Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Volume II

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Spencer Herbert. Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Volume II

THE GENESIS OF SCIENCE

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

REASONS FOR DISSENTING FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF M. COMTE

ON LAWS IN GENERAL, AND THE ORDER OF THEIR DISCOVERY

THE VALUATION OF EVIDENCE

WHAT IS ELECTRICITY?

MILL versus HAMILTON – THE TEST OF TRUTH

REPLIES TO CRITICISMS

THESES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

PROF. GREEN’S EXPLANATIONS

THE PHILOSOPHY OF STYLE

USE AND BEAUTY

THE SOURCES OF ARCHITECTURAL TYPES

GRACEFULNESS

PERSONAL BEAUTY

THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF MUSIC

POSTSCRIPT

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF LAUGHTER

Отрывок из книги

The first edition of this Essay is not yet out of print. But a proposal to translate it into French having been made by Professor Réthoré, I have decided to prepare a new edition free from the imperfections which criticism and further thought have disclosed, rather than allow these imperfections to be reproduced.

The occasion has almost tempted me into some amplification. Further arguments against the classification of M. Comte, and further arguments in support of the classification here set forth, have pleaded for utterance. But reconsideration has convinced me that it is both needless and useless to say more – needless because those who are not committed will think the case sufficiently strong as it stands; and useless because to those who are committed, additional reasons will seem as inadequate as the original ones. [In the preface to the third edition, however, a reason is given for a change of decision on this point at that time made (February 1871): the reason being “the publication of several objections by Prof. Bain in his Logic.”]

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• which, by disintegration, generates insensible motion, under the forms of {Heat. Light. Electricity. Magnetism.}

We come now to the third great group. We have done with the Sciences which are concerned only with the blank forms of relations under which Being is manifested to us. We have left behind the Sciences which, dealing with Being under its universal mode, and its several non-universal modes regarded as independent, treat the terms of its relations as simple and homogeneous; which they never are in Nature. There remain the Sciences which, taking these modes of Being as they are habitually connected with one another, have for the terms of their relations, those heterogeneous combinations of forces that constitute actual phenomena. The subject-matter of these Concrete-Sciences is the real, as contrasted with the wholly or partially ideal. It is their aim, not to separate and generalize apart the components of all phenomena, but to explain each phenomenon as a product of these components. Their relations are not, like those of the simplest Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations between one antecedent and one consequent; nor are they, like those of the more involved Abstract-Concrete Sciences, relations between some few antecedents cut off in imagination from all others, and some few consequents similarly cut off; but they are relations each of which has for its terms a complete plexus of antecedents and a complete plexus of consequents. This is manifest in the least involved Concrete Sciences. The astronomer seeks to explain the Solar System. He does not stop short after generalizing the laws of planetary movement, such as planetary movement would be did only a single planet exist; but he solves this abstract-concrete problem, as a step towards solving the concrete problem of the planetary movements as affecting one another. In astronomical language, “the theory of the Moon” means an interpretation of the Moon’s motions, not as determined simply by centripetal and centrifugal forces, but as perpetually modified by gravitation towards the Earth’s equatorial protuberance, towards the Sun, and even towards Venus: forces daily varying in their amounts and combinations. Nor does the astronomer leave off when he has calculated what will be the position of a given body at a given time, allowing for all perturbations; but he goes on to consider the effects produced by reactions on the perturbing masses. And he further goes on to consider how the mutual perturbations of the planets cause, during a long period, increasing deviations from a mean state; and then how compensating perturbations cause continuous decrease of the deviations. That is, the goal towards which he ever strives, is a complete explanation of these complex planetary motions in their totality. Similarly with the geologist. He does not take for his problem only those irregularities of the Earth’s crust that are worked by denudation; or only those which igneous action causes. He does not seek simply to understand how sedimentary strata were formed; or how faults were produced; or how moraines originated; or how the beds of Alpine lakes were scooped out. But taking into account all agencies co-operating in endless and ever-varying combinations, he aims to interpret the entire structure of the Earth’s crust. If he studies separately the actions of rain, rivers, glaciers, icebergs, tides, waves, volcanoes, earthquakes, etc.; he does so that he may be better able to comprehend their joint actions as factors in geological phenomena: the object of his science being to generalize these phenomena in all their intricate connexions, as parts of one whole. In like manner Biology is the elaboration of a complete theory of Life, in each and all of its involved manifestations. If different aspects of its phenomena are investigated apart – if one observer busies himself in classing organisms, another in dissecting them, another in ascertaining their chemical compositions, another in studying functions, another in tracing laws of modification; they are all, consciously or unconsciously, helping to work out a solution of vital phenomena in their entirety, both as displayed by individual organisms and by organisms at large. Thus, in these Concrete Sciences, the object is the converse of that which the Abstract-Concrete Sciences propose to themselves. In the one case we have analytical interpretation; while in the other case we have synthetical interpretation. Instead of synthesis being used merely to verify analysis; analysis is here used only to aid synthesis. Not to formulate the factors of phenomena is now the object; but to formulate the phenomena resulting from these factors, under the various conditions which the Universe presents.

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