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CONTENTS

Foreword

Table of Maps

Principal Events of Washington’s Life

Note on this Edition

THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON

Part One: Commander in Chief of the Revolution

1. “The Favorite Soldier of Virginia”: Early Years; the French and Indian War (1732 to 1759)

2. “The Soldier of America”; Victory at Boston (September 1774 to April 1776)

3. War in Canada and the North (June 1775 to November 1776)

4. War in the South; the Declaration of Independence (November 1775 to July 1776)

5. Defeat and the Restoration of “Native Courage”: Command in New York (June to September 1776)

6. “Unyielding Firmness”: Retreat and Attack in New York and New Jersey (October 1776 to January 1777)

7. The Army and Independence Maintained (January to July 1777)

8. Battle and a Wise Determination to Avoid Battle: The Struggle for Philadelphia (July to September 1777)

9. A Stubborn Contest in the Middle Colonies (September to December 1777)

10. Defeat, then Victory, in the North: Ticonderoga, Bennington, Saratoga (November 1775 to November 1777)

11. “The Character of Washington”: Preserving Army and Command at Valley Forge (December 1777 to May 1778)

12. “On His Own Responsibility”: A New Army at Monmouth (March to June 1778)

13. “Temperate Measures”: Disappointment with the French, Stalemate with the British (July to December 1778)

14. Diplomacy; Frontier Attacks; Congress’s Grand Plan (June 1778 to February 1779)

15. The British Shift the Front: War in Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia (November 1778 to June 1779)

16. Near-Mutinies and Calming Influence; Skirmishes; the Allies Fail at Savannah (May to December 1779)

17. Disasters and Misjudgments in South Carolina (January to August 1780)

18. Governing Without Teeth: Mutiny; Failures of Supply; a French Force Stalls (January to September 1780)

19. Arnold’s Treason; Faction and Army Policy in Congress (August to December 1780)

20. “Abilities, Fortitude, and Integrity”: Greene and His Lieutenants in the South (August 1780 to April 1781)

21. Mutiny Parried and Quelled; the “Miserably Defective” Structure of Congress; Lafayette Checks Cornwallis (November 1780 to July 1781)

22. “The Total Incompetency of the Political System”; Victory at Yorktown (May to December 1781)

23. The Deep South Regained; the Prudence of Greene (April 1781 to January 1782)

24. Peace; Pacifying the Army; the “Virtuous Moderation” to Bid Farewell (December 1781 to December 1783)

Part Two: Father and President of the New Republic

25. Private Statesmanship: Agriculture, Improvements, Union (1783 to 1785)

26. Political Imbecility; Constituting a Government (1784 to 1789)

27. Conciliating the Public: Election, Inauguration, and First Appointments (1789)

28. Defense, Finance, Foreign Affairs—and the First “Systematic Opposition” (1790 to 1791)

29. Democratic Rebellion; Indian War; the French Model (March 1791 to March 1793)

30. Reelection; Furor over Neutrality; the Extraordinary Citizen Genêt (November 1792 to December 1793)

31. “The Path of Duty”: Averting War, Maintaining Independence (December 1793 to June 1794)

32. Executive Vigor Confronts War, Rebellion, and Treaty-making (January 1794 to June 1796)

Part Three: The First of Americans

33. Last Farewell; Final Duty; Legacy and Character (1796 to 1799)

Appendix A: Note on Further Reading and Editorial Sources

Appendix B: Important Writings of Washington

Index

Notes

FOREWORD

WHILE THERE ARE other good biographies of George Washington, some recent, this Life by Chief Justice John Marshall probably should be read first. It is the first serious biography, appearing within eight years of Washington’s death, and its author was himself a statesman of rare judgment who knew the great man and many of his accomplishments. The Life of Washington is therefore an account of men and events by one who saw much at first hand and saw with a knowing eye. Marshall once wrote to Gouverneur Morris (October 2, 1816) on “the inferiority of modern to ancient history”; . . . it is not “written by practical statesmen” who have actually “engaged in the great & interesting events” they write about. The Life is the only published assessment of Washington’s whole work in war and peace by a wise observer himself active in both. While there are differing twentieth-century estimates of the book, the prominent historian Charles Beard had good reason to call Marshall “a historian of masterful acumen.”

Actually, the Life is about much more than Washington. Washington was father of his country, and Marshall’s Life of Washington is political history as well as biography. The Life is the only comprehensive account by a great statesman of the full founding of the United States—of the founding of an independent people as well as of its government. We see the war that freed and partly formed, and then the political deeds that made of tenuous union a self-governing country. We see these from the governing point of view: of the Commander in Chief and founding President without whom, Marshall suggests, neither would have happened. There is no other concentrated history of the essentials by such an authority on American institutions. It is a historical-political companion to that old bible of American institutions, The Federalist Papers.

One should add that Marshall’s epic is instructive about more than Washington and his political work. It can be seen as a case study of the relation between democracy and human greatness. To what extent does democracy depend upon extraordinary leaders? How do a leader and a democracy overcome the tensions inherent in such a relation? Superior leaders’ claims to superiority rub against a democracy’s pride in equal rights, majority rule, and popular consent. But it is a fact that the American democratic republic depended upon the great man Washington, and it sustained him. How success was possible is the question Marshall proposed to answer in the Life.

The Life began as what would now be called an authorized biography. Washington’s executor selected Marshall for the writing, and Marshall alone among the early biographers was permitted access to Washington’s own papers. He took this special responsibility seriously. He sifted the papers, reviewed what histories there were, inquired of those who had served Washington in war and in politics, and sought accuracy and even exactitude in describing details of a battle or responsibility of a politician. Where generals differed in their recollections, historians in their estimates of casualties, or parties in their political interpretations, Marshall presented the different sides. The Life was to be authoritative as well as authorized.

This one-volume version is Marshall’s final revision, completed a year or two before his death in 1835. It was the last of several revisions. The first edition in five volumes had been hurried out from 1803 through 1807, just when Marshall undertook his new duties as Chief Justice and as an ex officio justice on the North Carolina and Virginia circuit courts. It was somewhat ill conceived—Washington was not introduced until volume two—and burdened by printing errors and clumsiness. This is one reason that some historians have disdained the Life. But an embarrassed Marshall bent himself to correct and improve. A reprinting in 1805 allowed him to eliminate the worst errors in production and composition. In 1824 he spun off the first volume as a history of the colonies; in 1832 he reissued the revised biography proper as compressed into two volumes. This may be regarded as his definitive version. Then, during the remaining three years before his death, the aging Chief Justice shortened more and simplified more in order to prepare this one-volume edition for schools. Simplifying did not mean what now would be ridiculed as “dumbing down.” While Marshall cut out elaborate wording, some analyses, and the occasional incident, he retained from the two-volume work the three great parts (war, governing, character), much of the language, and the important diagnoses and events. “Written entirely” by the Chief Justice (according to the original publisher’s notice) and published from his manuscript in 1838, the one-volume edition was a success. It went through seven reprintings in six months and twenty reprintings in all, the last in 1849—and then it reappeared, with another publisher and without the subtitle “written for the use of schools,” in three printings from 1857 to 1859. This Liberty Fund edition makes available for the first time in over 140 years Marshall’s most approachable version of the Life and his final effort to keep before his countrymen the example of Washington’s character and principles.

Marshall had had plenty of opportunities to observe Washington in action. Their lives were intertwined despite the facts that Marshall was twenty-three years younger and that his deeds as Chief Justice came in the four decades after Washington’s death. Both men were Virginians. Marshall’s father had been Washington’s friend and eventually a trusted advisor and his Supervisor of Revenue for the District of Ohio. Marshall himself served as lieutenant and captain at a number of the battles described in the Life, including the defeat of Lord Dunmore near Norfolk in 1775 and the intense campaign of 1777, directed by Washington, to deny Philadelphia to the British. He endured with Washington the terrible winter camp of 1777–78 at Valley Forge. After the war Marshall too returned to Virginia, where he became prominent in state politics and eventually, at the Virginia ratifying convention of 1787, one of the leading younger defenders of the proposed Constitution. He became a member of the Legislature and the Council of State, Brigadier-General in the Militia, leader of the Richmond Bar, and, by the 1790s, President Washington’s most important supporter in Virginia. But he had made investments in land that led to large debts. Pleading his private finances, he declined Washington’s offers of such federal posts as Attorney General and Ambassador to France (as well as President John Adams’s nomination, in 1798, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court).

Still, Marshall had accepted appointment by Adams in 1797 to the so-called XYZ mission to France, and this mission made Marshall famous on a national scale. While the French government toyed with the envoys, reports of these humiliations abroad extracted political victory at home. Many hitherto enraptured with France’s democratic Revolution turned for the time from the Republican party which had espoused the cause of France; it is “a shock on the republican mind, as has never been seen since our independence,” Jefferson wrote to Madison (April 6, 1798). It was Marshall who had composed the chief negotiating documents and the reports home, and who had shepherded the Americans in keeping the onus on the French while appearing open to real negotiation. When returned to Virginia, determined to rescue his private affairs, the newly prominent Marshall was nevertheless persuaded to run for Congress. According to his little autobiography only the entreaties of Washington himself, pressed unrelentingly at Mount Vernon, brought him around. In the present “crisis” of parties and policy, Washington had insisted, “every man who could contribute to the success of sound opinions was required by the most sacred duty to offer his services to the public.” The clinching argument came when Washington reminded Marshall of Washington’s own (immeasurably greater) sacrifices of “private feeling” for “public duty.”

Within three years of his entry into national office, Marshall was Chief Justice of the United States, charged to protect the Washingtonian Constitution. He had run for Congress as a moderate Federalist and won, had become, in a very divided House, the unofficial leader without whom nothing could be done, and was selected to offer the House’s eulogy upon Washington’s death. After turning down a nomination by Adams for Secretary of War, he acquiesced in that of Secretary of State and then, as the Federalist era and the presidency of Adams completed their course, he accepted without hesitation a nomination in January of 1801 as Chief Justice. In the most unpromising circumstances ever to greet a Chief, succeeding two comparatively ineffectual predecessors, he went on to develop the semisacred authority of the Supreme Court and the fundamental outlines of a semisacred constitutional law. But founder as he was, and famous as he had become, Marshall himself looked up to Washington as founding father and political hero.

Is Marshall’s Life a shrewd diagnosis of a great founding or—as critics suggest—a partisan treatise intended to extol the Federalists and defame the Republicans? Is it, as these critics object, a one-sided history written by a public man advocating the particular principles of his party? To this objection there is an obvious reply. Even if the Life were partisan history, it helps us understand a great party, perhaps the indispensable party in American history. We are given an authentic account of the party that made enduring popular government possible. More precisely, the struggle between Federalists and Republicans was not merely a partisan matter but a serious political drama upon the outcome of which depended the true and practicable principles of liberal and popular government. More than party is at stake here, and, in any event, a serious political education must consider both sides in the disputes Marshall recounts.

A good challenge to the Life’s account of the Washingtonian administration is Jefferson’s little “Explanations” at the start of his Anas. The Anas consists of three volumes of memorabilia of Washington’s administration, with an intent, according to the introductory “Explanations,” to counter “the only history of that period which pretends to have been compiled from authentic and unpublished documents.” For Jefferson, at least, Marshall’s Life is the rival to be confronted. According to the Anas, the Life gilds and disguises the undemocratic corruption with which Alexander Hamilton had bamboozled an aging Washington. Hamilton was an “apostate” from the “holy cause” of republicanism. He would raise the wealthy few, put down the people, and reintroduce the corrupt British hierarchy of classes. According to Jefferson, Marshall in the Life puts an attractive shine on Hamilton and the few and their accomplishments, but is silent and cold as to “the rights of humanity,” as to democratic republicanism as a whole (which would “change the condition of man over the civilized globe”), and as to the Republican party in America. This is another common objection to the Life, and it is the one that influences many contemporary critics. These critics are less opposed to Marshall’s partisanship than to his alleged lack of democratic and humanitarian partisanship.

The diagnosis that Jefferson is so concerned to attack is this: at the founding of the American popular government the Republican party was good at being popular but not at establishing government. Only “the temporary ascendancy” of the Federalists, according to the Life, enabled the new government to acquire strength enough to confront the inevitable shocks that were to come. Party is secondary to Marshall, and party strife is “dubious” and regrettable. A constitutional government and wise policies are primary, and it was the Washingtonian Federalists who established both. Perhaps it is relevant to note that Jefferson, despite considerable effort, was unsuccessful at recruiting an author for a rival history. While he finally endorsed the Italian Carlo Botta’s work as “more true than the party diatribe of Marshall’s,” he himself noted that even Botta borrowed heavily from Marshall (Jefferson to John Adams, June 23, 1813).

The Life itself contains several diagnoses of partisanship, and these begin early, with divisions over support of the army during the war years. But Marshall concentrates on the growing opposition during Washington’s presidency from a “great party” that called itself “the people.” The fundamental division as he saw it was between those favoring a government strong enough to govern and those reluctant to burden the states and the majority with the necessary taxes, federal powers, and enforcement of contracts and debt payments. The Life thus supplies a sober but provocative mix: it mixes republican devotion with political science. Marshall was devoted to his country and to popular self-government. He nevertheless shows how the republican experiment might have failed. It was likely to have failed. The war for independence could have been lost (one mutiny threatened the patriot cause with “total ruin”). The attempt at national self-government under the Articles of Confederation did fail. The Americans finally succeeded. But success at war and government was due as much to superior men as to the country’s popular inclinations. It was not due to some inevitable progressive development or to the magic of popular self-rule.

The war for independence involved a people reluctant to sacrifice, states reluctant to allow a national government strong enough to compel sacrifice, and states and peoples reluctant to support the soldiers and officers who did sacrifice. Hence, in Marshall’s judgment, the grandeur of Washington as general on the defensive, as general patching together an army, and as pillar of not only the war effort but the civil effort. “The season for action always arrived before the preparations for it were completed,” Marshall observed of the civil authorities. But Washington also had to be a general squelching visionary hopes and projects, such as enterprises against Canada that tended to dazzle Congress even as the armies starved and supplies dwindled. Similar difficulties greeted Washington as President. According to Marshall, a majority of Americans probably opposed the Constitution, which was ratified only because voters, in selecting the ratifying conventions, still deferred somewhat to character and prominence. When the new government began to govern, it had to confront the long-standing democratic and state-oriented sympathies and authorities. These attitudes and powers were organized into a movement by Jefferson and his allies and inflamed in hope and hatred by the more democratic liberalism of the French Revolution. Thus was formed a Republican party which suspected the essentials (as Marshall saw them) of a strong government and a prosperous economy.

The Life is chiefly an account of what it took to establish the new American order. What it took, chiefly, was Washington. It took above all Washington’s “resolution” in war and peace—a forcefulness deliberate and upright, but unyielding. This is the outlook that controls not only Marshall’s occasional accounts of party conflict but also his general account of the war for independence and the struggle for an adequate government. It also controls the concluding summary of Washington’s mind and character: the moral and political lessons especially for the ambitious young who are “candidates for fame.”

Two-thirds of the Life is about Washington’s generalship and gives a panoramic portrait of the Revolution’s major battles. The surge of British effort moved from Boston to the crucial middle colonies and finally to the South. The British kept invading and raiding. They attempted the decisive things: to destroy the Americans’ little armies, to occupy the great ports, to split the colonies down the Hudson River, and to reclaim the land and people. First came maneuvering around Boston in 1775. Then the British made the crucial takeovers in the middle colonies, first New York City in 1776, and then Philadelphia in 1777, coupled with Burgoyne’s splitting movement from Quebec to the Hudson via Lakes Champlain and George. Finally, the British thought to roll up the South from Savannah in 1779 and from Charleston and from Westover in Virginia, near Richmond, in 1780. Washington kept defending. He kept the British from extending their conquests from enclaves such as New York and Philadelphia to states as a whole and hence—given the unsettled loyalties—to the bulk of the citizenry. There was an exception in the South. After the British captured General Benjamin Lincoln’s army at Charleston, counties and whole states returned to British sovereignty. Earlier there had almost been a similar disaster in New Jersey after Washington’s rag-tag forces had been chased out of New York and then over the Delaware River into Pennsylvania. But Washington did the most necessary thing—and more. He kept his army alive, and he was resilient. Though driven across the Delaware, amazingly he returned during 1776 and 1777 to Trenton and still more amazingly to Princeton to shake the British hold over most of New Jersey. What shows through the Life, then, is Washington’s immense tenacity. Even amidst the rout around New York “he did not appear to despair.” Washington possessed an “unconquerable firmness” that showed “a serene unembarrassed countenance” to the troops and that fostered enterprise as well as vigilance. He was always devising some plan for the fox on the run to become the wolf on the attack.

In similar circumstances a man less competent could lose. By surrendering his army at Charleston in 1780, General Lincoln lost the whole lower South. Lincoln heeded the pleas of the civil authorities and, contrary to Washington’s counsel, did not retreat when he could have saved his army. By comparison, Washington in 1777 withdrew his army rather than make a final fight for Philadelphia, despite the pleas of civil authorities and despite the fact that Philadelphia was the seat of the Continental Congress. In 1780–81, General Nathanael Greene regained in the South most of what Lincoln had lost—and by a Washingtonian strategy. Greene and his able commanders fought many battles and won few. But he never lost his army, and he was always dangerous. By continually harassing the enemy, by masterfully employing a popular guerrilla force, by dividing his army to force the British to divide and weaken theirs, and by keeping civilians loyal to the patriot cause, Greene made the lower South too difficult for the British to occupy. Greene’s strategy was that of the Commander in Chief, with the sole exceptions of the Continental Army’s victories over Burgoyne at Saratoga in 1777 and over Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781—the great victories that punctuated dogged effort.

