disposition to acknowledge the Tawhid (fitra), God’s gift of free will to humanity also opens up the possibility of human disobedience to the divine will. Thus, the innate disposition to obey God (fitra) and the gift of free will constitute what it means to be truly human; that is, “to be faced with the choice between right and wrong, obedience and disobedience.”555 So one would see that in Surah 7: 20, Iblis would lure Adam and Eve into disobedience to the divine command (Surah 7: 19) leading to the fall. Iblis is said to have deceived Adam and Eve in this way; “your Lord only forbade you this tree to prevent you from becoming angels and immortals.” Thus, Allah’s question, “did I not prohibit you two from this tree?” (Surah 7: 22), confirmed that “Adam disobeyed his Lord” (Surah 20: 121) 555 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.142. However, there was an immediate response of regret and repentance from Adam and Eve after the fall. Their repentance marked a significant departure from the Christian story in Genesis 3: 14 – 19. The Qur’an testifies that, “they were immediately shocked at what they had done and with one voice the two of them said, ‘we have wronged ourselves and unless you forgive us and have mercy on us, we shall surely be among the lost’” (Surah 7: 23). From this act of repentance and the search for forgiveness, Adam and Eve were forgiven by Allah who restored them back to the state of “grace” so to speak – “Then Adam received some words from His Lord, and He accepted his repentance” (Surah 2: 37). This suggests that whereas the Qur’an acknowledges the fall of Adam, it also admits that there was reconciliation in which Adam’s state of grace was completely restored to him by Allah. Thus, Murata and Chittick indicate that the fundamental difference between Adam and Iblis’ disobedience lies in how each responded to God after the fall. “Whereas Iblis refused to admit that he had done something wrong by blaming God for leading him astray (Surah 7: 16), Adam and Eve admitted their fault and asked God to forgive them”556 and Allah forgave them. In this way, we find two significant differences between the Islamic and the Christian accounts of the event of the fall. 556 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.145. First of all, within the Islamic context, the fall of Adam is not understood in the same way as the Christian doctrine of Original sin. For Christianity, the disobedience of Adam and Eve brought irrecoverable damnation on the human race. For instance, Christian theology asserts that, “on account of their disobedience, human beings exist in a state of corruption from which they are unable to extricate themselves. If redemption is to take place, it must be on the basis of a new obedience on the part of humanity.”557 But since humanity is unable to break free from its entanglement to sin, it could only take God in Jesus Christ to set it free from this bond of sin, through Jesus’ death and resurrection.558 However, for Islam there is no such thing as Original sin, because God immediately forgave Adam and Eve for their disobedience when they sought for mercy (Surah 2: 37). As the Qur’an affirms, God did not only forgive him, but “His Lord Chose him” (Surah 20: 122) 557 Alister McGrath. Christian Theology: An introduction. 1997, p.338. 558 Alister McGrath. Christian Theology: An Introduction. 1997, p.338. Consequently, Adam was made a true prophet of Allah and both he and Hauwa (Eve) were the first true Muslims.559 For Islam, if Adam was forgiven by God and was made the first true Muslim, then there is no original sin. Without the concept of original sin, the notion of Jesus’ death and resurrection as atonement for sin loses its soteriological pertinency. So, the fall underscores God’s divine power to restore His creation to normalcy without the need to suffer, die and resurrect in order to redeem. In Islam then, the significance of Jesus does not lie in, “a death and resurrection as atonement for original sin”. However, his significance lies in the role he played as a “Prophet” and the “Messenger” of Allah in the way he provided guidance in the acknowledgement of the Tawhid which defines the Islamic obligation to acknowledge God as One. 559 Badru Kateregga. & David Shenk. Islam and Christianity. 