Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science: A History (Third Edition)

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Thomas J. Hickey. Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science: A History (Third Edition)

A PROVOCATIVE PREFACE

BOOK I – Introduction

Chapter 1. Overview

1.01 Aim of Philosophy of Science

1.02 Computational Philosophy of Science

1.03 Two Perspectives on Language

1.04 Dimensions of Language

1.05 Classification of Functional Topics

1.06 Classification of Modern Philosophies

Chapter 2. Modern Philosophies

2.01 Romanticism

Aim of science:

Discovery:

Criticism:

Explanation:

2.02 Positivism

Aim of science:

Discovery:

Criticism:

Explanation:

2.03 Contemporary Pragmatism

Thesis I: Relativized semantics

Thesis II: Empirical underdetermination

Thesis III: Ontological relativity

Aim of science:

Discovery:

Criticism:

Explanation:

Chapter 3. Philosophy of Language

3.01 Synchronic and Diachronic Analysis

3.02 Object Language and Metalanguage

3.03 Dimensions of Language

A. SYNTAX. 3.04 Syntactical Dimension

3.05 Syntactical Rules

3.06 Mathematical Language

3.07 Logical Quantification in Mathematics

B. SEMANTICS. 3.08 Semantical Dimension

3.09 Nominalist vs. Conceptualist Semantics

3.10 Naturalistic vs. Artifactual Semantics

3.11 Romantic Semantics

3.12 Positivist Semantics

3.13 Positivist Thesis of Meaning Invariance

3.14 Positivist Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy

3.15 Positivist Observation-Theory Dichotomy

3.16 Contemporary Pragmatist Semantics

3.17 Pragmatist Semantics Illustrated

3.18 Rejection of the Observation-Theory Dichotomy

3.19 Rejection of Meaning Invariance

3.20 Rejection of the Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy

3.21 Semantical Rules

3.22 Componential vs. Wholistic Semantics

3.23 Componential Artifactual Semantics Illustrated

3.24 Semantic Values

3.25 Univocal and Equivocal Terms

3.26 Signification and Supposition

3.27 Aside on Metaphor

3.28 Clear and Vague Meaning

3.29 Semantics of Mathematical Language

3.30 Semantical State Descriptions

3.31 Diachronic Comparative-Static Analysis

3.32 Diachronic Dynamic Analysis

3.33 Computational Philosophy of Science

3.34 An Interpretation Issue

C. ONTOLOGY. 3.35 Ontological Dimension

3.36 Metaphysical and Scientific Realism

3.37 Ontological Relativity Defined

3.38 Ontological Relativity Illustrated

3.39 Causality

3.40 Ontology of Mathematical Language

D. PRAGMATICS. 3.41 Pragmatic Dimension

3.42 Semantic Definitions of Theory Language

3.43 Pragmatic Definition of Theory Language

3.44 Pragmatic Definition of Test-Design Language

3.45 Pragmatic Definition of Observation Language

3.46 Observation and Test Execution

3.47 Scientific Professions

3.48 Semantic Individuation of Theories

Chapter 4. Functional Topics

4.01 Institutionalized Aim of Science

4.02 Positivist Aim

4.03 Romantic Aim

4.04 More Recent Ideas

4.05 Aim of Maximizing “Explanatory Coherence”

4.06 Contemporary Pragmatist Aim

4.07 Institutional Change

4.08 Philosophy’s Cultural Lag

4.09 Cultural Lags among Sciences

4.10 Scientific Discovery

4.11 Discovery Systems

4.12 Types of Theory Development

4.13 Examples of Successful Discovery Systems

4.14 Scientific Criticism

4.15 Logic of Empirical Testing

4.16 Test Logic Illustrated

4.17 Semantics of Empirical Testing

4.18 Test Design Revision

4.19 Empirical Underdetermination

4.20 Scientific Pluralism

4.21 Scientific Truth

4.22 Nonempirical Criteria

4.23 The “Best Explanation” Criteria

4.24 Nonempirical Linguistic Constraints

4.25 Cognition Constraint

4.26 Communication Constraint

4.27 Scientific Explanation

BOOK II – Mach and Duhem

Mach’s Phenomenalism

Mach’s Philosophy of Science. Aim of Science

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Criticism

Scientific Discovery

Mach’s History of Mechanics

Duhem on Physical Theory and Metaphysics

Duhem’s Stratified Semantics for Physics

Duhem’s Philosophy of Science. Aim of Science

Scientific Criticism

Scientific Discovery

Scientific Explanation

Duhem’s History of Physics

The New Physics vs. the Old Philosophy

Comment and Conclusion

BOOK III – Carnap and Quine

Logical Constructionalism

Einstein and Mathematical vs. Physical Geometry

The Aufbau and “Rational Reconstruction”