While the obvious drama of the Life is the course of the Revolutionary War, the underlying drama is the way in which Washington’s generalship gave birth to his country. He made a national army out of what was virtually no army—“an undisciplined, ill-organized multitude” from various states. He kept an army despite shortages of soldiers, supplies, arms, and back pay. He kept it by his own example, especially among the officers. He kept it by severe punishment—the execution of deserters, of spies (even in the difficult case of Major André), and of mutineers. Often it seemed that the army was loyal only to him. But Washington kept the army loyal to the cause of free government when it might have turned away or even turned traitor. Marshall dwells on the key incidents. These include Washington’s overcoming a massive mutiny of Pennsylvania soldiers insisting on their back pay, the mutiny that “threatened the American cause with total ruin” in 1781, and with the war over, Washington’s overcoming a potentially massive mutiny by officers bent on assuring their pay before the army disbanded in 1783.

What Marshall quietly reveals is not only how Washington fought, but how Washington kept a deeply divided people loyal to the fight for self-government. The soldiers and the officers were kept loyal in the army. Outside the army, many people were kept loyal by the army and not least by the example and persuasiveness of its Commander in Chief. Still, states typically competed to sacrifice the least in men, money, and materiel. A sluggish administration at the national level was a constant problem, especially because Congress administered finance and even war by committee. Not least galling to Washington were the fear and envy directed against the army itself. Legislators often held back prerogatives and pay, especially from the officers. One is struck by Washington’s indignation at the injustice done to those who did the most and sacrificed the most to win American independence. One is struck, too, by his patient obedience and his diplomatic but persistent pressing of his political masters to do what justice and the war effort required.

The second portion of the Life shows Washington dealing politically with what he had helped to keep in line militarily. Marshall takes readers through troubles under the Articles of Confederation, to a glimpse of the Constitutional Convention, to the work of making a paper plan into a real government. The theme of this portion is the statesmanship needed to establish the plan. Marshall supplies a checklist of the country’s immense problems at the start of Washington’s administration; and he reports how the first President addressed each and all. Economic well-being is restored by negotiating trade agreements and enforcing contracts. Credit is restored through taxes and by paying at full agreed value all public debt (state as well as federal). A mixture of patient diplomacy and decisive forcefulness deals successfully with Indians, foreign powers, and a democratic insurrection.

The context of the particular policies is a general political struggle: a point-counterpoint between Washington’s efforts and a popular party of opposition. The start of the struggle was in a constitutional question with political implications for the Presidency (the most undemocratic of political branches): did executive dismissals, as well as appointments, require assent of the Senate? Opposition to the party of the government became “systematic opposition” in reaction to Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s plan to assume state debts as well as federal, with its implications for federal power, and to fund them at face value, with its benefit for creditors and speculators at the cost of higher taxes. The next stage was an open extension of the attack to the hero himself. It arose in reaction to Washington’s proclaiming neutrality as France, the new voice of democratic Revolution, warred with the old monarchical Britain. It rose to a crescendo of popular meetings and invective on the occasion of Jay’s Treaty settling disputes with Britain. Could the new government really govern? Or would the final power be the torrent of popular outrage, or those rebelling in western Pennsylvania against the new taxes on liquor, or the activists in democratic societies modeled on the French revolutionary clubs—or the revolutionary French emissary Genêt, who ignored court orders and federal law while provoking indignation against the administration and authorizing French acts of war from American soil? Would the Presidency have the authority in foreign affairs marked out by, say, The Federalist’s famous discussion of executive power? Or might the Senate obtain the records of the Executive’s diplomacy, thus to publicize and baffle it? Might the Senate try to control executive appointments by disallowing the President’s dismissal of his subordinates? Could the House scuttle treaties made constitutionally—negotiated by the executive, with the Senate’s consent—by refusing to provide the enforcing legislation?

The new government succeeded, and Marshall, without claiming for the first President all the credit, emphasizes what Washington did. To begin with, Washington “was slow to commit himself”; he weighed seriously different points of view. He tried to appoint the best people (Hamilton and Jefferson sat in his cabinet), and he sought substantive counsel from his advisors. He was upright, acted out of duty, aimed to conciliate differences of party, rectified grievances, and took account of objections to his own judgments. He tried to negotiate with the Whiskey rebels, sought counsel from all sides in the heated controversy over the constitutionality of a national bank, and deliberated long and hard as to the merits of John Jay’s proposed treaty with Great Britain. But with deliberation and moderation in decision went determination when decided. Against the Whiskey rebels, for example, Washington put together an intimidating army and thus dissolved a threatening insurrection without battle or casualty. When protests against the Jay Treaty threatened to overwhelm the government, Washington approved it promptly. Confronted with executive decisiveness, the crowds subsided.

The Life concludes with one of the finer brief character sketches in American literary and historical writing. It is an economical précis, a compression of intellectual and moral virtues that in itself calls for much pondering. No one who considers this section can suppose that Marshall writes simply for political purpose, to say nothing of partisan purpose. He admires for their own sake the eleven or twelve qualities that he lays out, from Washington’s “unaffected and indescribable dignity,” to his judiciousness, the subordination of ambition to duty, the devotion to a constitutional republicanism of equal rights, and the enterprise as well as caution in military matters. But Marshall also means to call the attention of his readers to the need in democratic government for superior character in the highest offices. Of Washington he writes, “Respecting as the first magistrate in a free government must ever do, the real and deliberate sentiments of the people, their gusts of passion passed over without ruffling the smooth surface of his mind. Trusting to the reflecting good sense of the nation, he had the magnanimity to pursue its real interests in opposition to its temporary prejudices; and in more instances than one, we find him committing his whole popularity to hazard, and pursuing steadily the course dictated by a sense of duty, in opposition to a torrent which would have overwhelmed a man of ordinary firmness.”

Robert K. Faulkner

Boston College

TABLE OF MAPS

The Thirteen Colonies

Invasion of Canada, 1775–76

Battle of Trenton, December 26, 1776

Battle of Saratoga, September 19–October 7, 1777

Battle of Yorktown, September 30–October 19, 1781

PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF WASHINGTON’S LIFE

NOTE ON THIS EDITION

JUST AS THE second edition of his Life of Washington was appearing in 1832, John Marshall wrote to his Philadelphia publishers Cary & Lea: “If I could engage in reducing The Life of Washington to a single volume for schools (I do not know of what size) I would attempt it without any view to profit.” A year later he reported: “I have at length completed an abridgment of the Life of Washington for the use of schools. I have endeavored to compress it as much as possible. . . . After striking out every thing which in my judgment could be properly excluded the volume will contain at least 400 pages.” Cary & Lea did publish the abridgment, but only in 1838, three years after Marshall died.

For this Liberty Fund republication we have eliminated some of the editorial apparatus of the original publisher, but have made no substantive changes to Marshall’s own text. We have kept editorial additions to a minimum. We have changed the subtitle chosen by the publishers in 1838 (“written for the use of schools”) in favor of a more concise indication that Marshall had produced a refined, not merely simplified, version of his larger work. (This single-volume Life was republished in the 1850s without a subtitle.) As to the text itself, a few changes in wording and punctuation have been duly noted. Spelling in general has not been changed, although some proper names have been varied to accord with modern usage; such changes have not been noted.

We have added features to clarify the order and events of the work. In addition to supplying portraits of Washington and Marshall and a new foreword, we divided the work into three parts in a new table of contents. Simple chapter titles have replaced a densely analytical table of contents, partly because the analytical summaries were repeated at the head of each chapter, where we retain them. We also added a list of maps, a list of the principal events of Washington’s life, a listing of further reading and editorial sources (Appendix A), five of Washington’s key speeches and writings, including the Farewell Address (Appendix B), and an index.

The editors’ footnotes are numbered, while Marshall’s few footnotes are marked by asterisks. Notes have been supplied only to clarify technical words, mostly military, or words now obscure, and to supply essential historical and biographical information not likely to be obvious to today’s reader.

While no maps appeared in the first twenty printings of this single-volume Life (1838 to 1849), nor in the edition published from 1857 to 1859, both editions of the full Life published under Marshall’s supervision (1804–7, 1832) included maps of the important battles and campaigns of the Revolutionary War. For this Liberty Fund edition we have supplied new maps for several important battles and campaigns.

We would like to acknowledge the assistance and support provided by Boston College and Middlebury College, specifically Patricia Gray and the Reference staff at Starr Library, Middlebury College, and Richard Saunders and Emmie Donadio of the Middlebury College Museum; the Valley Library and staff at Oregon State University, Corvallis; Thomas Schneider, for help in proofreading; and Charles Hobson, editor of The Papers of John Marshall, for unpublished copies of letters in which Marshall mentions an edition for schools (May 5, 1832 and June 13, 1833).

Part One

Commander in Chief of the Revolution

CHAPTER 1

“The Favorite Soldier of Virginia”: Early Years; the French and Indian War (1732 to 1759)

Birth of George Washington.—His mission to the French General of Ohio.—Is appointed Lieutenant of a Colonial regiment.—Surprises Monsieur Jumonville.—Capitulation of fort Necessity.—Appointed Aid-de-camp to General Braddock.—Defeat and death of that General.—Appointed to the command of a Colonial regiment.—Distress of the frontiers.—Expedition against fort Du Quêsne.—Defeat of Major Grant.—Fort Du Quêsne evacuated.—Colonel Washington resigns.—His marriage.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, the third son of Augustine Washington, was born on the 22d of February, 1732, near the banks of the Potomac, in the county of Westmoreland, in Virginia. His father married Miss Butler, who died in 1728; leaving two sons, Lawrence and Augustine. In 1730, he intermarried with Miss Mary Ball, by whom he had four sons, George, John, Samuel, and Charles; and one daughter, Betty, who intermarried with Colonel Fielding Lewis, of Fredericksburg.

His great-grand-father, John Washington, had emigrated from the north of England, about the year 1657, and settled on the place where Mr. Washington was born.

1743

At the age of eleven years, he lost his father. An affectionate mother continued to impress those principles of religion and virtue on his tender mind, which constituted the solid basis of a character that was maintained throughout all the trying vicissitudes of an eventful life. But his education was limited to subjects strictly useful, not even extending to foreign languages.

1749

At the age of seventeen, he was appointed a surveyor in the western part of the northern neck of Virginia; and, in that office, acquired such information respecting vacant lands, and formed those opinions concerning their future value, which afterwards contributed greatly to the increase of his fortune.

1752

Those powerful attractions, which the profession of arms presents to young and ardent minds, possessed their full influence over Mr. Washington. Stimulated by the enthusiasm of military genius, to take part in the war in which Great Britain was then engaged, he pressed earnestly to enter into the navy, and, at the age of fourteen, a midshipman’s warrant was obtained for him. The interference of a timid and affectionate mother deferred the commencement, and changed the course, of his military career. Six years afterwards, when the militia were to be trained for actual service, he was appointed one of the Adjutants-General¹ of Virginia, with the rank of Major. The duties annexed to this office soon yielded to others of a more interesting character.

1753

France was beginning to develop the vast plan of connecting her extensive dominions in America, by uniting Canada to Louisiana. The troops of that nation had taken possession of a tract of country claimed by Virginia, and had commenced a line of posts, to be extended from the Lakes to the Ohio. The attention of Mr. Dinwiddie,² Lieutenant-Governor of that province, was attracted to these supposed encroachments, and he deemed it his duty to demand in the name of the King, his master, that they should be suspended.

This mission was toilsome and hazardous. The Envoy would be under the necessity of passing through an extensive and almost unexplored wilderness, inhabited by fierce savages, who were either hostile to the English or of doubtful attachment. While the dangers and fatigues of this service deterred others from undertaking it, they seem to have possessed attractions for Mr. Washington, and he engaged in it with alacrity.

Oct.–Nov. 1753

On receiving his commission, he proceeded to Wills’ creek, then the extreme frontier settlement of the English, where guides were engaged to conduct him over the Alleghany mountains. At the mouth of Turtle creek he was informed that the French general was dead, and that the army had retired into winter quarters. Pursuing his route, he examined the country through which he passed, with a military eye, and selected the confluence of the Monongahela and Alleghany rivers, the place where fort Du Quêsne was afterwards erected by the French, as a position which it would be advisable to seize and fortify immediately.³

Jan. 1754

After employing a few days in securing the fidelity of the Indians in that neighborhood, he ascended the Alleghany to a French fort where he was received by the commanding officer on the Ohio, to whom he delivered the letter of Mr. Dinwiddie, and from whom he received an answer with which he returned to Williamsburg. The exertions made by Mr. Washington on this mission, the perseverance with which he surmounted the difficulties he encountered, and the judgment displayed in his conduct toward the Indians, raised him in the public opinion as well as in that of the Lieutenant-Governor. His journal, drawn up for the inspection of Mr. Davidson, was published, and impressed his countrymen with very favorable sentiments of his understanding and fortitude.⁴

March–April 1754

As the answer from the commandant of the French forces on the Ohio indicated no disposition to withdraw from that country, it was deemed necessary to make some preparations to maintain the rights asserted over it by the British crown; and the Assembly of Virginia authorized the Executive to raise a regiment for that purpose, to consist of three hundred men. The command of this regiment was given to Mr. Fry, and Major Washington was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel. Anxious to be engaged in active service, he obtained permission, about the beginning of April, to advance with two companies to the Great Meadows, in the Alleghany Mountains. Soon after his arrival at that place, he was informed by some friendly Indians that the French, having dispersed a party of workmen employed by the Ohio Company to erect a fort on the south-eastern branch of the Ohio, were engaged in completing a fortification at the confluence of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers; a detachment from which place was then on its march towards his camp. Though open hostilities had not yet commenced, the country was considered as invaded; and several circumstances were related, confirming the opinion that this party was approaching with hostile views. Confident of this, Lieutenant-Colonel Washington resolved to anticipate them. Proceeding under the guidance of Indians, through a dark and rainy night, to the French encampment, he completely surrounded it; and, at daybreak, his troops fired and rushed upon the party, which immediately surrendered. One man only escaped capture; and Monsieur Jumonville alone, the commanding officer, was killed.

May 27, 1754

While the regiment was on its march to join the detachment advanced in front, the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Washington by the death of Colonel Fry. Soon after its arrival, it was reinforced by two independent companies of regulars. After erecting a small stockade at the Great Meadows, Colonel Washington commenced his march towards fort Du Quêsne, with the intention of dislodging the French from that place. He had not proceeded more than thirty miles, when he was informed by some friendly Indians, that the French, “as numerous as the pigeons in the wood,” were advancing rapidly to meet him. Among those who brought this information was a trusty chief, only two days from the post on the Ohio, who had observed the arrival of a considerable reinforcement at that place, and had heard them express the intention of marching immediately to attack the English, with a corps composed of eight hundred French and four hundred Indians.

The ground occupied by Colonel Washington was not adapted to military purposes. A road leading through other defiles in the mountains, would enable the French to pass into his rear, intercept his supplies, and starve him into a surrender, or fight him with a superiority of three to one.

In this hazardous situation, a council of war unanimously advised a retreat to the fort at the Great Meadows, now termed fort Necessity; where the two roads united, and where the face of the country was such as not to permit an enemy to pass him unperceived. At that place he intended to await the arrival of reinforcements.

July 3, 1754

In pursuance of this advice, Colonel Washington returned to fort Necessity, and began a ditch around the stockade. Before it was completed, the French and Indians, computed at fifteen hundred men, commanded by Monsieur de Villier, appeared before the fort, and commenced a furious attack upon it. They were received with great intrepidity by the Americans, who fought partly within the stockade, and partly in the surrounding ditch, which was nearly filled with mud and water. Colonel Washington continued the whole day on the outside of the fort, encouraging the soldiers by his countenance and example. The assailants fought under cover of the trees and high grass with which the country abounds. The action continued from ten in the morning until dark, when Monsieur de Villier demanded a parley, and offered terms of capitulation. These were rejected, but, in the course of the night, articles were signed, by which the fort was surrendered on condition that the garrison should be allowed the honors of war—should be permitted to retain their arms and baggage, and be suffered to march unmolested into the inhabited parts of Virginia.

The loss of the Americans in this affair is not ascertained. A return made after arriving at Wills’ creek, states the killed and wounded of the Virginia regiment at fifty-eight. The loss sustained by the two independent companies was not reported. That of the assailants was supposed to be more considerable.

Great credit was given to Colonel Washington by his countrymen, for the courage displayed in this engagement. The legislature evinced its satisfaction with the conduct of the whole party, by passing a vote of thanks to him and the officers under his command; and by giving three hundred pistoles to be distributed among the soldiers engaged in the action.

The regiment returned to Winchester to be recruited;⁵ soon after which it was joined by a few companies from North Carolina and Maryland. On the arrival of this reinforcement, the Lieutenant-Governor, with the advice of council, unmindful of the condition and number of the troops, ordered them to march immediately over the Alleghany mountains; and to expel the French from fort Du Quêsne, or to build one in its vicinity.

Aug. 1754

The little army in Virginia, now under the command of Colonel Innes of North Carolina, did not exceed half the number of the enemy, and was neither provided with the means of moving, nor with supplies for a winter campaign. With as little consideration, directions had been given for the immediate completion of the regiment, without furnishing a shilling for the recruiting service—Colonel Washington remonstrated against these orders, but prepared to execute them. The assembly however, having risen without making any provision for the farther prosecution of the war, this wild expedition was abandoned, and the Virginia regiment was reduced to independent companies.