1980, p.16. Secondly, the “sending out” of Adam and Eve from the Garden is not seen within Islam as constituting a punishment from God for their transgressions. Within the Christian account, the departure from the Garden gives the impression that it is constitutively part of the consequences of the fall. In Genesis 3: 16 – 24, God said to the woman: “because you have done this, I will greatly multiply your pains in childbearing …” Then God said to the man: “because you have listened to your wife and have eaten of the tree … cursed is the ground because of you; in toil you shall eat of it …” The text then says that God subsequently drove the man and his wife out of the Garden of Eden and took measures to prevent them from coming back to the Garden again (Genesis 3: 22 – 24). From the Qur’anic perspective, Adam was intended to be God’s vicegerent to the “heavens and the earth and the mountains” (Surah 33: 72). This explains why Allah thought him the names of all created reality (Surah 2: 30 – 33). Hence, living in the Garden of Eden was therefore a preparatory process for his later job as the vicegerent of creation. As a result, Murata and Chittick affirm that, “God put Adam and Eve in the Garden so that they could gain strength for the hardships that would follow once they were placed at a great distance from Him, in the earth.”560 So, whereas in the Christian context, the separation from Eden is seen as part of the punishment meted out to Adam and Eve, for Islam, the separation is not as a consequence of their sin, but a necessary act which commences Adam’s task as God’s vicegerent. 560 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. 1994, p.144. In consequence, Islam sees man as God’s Khalifa on earth. Although it acknowledges that humanity is not perfect; for only Allah is perfect; it does not have the concept of original sin. The question of the free will of man and the continual presence of Iblis shows that there is the human propensity to sin (understood as heedlessness or misguidance). Although Adam heeded to the allurement of Iblis, Adam’s repentance reconciled him to God and gained for him his servant role in creation. As Murata and Chittick put it, “Adam’s entrance into the earth as vicegerent and prophet is a sign that God’s mercy takes precedence over his wrath, and that his guidance overtakes the misguidance of Satan.”561 In this way, if humanity is to accomplish its task of vicegerency and the acknowledgement of the Tawhid, then it would need the guidance of the prophets and the messengers of Allah. It is for this reason that God in his kindness provides for the prophets who give the right guidance to humanity. This brings us to the significance of prophetic guidance in Islam. 561 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. 1994, p.144. 5.4.2 The Nature and Significance of Prophetic Guidance. Like Christianity, Islam also believes that God sent prophets at various times and in different stages of human history to provide guidance to humanity. The Qur’an testifies that these prophets were raised from among every race and nation – “We sent a Messenger to every community saying, ‘worship God and shun false gods’” (Surah 16: 36). The Qur’an further states that: “Muslims say: ‘we believe in God and in what was sent down to us and in what was sent down to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the tribes and what was given to Moses, Jesus and all the prophets by their Lord’” (Surah 2: 136). As servants of Allah, all the prophets and the messengers are presented by the Qur’an as worthy of belief. To “deny the Prophethood of any of them constitutes disbelief”,562 for their message comes from Allah who is all-knowing. Islam conceives each of these prophets as fundamentally communicating the obligation to acknowledge the Tawhid. So, as the first prophet of Allah, Adam heeded and submitted himself to Allah as the only true God and Creator of all. However, some of his offspring refused to follow Allah’s teachings and committed shirk.563. 562 Badru Kateregga & David Shenk. Islam and Christianity. 1980, p.35. 563 Badru Kateregga & David Shenk. Islam and Christianity. 1980, p.36. As a result, God raised up prophets to give the right guidance to humanity on the straight path to Allah. These prophets accomplished this task through Dhikr (remembrance) and Huda (guidance).564 Dhikr is not just limited to the sense of “remembering” but it also takes on the meaning of “mentioning” and “reminding”. In the Tawhid, the work of the prophets as Dhikr was not just limited to reminding people about the Oneness of God and the human obligation to submit to Him, but it also centred on helping people to confess the Tawhid (mention). Those who respond to the prophets appropriately are Muslims and those who refuse are the truth-concealers. In consequence, Dhikr represents the drama of prophecy and the human response to it.565 Huda (guidance) however, defines God’s reason and motivation for sending the prophets. 