Fateful Triangle

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Tanvi Madan. Fateful Triangle

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. The Orientation in the Orient (1949–1952)

China and India: The View from Washington (1947–1949)

China and the US: The View from Delhi (1947–1949)

Colliding Positions (1949–1952)

Red China or New China? Comparing Notes (1949–1950)

To Recognize or Not to Recognize

The Korean War: Seeing Each Other as Spoilers (1950)

Tibet: Lost by Default? (1950–1951)

Chinese Intervention in the Korean War: The Blame Game (1950–1951)

India as a Channel to China: Only Hurting Itself? (1951–1952)

What Have They Done for US Lately? (1951–1952)

2. Why So Wary? (1953–1956)

Interacting in the East (1953–1954)

Korea: Mediating Once More (1953–1954)

Indochina: Dueling Approaches (1953–1954)

Problematic Partnerships (1953–1955)

US-Pakistan: Collective Security or Creating Insecurity? (1953–1954)

Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai: Peaceful Coexistence or Naïve Nurturing? (1953–1955)

The Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955)

The Problem of Prisoners: Major or Minor Issue? (1955–1956)

Other Problematic Partnerships (1955)

“Must Not Leave Backdoor Unlatched” (1950–1956)

3. The Pandit and the President (1956–1958)

Changing Diagnosis, Changing Prescription: The Infiltration of Ideas and Influence (1956–1958)

No More “You’re with Us or against Us”

The Development Race

Who Delivers Wins

The Glorious Gamble

Creeping Concern about China: The Infiltration of Ideas, Influence, and Individuals (1956–1958)

Changing Indian Perceptions

Contrasting Approaches

Mediating No More

Dealing with Differences

4. Semi-detached Ally? (1959–1962)

Ike Likes India; India Likes Ike (1959–1960)

From Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai to Zhou Enlai Hai-Hai (1959–1960)

Watching from Washington

The Soviet Stance

Pakistan’s Role

The Military Solution

The Camelot Years (1961–1962)

The “Present Excellent Trends”

Quid Pro Quo?

The Key to Asia

“Growls from Peking”

The China-Pakistan Relationship

Military Supply

“Indians to Arms”

The War and India’s Last Best Option: The US

The Tilt

5. Bread or Bombs (1963–1965)

The Limits and Possibilities of Alignment (November 1962–November 1963)

Debating Defense

Parley with Pakistan

The Substance of Alignment?

A Lost Opportunity?

Tethered, but Not Tied (December 1963–April 1965)

Guns or Butter

Diversification

Pakistan: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Mutual Disappointment (April–July 1965)

Vietnam: Dueling Approaches

Assets and Liabilities

The Stakes Made Evident (August–September 1965)

6. Playing It a Bit Cooler (1965–1968)

Dependence (Fall 1965–Spring 1966)

India: Too Big to Fail

The US: Too Important to Jettison

Disillusionment (Spring 1966–Spring 1967)

The Demands of Dependence

The Downside of Dependence

Vietnam: Force or Diplomacy?

Pakistan: Pressure or Persuasion?

Food Aid: With Strings or Chains?

Disengagement (Spring 1967–Winter 1968)

Losing Traction

Losing Interest

Reducing Dependence

The Soviet Option

The Look East Option

The Nuclear Option

The China Option?

7. Fluid New World (1969–1972)

Reaching for Rapprochements (1969)

US Views of China and India

India’s Views of China and the US

China, Keeping India Guessing (1970)

The US: Juggling China, India, and Pakistan (1970)

Triangulation and the Tilts (1971)

Early Reactions

The Indo-Soviet Treaty: The Insurance Policy

The Crisis and US-India Relations Deteriorate

A Vicious Circle (1972)

Reducing Dependence

The Plot for a Farce by Molière

8. Looking Both Ways (1973–1979)

Making Up (1973–1976)

Repairing Relations

Sino-US Relations and India (1973–1976)

Sino-Indian Relations and the US (1973–1976)

Dual Détentes (1974–1975)

The Carter-Desai Years (1977–1979)

A New Chapter

The China Rapprochements

Pluses and Minuses

On Various Visits

Complications

New Openings

Vietnam Once More

Rethinking Nonalignment

Alliances versus Diversification

Nonalignment Does Not Mean No Alignment

Diversification: Possibilities and Pitfalls

Ends, Ways, and Means

The Tangled Triangle

Notes. Introduction

Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Conclusion

Unpublished Primary Sources. Official Records

Manuscript Collections

Oral Histories

Recordings

Published Primary Sources. Documents

Newspapers and Periodicals

Autobiographies, Diaries, and Memoirs

Secondary Sources. Books

Articles and Book Chapters

Conference Papers

Websites and Online Resources

Отрывок из книги

FATEFUL TRIANGLE

How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations during the Cold War

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At the time that NSC-68 was being drafted, Europe remained the Truman administration’s primary area of focus. Policymakers accepted the potential loss of certain areas outside Europe—indeed Acheson said as much in his January speech. The Soviet Union remained the main threat; China was a secondary one. Fostering a Sino-Soviet split was still under consideration. But NSC-68 envisioned international communism rather than the Soviet Union as the threat, with no short-term possibility of “fragmentation.” Earlier reluctance to oppose a communist takeover of Taiwan (for fear that doing so would push China closer to the Soviet Union) was also revisited. A State Department reassessment of China policy in spring 1950 instead called for estimating the impact of such a takeover on perceptions of the global balance of power.

As John Lewis Gaddis has noted, NSC-68 might have had little impact had it not been for the Korean War. But the outbreak of the war, which eventually involved millions of soldiers and resulted in over 30,000 US combat deaths, “validate[d] several of NSC-68’s most important conclusions.”128 It also turned the spotlight on Asia, including China and India.

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