In the course of the winter, orders were received “for settling the rank of his majesty’s forces then serving with the provincials in North America.” These orders directed “that all officers commissioned by the king, or by his general in North America, should take rank⁶ of all officers commissioned by the governors of the respective provinces: and further, that the general and field officers of the provincial troops should have no rank when serving with the general and field officers commissioned by the crown; but that all captains, and other inferior officers of the royal troops, should take rank over provincial officers of the same grade, having senior commissions.”

Oct. 1754

Still professing his attachment to a military life, Colonel Washington could not submit to hold the station assigned to him, and retired indignantly from a service in which he was degraded by loss of rank.

His eldest brother had lately died and left him Mount Vernon,—a considerable estate on the Potomac.⁷ To this delightful spot he withdrew, resolving to devote his future life to private pursuits. This resolution was not long maintained.

General Braddock,⁸ being informed of his merit, and his knowledge of the country which was to become the theatre of action, gratified his desire to make one campaign under an officer supposed to possess some knowledge of war, by inviting him to enter his family as a volunteer aid-de-camp.⁹

1755

Having accepted this invitation, he joined the commander-in-chief on his march from Alexandria to Wills’ creek. The army was detained at that place until the 12th of June, by the difficulty of procuring wagons, horses, and provisions. Colonel Washington, impatient under these delays, suggested the propriety of using pack-horses instead of wagons: though the commander-in-chief at first rejected this advice, its propriety, soon after the commencement of the march, became too obvious to be longer neglected.

On the third day after the army had moved from Wills’ creek, Colonel Washington was seized with a violent fever which disabled him from riding on horseback, and was conveyed in a covered wagon. Being still privately consulted by the commander-in-chief, he urged that officer strenuously to leave his heavy artillery and baggage with the rear division, and with a chosen body of troops, and some pieces of light artillery, to press forward to fort Du Quêsne. In support of this advice, he stated that the French were then weak on the Ohio, but daily expected reinforcements. These could not arrive during the drought existing at that time, because the river Le Boeuf, on which their supplies must be brought to Virginia, was too low for the purpose. A rapid movement might enable him to carry the place before the arrival of the expected aid. But should the army remain united, the delays attending its march were such, that rain sufficient to raise the waters might be expected, and the whole force of the French might be collected for their reception;—a circumstance which would render the success of the expedition doubtful.

This advice according with the temper of the commander-in-chief, it was determined in a council of war that twelve hundred select men, to be commanded by the General in person, should advance with the utmost expedition against fort Du Quêsne. Colonel Dunbar was to remain with the residue of the regular troops and all the heavy baggage.

Colonel Washington was obliged to stop at the Great Crossings of the Yohogany—the physician having declared that his life would be endangered by continuing with the army. He obeyed the positive orders of the General to remain at this place; having first received a promise that means should be used to bring him up with the army before it reached fort Du Quêsne.

July 8, 1755

The day before the action of the Monongahela, he joined the General in a covered wagon; and, though weak, entered on the duties of his station.

In a short time after the action had commenced, Colonel Washington was the only aid remaining alive and unwounded. The whole duty of carrying the orders of the commander-in-chief, in an engagement with marksmen who selected officers, especially those on horseback, devolved on him. Two horses were killed under him, and four balls passed through his coat. To the astonishment of all he escaped unhurt, while every other officer on horseback was killed or wounded. “I expected every moment,” says an eye-witness, “to see him fall. His duty and situation exposed him to every danger. Nothing but the superintending care of Providence could have saved him from the fate of all around him.”¹⁰

At length, after an action of nearly three hours, General Braddock, under whom three horses had been killed, received a mortal wound, and his troops fled in great disorder. Every effort to rally them was ineffectual until they had crossed the Monongahela. The General was brought off in a tumbril,¹¹ by Colonel Washington, Captain Stewart of the guards, and his servant. The defeated detachment retreated to the rear division of the army, where General Braddock expired. The military stores not necessary for immediate use were destroyed, and Colonel Dunbar marched the remaining European troops to Philadelphia.

Colonel Washington, who was much dissatisfied with the conduct of the regular soldiers in this action, bestowed great praise on the provincials. “The Virginia companies,” he said in a letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, “fought like men and died like soldiers. Captain Peronny and all his officers, down to a corporal, were killed. Captain Poulson had almost as hard a fate, for only one of his escaped.”

Colonel Washington had long been the favorite soldier of Virginia, and his reputation grew with every occasion for exertion. His conduct in this battle had been universally extolled, and the common opinion of his countrymen was, that, had his advice been pursued, the disaster had been avoided.

Aug. 14, 1755

The Assembly, which was in session when intelligence of this defeat and of the abandonment of the province by Colonel Dunbar was received, immediately determined to raise a regiment for the defence of the colony, the command of which was given to Colonel Washington, who was also designated in his commission as the commander-in-chief of all the forces raised and to be raised in Virginia. The uncommon privilege of naming his field officers was added to this honorable manifestation of public confidence.

After making the necessary arrangements for the recruiting service, and visiting the posts on the frontier, he set out for the seat of government; but was overtaken by an express carrying the intelligence that a large number of French and Indians, divided into several parties, had broken up the frontier settlements; were murdering and capturing men, women, and children; burning their houses, and destroying their crops. The troops stationed among them for their protection were unequal to that duty, and instead of affording aid to the inhabitants, were blocked up in their forts.

Colonel Washington hastened back to Winchester, but his efforts to raise the militia¹² were unavailing. Instead of assembling in arms and obtaining safety by meeting their invaders, the inhabitants fled into the lower country, and increased the general terror. He endeavored to collect and arm the men who had abandoned their houses, and to remove their wives and children from this scene of desolation and carnage. Pressing orders were despatched to the newly appointed officers to forward their recruits, and to the county lieutenants east of the Blue Ridge to hasten their militia to Winchester. Before these orders could be executed, the invading enemy had recrossed the Alleghany Mountains.

1756

Early in the following spring another irruption, spreading death and desolation around, was made into the inhabited country. The number of troops on the regular establishment was unequal to the protection of the frontier, and effective service from the militia was found to be unattainable. The people either abandoned the country, or attempted to secure themselves in small stockade forts, where they were in great distress for provisions, arms, and ammunition, were often surrounded, and sometimes cut off. The letters of Colonel Washington at the time show the deep impression made on his mind by this afflicting and irremediable state of things.

The incompetency of the military force to the defence of the country having become obvious, the assembly determined to augment the regiment to fifteen hundred men. Colonel Washington urged the necessity of increasing it still further, and demonstrated the total incompetency of the number proposed to the protection of the extensive frontier of Virginia. His representations did not succeed, and the distress of the country increased. As had been foreseen, Winchester became almost the only settlement west of the Blue Ridge on the northern frontier; and fears were entertained that the enemy would pass even that barrier, and ravage the country below it. Express after express was sent to hasten the militia, but sent in vain. At length, about the last of April, the French and their savage allies, laden with plunder, prisoners, and scalps, returned to fort Du Quêsne.

Some short time after their retreat, the militia appeared, and were employed in searching the country for small lingering parties of Indians, and in making dispositions to repel another invasion. A fort was commenced at Winchester, which, in honor of the General then commanding the British forces in America, was called fort Loudoun; and the perpetual remonstrances¹³ of Colonel Washington at length effected some improvement in the military code.

Successive incursions continued to be made by the French and Indians, who kept up a perpetual alarm, and murdered the defenceless wherever found. In Pennsylvania, the inhabitants were driven as far as Carlisle; and, in Maryland, Fredericktown, on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, became a frontier. With less than one thousand men, aided occasionally by militia, Colonel Washington was required to defend a frontier nearly four hundred miles in extent, and to complete a chain of forts.

This campaign furnishes no event which can interest the reader; yet the duties of the officer, though minute, were arduous; and the suffering of the people beyond measure afflicting. It adds to the many instances history records of the miseries always to be expected by those who defer preparing the means of defence, until the moment when they ought to be used, and then rely on a force neither adequate to the danger, nor of equal continuance with it.

Oct. 1756

As soon as the main body of the enemy had withdrawn from the settlements, a tour was made by Colonel Washington to the south-western frontier. There, as in the North, repeated incursions had been made; and there too, the principal defence of the country was entrusted to our ill-regulated militia.

March 1757

After returning to Winchester, he gave the Lieutenant-Governor, in curious¹⁴ detail, a statement of the situation in which he found the country, urging, but urging in vain, arguments which will always be suggested by experience, against relying chiefly on militia for defence.

Sensible of the impracticability of defending such an extensive frontier, Colonel Washington continued to press the policy of enabling him to act on the offensive. The people of Virginia, he thought, could be protected only by entering the country of the enemy; giving him employment at home, and removing the source of all their calamities by taking possession of fort Du Quêsne.

His inability to act offensively was not the only distressing and vexatious circumstance to which he was exposed. The Lieutenant-Governor, who seems to have been unequal to the difficulties of his station, frequently deranged his system by orders which could not be executed, and sometimes could not be well understood. He seems, too, to have occasionally manifested unreasonable dissatisfaction with the conduct of the commander-in-chief.

July 1756

In the midst of these embarrassments, Lord Loudoun,¹⁵ in whose person the offices of Governor and commander-in-chief were united, arrived in Virginia. A comprehensive statement of the situation of the Colony in a military point of view, and of the regiment in particular, was drawn up and submitted to him by Colonel Washington. In this, he enumerated the errors which had prevented the completion of his regiment, showed the insufficiency of militia for military purposes, and demonstrated the advantages of an offensive system.

Feb.–April 1757

This statement was probably presented by Colonel Washington in person, in the winter when permitted to visit Lord Loudoun in Philadelphia, when that nobleman met the Governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Virginia, in order to consult with them on the measures to be taken in their respective provinces, for the ensuing campaign. He was, however, disappointed in his favorite hope of being able to act offensively against the French on the Ohio. Lord Loudoun had determined to make a grand effort against Canada, and to leave only twelve hundred men in the middle and southern colonies; yet his anxious wishes continued to be directed towards fort Du Quêsne. In a letter written in May to Colonel Stanwix, who commanded in the middle colonies, he observed, “You will excuse me, sir, for saying that I think there never was, and perhaps never again will be, so favorable an opportunity as the present for reducing fort Du Quêsne. Several prisoners have made their escape from the Ohio this spring, and agree in their accounts that there are but three hundred men left in the garrison. Surely then, this is too precious an opportunity to be lost.”

July 1757

But Mr. Pitt¹⁶ did not yet direct the councils of Britain, and a spirit of enterprise and heroism did not yet animate her generals. The campaign to the North was inglorious; and nothing was even attempted towards the West which might relieve the middle colonies.

Large bodies of savages in the service of France once more spread desolation and murder over the whole country west of the Blue Ridge. The regular troops were inadequate to the defence of the inhabitants, and the incompetence of the defensive system to their security became every day more apparent. He continued to urge on the Lieutenant-Governor, and on the Assembly, in his letters to the Speaker, the necessity of vigorous exertions. Without them he predicted that there would not be found an individual west of the Blue Ridge the ensuing autumn, except the troops in garrison, and a few in Winchester under the protection of the fort.

1757

It was impossible that Colonel Washington, zealous in the service of his country, and ambitious of military fame, could observe the errors committed in the conduct of the war without censuring them. These errors were extended to Indian affairs. The Cherokees and Catawbas had hitherto remained faithful to the English, and it was very desirable to engage the warriors of those tribes heartily in their service; but so badly was the intercourse with them conducted, that, though considerable expense was incurred, not much aid was obtained, and great disgust was excited among them. The freedom with which his censures were uttered gave offence to the Lieutenant-Governor, who considered them as manifesting a want of respect for himself. Sometimes he coarsely termed them impertinent; at others, charged him with looseness in his information, and inattention to his duty. On one of these occasions, Colonel Washington thus concluded a letterAug. 27 of detail:¹⁷ “I must beg leave before I conclude, to observe in justification of my own conduct, that it is with pleasure I receive reproof when reproof is due, because no person can be readier to accuse me than I am to acknowledge an error when I have committed it, nor more desirous of atoning for a crime when I am sensible of being guilty of one. But on the other hand, it is with concern I remark that my best endeavors lose their reward; and that my conduct, although I have uniformly studied to make it as unexceptionable as I could, does not appear to you in a favorable point of light; otherwise your honor would not have accused me of loose behavior, and remissness of duty, in matters where I think I have rather exceeded than fell short of it. This I think is evidently the case in speaking of Indian affairs at all, after being instructed in express terms not to have any concern with or management of Indian affairs.”

Not long after this he received a letter informing him of some coarse calumny, reflecting on his veracity and honor, which had been reported to the Lieutenant-Governor. He inclosed a copy of this letter to Mr. Dinwiddie, and thus addressed him: “I should take it infinitely kind if your honor would please to inform me whether a report of this kind was ever made to you; and, in that case, who was the author of it.

“It is evident from a variety of circumstances, and especially from the change in your honor’s conduct towards me, that some person as well inclined to detract, but better skilled in the art of detraction than the author of the above stupid scandal, has made free with my character!

“If it be possible that * * * *, for my belief is staggered, not being conscious of having given the least cause to any one, much less to that gentleman, to reflect so grossly; I say if it be possible that * * * * could descend so low as to be the propagator of this story, he must either be vastly ignorant of the state of affairs in this country at that time, or else he must suppose that the whole body of the inhabitants had combined with me in executing the deceitful fraud.

“It is uncertain in what light my services may have appeared to your honour; but this I know, and it is the highest consolation I am capable of feeling, that no man that ever was employed in a public capacity, has endeavored to discharge the trust in him with greater honesty, and more zeal for the country’s interest than I have done.”

In a letter some short time after this to the Lieutenant-Governor, he said, “I do not know that I ever gave your honor cause to suspect me of ingratitude; a crime I detest, and would most carefully avoid. If an open disinterested behavior carries offence, I may have offended, for I have all along laid it down as a maxim to represent facts freely and impartially, but not more so to others than to you, sir. If instances of my ungrateful behavior had been particularized, I would have answered them. But I have been long convinced that my actions and their motives have been maliciously aggravated.”

Mr. Dinwiddie soon afterwards took leave of Virginia, and the government devolved on Mr. Blair, the president of the council. Between him and the commander of the colonial troops the utmost cordiality existed.

After the close of the campaign of 1757, Loudoun returned to England, and General Abercrombie succeeded to the command of the army. The department of the middle and southern provinces was committed to General Forbes, who, to the inexpressible gratification of Colonel Washington, determined to undertake an expedition against fort Du Quêsne.

1758

He urged an early campaign, but he urged it ineffectually; and before the troops were assembled, a large body of French and Indians broke into the country, and renewed the horrors of the tomahawk and scalping-knife. The attempts made to intercept these savages were unsuccessful; and they recrossed the Alleghany with their plunder, prisoners, and scalps.

Among other motives for an early campaign, Colonel Washington had urged the impracticability of retaining the Indians. His fears were well founded. Before a junction of the troops had been made, these savages became impatient, and finding that the expedition would yet be delayed a considerable time, they left the army, promising to rejoin it at the proper season.

In pursuance of orders, the Virginia troops moved in detachments from Winchester to fort Cumberland, where they assembled early in July; after which they were employed in opening a road to Raystown, where Colonel Bouquet was stationed.

Colonel Washington had expected that the army would march by Braddock’s road; but, late in July, he had the mortification to receive a letter from Colonel Bouquet, asking an interview, in order to consult on opening a new road from Raystown, and requesting his opinion on that route. “I shall,” says he, in answer to this letter, “most cheerfully work on any road, pursue any route, or enter upon any service, that the General or yourself may think me usefully employed in or qualified for; and shall never have a will of my own when a duty is required of me. But since you desire me to speak my sentiments freely, permit me to observe that, after having conversed with all the guides, and having been informed by others acquainted with the country, I am convinced that a road to be compared with General Braddock’s, or indeed that will be fit for transportation even by pack-horses, can not be made.”

A few days after writing this letter he had an interview with Colonel Bouquet, whom he found decided in favour of opening the new road. After their separation, Colonel Washington addressed to him a letter to be laid before General Forbes, in which he stated his reasons against this measure. He concluded his arguments against it (arguments which appear to be conclusive) by declaring his fears that, should the attempt be made, nothing more could be done than to fortify some post west of the Alleghany, and prepare for another campaign. This he prayed heaven to avert.

In a letter to Major Halket, aid-de-camp to General Forbes, he thus expressed his forebodings of the mischiefs to be apprehended from the adoption of the new route. “I am just returned from a conference held with Colonel Bouquet. I find him fixed—I think I may say unalterably fixed—to lead you a new way to the Ohio through a road, every inch of which is to be cut at this advanced season, when we have scarcely time left to tread the beaten track, universally confessed to be the best passage through the mountains.

“If Colonel Bouquet succeeds in this point with the General, all is lost! all is lost indeed! our enterprise is ruined; and we shall be stopped at the Laurel Hill this winter; but not to gather laurels, except of the kind which cover the mountains. The southern Indians will turn against us, and these colonies will be desolated by such an accession to the enemy’s strength. These must be the consequences of a miscarriage; and a miscarriage the almost necessary consequence of an attempt to march the army by this route.”

Colonel Washington’s remonstrances and arguments were unavailing; and the new route was adopted. His extreme chagrin at this measure, and at the delays resulting from it, was expressed in anxious letters to Mr. Fauquier, then governor of Virginia, and to the Speaker of the House of Burgesses.