564 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.147. 565 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.147. As we saw earlier, since Iblis’ intention and task were to promote misguidance (Surah 7: 16 – 18), God in His Mercy sends the prophets as guides to the actualization of the fitra. To actualize the fitra is to actualize one’s human potential, and the actualization of one’s potential is the key to happiness and peace.566 Hence, the reason for the guidance provided by the prophets from Adam to Muhammad was to lead humanity to a total submission to the will of Allah as expressed in the Tawhid. Among these prophets of Allah are Adam, Noah, Moses, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, David, Elijah, Elisha, Jonah, Zachariah, Jesus and Muhammad. Their universal task was to direct humanity to observe the Tawhid – “There is no god but one God” (Surah 21: 25). The Tawhid is the basic message of each of these prophets. As a result, the Qur’an affirms “… that which was given to Moses and Jesus and the other prophets by their Lord, we make no distinction among any of them” (Surah 2: 136 and 3: 84) 566 Murata, Sachiko & Chittick, Williams, C. The Vision of Islam. 1994, p.151. Consequently, it is considered an act of disbelief for a Muslim to despise the message of any of the prophets and the messengers of Allah; for they all served to bring right guidance to humanity in its response to the Tawhid. (See Surah 5: 48). Even though Islamic theology views Jesus as a “Prophet” and the “Messenger” of Allah who provided right guidance to the children of Israel with a new Scripture (the Gospels), the Qur’anic texts about the prophets and the messengers of Allah demonstrates that this guidance does not contradict the human obligation to the Tawhid. In this way, the message of Jesus is not just significant to Christians only, but significant to Muslims in their response to the Tawhid as well. For Islam, faith in one God demands the observation of the Tawhid which constitutes the fundamental message of the prophets and the messengers of Allah. The question however is: how does Jesus function within this context of the Tawhid? 5.5 Qur’anic Christology: Jesus as the Messenger of Allah. The interest in this area of Qur’anic Christology is to carefully analyse and present the various references concerning the relationship between Jesus, the Holy Spirit, and Allah in the Qur’an, and how this relationship contributes in defining the role that Jesus played in Allah’s divine plan. Since there are many texts which relate to Jesus in the Qur’an, we shall focus particular attention on Surah 2: 87; 2: 253 and 5: 110. The reasons for selecting these particular texts are that: first of all, these texts capture the identity of Jesus in the Qur’an, asserting his prophetic role within the whole context of Islamic prophecy; secondly, these texts equally highlight a unique relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit (Ruh al-qudus), who will later provide guidance to the Prophet Muhammad in his reception of the Qur’an. Although there are other texts of equal importance, we reckon that these texts contain, in themselves, the support that we need for a careful reflection on what is today called a “Qur’anic Christology.” We shall approach the above texts thematically; by focusing on the unique relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit, and how this contributes to defining his identity and his mission in the Qur’an. Our interest in the theme of the Holy Spirit is first of all, informed by the argument that the Holy Spirit is that significant agent who remains instrumental in the life of Jesus in the Qur’an, right from his birth, his public ministry to his final end. Consequently, a careful study of the relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit would help elicit his identity, and the role that he played within the divine plan of Allah. It would also provide the appropriate context for a better interpretation and understanding of the Christological titles ascribed to Jesus in the Qur’an. As a significant agent in the life and ministry of Jesus, the Holy Spirit teaches Jesus the Injil (the Gospel) and communicates the Qur’an to the Prophet Muhammad. So, by virtue of His origin as a “Messenger” of Allah and His involvement in the prophetic missions of Jesus and Muhammad; the Holy Spirit in the eyes of Muslims, places a stamp of authenticity on the message received by Jesus and the message of Muhammad in the Qur’an: for both derive