9/11 Final Report of the National Commission

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Thomas R. Eldridge. 9/11 Final Report of the National Commission

9/11 Final Report of the National Commission

Contents

Preface

1 “We Have Some Planes”

1.1 Inside the Four Flights

1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense

1.3 National Crisis Management

2. The Foundation of the New Terrorism

2.1 A Declaration of War

2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World

2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992)

2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996)

2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998)

3. Counterterrorism Evolves

3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New: The First World Trade Center Bombing

3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation—in the Law Enforcement Community

3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration

3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community

3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department

3.6 . . . and in the White House

3.7 . . . and in the Congress

4. Responses to Al Qaeda’s Initial Assaults

4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania

4.2 Crisis: August 1998

4.3 Diplomacy

4.4 Covert Action

4.5 Searching for Fresh Options

5. Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland

5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs

5.2 The “Planes Operation”

5.3 The Hamburg Contingent

5.4 A Money Trail?

6. From Threat to Threat

6.1 The Millennium Crisis

6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000

6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole

6.4 Change and Continuity

6.5 The New Administration’s Approach

7. The Attack Looms

7.1 First Arrivals in California

7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States

7.3 Assembling the Teams

7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics

8 “The System was Blinking Red”

8.1 The Summer of Threat

8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM

9. Heroism and Horror

9.1 Preparedness as of September 11

9.2 September 11, 2001

9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon

9.4 Analysis

10. Wartime

10.1 Immediate Responses at Home

10.2 Planning for War

10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq

11. Foresight—and Hindsight

11.1 Imagination

11.2 Policy

11.3 Capabilities

11.4 Management

12. What To Do? A Global Strategy

12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge

12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations

12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism

12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks

13. How To Do It? A Different Way of Organizing the Government

13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide

13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community

13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information

13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress

13.5 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States

Appendix A: Common Abbreviations

Appendix B: Table of Names

Appendix C: Commission Hearings

Notes

Commission Staff

Отрывок из книги

Thomas R. Eldridge, Susan Ginsburg, Walter T. Hempel II, Janice L. Kephart, Kelly Moore, Joanne M. Accolla, The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

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By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of the second explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fighters in military airspace away from Manhattan:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell ’em if this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put ’em over Manhattan. That’s best thing, that’s the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell ’em if there’s more out there, which we don’t know, let’s get ’em over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play.135

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