Sept. 21

He was soon afterwards ordered to Raystown. Major Grant had been previously detached from the advanced post at Loyal Hanna, with a select corps of eight hundred men, to reconnoitre the country about fort Du Quêsne. The morning after his arrival in the vicinity of the fort, he detached Major Lewis of Colonel Washington’s regiment, with a baggage-guard, two miles in his rear; and sent an engineer with a covering party, in full view of the fort, to take a plan of the works. An action soon commenced, on which Major Lewis, leaving Captain Bullett with about fifty Virginians to guard the baggage, advanced with the utmost celerity to support Major Grant. The English were defeated with considerable loss; and both Major Grant and Major Lewis were taken prisoners. In this action the Virginians manifested the spirit with which they had been trained. Of eight officers, five were killed, a sixth wounded, and seventh taken prisoner. Captain Bullett, who defended the baggage with great resolution, and contributed to save the remnant of the detachment, was the only officer who escaped unhurt. Of one hundred and sixty-two men, sixty-two were killed on the spot, and forty-two wounded.

Oct. 11

It was at length determined that the army should move from Raystown, and the colonels of regiments were required to submit severally to the consideration of the General, a plan for his march. That proposed by Colonel Washington has been preserved, and appears to have been judiciously formed.

They reached the camp at Loyal Hanna, through a road indescribably bad, about the fifth of November. At this place, as had been predicted, a council of war determined that it was unadvisable to proceed farther this campaign. It would have been almost impossible to winter an army in that position. They must have retreated from the cold inhospitable wilderness into which they had penetrated, or have suffered immensely, perhaps have perished. Fortunately, some prisoners were taken who informed them of the extreme distress of the fort. Receiving no support from Canada, the garrison was weak, in great want of provisions, and deserted by the Indians. This encouraging intelligence changed the resolution which had been taken, and determined the General to prosecute the expedition.

Colonel Washington was advanced in front, and, with immense labor, opened a way for the main body of the army. The troops moved forward with slow and painful steps until they reached fort Du Quêsne, of which they took possession on the 25th of November; the garrison having on the preceding night, after evacuating and setting it on fire, proceeded down the Ohio in boats.

To other causes than the vigor of the officer who conducted the enterprise, is the capture of this important place to be ascribed. The naval armaments of Great Britain had intercepted the reinforcements designed by France for her colonies; and the pressure on Canada had disabled the Governor of that province from detaching troops to fort Du Quêsne. Without the aid of these causes, the extraordinary and unaccountable delays of the campaign must have defeated its object.

The works were repaired, and the new fort received the name of the great minister who, with unparalleled vigor and talents, then governed the British nation.¹⁸

After furnishing two hundred men from his regiment as a garrison for fort Pitt, Colonel Washington marched back to Winchester, whence he proceeded to Williamsburg to take his seat in the General Assembly, of which he had been elected a member by the county of Frederick, while at fort Cumberland.

Dec. 1758

A cessation of Indian hostility being the consequence of the removal of the French from the Ohio, Virginia was relieved from immediate danger; and the object for which alone he had continued in service, after finding that he could not be placed on the permanent establishment, was accomplished. His health was much impaired, and his private affairs required his attention. Impelled by these and other motives of a private nature, he determined to withdraw from a service which he might now quit without dishonor; and, about the close of the year, resigned his commission as colonel of the first Virginia regiment, and commander-in-chief of all the troops raised in the colony.

The officers whom he had commanded were strongly attached to him, and manifested their regret at parting with him, by an affectionate address, expressing the high opinion they entertained both of his military and private character.

This opinion was not confined to the officers of his regiment. It was common to Virginia; and had been adopted by the British officers with whom he served. The duties he performed, though not splendid, were arduous; and were executed with zeal and with judgment. The exact discipline he established in his regiment, when the temper of Virginia was hostile to discipline, does credit to his military character; and the gallantry the troops displayed when they were called into action, manifests the spirit infused into them by their commander.

The difficulties of his situation while unable to cover the frontier from the French and Indians, who were spreading death and desolation in every quarter, were incalculably great; and no better evidence of his exertions under these distressing circumstances can be given, than the undiminished confidence still placed in him by those he was unable to protect.

The efforts to which he incessantly stimulated his country for the purpose of obtaining possession of the Ohio; the wise system for the conduct of the war which he continually recommended; the vigorous and active measures always urged upon those by whom he was commanded; manifest an ardent and enterprising mind, tempered by judgment, and quickly improved by experience.

Jan. 1759

Not long after his resignation he was married to Mrs. Custis, a young lady to whom he had been for some time attached; and who, to a large fortune, and fine person, added those amiable accomplishments which ensure domestic happiness, and fill with silent but unceasing felicity the quiet scenes of private life.

CHAPTER 2

“The Soldier of America”; Victory at Boston (September 1774 to April 1776)

Colonel Washington appointed commander-in-chief of the American forces.—Arrives at Cambridge.—Strength and disposition of the army.—Deficiency in arms and ammunition.—Falmouth burnt.—Measures to form a continental army.—Difficulty of re-enlisting the troops.—General Lee detached to New York.—Possession taken of the heights of Dorchester.—Boston evacuated.—Correspondence respecting prisoners.

Sep. 1774

1775

COLONEL WASHINGTON took a decided part against the claims of supremacy asserted by the British parliament; and was elected a member of the first congress. He was soon distinguished as the soldier of America, and placed on all those committees whose duty it was to make arrangements for defence. When it became necessary to appoint a commander-in-chief, his military character, the solidity of his judgment, the steady firmness of his temper, the dignity of his person and deportment, the confidence inspired by his patriotism and industry, and the independence of his fortune, combined to designate him in the opinion of all for that important station. Local jealousy was suppressed by the enthusiasm of the moment, and, on the 14th of June, 1775, he was unanimously chosen “general and commander-in-chief of the armies of the united colonies, and all the forces now raised or to be raised by them.”

On the succeeding day, when this appointment was communicated to him, he modestly expressed his high sense of the honor conferred upon him, and his firm determination to exert every power he possessed in the service of his country and of her “glorious cause.” Declining all compensation for his services, he avowed an intention to keep an exact account of his expenses, which he should rely on Congress to discharge.

He hastened to the American army, which was encamped around Boston, in which place the British troops commanded by General Gage were besieged. It consisted of fourteen thousand five hundred men, but several circumstances combined to render it less effective than its numbers would indicate.

In the hope of avoiding open hostilities, the time for preparing to meet them had passed away unemployed, and this neglect could not be remedied. In the essential article of ammunition, it was discovered, soon after the arrival of the General in camp, that the magazines¹ would furnish only nine cartridges² for each man. Powder was to be obtained, not from officers under the control of Congress, but from committees and other local powers, who had collected small parcels for local defence. Arms, too, were deficient in number, and inferior in quality. The troops were almost destitute of clothing, and without tents. A siege was to be carried on without engineers, and almost without intrenching tools. In addition to these defects, many were discontented with the general officers appointed by Congress: and the mode of appointing regimental officers, in some of the colonies, where they were elected by the soldiers, was extremely unfavorable to discipline.³ Yet, under all these disadvantages, the General observed with pleasure, “the materials of a good army.” There were “a great number of men, able-bodied, active, zealous in the cause, and of unquestionable courage.” Possessed of these materials, he employed himself indefatigably in their organization.

The commander-in-chief felt the full importance of destroying the army in Boston, before it should be reinforced in the spring. The result of his assiduous inquiries into the situation of the enemy, seems to have been a strong inclination to the opinion that, to carry their works by storm, though hazardous, was not impracticable; but, a council of general officers being unanimous against making the attempt, it was abandoned.

To relieve the wants of his army, produced by the rigorous blockade of Boston, the British general frequently detached small parties by water, in quest of fresh provisions. The task of repelling their incursions became so burdensome to the inhabitants of the sea-coast, that the several governors pressed for detachments from the main army, for their protection; and the manifest danger of granting the request did not appease the irritation excited by refusal. Congress was at length induced to pass a resolution, declaring that the army before Boston was designed solely to oppose the enemy in that place, and ought not to be weakened by detachments. At Newport, in Rhode Island, the committee sought security by entering into a stipulation with the officer commanding the ships of war on that station, to furnish the requisite supplies on condition of his sparing the place. General Washington thought it necessary to remonstrate against this dangerous measure.

While the blockade of Boston was thus perseveringly maintained, other events of considerable importance occurred elsewhere.

In July, Georgia joined her sister colonies, and chose delegates to represent her in Congress; after which, the style of “the thirteen United Colonies” was assumed.

After a recess of one month, Congress reassembled at Philadelphia.

Sept. 6

The scarcity of arms and ammunition, and the importance of a maritime force, engaged their immediate attention. It was more forcibly attracted to the latter object, by an event which, at the time, excited no ordinary degree of resentment.

Orders had been issued to the commanders of the British ships of war to proceed against those seaport towns in which any troops should be raised, or military works erected, as in the case of actual rebellion. Under color of these orders, a small naval force, commanded by Captain Mowat, was detached against Falmouth, a flourishing village on the coast of Massachusetts. After reducing the town to ashes, an attempt was made to penetrate into the country; but the militia and minute-men soon drove the party back to their ships.⁴ This measure was immediately followed by a resolution of the Convention of Massachusetts for issuing letters of marque and reprisal;⁵ and by an addition of some ships of war, on the part of Congress, to the existing naval force.

The re-enlistment of the army, next to the supply of arms and ammunition, was the subject most deeply interesting to the American government.

On the 29th of September, at the earnest solicitation of General Washington, a committee had been appointed by Congress, with directions to repair to the camp at Cambridge, there to consult with the commander-in-chief and the governments of New England, “on the most effectual method of continuing, supporting, and regulating a continental army.” On the return of this committee, Congress determined that the new army should consist of twenty thousand three hundred and seventy-two men, including officers. Unfortunately, an essential error was committed in constituting this first military establishment of the Union, the consequences of which ceased only with the war. The soldiers were enlisted for the term of one year, if not sooner discharged by Congress. This fatal error brought the American cause more than once into real hazard.

Other resolutions accompanied that for raising the new army, which exhibit the perilous condition of the country. The arms of those who refused to re-enlist, though private property, were detained at a valuation; two dollars were offered to every recruit who would supply himself with a blanket; clothes for the privates, (the price to be deducted from their pay,) were purchased without regard to color; and they were required to furnish their own arms, or to pay for the use of those which might be supplied by government.

That enthusiastic ardor which had brought such numbers into the field after the battle of Lexington, was already beginning to dissipate; and though the orders of the day contain the most animating exhortations to the army, and the strongest appeals to its patriotism, an ominous hesitation in forming new engagements was displayed.

At length, with much labor, the officers were arranged, and recruiting orders were issued; but the sufferings of the army had been so great, that this service advanced slowly.

General Washington had earnestly urged Congress to offer a bounty;⁶ but this expedient was not adopted till late in January; and, on the last day of December, when the old army was disbanded, only nine thousand six hundred and fifty men had been enlisted for the army of 1776.

The General viewed with deep mortification the inactivity to which he was compelled to submit. His real difficulties were not generally known; his numbers were exaggerated; his means of acting on the offensive were magnified; the expulsion of the British army from Boston had been long since anticipated by many; and those were not wanting who insinuated that the commander-in-chief was desirous of prolonging the war, in order to continue his own importance.

Congress having manifested dispositions favorable to an attack on Boston, the general officers had been again assembled, and had again advised unanimously against the measure. Supposing that fear for the safety of the town might restrain the assault, Congress resolved, “that if General Washington and his council of war should be of opinion that a successful attack might be made on the troops in Boston, he should make it in any manner he might think expedient, notwithstanding the town and property in it might be thereby destroyed.”

1776

Considering this resolution as indicating the desire of Congress, the General continued to direct his utmost efforts to that object. In January, a council of war, at which Mr. John Adams, a member of Congress,⁷ and Mr. Warren, President of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,⁸ assisted, resolved, “that a vigorous attempt ought to be made on the ministerial troops in Boston, before they can be reinforced in the spring, if the means can be provided and a favorable opportunity should offer;” and for this purpose that thirteen regiments of militia should be required from Massachusetts and the neighboring colonies.

The colonies complied with this requisition; but such was the mildness of the early part of the winter that the waters continued open, and of course impassable.

Early in January, the commander-in-chief received intelligence that an armament was equipping in Boston, to sail under General Clinton⁹ on a secret expedition. Believing its object to be New York, he detached General Lee¹⁰ with orders to raise a body of volunteers in Connecticut, and proceed with them to that city, where he was to take command of the American troops, and was instructed to put the fortifications in the best state of defence, to disarm the justly suspected, and to collect their arms and ammunition for the use of the American army.

The volunteers were raised, and Lee commenced his march to New York at the head of twelve hundred men. The inhabitants of that place were alarmed at his approach. Captain Parker, of the Asia man-of-war,¹¹ had threatened to destroy the city, should the provincials enter it. A committee of safety, exercising at the time the powers of government, addressed a letter to General Lee expressing astonishment at the report that he designed to enter their city without consulting them, and urging him not to pass the confines of Connecticut.

Lee continued his march, and represented so strongly the impolicy of leaving the military arrangements for New York under the control of the local government, that Congress appointed three of its own members to consult with him and the committee of safety concerning the defence of the place.

General Clinton arrived almost at the same instant with General Lee, but without troops. He said openly, that none were coming, that no hostilities were contemplated against New York; and that he was proceeding to North Carolina, where he expected to be joined by five regiments from Europe.

Late in February, appearances among the British troops indicated an intention to evacuate Boston. But as these appearances might be deceptive, General Washington, who had lately received a small supply of powder, determined to prosecute a plan which must force General Howe¹² either to come to an action or to abandon the town.

Since the allowance of a bounty, recruiting had been more successful, and the regular force had been augmented to fourteen thousand men. The commander-in-chief had also called to his aid six thousand militia. Thus reinforced, he determined to take possession of the heights of Dorchester and fortify them. As the possession of this post would enable him to annoy the ships in the harbor and the soldiers in the town, he was persuaded that a general action would ensue. Should this hope be disappointed, his purpose was to make the works on the heights of Dorchester preparatory to seizing and fortifying Nook’s hill, and the points opposite the south end of Boston which commanded the harbor, a great part of the town, and the beach from which an embarkation must take place in the event of a retreat.

To facilitate the execution of this plan, a heavy bombardment and cannonade were commenced on the British lines on the 2d of March, which were repeated on the succeeding nights. On the last of them a strong detachment under the command of General Thomas¹³ took possession of the heights, and labored with such persevering activity through the night, that the works were sufficiently advanced by the morning nearly to cover them.

It was necessary to dislodge the Americans or to evacuate the town, and General Howe determined to embrace the former part of the alternative. Three thousand chosen men commanded by Lord Percy, embarked, and fell down to the Castle, in order to proceed up the river to the intended scene of action, but were scattered by a furious storm. Before they could be again in readiness for the attack, the works were made so strong that the attempt to storm them was thought unadvisable, and the evacuation of the town became inevitable.

This determination was soon known to the Americans. A paper signed by some of the select-men, and brought out by a flag, communicated the fact. This paper was accompanied by propositions said to be made by General Howe, relative to the security of the town, and the peaceable embarkation of his army.

The advances of the American troops were discontinued, and considerable detachments were moved towards New York before the actual evacuation of Boston. That event took place on the 17th of March; and, in a few days, the whole fleet sailed out of Nantasket road, directing its course eastward; immediately after which the American army proceeded by divisions to New York, where it arrived on the 14th of April.

During the siege of Boston an altercation concerning prisoners took place between the commanders of the respective armies, which was viewed with great interest throughout America. The irritations General Gage¹⁴ had received as governor of Massachusetts, seemed to influence his conduct as commander-in-chief. He regarded the Americans as rebels, and viewed the great national resistance they were making, as the act of a few turbulent individuals who would soon be quelled. In this spirit he threw some distinguished gentlemen of Boston, and the American officers and soldiers who fell into his hands, into the common jail of felons, and treated them, not as prisoners, but as state criminals.

General Washington remonstrated very seriously against this unjustifiable measure, and declared his determination “to be regulated entirely towards the prisoners who should fall into his hands, by the treatment which those in the power of the British General should receive.” To this letter a haughty answer was returned, retorting the complaints concerning the treatment of prisoners, and affecting to consider it as an instance of clemency, that the cord was not applied to those whose imprisonment was complained of. To this answer, General Washington made a dignified reply, which was, he said, “to close their correspondence, perhaps forever;” and which concluded with saying, “if your officers, our prisoners, receive from me a treatment different from what I wished to show them, they and you will remember the occasion of it.”

On the recall of General Gage, the command devolved on General Howe; and this rigorous treatment of prisoners was relaxed.

Not long after this correspondence, Colonel Ethan Allen¹⁵ was captured in a rash attempt on Montreal. Under the pretext of his having acted without authority, he was put in irons and sent to England as a traitor. While he was in Canada, the commander-in-chief, at the request of Congress, addressed a letter to Sir William Howe, assuring him that General Prescot, who had been taken in Canada, and was understood to have contributed to the severities inflicted on Colonel Allen, should receive exactly the fate of that officer.

General Howe not holding any authority in Canada, declined entering into the subject, and Congress ordered General Prescot into close jail.