their source from Allah. In other words, in the Qur’an, the Holy Spirit could be seen as a principal agent in the communication of the message of the Injil (the Gospel) and the Qur’an. It will become clearer as the discourse unfolds that the message of Jesus as can be found in the Qur’an is fundamentally about the observance of the Tawhid. Jesus in the Qur’an said, “I have come to you to confirm the truth of the Torah which preceded me … I have come to you with a sign from your Lord. Be mindful of God, obey me. God is my Lord and your Lord, so serve Him – that is the straight path” (Surah 3: 50 – 51). Here, one finds an immediate connection between Jesus’ message and the message of the prophets who preceded him. Since it is the Holy Spirit who is the principal agent through whom Allah communicated His message to His prophets, then the Holy Spirit remains an important agent for reflecting on the identity and the mission of Jesus, the Christ. Thus, a significant question that is worthy of note here is: if the Holy Spirit is the medium through whom God provides guidance to humanity through the message of His prophets, then how does the message of Jesus in the Qur’an contribute to providing this guidance? We shall commence this section by first considering the identity of the Holy Spirit in the Qur’an, and His relationship with Jesus in the light of Surah 2: 87, 2: 253; and 5: 110. 5.5.1 The Identity of the Holy Spirit in the Qur’an. According to O’Shaughnessy, the concept of, “Spirit as a symbol of divine power is a term of unique importance in the religions of both the Semitic people, and of the nation’s directly influenced by them.”567 It represents the tangible means by which the supreme Deity of both the Judeo-Christian religions and the nature religions of Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt and so forth, exercises control over humanity and the cosmos. For O’Shaughnessy, although this idea of the “Spirit” may be unique to these religions, it nonetheless represents a natural solution to the problem of how the divine communicates life force to man. Since respiration is universally observed to be coextensive with life, and ceases with its cessation, then breath becomes the concrete manifestation of life imparted to humanity through the supreme Deity.568 Thus, the Spirit is viewed as the “Divine breath” and the “unseen power” that moves the cosmic forces and gives life to humanity and the entirety of creation. For the Judeo-Christian religions, Ruh is the breath of Yahweh, the life-giving spirit in man and the mysterious power at work in the natural phenomena of the universe. According to O’Shaughnessy, in pre-Islamic Arabic poetry the term Ruh means “breath or blow.” It was only after the establishment of Islam that Ruh took on an additional meaning of the soul.569. 567 Thomas O’Shaughnessy. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran. 1953, p.9. 568 Thomas O’Shaughnessy. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran. 1953, p.9. 569 Thomas O’Shaughnessy. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran. 1953, p.11. In the Qur’an, the word Ruh (Spirit) is used about twenty times.570 From the chronological study of Ruh, William Shellabear asserts that there are different ways in which Ruh is used in the Qur’an. Firstly, at the start of Muhammad’s mission at Mecca, Ruh (Ruh al-Quddus) was used to refer to the Angel Gabriel (see Surah 70: 4; Surah 78: 38 and Surah 97: 4). Secondly, in the later Meccan Surahs, Ruh was used in connection with the creation of Adam (Surah 15: 29; Surah 38: 72; and Surah 32: 8) and the conception of Jesus (Surah 21: 91; Surah 19: 17; and Surah 66: 12). Thirdly, in the Surahs believed to be delivered in Mecca nearer the time of the Hijra, Ruh was used in four occasions in connection to the amr (a Command, an Order – Surah 16: 2, 17: 87 and 40: 15).571 “Finally, in the Medina Surahs it is stated three times that Jesus was aided with the Holy Spirit (Ruh al-qudus – Surah 2: 87; Surah 2: 53; and Surah 5: 110), once that Jesus was himself a spirit from Allah (Surah 4: 171), and once that the believers had been aided with a spirit from Allah (Surah 58: 22).572. 570 Thomas O’Shaughnessy. The Development of the Meaning of Spirit in the Koran. 1953, p.13-15. 571 William Shellabear. The Development of the word ‘Spirit’ as Used in the Koran. 1932, p.355. 572 William Shellabear. The Development of the word ‘Spirit’ as Used in the Koran. 