Care in Technology

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Xavier Guchet. Care in Technology

Table of Contents

Guide

Pages

Care in Technology

Acknowledgments

Foreword

Introduction

I.1. Care for nature

I.2. The two-layered model of care

I.3. The intellectualist conception of technology

I.4. From design of nature to care for “ordinary nature”

I.5. Technology, life and care

1. Care and Technology: An Anthropological Question. 1.1. From mastery to care. 1.1.1. Making good use of technology, anticipating its potential risks: two possible examples of care in technology? 1.1.1.1. Care and technology in ancient Greece

1.1.1.2. For a moral evaluation of technologies independent of the uses made of them

1.1.1.3. The impossibility of being quite sure that our technologies avoid a defect of care

1.1.1.4. The limits of a purely contextual evaluation of technologies

1.1.2. Do we need to learn to master our technological mastery? 1.1.2.1. “We must re-bind Prometheus”

1.1.2.2. Hybris and technè: the Greek model of the limitation of technology

1.1.2.3. Regulating by ethics: an externalist vision of the mastery of technology

1.1.3. The limits of the externalist approach to technological regulation

1.1.3.1. First consideration: the ambiguity of the means employed to master technologies

1.1.3.2. Second consideration: uncooperative matter

1.1.3.3. Are scientists and engineers the sorcerer’s apprentices?

1.1.3.4. Evaluation (appraisal) versus valuation (prizing)

1.2. In what sense can technologies be “inherently” caregiving? 1.2.1. Can there be an intrinsic morality of technology? 1.2.1.1. The empirical turn in the philosophy of technology: towards internalist approaches to the ethical regulation of technologies

1.2.1.2. Can there be care in technology?

1.2.1.3. A plurality of possible approaches to the thesis of the non-value-neutrality of technology

1.2.1.4. Is ethics in technology a categorical, dispositional, relational, or systemic property?

1.2.2. Technology and care: a difficult articulation. 1.2.2.1. Reconsidering the two-layer model of care: the state of the art

1.2.2.2. Nature, technology and care

1.2.2.3. Care for engineers

1.2.2.4. Care for technology

1.2.2.5. Design with care

1.2.2.6. Ethics of care and of technology: the missed connection

1.3. Taking care of living beings. 1.3.1. Care and technology: from ethics to anthropology. 1.3.1.1. The definition of care according to Tronto and Fischer, or the denial of the role of technology in care

1.3.1.2. Two possible conceptions of the subject that provides care

1.3.1.3. Technology and the two meanings of life

1.3.1.4. Is the conception of the human as a being which produces itself compatible with care?

1.3.1.5. In what sense should vital needs be objects of care?

1.3.2. Caring about valuating living beings. 1.3.2.1. Vital valuations and care

1.3.2.2. First difficulty for the valuating subject: a dated conception of the living being?

1.3.2.3. Second difficulty of the valued object: does the concept of care for nature suppose assigning an intrinsic value to nature as a whole?

1.3.2.4. Natura instruens

1.3.2.5. Towards a renewal of the instrumentalist conception of technology?

1.3.2.6. Should recognizing that living beings are valuators lead to assigning them moral consideration?

1.3.2.7. Innumerable cares

1.3.3. The difficulty of thinking technology from life. 1.3.3.1. Technology, a vital activity

1.3.3.2. The persistence of a dualist anthropology in the philosophy of technology

1.3.3.3. Thinking technology between intellectualism and organism

1.3.3.4. Discussion of the ACT thesis – Anthropologically Constitutive/ Constituent Technology34

1.4. Transition

2. Technology and Life: Analysis of a Divorce. 2.1. Body, gestures, technology, production. 2.1.1. Work without skill. 2.1.1.1. A controversial bracelet

2.1.1.2. From Industrial Technology to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: deskilling human labor

2.1.1.3. A plural history of Technology and industrialization

2.1.1.4. The counter-model of the artisan

2.1.2. Control and discipline of technology. 2.1.2.1. Diderot and Alembert’s Encyclopedia project

2.1.2.2. The article Art of the Encyclopedia: entering technological know-how into a new rationality

2.1.2.3. Towards a new concept of work

2.1.2.4. The specifics of Encyclopedic Technology

2.1.3. A rupture in the conception of technology: the divorce of technology and life. 2.1.3.1. When work ceases to be the activity of the living being, and technology to be a vital activity