CHAPTER 3

War in Canada and the North (June 1775 to November 1776)

Invasion of Canada.—Carleton defeated.—St. Johns taken.—Montreal capitulates.—Expedition of Arnold.—He arrives before Quebec.—Retires to Point aux Tremble.—Montgomery lays siege to Quebec.—Unsuccessful assault on that place.—Death of Montgomery.—Blockade of Quebec.—General Thomas takes command of the army.—The blockade raised.—General Sullivan takes the command.—Battle of the Three Rivers.—Canada evacuated.—General Carleton enters Lake Champlain.—Defeats the American Flotilla.—Takes possession of Crown Point.—Retires into winter quarters.

DURING THESE transactions, events of great interest were passing still farther north.

1775

The discontents which prevailed in Canada, and the removal of the troops destined for its defence, to Boston, inspired Congress with the daring design of taking possession of that province.

In June 1775, General Schuyler¹ had been directed to repair to Ticonderoga, to secure the command of the lakes, to take possession of St. Johns and Montreal, if that measure should not be disagreeable to the Canadians, and to pursue such other steps as might conduce to the peace and security of the United Colonies.

Near three thousand men from New England and New York were designed for this service, and general Schuyler hastened to Ticonderoga.

Before the preparations were complete, or the soldiers assembled, the impatience expressed by the discontented in Canada, having rendered an immediate movement advisable, the troops then in readiness were ordered to the isle Aux Noix, at the junction of the Sorel with Lake Champlain, and the expected reinforcements were directed to meet at that place. General Schuyler having become dangerously sick, the command devolved on Montgomery,² who, late in September, at the head of near two thousand men, laid siege to St. Johns.

Colonel M’Clean, with his regiment of royal Highland Emigrants and a few hundred Canadians, was posted near the junction of the Sorel with the St. Lawrence; and General Carleton³ had collected about a thousand men, chiefly Canadians, at Montreal. In attempting to effect a junction with M’Clean, he was encountered and entirely defeated at Longue isle, by a body of Americans under Colonel Warner. M’Clean, being immediately abandoned by his Canadians, and hearing that Arnold⁴ was approaching Point Levy, retreated to Quebec. On receiving this intelligence, St. Johns capitulated.

Oct. 1775

Nov. 1775

This first success was nearly rendered useless by the expiration of the terms for which the soldiers were engaged. Before the General could induce them to march against Montreal, he was under the necessity of stipulating that all who wished it should be discharged at that place. Having effected this compromise, he proceeded against Montreal, while his floating batteries under Colonel Easton advanced up the river. After stipulating for the rights of self-government, the town was surrendered; and Governor Carleton took refuge on board his flotilla. While preparations were making to attack the vessels, the Governor escaped in a dark night, in a boat with muffled oars, down the river to Quebec.

After garrisoning Montreal and the adjacent ports, Montgomery found the army which could follow him to Quebec, reduced to about three hundred men.

Foreseeing that the whole force of Canada would be concentrated about Montreal, General Washington had, in August, planned an expedition against Quebec, to be carried on by a detachment from his camp before Boston, which was to march by the way of Kennebec river; and passing through the then dreary wilderness lying between the settled parts of Maine and the St. Lawrence, to enter Canada about ninety miles below Montreal.

This arduous enterprise was entrusted to Colonel Arnold, and rather more than a thousand men were selected for the service. He commenced his march about the middle of September, and after encountering almost incredible hardships, arrived with two divisions of his army, on the 3d of November, at the first settlements on the Chaudiere, which empties itself into the St. Lawrence. The rear division had been compelled by the prospect of perishing with famine, to return from the Dead River, a branch of the Kennebec.

After allowing a short respite to collect the rear and to refresh the men, Arnold resumed his line of march, and, on the 9th of November, reached Point Levi, opposite Quebec. A high wind and the want of boats rendered it impossible to cross the river, and to take advantage of the consternation excited by his first appearance. While he was thus detained on the south side of the river, Colonel M’Clean entered the city and took measures for its defence.

At length the wind moderated, and Arnold, having collected some canoes, determined to attempt passing the river. Eluding the armed vessels which guarded the passage, and conquering a rapid current, he crossed over, the night of the 14th of November, and landed a short distance above the place which is rendered memorable by the disembarkation of Wolfe.⁵ After ascending the same precipice, he, too, formed his small corps on the heights near the plains of Abraham.

Counting on surprising the place, and finding the gates open, he proposed in a council of his officers to march immediately against Quebec, but was overruled. The next day he demanded a surrender of the town, but Colonel M’Clean prevented a measure which the fears of the inhabitants would probably have induced. Being without cannon, almost destitute of ammunition, and not superior to the garrison in numbers, he determined to retire to Point aux Tremble, about twenty miles above Quebec, there to await the arrival of Montgomery.

That General, after clothing his almost naked troops, proceeded with his usual expedition at the head of about three hundred men to Point aux Tremble, whence their united forces marched against Quebec. But Governor Carleton had entered the town and was preparing for a vigorous defence. The garrison amounted to fifteen hundred men, of whom eight hundred were militia. Montgomery’s effective force was stated by himself at eight hundred. Yet he determined to lay siege to the town.

His artillery was too light to make any impression on the walls, the weather was intensely cold, and a part of his army would soon be entitled to a discharge. Under these circumstances he resolved to risk an assault.

Of such materials was his little army composed, that it was necessary not only to consult the officers but the soldiers. Their approbation was obtained with some difficulty, and between four and five in the morning of the 30th of December, the several divisions moved to the assault under a violent storm of snow.

Montgomery advanced at the head of the New York troops round Cape Diamond, along the St. Lawrence to the first basin. A single piece was discharged, by which the General, with Captains M’Pherson and Cheeseman, the first of whom was his aid, together with his orderly sergeant and a private, were killed upon the spot. The whole division retreated, and left the garrison at leisure to direct its individual force against Arnold.

This officer marched at the head of his division along the St. Charles, to the first barrier on that side of the town, when he received a musket-ball in the leg which shattered the bone, and he was carried off the field. Morgan⁶ rushed forward to the battery at the head of his company, and received from one of the pieces, almost at its mouth, a discharge of grape-shot, which killed only one man. The barricade was instantly mounted, on which the battery was deserted. Morgan formed his company in the streets, but, being entirely ignorant of the town, thought it unadvisable to proceed farther until daylight should enable him to distinguish objects. He was soon joined by Colonel Greene, and Majors Bigelow and Meigs, with several fragments of companies amounting to about two hundred men. They advanced to the second barrier, where an obstinate conflict was maintained for some time. Being unable to gain it, Morgan proposed to cut their way back to the American camp. Uncertainty respecting the fate of the division led by Montgomery prevented the attempt. The number of the enemy soon increased so considerably that retreat became impossible, and the surviving Americans were made prisoners.

In this bold attack on Quebec, the loss on the part of the garrison was inconsiderable. That of the Americans was about four hundred men, three hundred and forty of whom were prisoners. It fell chiefly on Arnold’s division. Captain Hendricks of Pennsylvania, Lieutenant Humphries of Virginia, and Lieutenant Cooper of Connecticut, were among the slain. Captains Lamb and Hubbard, and Lieutenants Steele and Tisdale, were among the wounded. But the loss most deplored, and most fatal to the hopes of the American army, was that of their gallant general.

Richard Montgomery was a native of Ireland, and had served with reputation in the late war. After its termination he settled in New York, and took a decided part with the colonies in their contest with Great Britain. His military reputation was high throughout America; and his achievements, while commanding in Canada, show the bold, skilful, and active partizan; and, so far as a judgment can be formed of the capacity for conducting a large army from the judicious management of a small one, we cannot hesitate to allow him the talents of an able general.

Congress directed a monument, expressing the circumstances of his death, and the gratitude of his country, to be erected to his memory.

The Americans retired about three miles from Quebec, where they maintained the blockade. Arnold, on whom the command devolved, though severely wounded, and though his army, which never exceeded seven hundred men, was at one time reduced by the discharge of those whose terms of service had expired, to five hundred effectives, showed no disposition to sink under adverse fortune.

1776

While the affairs of the colonies wore this gloomy aspect in Canada, Congress was indulging sanguine hopes of annexing that province to the Union. Nine regiments were ordered to be raised for its defence, and General Thomas, an officer of reputation, was directed to take the command. The intelligence of the disaster of the 31st of December did not arrest these measures, or change these hopes. In aid of their military operations, three commissioners were deputed to Canada, with instructions to establish a free press, and to propagate the opinions which prevailed through the United Colonies.

In March, reinforcements arrived, so as to increase the army to seventeen hundred men; but this number was soon reduced by the small-pox, and was still further weakened, by being spread over a circuit of twenty-six miles, and separated by three ferries. This division was indispensable to the maintenance of the blockade.

As the season of the year approached when reinforcements from England might be expected, Arnold determined to resume the siege of Quebec. His batteries were opened on the 2d of April; but he had not weight of metal to make a breach in the wall, nor an engineer capable of directing a siege, nor artillerists who understood the management of the pieces.

On the 1st of April, General Wooster had arrived; soon after which Arnold, believing himself to be neglected, obtained leave of absence, and took command at Montreal.

General Thomas reached the American camp on the first of May. He found an army consisting of nineteen hundred men, of whom less than one thousand were fit for duty. Among these were three hundred entitled to a discharge, who insisted on being immediately dismissed. This small force was so divided that not more than three hundred could be united at any one place. The magazines contained only one hundred and fifty barrels of powder, and provisions for six days; nor could adequate supplies be obtained from the country, as the Canadians no longer manifested a disposition to serve. The river too began to open below; and it was certain that the British would seize the first opportunity to relieve Quebec.

Amidst these unpromising appearances, General Thomas thought the hope of taking the town chimerical, and a longer continuance before it both useless and dangerous. Under this impression he called a council of war, which unanimously determined that the army was not in a condition to risk an assault, and that preparations should be made to move to a more defensible position.

May 6

The next day five ships entered the harbor and landed some troops, while the Americans were employed in the embarkation of their sick and stores.

About noon General Carleton made a sortie⁷ at the head of a thousand men, supported by six field-pieces; and General Thomas, by the advice of his field officers, ordered a retreat, which was continued to the Sorel, where he was seized with the small-pox, of which he died.

After his death reinforcements arrived which increased the army in June to four or five thousand men, commanded by General Sullivan,⁸ who entertained hopes of recovering and maintaining the post at De Chambeau.

Towards the end of May the British army was augmented to thirteen thousand men, great part of whom were on their way to the Three Rivers. A strong corps, commanded by General Frazer, had reached that place, and several armed vessels and transports full of troops lay still higher up the river.

Before the arrival of General Sullivan, General Thompson, who commanded the army after the illness of General Thomas, understanding that the party at the Three Rivers was inconsiderable, had detached Colonel St. Clair with six or seven hundred men against that place. St. Clair, being informed that the party was much stronger than had been supposed, waited at Nicolet for farther orders. When his letter reached camp, General Sullivan had arrived, who immediately detached General Thompson at the head of fourteen hundred men, with orders to attack the enemy, should there be a prospect of success.

June 8, 1776

The plan was to attack the village just before day; but the troops arrived an hour later than was intended, in consequence of which they were discovered when landing, and the alarm given. To avoid the fire of some ships lying in the river, they attempted to pass what appeared to be a point of woods, but was in reality a deep morass,⁹ three miles in extent. Their detention in this morass gave General Frazer full time to prepare for their reception, while General Nesbit cut off their return to their boats. The Americans advanced to the charge, but were soon repulsed, and driven some miles through a deep swamp. General Thompson and Colonel Irwin, with about two hundred men, were made prisoners, and from twenty to thirty were killed.

Notwithstanding his very great inferiority to his enemy, General Sullivan determined to defend the post at the Sorel, and was induced only by the unanimous opinion of his officers, and a conviction that the troops would not support him, to abandon it a few hours before the British took possession of it. The same causes drew him reluctantly from Chamblée and St. Johns, where he was joined by General Arnold with the garrison of Montreal. At the Isle aux Noix he received the orders of General Schuyler to embark on the lakes for Crown Point.

The armed vessels on the St. Lawrence and the Sorel were destroyed, and the fortifications of Chamblée and St. Johns set on fire.

The British army, during this whole retreat, followed close in the rear. At Sorel, the pursuit stopped. The Americans commanded the lake, and it could not be wrested from them until vessels of war should be constructed for the purpose.

While General Carleton was preparing to enter the lakes, General Schuyler was using his utmost exertions to retain the command of them; but so great was the difficulty of obtaining workmen and materials, that he found it impossible to equip a fleet which would be equal to the exigency. It consisted of fifteen small vessels, the largest mounting twelve guns, carrying six and four pound balls.¹⁰ At the instance of General Washington, the command of this squadron was given to General Arnold.

With almost incredible exertions, the British General constructed a powerful fleet; and afterwards dragged up the rapids of St. Therese and St. Johns a vast number of long boats¹¹ and other vessels, among which was a gondola¹² weighing thirty tons. This immense work was completed in little more than three months; and, as if by magic, General Arnold saw on Lake Champlain, early in October, a fleet consisting of near thirty vessels, the largest of which, the Inflexible, carried eighteen twelve-pounders. It proceeded immediately in quest of Arnold, who was advantageously posted between the island of Valicour and the Western main. Notwithstanding the disparity of force, a warm action ensued, which Arnold was enabled to sustain till night, by the circumstance, that a wind unfavorable to the British kept some of their largest vessels at too great a distance to render any service.

In the night Arnold attempted to escape to Ticonderoga; but was overtaken the next day about noon, and brought to action a few leagues short of Crown Point. He maintained the engagement for two hours, during which the vessels that were most ahead escaped to Ticonderoga. The galleys and five gondolas made a desperate resistance. At length one of them struck;¹³ after which Arnold ran the remaining vessels on shore and blew them up, having first saved his men.

On the approach of the British army, a small detachment which had occupied Crown Point, retired to Ticonderoga, which Schuyler determined to defend to the last extremity.

Nov. 1776

General Carleton took possession of Crown Point, and advanced a part of his fleet into Lake George, within view of Ticonderoga. His army also approached that place; but, after reconnoitring the works, he thought it too late to lay siege to the fortress. Reembarking his army, he returned to Canada, where he placed it in winter quarters, making the Isle Aux Noix his most advanced post.

CHAPTER 4

War in the South; the Declaration of Independence (November 1775 to July 1776)

Transactions in Virginia.—Action at the Great Bridge.—Norfolk burnt.—Transactions in North Carolina.—Action at Moore’s creek Bridge.—Invasion of South Carolina.—British fleet repulsed at fort Moultrie.—Transactions in New York.—Measures tending to Independence.—Independence declared.

Nov. 1775

WHILE THE WAR was carried on thus vigorously in the north, the southern colonies were not entirely unemployed.

Lord Dunmore, the Governor of Virginia, who was joined by the most active of the disaffected, and by a number of slaves, had collected a small naval force with which he carried on a predatory war, and at length attempted to burn the town of Hampton.

Intelligence of this design having been obtained, preparations were made for his reception, and the assailants were compelled to retreat to their vessels with some loss.

In consequence of this repulse, his lordship proclaimed martial law, summoned all persons capable of bearing arms to repair to the royal standard, or be considered as traitors, and offered freedom to all indented servants and slaves who would join them.

Intelligence of these transactions being received at Williamsburg, the committee of safety¹ ordered a regiment of regulars, and a battalion of minute-men, to march into the lower country for the defence of the inhabitants.²

Hearing of their approach, Lord Dunmore selected a position on the north side of Elizabeth river, at the Great Bridge, where it was necessary for the provincials³ to cross in order to reach Norfolk, at which place his lordship had established himself in some force. Here he erected a small fort on a piece of firm ground surrounded by a marsh, which was accessible on either side only by a long causeway.⁴ Colonel Woodford encamped at the south end of the causeway, across which, at its termination, he erected a breast-work.⁵

After remaining in this position for a few days, Lord Dunmore sent orders to Captain Fordyce, the commanding officer of the fort, to storm the breast-work. Between daybreak and sunrise on the morning of the 9th of December, Fordyce, at the head of about sixty grenadiers⁶ of the 15th regiment, who led the column, advanced along the causeway with fixed bayonets against the breast-work, which was immediately crowded with the bravest of the Americans, who kept up a heavy fire on the front of the British column. It was also taken in flank⁷ by a party which occupied a small eminence on its right. Captain Fordyce pressed forward under this destructive fire, until he fell dead within a few steps of the breast-work. The column immediately broke and retreated, but, being covered by the artillery of the fort, was not pursued.

In this rash attack, every grenadier was said to have been killed or wounded. The Americans did not lose a man.

The following night the fort was evacuated. The provincials proceeded to Norfolk, under the command of Colonel Howe of North Carolina, who had arrived with his regiment after the battle; and Lord Dunmore took refuge on board his vessels.

1776

The American soldiers were in the habit of firing into the vessels from the houses near the water. To relieve himself from this practice, Lord Dunmore, on the night of the first of January, landed a body of troops under cover of a heavy cannonade, and set fire to several houses near the river. The provincials, who entertained strong prejudices against this station, made no attempt to extinguish the flames. After the fire had continued several weeks, and had consumed about four-fifths of the town, Colonel Howe, who had waited on the convention to urge the necessity of destroying the place, returned with orders to burn the remaining houses; which were carried into immediate execution.⁸

Lord Dunmore continued for some time a predatory war on the rivers, distressing individuals, and increasing the detestation in which he was held. At length his wretched followers were sent to Florida.