1932, p.355. From these different forms of usage, though the word Ruh appears to mean something distinct from the angels and yet in some way is associated with them or something associated to the creation of Adam and Jesus,573 the spirit is that force which gives life through the command of Allah. When referred to as Ruh al-Quddus, Samuel Schlorff asserts that without exception, Muslims identify it with Gabriel, the Angel of revelation. Hence, “when the Qur’an states that Jesus, Muhammad and others, were strengthened by the Holy Spirit, it is clearly referring to the Angel Gabriel in the process of revelation.”574 Indeed, the word Spirit or al-Ruh may be taken to mean the “soul”, the “breath of life” or as “intangibility”. However, when specifically mentioned as “Ruh al-Quddus” in the Qur’an, many scholars are of the view that it refers to the Angel Gabriel. Let us see how the relationship between Jesus and the Angel Gabriel (the Holy Spirit) helps us arrive at a better understanding of the identity and the mission of Jesus. 573 William Shellabear. The Development of the word ‘Spirit’ as Used in the Koran. 1932, p.356. 574 The Theological and Apologetical Dimensions of Muslim Evangelization” in Westminster Theological Journal. Vol. 42 (1986), p.335. http://www.answering-islam.org/Authors/Schlorff/schlorff1_f.html (12/04/2013) 5.5.2 The Relationship between Qur’anic Jesus and the Holy Spirit. The discourse here is centred on three Qur’anic texts: Surah 2: 87; Surah 2: 253; and Surah 5: 110. Whereas each of these three verses state that Jesus was “strengthened by the Holy Spirit”, our interest is to investigate what this phrase means within the Qur’an. We shall do this through the exegetical views of three Islamic scholars – namely Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (838 – 923AD), Abu al-Qasim Mahmud ibn Umar al-Zamakhshari (1075 – 1144AD) and Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Umar ibn al-Husayn al-Taymi al-Bakri al-Tabaristani Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1149 – 1209AD). Due to the lengthy nature of their names, we shall adopt their fully recognised shorter forms such as al-Tabari, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi for simple referencing. The reasons for the recourse to these three classical Islamic commentators are that on the one hand, they enjoy some degree of historical proximity to the beginning stages of the development of Islam, and therefore have the privilege of enjoying the title “classical commentators”. Yet on the other hand, their commitment to the religion of Islam as Sunni, Mutazilite and Shi’i Muslims coupled with their desire to learn more about the religion through the application of linguistics, philosophical and exegetical tools, brings freshness to issues of textual interpretations of the Qur’an. In other words, these commentators provide the insiders’ point of view in respect of the interpretations of the above Qur’anic texts. As Ricoeur indicated in the section on practical wisdom, where there appears to be the conflict of understanding as a result of interpretation, recourse to the opinion of experts in the area is advised. The texts under consideration in this area are: Surah 2: 87 – We gave Moses the scriptures and We sent messengers after him in succession. We gave Jesus, the Son of Mary, clear signs and strengthened him with the Holy Spirit. So now, how is it that whenever a messenger brings you something you don’t like, you become arrogant, calling some imposters and killing others? Surah 2: 253 – We favoured some of the messengers above others. We gave Jesus, the Son of Mary our clear signs and strengthened him with the Holy Spirit. Surah 5: 110 – Then God will say, ‘Jesus, the Son of Mary! Remember my favour to you and your mother: how I strengthened you with the Holy Spirit, so that you spoke in your infancy and as a grown man; how I taught you the Scriptures and the wisdom, the Torah and the Gospel; how by My leave, you fashioned the shape of a bird out of clay, breathed into it and it became by My leave a bird; how by My leave, you brought the dead back to life; how by My leave, I retrained the children of Israel from harming you when you brought them the clear signs and those of them who disbelieved said, ‘This is clearly nothing but sorcery.575. 575 Texts are taken from M.A.S. Abdel Haleem. The Qur’an: A New Translation. 2010. The underlined sentences and phrases will be part of our primary exegetical concern. Let us see how the contributions of al-Tabari, al-Zamakhshari and al-Razi helps us to understand the relationship between Jesus and the Holy Spirit and the identity and the mission that this relationship underscores

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