2.1.3.2. New representations of the body at work: towards the rationalization of productive practices in the 18th century

2.1.3.3. Is the human machine an automatable worker?

2.1.3.4. Technology and needs

2.1.3.5. The body-instrument

2.2. The intellectualist conception of technology: the Kantian turning point. 2.2.1. Difficulty in thinking of the artisan’s activity. 2.2.1.1. Art in general: paragraph 43 of the Critique of Judgement

2.2.1.2. Technology and mechanics

2.2.2. Technology excluded from the field of aesthetics. 2.2.2.1. Technology and the two meanings of life

2.2.2.2. Difficulty locating technology in the critical edifice

2.2.3. Technology, a synthetic activity without representation and without rule. 2.2.3.1. An embarrassing organ player

2.2.3.2. The technical body reverting to the machine-body

2.2.3.3. Beyond organon: redefining the links between technology and life

2.2.3.4. Technology beyond the artefact

2.3. Transition

3. The Conditions of Care in Technology. 3.1. Vitalist approaches to technology. 3.1.1. The concept of technological evolution: contributions and limits with regard to care. 3.1.1.1. Origin and development of the concept of technological evolution

3.1.1.2. Ambiguity of evolutionary approaches with regard to care

3.1.2. Technology as an “organ projection”: contributions and limits with regard to care. 3.1.2.1. In what sense is technology an organ projection?

3.1.2.2. Limits of the theory of organic projection with regard to care

3.1.3. The utopia of Erewhon: analysis of an aporia. First condition of care in technology. 3.1.3.1. Two opposing positions concerning technology in Erewhon

3.1.3.2. Incompatibility between the concept of self-regulation and the aim of care

3.1.3.3. To take care, must we admit that there is an immutable nature of things?

3.1.3.4. From Erewhon to Hans Jonas: an ambiguity in the conception of technology

3.1.3.5. Caring for living beings: does this necessarily mean that we cannot modify them? A story of the goat-spider

3.1.3.6. The “biological philosophy of technology”: a plurality of approaches

3.2. Philosophical anthropology, a promising way to articulate care and technology? 3.2.1. Plessner’s biological anthropology: redefining the concepts of organ and organism. 3.2.1.1. Positionality and excentricity of the human in Plessner

3.2.1.2. The ambiguity of the question of technology in Plessner

3.2.2. Industrialization, work, and life. Critique of modernity in Gehlen. 3.2.2.1. The “loss of experience” of the Handelndes Wesen in the industrial era

3.2.2.2. The circuit of action and organic life

3.3. The organ-instrument. Second condition of care in technology. 3.3.1. From the organ as part of the organism to the organ as an instrument with use-value. 3.3.1.1. Being one’s organism, having one’s organism

3.3.1.2. The two conceptions of the body in Descartes

3.3.1.3. A liver that tolerates gin, or the risk of forgetting the individual

3.3.2. Putting the individual point of view first in the ethical evaluation of technology. 3.3.2.1. The two senses of the organ in Marx

3.3.2.2. Ortega y Gasset: the individual, the culture, and the species

3.3.2.3. Is giving priority to the point of view of the individual compatible with the aim of caring for nature?

3.3.2.4. From the human cut off from nature to the human cut off from its own evolutionary process: Leroi-Gourhan’s analysis

3.3.2.5. A facetious little robot, more human than “humans”

3.3.2.6. Technology creating objective connections in nature: Dewey’s analysis

3.4. From anthropology to aesthetics. 3.4.1. Is it enough to recognize that humans “belong to nature” to orient technology towards care for nature? 3.4.1.1. Beyond the theme of the deficient being. Third condition of care in technology

3.4.1.2. From body-adaptation to body-liberation: the analysis of Paul Alsberg

3.4.1.3. Overconfidence in science

3.4.2. Creating a new perception. Fourth condition of care in technology. 3.4.2.1. The Bergsonian “bigger soul”: learning to perceive differently

3.4.2.2. Supplementing our perception with technological devices: a possible way to direct our action towards care?

3.5. Transition

4. Design, Technology and Life. 4.1. At the sources of design for life. 4.1.1. The premises of design. 4.1.1.1. Art and industry in the 19th century: a conflict still in Kantian terms