In North Carolina, an extensive settlement had been made by emigrants from the highlands of Scotland, who adhered to the royal cause. By a union between them, and the numerous disaffected on the western frontier, Governor Martin, who had taken refuge on board a ship of war in Cape Fear river, hoped to make a successful struggle for the province. His confidence was increased by the assurances he had received, that a considerable amount was destined for the southern colonies.

To prepare for events, he sent commissions to the leaders of the highlanders, and granted one to a Mr. M’Donald, their chief, to act as their General. He also sent a proclamation, to be used on the proper occasion, commanding all persons, on their allegiance, to repair to the royal standard. This was raised by M’Donald at Cross creek, about the middle of February, and nearly fifteen hundred men arranged themselves under it.

Upon the first advice that the loyalists were assembling, Brigadier-General Moore,⁹ with a provincial regiment and a few militia, took a strong position within a few miles of them. M’Donald sent a letter to Moore, inclosing the Governor’s proclamation, and inviting him to join the King’s standard. Moore protracted the negotiation in the hope that the numerous bodies of militia who were assembling might enable him to surround his adversary. M’Donald at length perceived his danger, and endeavored by forced marches to extricate himself from it, and to join Governor Martin who had been encouraged to commence active operations by the arrival of General Clinton¹⁰ in the colony.

Feb. 27, 1776

The provincial parties, however, were so alert that he found himself under the necessity of engaging Colonels Caswell and Lillington, who, with about a thousand minute-men and militia, were entrenched directly in his front, at Moore’s Creek bridge. The royalists, who were compelled to cross the bridge in the face of the entrenchments occupied by the provincials, attacked with great spirit: but Colonel M’Clean, who commanded them in consequence of the indisposition of M’Donald, with several of their bravest officers, having fallen in the first onset, they fled in great disorder, leaving behind them their General and several of their leaders, who fell into the hands of the provincials.

General Clinton remained with governor Martin until the arrival of Sir Peter Parker with several ships of war. Fortunately for the province, the unsuccessful insurrection of M’Donald, had previously broken the strength and spirits of the loyalists, and deprived them of their most active chiefs. The operations which had been meditated against that colony were deferred, and Clinton determined to make an attempt on the capital of South Carolina.

Early in April, a letter from the Secretary of State to the Governor of Maryland, disclosing the designs of government against the southern colonies, had been intercepted in the Chesapeake, and communicated to Mr. Rutledge the President of South Carolina.¹¹ Thus apprized of the danger, preparations were made to meet it.

In the beginning of June, the fleet came to anchor off the harbor of Charleston. The bar¹² was crossed on the 20th, and it was determined to silence a fort on Sullivan’s Island.

During the interval between passing the bar and attacking the fort, reinforcements were received from Virginia and North Carolina, which augmented the American army commanded by General Lee,¹³ to five thousand men, one half of whom were regulars.

The signal for the attack was given to the fleet by Sir Peter Parker, at half-past ten in the morning of the 28th of June, and a furious cannonade was commenced on the American works, which was continued without intermission until it was terminated by night. Its effect was not such as had been anticipated. The fort was constructed of earth and of palmetto, a soft wood, which, on being struck, does not splinter, but closes on the ball. The fire from the fort did vast execution. The Bristol and the Experiment were nearly wrecks. The first lost one hundred and eleven men, and the last seventy-nine. Several officers of distinction were killed or wounded. The Acteon frigate ran aground and was burnt. The loss of the Americans in killed and wounded was only thirty-five men.

The British did not renew the action. In a few days the troops who had been landed on Long Island¹⁴ previous to the attack on the fort were re-embarked, and, on the 25th of July, the fleet sailed for New York.

Great and well-merited praise was bestowed on Colonel Moultrie who commanded the fort, and on the garrison. The thanks of the United Colonies were voted by Congress to General Lee, Colonels Moultrie and Thompson, and the officers and men under their command.

Even before the evacuation of Boston, it had been foreseen that New York must become the seat of war. The fortifications which had been commenced for the defence of its capital, and those to be erected in the passes through the highlands up the Hudson, were, after the arrival of the commander-in-chief, objects of his unremitting attention.

The difficulty which had been experienced in expelling the British from Boston, had determined Congress to make great exertions for the preservation of New York. The execution of this determination was difficult and dangerous. It required an army capable of meeting the enemy in the open field, and of acting offensively both on York¹⁵ and Long Islands. Congress had not raised such an army. The letters of the commander-in-chief, urging measures which might bring the whole strength of the colonies into operation, had not been disregarded, but many circumstances combined to prevent such a military establishment as the exigency required.

Hopes had been long cherished that the differences between the mother country and her colonies might be adjusted; and when, at length, a conviction that the appeal must be made to arms was forced on Congress, that body, unaccustomed to the arduous duties of conducting a war of vast extent, could not estimate rightly the value of the means employed, nor calculate the effect which certain causes must produce. Opinions of the most pernicious tendency prevailed, from which they receded slowly, and from which they could be forced only by melancholy experience.

The most fatal among these was the theory that an army could be created every campaign for the purposes of that campaign. They relied too confidently on being able, on any emergency, to call out a force equal to the occasion; and on the competency of such a force to the purposes of war.

Under these impressions, the determination to form a permanent army was too long delayed; and the measures required by the object were deferred until their execution had become extremely difficult.

It was not until June 1776, that the representations of the commander-in-chief could obtain a resolution directing soldiers to be enlisted for three years, and offering a bounty of ten dollars for each recruit. The time when this resolution would certainly have accomplished its purpose had passed away. The regiments voted by Congress were incomplete; and that bounty which, if offered in time, would have effected its object, came too late to fill them.

The American army was not only inferior to its adversary in numbers, but was deficient in arms, ammunition, tents, and clothes. Yet both the government and commander-in-chief were determined to defend New York. Congress passed a resolution to reinforce the army with thirteen thousand eight hundred militia; and to form a flying camp¹⁶ on the Jersey shore, to consist of ten thousand militia, to be furnished by Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland. They were to serve till the first of December, and the commander-in-chief was also authorized to require such additional temporary aids as circumstances might make necessary.

Great and embarrassing as were the difficulties already noticed, they were augmented by the disaffection of the city of New York, and of the adjacent islands. Governor Tryon, who had taken refuge on board some ships lying in the harbor, had been permitted to continue an open intercourse with the inhabitants. This intercourse was broken off upon the arrival of the commander-in-chief: yet a plot was formed through the agency of the Mayor, to rise in favor of the British on their landing, and to seize and deliver up General Washington himself. It extended to the American army, and even to the General’s guards. It was fortunately discovered in time to be defeated, and some of the persons concerned were executed. About the same time, the plan of an insurrection was discovered in the neighborhood of Albany; and there, too, executions were deemed necessary.

Although the original and single object of the war on the part of the colonies was a redress of grievances, the progress of public opinion towards independence, though slow, was certain; and measures were necessarily adopted which tended to that object. Among the first of these was the establishment of temporary governments in place of that revolutionary system which followed the suspension of the pre-existent institutions. Still, the most anxious desire to re-establish the union between the two countries on its ancient principles was openly and generally declared. However sincere these declarations might have been in the commencement, the operation of hostilities was infallible.¹⁷ To profess allegiance and attachment to a monarch with whom they were at open war, was an absurdity too great to be of long continuance. The prejudices in favor of a connexion with England and of the English constitution, gradually but rapidly yielded to republican principles, and to a desire of independence. New strength was every day added to the opinions that a cordial reconciliation had become impossible; that reciprocal jealousy, suspicion, and hate, would take the place of that affection which could alone render such a connexion beneficial; that even the commercial dependence of America on Great Britain was greatly injurious to the former; and that the government of a distant nation or sovereign, unacquainted with and unmindful of their interests, would, even if replaced in their former situation, be an evil too great to be voluntarily borne. But, victory alone could restore them to that situation; and victory would give independence. The hazard was the same; and since the risk of everything was inevitable, the most valuable object ought to be the reward of success.

It was also urged with great effect, that the probability of obtaining foreign aid would be much increased by holding out the dismemberment of the British empire to rivals of that nation, as an inducement to engage in the contest.

American independence became the common theme of conversation; and, as it became more and more the general wish, the proceedings of Congress took their complexion from the temper of the people.

At length a measure was adopted which was considered generally as deciding the question. The affairs of the several provinces had hitherto been conducted by temporary institutions; but on the 6th of May, a resolution was offered recommending the adoption of governments adequate to the exigency, to such colonies as had not already established them. This resolution was referred to Mr. John Adams, Mr. Rutledge, and Mr. Richard Henry Lee, all zealous advocates for independence, whose report in favor of the measure was adopted on the 15th of May.¹⁸

The provincial conventions acted on this recommendation, and governments were generally established. Some hesitation was at first discovered in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York; but public opinion was in favor of it, and finally prevailed. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, the executive as well as legislature had been elected by the people, and in those colonies no change had been thought necessary.

The several colonies now exhibited the novel spectacle of matured and enlightened societies devising political systems of self-government.

The institutions received from England were admirably calculated to lay the foundation for temperate and rational republics. The materials in possession of the people, as well as their habits of thinking, were adapted only to governments in all respects representative; and such governments were universally adopted.

The provincial assemblies, under the influence of Congress, took up the question of independence; and many declared themselves in favor of an immediate and total separation from Great Britain.

On the 7th of June a resolution to that effect was moved by Richard Henry Lee, and seconded by John Adams. It was referred to a committee, who reported it in the following terms: “Resolved, that these United States are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; and that all political connexion between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.”

July 4, 1776

This resolution was debated on Saturday the 8th and Monday the 10th of June; when, it appearing that some of the states were not yet matured for the measure, the question was adjourned to the 1st of July. In the mean time a committee^* was appointed to draw the declaration of independence, which was reported on the 28th of June, and laid on the table. On the 1st of July the debate on the original resolution was resumed. The question was put on the evening of that day, and carried in the affirmative. The report of the committee was postponed till the next day, when it was agreed to. Congress then proceeded to consider the declaration of independence, which, after some amendments, was approved and signed.

This declaration was immediately communicated to the armies, who received it with enthusiasm. It was also proclaimed throughout the United States, and was generally approved by those who had opposed the claims of the British Parliament. Some few individuals who had been zealous supporters of measures having for their object a redress of grievances, relinquished with regret their connexion with Great Britain. It was also an unfortunate truth, that in the country between New England and the Potomac, which was now to become the great theatre of action, a formidable minority existed who were opposed to the revolution.

CHAPTER 5

Defeat and the Restoration of “Native Courage”: Command in New York (June to September 1776)

Lord and Sir William Howe arrive before New York.—Circular letter of Lord Howe.—State of the American army.—The British land on Long Island.—Battle of Brooklyn.—Fruitless negotiations.—New York evacuated.—Skirmish on the heights of Haarlem.

WHILE CONGRESS was deliberating in Philadelphia on the great question of independence, the British fleet appeared before New York.

June 1776

On evacuating Boston, General Howe¹ had retired to Halifax, from which place he sailed for New York in June. In the latter end of that month, he arrived off Sandy Hook; and on the 3d and 4th of July his troops were landed on Staten Island. They were received with great demonstrations of joy by the inhabitants, who took the oaths of allegiance to the British crown, and embodied themselves for the defence of the island. Strong assurances were also given by the inhabitants of Long Island, and the neighboring parts of New Jersey, of the favorable disposition of a great proportion of the people to the royal cause.

The command of the fleet had been conferred on Lord Howe, the brother of the general;² and they were both commissioners for restoring peace to the colonies. He arrived at Staten Island on the 12th of July.

Lord Howe was not deterred by the declaration of independence from trying the influence of his powers for pacification. He sent on shore a circular letter, dated off the coast of Massachusetts, addressed severally to the late governors under the crown, inclosing a declaration which he requested them to make public. It announced his authority to grant pardons, and to declare any colony, town, port, or place, in the peace, and under the protection of the King. Assurances were also given that the meritorious services of all persons who would aid in restoring tranquillity in the colonies would be duly considered.

These papers were immediately transmitted by the commander-in-chief, to Congress, who directed their publication, “that the good people of the United States might be informed of what nature were the Commissioners, and what the terms, with the expectation of which the insidious court of Britain had sought to amuse and disarm them.”

About the same time, General Howe addressed, by a flag, a letter to “George Washington, Esquire,” which the General refused to receive, “as it did not acknowledge the public character with which he was invested.” In a resolution approving this proceeding, Congress directed “that no letter or message whatever be received by the commander-in-chief, or others, the commanders of the American army, but such as shall be directed to them in the characters they respectively sustain.”

To evade the preliminary difficulty which the unwillingness of the commissioners to recognize the existing powers in America, opposed to any discussion of the terms they were authorized to propose, Colonel Patteson, Adjutant-General of the British army, was sent on shore by General Howe, with a letter directed to “George Washington,” &c. &c. &c. He was introduced to the General, whom he addressed by the title of “Excellency;” and, after the usual compliments, opened the subject of his mission by saying that General Howe much regretted the difficulties which had arisen respecting the address of the letters; that the mode adopted was deemed consistent with propriety, and was founded on precedent in cases of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, where disputes or difficulties had arisen about rank; that Lord and General Howe did not mean to derogate from his rank, or the respect due to him, and that they held his person and character in the highest esteem; but that the direction with the addition of “&c. &c. &c.” implied every thing that ought to follow. Colonel Patteson then produced a letter which he said was the same that had been previously sent, and which he laid on the table.

The General declined receiving it. He said that a letter addressed to a person in a public character, should have some description or indication of that character; otherwise it would be considered as a mere private letter. It was true the et-ceteras implied every thing, and they also implied any thing; and that he should absolutely decline any letter relating to his public station, directed to him as a private person.

Colonel Patteson then said that General Howe would not urge his delicacy farther, and repeated the assertion that no failure of respect was intended.

After some conversation relative to the treatment of prisoners, Colonel Patteson said that the goodness and benevolence of the King had induced him to appoint Lord Howe and General Howe, his commissioners to accommodate the unhappy dispute at present subsisting; that they had great powers, and would derive much pleasure from effecting the accommodation; and that he wished this visit to be considered as the first advance towards so desirable an object.

General Washington replied that he was not vested with any powers on this subject; but he would observe that, so far as he could judge from what had yet transpired, Lord Howe and General Howe were only empowered to grant pardon; that those who had committed no fault wanted no pardon; and that the Americans were only defending what they deemed their indubitable rights. This, Colonel Patteson said, would open a very wide field for argument; and, after expressing his fears that an adherence to forms might obstruct business of the greatest moment and concern, took his leave.

The reinforcements expected from Europe, of whom about four hundred and fifty were captured on their passage by the American cruisers, were now chiefly arrived; and the British army was estimated at twenty-four thousand men.

To this army, aided in its operations by a numerous fleet, was opposed a force unstable in its nature, incapable from its structure of receiving discipline, and inferior to its enemy in numbers, in arms, and in every military equipment. It consisted, when General Howe landed on Staten Island, of ten thousand men, much enfeebled by sickness. At the instance of General Washington, a few regiments stationed in the different states were ordered to join him; and the neighboring militia were called into service. Yet in a letter dated the 8th of August, he stated that his army consisted of only seventeen thousand, two hundred and twenty-five men, of whom three thousand, six hundred and sixty-eight were sick. This force was rendered the more inadequate to its objects by being necessarily divided for the defence of posts, some of which were fifteen miles distant from others, with navigable waters between them.

“Under every disadvantage,” continued the letter, “my utmost exertions shall be employed to bring about the great end we have in view; and, so far as I can judge from the professions and apparent dispositions of my troops, I shall have their support.”

The army was soon afterwards reinforced by three regiments of regulars, and by militia,³ which augmented it to twenty-seven thousand men, of whom one-fourth were sick. A part of it was stationed at Brooklyn, on Long Island, under General Sullivan.

Believing that the effect of the first battle would be considerable, the commander-in-chief employed every expedient which might act upon that enthusiastic love of liberty, that indignation against the invaders of their country, and that native courage, which were believed to animate the bosoms of his soldiers, and were relied on as substitutes for discipline and experience. The orders of the day contain the most animating exhortations to both officers and soldiers; recommending to the officers, coolness in time of action, and to the soldiers, strict attention and obedience, with becoming spirit. He directed explicitly that any soldier who should attempt to conceal himself, or retreat without orders, should instantly be shot; and solemnly promised to notice and reward those who should distinguish themselves. Thus did he, by infusing into every bosom those sentiments which would stimulate to the greatest individual exertion, endeavor to compensate for the want of arms, of discipline, and of numbers.

Early in the morning of the 22d of August, the principal part of the British army, under the command of General Clinton, landed on Long Island, under cover of the guns of the fleet, and extended from the ferry at the Narrows, through Utrecht and Gravesend, to the village at Flatbush. A large division, commanded by General Clinton, turned short to the right and approached Flatland. General Sullivan had been strongly reinforced as soon as the movements of the British fleet indicated an intention to make the first attack at this point. On the 25th, Major-General Putnam,⁴ with a reinforcement of six regiments, was directed to take command at Brooklyn, and was charged most earnestly by the commander-in-chief, to be in constant readiness for an attack, and to guard the woods between the two camps with his best troops. General Washington passed the 26th at Brooklyn, making arrangements for the expected engagement, and returned at night to New York.⁵

The two armies were separated from each other by a range of hills covered with thick woods, which extended from east to west nearly the length of the island, and across which were three different roads leading directly to Brooklyn ferry. The British centre at Flatbush was distant scarcely four miles from the American lines, and a direct road led across the heights from one to the other. Another road, more circuitous than the first, led from Flatbush and entered the road leading from Jamaica to Bedford, a small village on the Brooklyn side of the hills; and a third, leading from the Narrows along the coast by the way of Gowan’s Cove, afforded the most direct route to their left.