Logical Syntax of Language

Semantical Systems: Definitions and Characteristics

Semantical Systems: Ontological vs. Linguistic Issues

Semantical Systems: Physics and the Reduction of Theories

Semantical Systems: Probability and Induction

Semantical Systems: Information Theory

Shreider’s Semantic Theory of Information

The Philosophy of Science. Aim of Science

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Criticism

Scientific Discovery

Hempel’s Critique of Analyticity

Carnap’s Reply to Hempel

Quine’s Pragmatist Critiques

Quine’s Critique of Intensions and Propositions

Quine’s Critique of Reductionism

Quine’s Critique of Analyticity

Quine’s Rejection of First Philosophy

Comment and Conclusion

BOOK IV – Heisenberg and Einstein

Heisenberg’s Discovery and Einstein’s Semantical Views

Heisenberg’s Discovery and Einstein’s Ontological Criteria

Bohr’s Influence on Heisenberg and Issues with Einstein

Semantical Revision and Heisenberg’s Doctrine of Closed-off Theories

Bohr’s “Forms of Perception” and Neo-Kantianism

On Scientific Revolutions

Heisenberg’s Philosophy of Science

Aim of Science

Scientific Discovery

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Criticism

Comment and Conclusion

Naturalistic vs Artifactual Semantics for Observation Language

The Contemporary Pragmatist Alternative

False Assumptions in Closed-off Theories Doctrine

Semantical Wholism Rejected

Naturalistic “Observation” and “Theory” Rejected

Test Language Before Test Execution

Test Language After Test Execution

Semantics and Quantum Theory Tests

Heisenberg’s Last Statements on Semantics

Double-Think Rejected

A New Language Developed

Heisenberg’s Practice of Ontological Relativity

Hanson and Heisenberg

BOOK V – Popper and Landé

Einstein’s Influence and the Falsificationist Thesis of Criticism

Explanation, Information, and the Growth of Science

Against Psychologism, Induction, and Naturalistic Semantics

On Computers, Induction Machines, and Scientific Discovery

The Schism in Physics and Metaphysical Research Programmes

Landé’s New Foundations of Quantum Physics

Popper’s Particle-Propensity Interpretation of Quantum Theory

On Crucial Experiments and Scientific Revolutions

The Philosophy of Science

Scientific Criticism

Scientific Explanation

Aim of Science

Scientific Discovery

Comment and Conclusion

BOOK VI – Kuhn and Feyerabend

Conant on Prejudice and The Dynamic View of Science

Kuhn’s “Aristotle Experience”

Kuhn on the Copernican Revolution

Kuhn on the Structure of Scientific Revolutions

The Evolution of Kuhn’s Philosophy

Kuhn’s Criticism of Popper’s Falsificationist Philosophy

Popper’s Criticism of “Normal Science”

Feyerabend on Theory Proliferation vs. Kuhn’s Consensus Paradigm

Shapere’s Criticism of Kuhn’s Concept of Paradigm

Kuhn Replies

Kuhn, Normal Science, and the Academic Sociologists

Kuhn’s Linguistic Analysis of Incommensurability

Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science

Nagel and Feyerabend on Meaning Variance

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis

Feyerabend on Semantic Incommensurability

Feyerabend on Scientific Anarchy

Feyerabend on Quantum Theory

Feyerabend on Relativism, Historicism, and Realism

Feyerabend’s Criticism of Popper

Feyerabend’s Philosophy of Science

Scientific Criticism

Aim of Science

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Discovery

Comments and Conclusion. On Kuhn

Incommensurability

Revolutions

On Feyerabend

Componential semantics

Semantics of Experiments

Nonfalsified theory redefines the test design

Feyerabend’s universality criterion

Alternative to relativism and deductivism

Summary

Incommensurability between theories

Incommensurability as inexpressibility

Semantics of the eclipse experiment

Newtonian confusion

Cultural relativism

Critique of Popper’s falsificationism

Semantical consequences

Achievements

BOOK VII – Hanson and Bohm

Bohm’s Early Copenhagen Views

Bohm’s Agenda for Future Microphysics

Bohm’s Hidden-Variable Interpretation of Quantum Theory

Bohm’s Critique of Heisenberg’s Copenhagen Interpretation

Bohm and Bell on the EPR Experiment and Nonlocality

Bohm on Perception and Metaphor in Scientific Discovery

Bohm on Mathematics and Scientific Discovery

Bohm’s Philosophy of Science. Aim of Science

Scientific Discovery

Scientific Criticism

Scientific Explanation

Hanson on the Copenhagen Interpretation and Scientific Discovery

Peirce, Retroductive Logic, and Semantical Constraints in Discovery

Hanson on Perception, Observation and Theory

Hanson’s Philosophy of Science. Aim of Science and Scientific Discovery

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Criticism

Hesse on Models and Analogy

Hesse on Metaphor

Comment and Conclusion

BOOK VIII – Simon and Thagard

Thagard’s Psychologistic Computational Philosophy of Science

Thagard on Conceptual Change, Scientific Revolutions, and System PI

Thagard on Discovery by Analogy and his Systems ACME and ARCS

Thagard on Criticism by “Explanatory Coherence”