4.1.1.2. Towards a more nuanced perception of the relationship between art and industry

4.1.1.3. Birth of arts applied to industry

4.1.1.4. William Morris’s Arts & Crafts movement

4.1.2. Overcoming the conflict of arts and industry: the rational aesthetics of Paul Souriau. 4.1.2.1. Beyond the Kantian division between the beautiful and the useful, the idea of “rational beauty”

4.1.2.2. Rational aesthetics at the service of broader human experience

4.1.2.3. Liberation of aesthetic judgement

4.1.2.4. A yet-insufficient integration of the two meanings of life in the rational aesthetic

4.1.3. Industry and the fragmentation of experience: anthropology and instrumentality in Dewey’s work. 4.1.3.1. Perceiving things according to their constructive processes and their objective connections to other things

4.1.3.2. Recreating, through design, the conditions of undivided life and experience

4.1.4. Life as judge of technology. Lewis Mumford. 4.1.4.1. At the origin of the separation of the mechanical and the organic

4.1.4.2. Bioaesthetics: constitution versus institution of experience

4.1.4.3. Technology, nature, person

4.1.5. Towards a design for life: László Moholy-Nagy. 4.1.5.1. The Bauhaus experience

4.1.5.2. Design against the anti-biological tendency of industrial capitalism

4.1.5.3. Vision in Motion

4.1.6. Opening

4.2. Towards responsible and caring innovation. 4.2.1. Technical activities and care: practical lessons from ancient China and Greece. 4.2.1.1. A story of a Chinese cook

4.2.1.2. Some Greek precepts for caring technical action

4.2.2. The square of care in technological design. 4.2.2.1. Letting nature do its thing. The example of alternative agriculture

4.2.2.2. Technology is in nature

4.2.2.3. The human technician, organizer of nature

4.2.2.4. Techno-aesthetic

4.2.2.5. The imperative of knowledge

4.2.2.6. Refusing the view of the user as pure performer

4.2.2.7. Stimulating conflictual pluralist debate

4.2.2.8. Concluding remarks about the square of care

Conclusion

References

Index. A

B

C, D

E

G, I

L, M

N, O

P, R

T, V, W

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

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To Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent, who taught me a lotIn testimony of friendship

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This requirement of unity in care, an indivisibility of caregiving and taking care, has been particularly pronounced in the field of medical ethics, except however that these two aspects of care, although not separate, are not so much merged into a truly unitary care. There are two layers of care and they are clearly hierarchical. It has in effect become a commonplace to recall that the therapeutic act in the technical sense of the term, that is to say caregiving (cure), is devoid of any moral value if it is not inserted into a more essential relationship of care which envelopes it. The greatest risk is that, while thus conceived according to a two-layer model, care becomes precisely two quite distinct and unrelated cares – and even worse, that care within the meaning of caregiving will eventually prevail over care within the meaning of taking care. As psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott deplored at the beginning of the 1970s, “Cure, in the sense of remedy, successful eradication of disease and its cause, tends today to overlay cure as care” (Winnicott 2017, p. 192). However, as stressed by the preface writers of an Italian collective work (Donghi and Preta 1995), the risk of splitting care and giving priority, as Winnicott deplored, to cure as remedy over care, results specifically in an inability to properly pose the problem of the relationships between body and spirit, and their unity. In other words, a relationship of reciprocal implication is forged here between, on one hand, the conception of the human as a living being – but in the sense of a being composed of body and spirit unified by care – and on the other hand, a two-layer conception of care.

However, this two-layer conception of care, well documented in the field of medical ethics, does not confine itself there: it is also found in the invocation of care for nature and it leads to a blurring of its meaning. Not, incidentally, that any idea of care for nature should invariably find its only possible model in medical care (Pierron 2019). Thus, van Rensselaer Potter, one of the theoreticians of the concept of bioethics, considered that medical bioethics, far from being possibly the basis for a global concept of care by extension of the care due to humans to the care due to nature, was on the contrary only a shrinkage of a broader concept of bioethics, linking human health and health of the environment (Gaille 2013). That being said, the need to establish a hierarchical relationship between cure and care now extends to the whole set of activities where care is required. The penetration of the ethics of care into environmental ethics illustrates this phenomenon of extension: we are required not only to interact in a prudent and careful manner with nature, but also to assume that these interactions are of a moral scope and that, therefore, we are morally obliged to comply with the values of prudence and fair measure.

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