The direct road from Flatbush to Brooklyn was defended by a fort in the hills; and the coast and Bedford roads were guarded by detachments posted on the hills within view of the British camp. Light parties of volunteers were directed to patrol on the road leading from Jamaica to Bedford; about two miles from which, near Flatbush, Colonel Miles, of Pennsylvania, was stationed with a regiment of riflemen.⁶ The Convention of New York⁷ had ordered General Woodhull, with the militia of Long Island, to take post on the high grounds, as near the enemy as possible.

About nine at night, General Clinton drew off the right of the British army in order to seize a pass in the heights three miles east of Bedford, on the Jamaica road. About two in the morning of the 27th, his patrols fell in with and captured one of the American parties directed to watch this road. Learning from his prisoners that the pass was unoccupied, he immediately seized it; and, on the appearance of day, the whole column passed the heights, and appeared in the level country between them and Brooklyn.

Before Clinton had secured the passes on the road leading from Jamaica, General Grant,⁸ in order to draw the attention of the Americans from their left, advanced slowly along the coast, at the head of the British left wing, supported by ten pieces of cannon, skirmishing as he advanced with the light parties stationed on that road. These were reinforced by Putnam; and, about three in the morning, Brigadier-General Lord Sterling⁹ was detached to that point, with the two nearest regiments. Major-General Sullivan, who commanded all the troops without the lines, advanced about the same time at the head of a strong detachment, on the road leading to Flat Bush; while another detachment occupied the heights still farther to his left.

About break of day, Lord Sterling reached the summit of the hills, where he was joined by the troops which had been already engaged, soon after which the enemy appeared in sight. A warm cannonade commenced, and some sharp but not very close skirmishing took place between parties of infantry. Lord Sterling was content with defending the pass; and General Grant did not wish to drive him from it until that part of the plan which had been entrusted to Sir Henry Clinton should be executed.

In the centre, General de Heister,¹⁰ soon after daybreak, began a cannonade on the troops under Sullivan. In the mean time, in order the more effectually to draw off the attention of the Americans from the point at which the general attack was to be made, the fleet was put in motion, and a heavy cannonade was commenced on the battery at Red Hook.

Aug. 27

About half-past eight, the British right having then reached Bedford in the rear of Sullivan’s left, General de Heister ordered Colonel Donop’s corps to attack the hills, following himself with the centre of the army. The approach of Clinton was now discovered by the American left, which immediately endeavored to regain the camp at Brooklyn. While retiring from the woods by regiments, they encountred the front of the British. About the same time the Hessians advanced from Flat Bush against that part of the army which occupied the direct road to Brooklyn, where General Sullivan commanded in person. The firing heard towards Bedford had disclosed to these troops the alarming fact that the British had turned their left flank, and were getting completely into their rear. They sought to escape the danger by regaining the camp with the utmost celerity. The sudden rout of this party enabled De Heister to detach a part of his force against those who were engaged near Bedford. In that quarter, too, the Americans were broken and driven back into the woods; and the front of the column, led by General Clinton, intercepted those who were retreating along the direct road from Flat Bush. Thus attacked both in front and rear, driven alternately by the British on the Hessians, and by the Hessians back on the British, a succession of skirmishes took place in the woods, in the course of which some parts of corps forced their way through the enemy, and regained the lines of Brooklyn; but the greater part of the detachment was killed or taken.

The fire towards Brooklyn gave the first intimation to the American right that the enemy had gained their rear. Lord Sterling immediately directed the main body of his troops to retreat across the creek; and, to secure this movement, determined to attack in person a British corps commanded by Lord Cornwallis,¹¹ stationed rather above the place at which he intended to cross. The attack was made with great spirit; but the force in front increasing, and General Grant advancing in his rear, his lordship, and the survivors of this gallant corps, were made prisoners of war. This attempt, though unsuccessful, enabled a great part of the detachment to cross the creek and save themselves in Brooklyn.

The loss sustained by the American army in this battle was estimated by General Washington at one thousand men; but in this estimate he must have included only his regular troops. In the letter of General Howe, the number of prisoners is stated at one thousand and ninety-seven, among whom were Major-General Sullivan, and Brigadiers Lord Sterling and Woodhull. He computes the total loss at three thousand three hundred. He states his own loss at twenty-one officers, and three hundred and forty-six privates, killed, wounded, and taken.

As the action became warm, the commander-in-chief passed over to the camp at Brooklyn, where he saw with inexpressible anguish, the destruction in which his best troops were involved, without the ability to extricate them. An attempt to save them by sallying from his entrenchments, and attacking the enemy, would put the camp in imminent danger, and expose that whole division of the army to ruin. His efforts, therefore, were necessarily directed to the preservation of those that remained.

General Howe did not think it advisable to risk an immediate assault on the American lines. He encamped in front of them; and, the night of the 28th, broke ground in form, within six hundred yards of a redoubt¹² on the left.

In this perilous state of things, General Washington determined to withdraw from Long Island. This difficult movement was effected on the night of the 28th, so silently, that all the troops and military stores were carried over in safety. Early next morning, the British out-posts perceived the rear-guard crossing the East river, out of reach of their fire. The manner in which this critical operation was executed, added greatly to the reputation of General Washington in the opinion of all military men.

The resolution to defend Long Island was so hazardous in itself, and so disastrous in its consequences, that it has been condemned by many as a great error in the commander-in-chief. But the event will not always determine the wisdom of a measure. It is necessary to consider the previous state of things; and to compare the value of the object, and the means of securing it, with the hazards attending the attempt.

It was very desirable to defend New York, or to waste the campaign in a struggle for that important place. The difficulty of effecting either of these objects would be incalculably increased by abandoning Long Island to the enemy. It was, therefore, to be maintained if possible.

The impossibility of maintaining it, was not evident until the battle had been fought. It is true that the American force on the island could not have been rendered equal to that of the British; but with the advantages of the defensible country through which the assailants were to pass, and of a fortified camp assailable only on one side, hopes might be entertained without the imputation of rashness, of maintaining the position for a considerable time, and of selling it ultimately at a high price. This opinion is supported by the fact that, even after the victory of the 27th, General Howe was unwilling to hazard an assault on the works, and chose rather to carry them by regular approaches.

With more appearance of reason the General has been censured for not having guarded the road which leads from Jamaica to Bedford.

The written instructions given to the officer commanding on Long Island, directed that the woods should be well guarded, and the approach of the enemy through them be rendered as difficult as possible. But his numbers were not sufficient to furnish detachments for all the defiles through the mountains; and if a corps sufficient for defending that pass had been posted on the Jamaica road, and a feint had been made on it, while the principal attack was by the direct road leading from Flat Bush, or that along the coast, the events of the day would probably have been equally disastrous. The column marching directly from Flat Bush would probably have been in possession of the plain in rear of the detachment posted on the road from Jamaica, so as to intercept its retreat to the camp. So great is the advantage of those who attack, in being able to select the point against which to direct their grand effort.

The most advisable plan then appears to have been to watch the motions of the enemy, to oppose with a competent force, every attempt to seize the heights, and to guard all the passes in such a manner as to receive notice of his approach through any one of them, in sufficient time to recall the troops maintaining the others.

This plan was adopted:—and the heavy disasters of the day are attributable chiefly to the failure of those charged with the execution of that very important part of it which related to the Jamaica road.

The events of this day disclosed a radical defect in the structure of the American army. It did not contain a single troop of cavalry. Had the General been furnished with a few light-horse, merely to serve as videts,¹³ it is probable that the movement so decisive of the fate of the day, would not have been made unnoticed. The troops on the lines do not appear to have observed the column which was withdrawn on the evening of the 26th, from Flat Bush, to Flatland.

Whatever causes might have led to this defeat, it gave a gloomy aspect to the affairs of America. Heretofore, her soldiers had manifested a great degree of intrepidity.¹⁴ A confidence in themselves, a persuasion of superiority over the enemy, arising from the goodness of their cause, and their habitual use of fire-arms, had been carefully encouraged. This sentiment had been nourished by experience. When they found themselves, by a course of evolutions in which they imagined they perceived a great superiority of military skill, encircled with unexpected dangers from which no exertions could extricate them, their confidence in themselves and in their leaders was greatly diminished, and the approach of the enemy inspired the apprehension that some stratagem was concealed from which flight alone could preserve them. The impression made on the militia, was attended with consequences immediately injurious. Great numbers left the army; in some instances almost by whole regiments, in many, by companies, at a time.

The first use made by Lord Howe of this victory, was to avail himself of the impression it had probably made, by opening a negotiation with Congress. For this purpose, General Sullivan was sent on parole¹⁵ to Philadelphia, with a verbal message, the import of which was, that though he could not at present treat¹⁶ with Congress as a political body, he was very desirous of having a conference with some of its members; that, in conjunction with General Howe, he had full powers to compromise the dispute between Great Britain and America, on terms advantageous to both; and wished a compact might be settled when no decisive blow was struck, and neither party could allege being compelled to enter into an arrangement; that in case Congress were disposed to treat, many things which they had not yet asked, might, and ought to be granted them; and that, if upon the conference, they found any probable ground of accommodation, the authority of Congress must be afterwards acknowledged—otherwise the compact would not be complete.

This proposition was not without its embarrassments. Congress dreaded the effects of an opinion, that the restoration of the ancient connexion on principles formerly deemed constitutional, was practicable; and was at the same time unwilling to enter into a negotiation, which might excite a suspicion, that the determination to maintain independence was not immovable.

The answer given through General Sullivan was, “that Congress, being the representatives of the free and independent states of America, cannot with propriety send any of its members to confer with his lordship in their private characters; but that, ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee of their body, to know whether he has any authority to treat with persons authorized by Congress for that purpose, on behalf of America; and what that authority is; and to hear such propositions as he shall think proper to make respecting the same.”

Mr. Franklin, Mr. John Adams, and Mr. Edward Rutledge, all zealous supporters of independence, were appointed to receive the communications of Lord Howe.¹⁷

They waited on his lordship, and on their return reported that he had received them, on the 11th of September on Staten Island, with great politeness.

He opened the conversation by saying, that though he could not treat with them as a committee of Congress, yet as his powers enabled him to consult with any private gentlemen of influence on the means of restoring peace, he was glad of this opportunity of conferring with them on that subject, if they thought themselves at liberty to enter into a conference with him in that character. The committee observed that, as their business was to hear, his lordship might consider them in what light he pleased, and communicate any propositions he might be authorized to make; but that they could consider themselves in no other character, than that in which they were placed by Congress. His lordship then proceeded to open his views at some length. A return to their allegiance to the British crown was the condition on which peace was offered. He gave assurances of a good disposition in the King and his ministers, to make the government easy to them; and intimated that, in case of submission, the offensive acts of Parliament would be revised, and the instructions to the Governors reconsidered.

The committee gave it as their opinion, that a return to the domination of Great Britain was not now to be expected. They mentioned the repeated humble petitions which had been treated with contempt, and answered only by additional injuries; the unexampled patience which had been shown under their tyrannical government; and that it was not until the late Act of Parliament, which denounced war against them, and put them out of the King’s protection,¹⁸ that they declared their independence. All now considered themselves as independent states, and it was not in the power of Congress to agree for them that they should return to their former dependent state. There was no doubt of their inclination for peace, and of their willingness to enter into a treaty with Britain that might be advantageous to both countries. If the same good disposition existed on the part of Britain, his lordship might obtain powers for that purpose, much sooner than powers could be obtained from the several colonies to consent to submission.

His lordship expressed his regret that no accommodation was likely to take place, and put an end to the conference.

These fruitless negotiations produced no suspension of hostilities.

The British army, posted from Bedford to Hurlgate, fronted and threatened York island from its southern extremity to the part opposite to the northern boundary of Long Island, a small distance below the heights of Haarlem, comprehending a space of nine miles.

The two armies were divided only by the East river, which is generally less than a mile wide.

Immediately after the victory at Brooklyn, dispositions were made by the enemy to gain possession of New York. The movements of the fleet indicated an intention to land near Kingsbridge, and take a position which would cut off the communication of the American army with the country.

Aware of his danger, General Washington began to remove such stores as were not immediately necessary, and called a council of general officers to determine whether New York should be immediately evacuated. His own opinion appears to have been in favor of immediate evacuation; but the majority of the council was opposed to it. In the hope of defending the place till the campaign should be too far wasted to admit of further operations, the advice they gave was that the army should be formed into three divisions; one to remain in New York; the second to be stationed at Kingsbridge; and the third to occupy a camp in the intermediate space, so as to support either extreme.

This opinion was soon changed. The movements of the British general indicated clearly an intention either to break their line of communication, or to inclose the whole army in York island. A second council determined, by a large majority, that it had become absolutely necessary to withdraw the army from New York.

In consequence of this determination, Brigadier-General Mercer, who commanded the flying camp¹⁹ on the Jersey shores, was directed to move up the North river²⁰ to the post opposite fort Washington; and every effort was made to expedite the removal of the stores.

On the morning of the 15th of September, three ships of war sailed up the river as far as Bloomingdale; a movement which stopped the removal of the stores by water. About eleven o’clock on the same day, Sir Henry Clinton, with a division of four thousand men, who had embarked at the head of New Town bay, unperceived by the troops on York island, proceeded through that bay into the East river, which he crossed; and, under cover of the fire of five men-of-war, landed at Kipp’s bay, about three miles above New York.

The works thrown up at this place were capable of being defended for some time; but the troops abandoned them, and fled with precipitation. On the commencement of the cannonade, General Washington ordered the brigades of Parsons and Fellows to their support, and rode in person towards the scene of action. The panic of those who had fled from the works was communicated to the troops who had been ordered to sustain them, and the commander-in-chief had the extreme mortification to meet the whole party retreating in the utmost disorder, regardless of the efforts made by their generals to stop their disgraceful flight. The only part now to be taken was to secure the posts on the heights, and to withdraw the few troops still remaining in New York. In the retreat from the town, a small skirmish took place at Bloomingdale, in which an inconsiderable loss of men was sustained; but all the heavy artillery, and a large portion of the baggage, provision, and military stores, were unavoidably abandoned.

The British army, after taking possession of New York, encamped near the American lines. Its right was at Hoven’s hook, near the East river, and its left reached the North river, near Bloomingdale. Both flanks were covered by ships of war.

The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge. M’Gowan’s Pass and Morris’s Heights were also occupied in considerable force. A strong detachment was posted in an entrenched camp, on the heights of Haarlem, within about a mile and a half of the British lines.

The present position of the armies favored the views of the American general. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a series of skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field; and he persuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a strong entrenched camp to be immediately in their rear, would engage without apprehension, would display their native courage, and would soon regain the confidence they had lost.

Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded. The day after the retreat from New York, the British appeared in considerable force in the plain between the two camps; and the general rode to his advanced posts in order to make such arrangements as this movement might require. Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton,²¹ of Connecticut, who, at the head of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party, soon came in and stated their numbers at about three hundred.

The general ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and Major Leitch,²² with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which had joined the army the preceding day, to gain their rear, while he amused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack their front.

This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill, in order to take possession of some fences and bushes which presented an advantageous position, and a firing commenced, but at too great a distance to do much execution. In the mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not being precisely acquainted with their new position, made his attack rather on their flank than rear; and a warm action ensued.

In a short time Major Leitch, who led the detachment, was brought off the ground mortally wounded, having received three balls through his body; and soon afterwards the gallant Knowlton also fell. Not discouraged by the loss of their field-officers, the Captains continued the action with great animation. Both parties were reinforced. The Americans drove the enemy out of a wood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther, when the General, content with the present advantage, called back his troops into their entrenchments.

In this sharp encounter, the British loss was double that of the Americans; but its real importance was its operation on the spirits of the army. To give it the more effect, the parole²³ the next day was Leitch; and the General, in his orders, publicly thanked the troops under the command of that officer, who had first advanced on the enemy, and the others who had so resolutely supported them; contrasting, at the same time, their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day before. He appointed a successor to the gallant and brave Colonel Knowlton, “who would,” he said, “have been an honor to any country.”

CHAPTER 6

“Unyielding Firmness”: Retreat and Attack in New York and New Jersey (October 1776 to January 1777)

The British land at Frogsneck.—York Island, except fort Washington, evacuated.—Battle of the White Plains.—General Howe returns to Kingsbridge.—General Washington crosses the North river.—Fort Washington surrenders.—Fort Lee evacuated.—Weakness of the American army.—Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia.—Retreat through Jersey.—Capture of General Lee.—General Washington crosses the Delaware.—The British go into winter quarters.—Battle of Trenton.—Princeton.—Firmness of Congress.

Oct. 1776

THE ARMIES did not long retain their position on York Island. General Howe determined to gain the rear of the American camp by the New England road, and also to possess himself of the Hudson above Kingsbridge. Having ascertained the practicability of passing the forts on the North river, he embarked a great part of his army in flat-bottomed boats on the East river, and, passing through Hurlgate into the Sound, landed on the 12th of October at Frogsneck, about nine miles from the camp on the heights of Haarlem, where he remained some days waiting for his artillery, military stores, and reinforcements from Staten Island, which were detained by contrary winds.

General Washington strengthened the fort at Kingsbridge, detached some regiments to West Chester for the purpose of skirmishing with the enemy should the occasion offer, and submitted the propriety of changing his ground to a board of general officers. The necessity of moving out of the island was too apparent not to be advised; but it was also determined to hold fort Washington, and to defend it as long as possible. A resolution of Congress of the 11th of October, desiring General Washington to obstruct if possible the navigation of the river, had great influence in producing this determination.

