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W. T. Massey. How Jerusalem Was Won
How Jerusalem Was Won
Table of Contents
PREFACE
I. PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR. II. OLD BATTLEGROUNDS. III. DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK. IV. TRAINING THE ARMY. V. RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE. VI. PREPARING FOR 'ZERO DAY' VII. THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY. VIII. GAZA DEFENCES. IX. CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT. X. THROUGH GAZA INTO THE OPEN. XI. TWO YEOMANRY CHARGES. XII. LOOKING TOWARDS JERUSALEM. XIII. INTO THE JUDEAN HILLS. XIV. THE DELIVERANCE OF THE HOLY CITY. XV. GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY. XVI. MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE. XVII. A GREAT FEAT OF WAR. XVIII. BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN. XIX. THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND. XX. OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN. APPENDICES. INDEX. LIST OF MAPS. PLAN OF SOUTHERN PALESTINE. PLAN OF GAZA-BEERSHEBA LINE. PLAN OF THE BETH-HORON COUNTRY. PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF JERUSALEM. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO THE HOLY CITY. GENERAL ALLENBY RECEIVED BY THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OP JERUSALEM, DECEMBER 11, 1917. KANTARA TERMINUS OF THE DESERT MILITARY RAILWAY. EAST FORCE H.Q. DUG-OUTS NEAR GAZA. WADI GHUZZE NEAR SHELLAL. OUR WATERWORKS AT SHELLAL. ON THE MOVE IN THE DESERT. THE GREAT MOSQUE AT GAZA
A DESERT MOTOR ROAD NEAR SHELLAL. TURKISH DUG-OUTS AT GAZA. BEERSHEBA RAILWAY STATION WITH MINED ROLLING STOCK
EL MUGHAR. THE SCENE OF A YEOMANRY CHARGE. BURIAL-PLACE OF ST. GEORGE, PATRON SAINT OF ENGLAND (AT LUDD) YEOMANRY GRAVES AT BETH-HORON THE UPPER, WHERE JOSHUA COMMANDED THE SUN TO REMAIN STILL TO ENABLE THE ISRAELITES TO OVERTHROW THE PHILISTINES. IN THE JUDEAN HILLS. A ROMAN CENTURION'S TOMB, KURYET EL ENAB. ONE OF KING SOLOMON'S POOLS. A TYPICAL NEW ZEALANDER. WADI SURAR, CROSSED BY LONDON TERRITORIALS ON THE MORNING OF THEIR ASSAULT ON THE JERUSALEM DEFENCES. THE DEIR YESIN POSITION WEST OF JERUSALEM. EASTERN FACE OF NEBI SAMWIL MOSQUE, SHOWING DESTRUCTION BY TURKISH SHELL-FIRE. OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO THE HOLY CITY. GENERAL ALLENBY ARRIVING OUTSIDE THE JAFFA GATE. OFFICIAL ENTRY. GENERAL ALLENBY RECEIVING THE MAYOR OF JERUSALEM (A DESCENDANT OF MAHOMET) JERUSALEM FROM MOUNT OF OLIVES. JERUSALEM FROM GARDEN OF GETHSEMANE. PANEL IN THE CHAPEL OF THE KAISERIN AUGUSTA VICTORIA HOSPICE ON THE MOUNT OF OLIVES. BETHLEHEM. CHURCH OF THE NATIVITY, BETHLEHEM. AIN KARIM, PART OF THE JERUSALEM DEFENCES. RIVER AUJA, CROSSED AT NIGHT BY LOWLAND TERRITORIALS. JERISHEH MILL, RIVER AUJA, ONE OF THE LOWLANDERS' CROSSINGS. BARREL BRIDGE OVER THE RIVER AUJA. DESTROYED BRIDGE ON THE JERICHO ROAD. THE WILDERNESS, WITH A GLIMPSE OF THE DEAD SEA. LONDONERS' BRIDGE OVER THE JORDAN. THE RIVER IS IN FLOOD. GERMAN PRISONERS CROSSING THE JORDAN. NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES AT BETHLEHEM. A HAIRPIN BEND ON THE JERUSALEM ROAD. CHAPTER I
PALESTINE'S INFLUENCE ON THE WAR
CHAPTER II
OLD BATTLEGROUNDS
CHAPTER III
DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATTACK
CHAPTER IV
TRAINING THE ARMY
CHAPTER V
RAILWAYS, ROADS, AND THE BASE
CHAPTER VI
PREPARING FOR 'ZERO DAY'
CHAPTER VII
THE BEERSHEBA VICTORY
CHAPTER VIII
GAZA DEFENCES
CHAPTER IX
CRUSHING THE TURKISH LEFT
CHAPTER X
THROUGH GAZA INTO THE OPEN
CHAPTER XI
TWO YEOMANRY CHARGES
CHAPTER XII
LOOKING TOWARDS JERUSALEM
CHAPTER XIII
INTO THE JUDEAN HILLS
CHAPTER XIV
THE DELIVERANCE OF THE HOLY CITY
CHAPTER XV
GENERAL ALLENBY'S OFFICIAL ENTRY
CHAPTER XVI