Thagard on Explanation and the Aim of Science

Herbert Simon and Logic Theorist

Neoclassical Maximizing Rationality and Weber’s Ideal-Types

Simon’s Postulate of Bounded Rationality and “Satisficing”

Bounded Rationality, Institutionalism, and Functionalism

Human Problem Solving, Cognitive Psychology and Heuristics

On Scientific Discovery and Philosophy of Science

The Theory of Discovery Systems

Langley’s BACON and Other Discovery Systems

Simon’s Philosophy of Science

Aim of Science

Scientific Explanation

Scientific Discovery

Scientific Criticism

Muth’s Rational-Expectations “Hypothesis”

Haavelmo’s Structural-Equations Agenda and Its Early Critics

Mitchell’s Institutionalist Critique

Muth’s Rationalist Expectations Agenda

Rejection of Expectations Data and Evolution of VAR Models

Litterman’s BVAR Models and Discovery System

Hickey’s Metascience or “Logical Pragmatism”

Hickey’s Linguistic Analysis

Hickey’s Functional Analysis

Hickey’s METAMODEL Discovery System

Hendry and Doornik’s AUTOMETRICS Discovery System

Parsons’ Romantic Sociology

Habermas on Weber

Merton’s Critique of Parsons

Lundberg’s Positivist Sociology

Parsons and Lundberg Compared

The METAMODEL System Applied to Sociology

A Pragmatist Critique of Academic Sociology’s Weltanschauung

The “Last Sociologist”

Sonquist on Simulating the Research Analyst with AID

Comment and Conclusion. Pragmatism vs. Romanticism

Pragmatism vs. Psychologism

APPENDIX I. A Post-Classical Quantitative-Functionalist Macrosociological Theory of the American National Society © Copyright Thomas J. Hickey 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982. ABSTRACT

CLASSICAL FUNCTIONALISM

QUANTITATIVE FUNCTIONALISM

PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE

VARIABLES IN THE THEORY

EQUATIONS OF THE THEORY

Change Rates in Per capita Birth Rates:

Change Rates in Per capita Marriage Rates:

Change Rates in Per capita Criminal-Law Compliance Rates:

Change Rates in High School Graduation Percentage Rates:

Change Rates in Business Formation Per capita Rates:

Change Rates in Religious Affiliation Per capita Rates:

Change Rates in Technological Innovation Per capita Rates:

Change Rates in Urbanization Percentage Rates:

Change Rates in Mass Communication Per capita Rates:

STATIC ANALYSIS

DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX II. Rejections and Rejoinders. Prologue

Bohrnstedt’s first referee attempted criticisms and Hickey’s rejoinders

Bohrnstedt’s second criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders

Laumann’s first criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders

Laumann’s second criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders:

Laumann’s third criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders

Form’s first criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders

Form’s second criticism and Hickey’s rejoinders

Form’s rejection letter

Michalos’ rejection letter

Hickey’s comments

APPENDIX III. Critique of the Literature. Rejected evidence

Guild politics

Cynical “success”

Proposed reforms

Circumventing obstructionism

Revolutionary purge

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Отрывок из книги

In his magisterial two-volume Types of Economic Theory Wesley Clair Mitchell, Columbia University American Institutionalist economist, business-cycle economic historian, historian of economic theory and founder of the National Bureau of Economic Research, wrote that the process that constitutes the development of the social sciences is an incessant interaction between logically arranged ideas and chronologically arranged events.

Since modern science is an evolving cultural institution, this memorable Institutionalist refrain can be modified to apply to philosophy of science: The process that constitutes the development of philosophy of science is an episodic interaction between logically arranged ideas in philosophy and chronologically arranged events science. For the contemporary pragmatist philosopher of science the most important episodes in twentieth-century science are the two great scientific revolutions in physics – Einstein’s relativity physics and Heisenberg’s quantum physics – with the latter’s the more influential for philosophy.

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The discovery systems created by the computational philosopher of science represent diachronic dynamic metalinguistic analyses. They proceduralize a transitional process explicitly with the computerized system design, in order ultimately to accelerate the contemporary advancement of a science by mechanizing a transitional procedure. Then by applying the system to the current state description for the science they generate new theories. The discovery systems typically include empirical criteria for selecting a subset of the generated theories for output as tested and nonfalsified theories either for further predictive testing or for use as laws in explanations and test designs.

The computer is here to stay, and in this computer age computational philosophy of science is inevitable. The exponentially growing capacities of computer hardware and proliferation of computer-systems designs have already been enhancing the technical practices of basic-scientific research in many sciences, and philosophy of science cannot escape such developments. Presently few philosophy professors have the needed competencies to contribute to computational philosophy of science. And thus few curricula in philosophy departments encourage much less actually prepare students for contributing to this new and emerging area in philosophy of science. Computational philosophy of science will achieve ascendancy in twenty-first-century philosophy of science due to those who are opportunistic enough to master both the necessary system-development skills and the requisite working competencies in an empirical science. Lethargic and/or reactionary academics that dismiss it are fated to spend their careers evading it, as they are progressively marginalized.

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