MAKING JERUSALEM SECURE
CHAPTER XVII
A GREAT FEAT OF WAR
CHAPTER XVIII
BY THE BANKS OF THE JORDAN
CHAPTER XIX
THE TOUCH OF THE CIVILISING HAND
CHAPTER XX
OUR CONQUERING AIRMEN
APPENDICES
I
II
III
PAPEN. IV
V
XXTH CORPS
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS
VI
FORCE ORDER
VII. ORDERS FOR THE OFFICIAL ENTRY INTO JERUSALEM
VIII
IX
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY. G.H.Q., E.E.P.,
G. DAWNAY, B.G.G.S.,
X
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY. BY
SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY
INDEX
Отрывок из книги
W. T. Massey
Being the Record of Allenby's Campaign in Palestine
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If we made another frontal attack at Gaza we should find ourselves up against a desperately strong defensive system, but even supposing we got through it we should come to another halt in a few miles, as the enemy had selected, and in most cases had prepared, a number of positions right up to the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, where he would be in a land of comparative plenty, with his supply and transport troubles very considerably reduced. No one could doubt that the Turks intended to defend Jerusalem to the last, not only because of the moral effect its capture would have on the peoples of the world, but because its possession by us would threaten their enterprise in the Hedjaz, and the enormous amount of work we afterwards found they had done on the Judean hills proved that they were determined to do all in their power to prevent our driving them from the Holy City. The enemy, too, imagined that our progress could not exceed the rate at which our standard gauge railway could be built. Water-borne supplies were limited as to quantity, and during the winter the landing of supplies on an open beach was hazardous. In the coastal belt there were no roads, and the wide fringe of sand which has accumulated for centuries and still encroaches on the Maritime Plain can only be crossed by camels. Wells are few and yield but small volumes of water. With the transport allotted to the force in the middle of 1917 it was not possible to maintain more than one infantry division at a distance of twenty to twenty-five miles beyond railhead, and this could only be done by allotting to them all the camels and wheels of other divisions and rendering these immobile. This was insufficient to keep the enemy on the move after a tactical success, and he would have ample time to reorganise.
General Chetwode held that careful preliminary arrangements, suitable and elastic organisation of transport, the collection of material at railhead, the training of platelaying gangs provided by the troops, the utilisation of the earthwork of the enemy's line for our own railway, luck as regards the weather and the fullest use of sea transport, should enable us to give the enemy less breathing time than appeared possible on paper. It was beyond hope, however, whatever preparations were made, that we should be able to pursue at a speed approaching that which the river made possible in Mesopotamia. General Chetwode considered it would be fatal to attempt an offensive with forces which might permit us to attack and occupy the enemy's Gaza line but which would be insufficient to inflict upon him a really severe blow, and to follow up that blow with sufficient troops. No less than seven infantry divisions at full strength and three cavalry divisions would be adequate for the purpose, and they would be none too many. Further, if the Turks began to press severely in Mesopotamia, or even to revive their campaign in the Hedjaz, a premature offensive might be necessitated on our part in Palestine.
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