Measures were immediately taken for moving the army up the river, so as to extend its front, or left, beyond the British right. The rear division commanded by General Lee remained a few days longer at Kingsbridge, to secure and bring up the heavy baggage and military stores.

On the 18th of October, General Howe moved through Pelham’s Manor, and took post at New Rochelle, a village on the Sound. The American army occupied the heights between that place and the North river.

A corps of American loyalists, commanded by Major Rogers, lay east of the main army, and was supposed to be covered by it. A bold attempt to surprise him in the night and to bear off his whole corps, by passing between him and the British camp, was made by an American detachment commanded by Major Green of Virginia. Major Rogers was surprised, and about sixty of his regiment were killed and taken. The loss of the Americans was inconsiderable, but among the wounded was Major Green, who received a ball in his shoulder which disabled him through life.

Not long afterwards a regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen under Colonel Hand, engaged an equal number of Hessian chasseurs,¹ with some advantage.

These evidences of enterprise on the part of his adversary served to increase the caution of the British General. He waited a few days at New Rochelle, for a division commanded by Knyphausen.² After its arrival, both armies, the Brunx³ dividing them, moved towards the White Plains, a strong piece of ground already occupied by a detachment of militia.

General Washington took possession of the heights at White Plains, on the east side of the Brunx, seven or eight miles in front of the British column. This stream meandered so as to cover the front as well as the flank of his right wing, which extended along the road leading towards New Rochelle, as far as the brow of the hill where his centre was posted. His left, which formed almost a right angle with his centre, and was nearly parallel to his right, extended along the hills northward, so as to keep possession of the commanding ground, and secure a retreat to a still stronger position in his rear.

General M’Dougal⁴ with about sixteen hundred men, chiefly militia, occupied a hill, on the west side of the Brunx, about a mile from the right wing, for the purpose of covering the right flank. His communication with the main body was open, the river being fordable. Entrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the lines.

Oct. 25

General Howe having determined to attack Washington in his camp, advanced in two columns, the right commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, and the left by General Knyphausen; and, about ten, his van⁵ appeared in full view. His right formed behind a hill about a mile in front of the American centre.

After viewing Washington’s situation, Howe, who accompanied Knyphausen, determined to commence the action by carrying the hill occupied by M’Dougal; and directed Colonel Rall with a brigade of Hessians, to make a circuit so as to turn M’Dougal’s right flank, while Brigadier-General Leslie with a strong corps of British and Hessian troops should attack him in front. When Rall had gained his position, Leslie also crossed the Brunx and attacked with great animation. The militia instantly fled; but the regulars maintained their ground with great gallantry. Colonel Smallwood’s regiment of Maryland, and Colonel Reitzimer’s of New York, advanced boldly towards the foot of the hill to meet Leslie; but, after a sharp encounter, were compelled to retreat. The remaining troops were soon driven from the hill, but still kept up an irregular fire from the stone walls near the scene of action. General Putnam, with Beal’s brigade, was ordered to support them; but, the hill being lost, the attempt to regain it was deemed unadvisable. The American loss, in this spirited action, was between three and four hundred in killed, wounded, and missing. General Smallwood was among the wounded.⁶

A considerable part of the day having been exhausted in gaining the hill, Howe suspended further operations till the next morning; and the British army lay on their arms through the night in order of battle.

This interval was employed by General Washington in removing his sick and baggage, and adapting the arrangement of his troops to existing circumstances. His right was drawn back to stronger ground. Perceiving this, Howe resolved to postpone further offensive operations until Lord Percy should come up with the rear division of the army. This reinforcement was received on the evening of the thirtieth; but a violent rain which fell that night and the succeeding day still farther postponed the meditated assault.

Having now removed his sick, provisions, and heavy baggage, to stronger ground, General Washington retired, in the night of the first of November, to the heights of North Castle, about five miles from the White Plains. General Howe thought this position too strong to be attempted with prudence, and determined to change his plan of operation.

The American garrisons in forts Lee and Washington imposed a check on his movements, and rendered York Island insecure. As preliminary to an attack on these forts, he directed Knyphausen to take possession of Kingsbridge, which was defended by fort Independence. On his approach, the small garrison retired to fort Washington, and Knyphausen encamped between that place and Kingsbridge.

In the mean time General Howe retired slowly down the North river. General Washington penetrated his design, and prepared as far as was in his power to counteract it. His letter to Congress communicating his movements, states his conviction that his adversary was not about to close the campaign, but would immediately invest⁷ fort Washington, and make a descent into Jersey. A council of war determined unanimously that the troops raised on the west of the Hudson should cross that river immediately, and be soon afterwards followed by those from the eastern part of the continent, except three thousand men who were to remain for the defence of the Highlands. A letter was also addressed to the Governor of New Jersey, stating the probable invasion of that State, and urging the necessity of putting the militia in the best possible condition to reinforce his army, and to replace the new levies which were engaged only to the first of December. Immediate information of this movement was also transmitted to General Greene,⁸ who commanded in the Jerseys; and his attention was particularly pointed to fort Washington.

As the British army approached Kingsbridge, three ships of war passed up the Hudson, notwithstanding the additional obstructions placed in the channel, uninjured by the fire from the forts. This demonstration of the inefficacy of those obstructions justified, in the opinion of General Washington, the evacuation of those forts. “If,” said he, in his letter to General Greene, “we cannot prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be derived? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington. But as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders respecting the evacuation of the place as you may think most advisable; and so far revoke the orders given to Colonel McGaw to defend it to the last.”

General Washington crossed the North river on the 13th of November, in the rear of the troops destined to act in the Jerseys, and proceeded to the quarters of General Greene, near fort Lee.

Mount Washington is a high piece of rocky ground, very difficult of ascent, especially towards the north. The lines and outworks, which were chiefly on the southern side, were drawn quite across the island. The fortifications were believed to be capable of resisting any attempt to carry them by storm; and the garrison, which consisted of about two thousand regulars and a few militia, was commanded by Colonel McGaw, a brave and intelligent officer.

General Howe, having made the necessary preparations for an assault, summoned the garrison to surrender on the 15th of November. Colonel McGaw replied, that he should defend the place to the last extremity, and communicated the summons to General Greene at fort Lee, who transmitted it to the commander-in-chief, then at Hackensac. He immediately rode to fort Lee, and, though late in the night, was proceeding to fort Washington, when, in crossing the river, he met Generals Putnam and Greene returning from a visit to that fort. They reported that the garrison was in high spirits, and would make a good defence; on which he returned with them to fort Lee.

Early next morning, Colonel McGaw prepared for the expected assault. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, commanded a party posted on a hill towards Kingsbridge; and Colonel Cadwallader of Pennsylvania, commanded a body of troops who were posted in the outermost of the lines drawn across the island, and between the lines, on the rocky and precipitous heights fronting Haarlem river.

Nov. 16

About ten, the assailants appeared before the works and moved to the assault in four different quarters. The first division consisting of about five thousand Germans, commanded by General Knyphausen advanced against the hill occupied by Colonel Rawlings. The second, on the east, was led by General Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis. These troops crossed Haarlem river in boats under cover of their artillery, and landed within the outer line which crossed the island. The third, conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Stirling, crossed the river higher up; and the fourth, led by Lord Percy, accompanied by General Howe, assaulted the lines in front on the south side.

The attacks on the north and south were made at the same instant. While Colonel Cadwallader was engaged in the first line against Lord Percy, the second and third divisions crossed Haarlem river, made good their landing, and dispersed the troops fronting that river, as well as a detachment sent by Colonel Cadwallader to support them. As the British advanced between the fort and the lines, they were necessarily abandoned. In retreating to the fort, some of the troops were intercepted by the division under Colonel Stirling, and made prisoners.

The resistance on the north was of longer duration. After an obstinate conflict, the Germans gained the summit of the hill; and Rawlings, perceiving the danger which threatened his rear, retreated to the fort.

The summons to surrender was now repeated; and it being thought impracticable to defend the place, the garrison became prisoners of war.

The loss on this occasion was the greatest the Americans had ever sustained. That of the assailants, according to Mr. Stedman, amounted to eight hundred men.⁹ It fell chiefly on the Germans.

The determination to evacuate fort Lee was the consequence of the surrender of fort Washington, and a removal of the stores was immediately commenced. Before this operation could be completed, Lord Cornwallis with about six thousand men crossed the river, and endeavoured to enclose the garrison between the north and Hackensac rivers. A retreat from that narrow neck of land was effected, with the loss of the heavy cannon and military stores.

After crossing the Hackensac, General Washington posted his troops along its western bank, but was unable to dispute its passage. At the head of about three thousand effectives, he was in a level country, with the Passaic in his rear, which unites with the Hackensac, a small distance below the ground he occupied.

This gloomy state of things was not brightened by the prospect before him. No confidence could be placed on receiving reinforcements from any quarter. But in no situation could Washington despond. Understanding that Ticonderoga was no longer threatened, he directed General Schuyler to hasten the troops of Pennsylvania and Jersey to his assistance, and ordered General Lee to cross the North river and be in readiness to join him. But under the same fatal cause which had acted elsewhere, their armies were melting away, and would soon be almost totally dissolved. General Mercer, who commanded part of the flying-camp stationed about Bergen, was also called in; but these troops who had engaged to serve only till the first of December, had already abandoned the army in great numbers. No hope existed of retaining them after they should be entitled to a discharge; and there was not much probability of supplying their places with other militia. To New England he looked with anxious hope; and his requisitions on those states received prompt attention. Six thousand militia from Massachusetts, and a considerable body from Connecticut, were ordered to his assistance; but some delay in assembling them was unavoidable, and their march was arrested by the appearance of danger in their immediate neighborhood. Three thousand men commanded by Sir Henry Clinton took possession, late in November, of Newport in Rhode Island.

Not intending to maintain his present position, General Washington crossed the Passaic and took post at Newark. Having now entered the open country, his purpose was to halt a few days, and endeavor to collect such a force as would keep up the semblance of an army. General Mifflin was deputed to the government of Pennsylvania, and Colonel Reid, his Adjutant-General, to that of New Jersey, with orders to represent the real situation of the army, and the certainty that, without great reinforcements the state of New Jersey would be overrun, and Philadelphia be lost. General Lee was at the same time pressed to hasten his march, and cautioned to keep high enough up the country to avoid the enemy.

This perilous state of things was rendered still more critical by indications of an insurrection in the county of Monmouth, in New Jersey. In other places, too, an indisposition to further resistance was manifested. These appearances obliged him to make detachments from the militia of his army, to overawe the disaffected of Monmouth, who were on the point of assembling in force.

Dec. 1

As the British army crossed the Passaic, General Washington retreated to Brunswick. At this place, the levies drawn from Maryland and Jersey, to compose the flying camp, became entitled to their discharge; and no remonstrances could detain them. The Pennsylvanians were engaged to serve till the first of January. So many of them deserted, that guards were placed on the roads and ferries over the Delaware, to apprehend and send them back to camp. The next day, the van of the British army appeared in sight, and General Washington retreated to Trenton. Directions had already been given to collect all the boats from Philadelphia for seventy miles up that river, in the hope that the progress of the enemy might be arrested until the arrival of reinforcements, which would enable him to dispute its passage.

The army which was thus pressed slowly through the Jerseys, at no time, during the retreat, exceeded four thousand men. On reaching the Delaware, it was reduced to less than three thousand; of whom not quite one thousand were militia of New Jersey. The regulars were badly armed, worse clad, and almost destitute of tents, blankets, or utensils for dressing their food.¹⁰

In this crisis of American affairs, a proclamation was issued by Lord and General Howe, commanding all persons assembled in arms against his majesty’s government, to disband, and return to their homes; and offering pardon to every person who should, within sixty days, appear before certain officers of the crown, and testify his obedience to the laws, by subscribing a declaration of his submission to the royal authority. Numbers flocked in daily to make their peace, and obtain protection.

Among the many valuable traits in the character of Washington, was that unyielding firmness which supported him under these accumulated circumstances of depression. Undismayed by the dangers which surrounded him, he did not for an instant relax his exertions, nor omit any thing which could retard the progress of the enemy. He did not appear to despair; and constantly showed himself to his harassed and enfeebled army, with a serene unembarrassed countenance, betraying no fears in himself, and inspiring others with confidence. To this unconquerable firmness—to this perfect self-possession under the most desperate circumstances, is America, in a great degree, indebted for her independence.

The exertions of General Mifflin to raise the militia of Pennsylvania, were successful in Philadelphia. A large proportion of the inhabitants of this city had associated for the general defence; and on this occasion, fifteen hundred of them marched to Trenton. A German battalion¹¹ was also ordered to that place by Congress. On the arrival of these troops, General Washington moved towards Princeton; but was stopped by intelligence that Lord Cornwallis, having received large reinforcements, was advancing rapidly from Brunswick by different routes, and endeavoring to gain his rear. He immediately crossed the Delaware, and placed his army in such a manner as to guard its fords. As his rear passed the river, the British van appeared in sight.

From Bordentown, the course of the river turns westward, making an acute angle with its course from Philadelphia to that place; so that a British division might cross a considerable distance above Trenton, and be almost as near Philadelphia as the troops opposite to that place. Lord Cornwallis made dispositions to cross both above and below. The American army was so arranged as to counteract this design.

The commander-in-chief had ordered General Gates,¹² with the regulars of the northern army, and General Heath, with those at Peekskill, to march to his assistance.

Although General Lee had been repeatedly urged to join him, that officer proceeded reluctantly in the execution of his orders, manifesting a strong disposition to retain his separate command, and rather to threaten the rear of the British army, than to strengthen that in its front. On the 12th of December, while passing slowly through Morris county, he was surprised in his quarters, about three miles from his army, by a detachment of cavalry, commanded by Colonel Harcourt, and was carried off in triumph.

General Sullivan, on whom the command devolved, obeyed promptly the orders which had been given to Lee, and, crossing the Delaware at Philipsburg, joined the commander-in-chief. On the same day, General Gates arrived with a few northern troops. By these and other reinforcements, the army was augmented to about seven thousand effective men.

All the attempts of the British General to get possession of boats for the transportation of his army over the Delaware having failed, he gave indications of an intention to close the campaign, and to retire into winter quarters. About four thousand men were cantoned¹³ on the Delaware, at Trenton, Bordentown, the White Horse, and Mount Holly; and the residue of the army of Jersey was distributed from that river to the Hackensac. Strong corps were posted at Princeton, Brunswick, and Elizabeth Town. General Howe hoped, by covering so large a portion of Jersey, to intimidate the people, and to impede the recruiting service. To counteract these views, three regiments from Peekskill were ordered to halt at Morristown, and to unite with the Jersey militia assembled at that place under Colonel Ford. General Maxwell was sent to take command of these troops.

The short interval between this cantonment of the British troops and the recommencement of active operations, was employed by General Washington in repeating the representations he had so often made to Congress respecting preparations for the ensuing campaign.

The present aspect of American affairs was gloomy in the extreme. The existing army, except about fifteen hundred men, would dissolve in a few days. New Jersey had, in a great measure, submitted; and the militia of Pennsylvania had not displayed the alacrity expected from them. General Howe would most probably avail himself of the ice, which would soon be formed, and of the dissolution of the American army, to seize Philadelphia. It was feared, and with reason, that this event would deter the American youth from engaging in a service which was becoming hopeless.

To extricate the affairs of America from this desperate situation, General Washington formed the daring plan of attacking all the British posts on the Delaware at the same instant. If successful in all or any of these attacks, he hoped to relieve Philadelphia from immediate danger—to compel his adversary to compress himself, so as no longer to cover Jersey, and above all, to restore public confidence.

The positions taken to guard the river, were equally well adapted to offensive operations. It was intended to cross, in the night of the 25th of December, at M’Konkey’s ferry, about nine miles above Trenton, and to march down in two divisions, by the river and Pennington roads, the first of which enters the western part of the town, and the last towards the north. This part of the plan was to be executed by the General in person, at the head of about two thousand four hundred continental troops. It was thought practicable to pass the river by twelve, and to reach the point of destination by five in the morning. General Irvine was directed to cross at the Trenton ferry, and to secure the bridge below the town. General Cadwallader was to cross over at Dunks’ ferry, and to secure the post at Mount Holly.

The cold, on the night of the 25th, was intense. Snow, mingled with hail and rain, fell in great quantities, and so much ice was made in the river, that the division commanded by the General in person could not effect its passage till three, nor commence its march till near four. As the distance to Trenton, by either road, is nearly the same, orders were given to attack at the instant of arrival, and, after driving in the outposts, to follow them rapidly into town, and prevent the main body from forming.

General Washington accompanied the upper column; and, arriving at the outpost on that road precisely at eight o’clock, drove it in, and followed it with such ardor that its attempts to make a stand were unavailing. In three minutes, the fire of those who had taken the river road was heard. Colonel Rall, who commanded in the town, paraded his men, and met the assailants. He fell in the commencement of the action, and his troops, in apparent confusion, attempted to gain the road to Princeton. General Washington threw a detachment into their front, and advanced rapidly on them in person. Finding themselves surrounded, and their artillery already seized, they laid down their arms and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. About twenty of the enemy were killed, and about one thousand made prisoners. The American loss was two privates killed, two frozen to death, and three or four wounded. One officer, Lieutenant Monroe, was wounded.¹⁴

The ice rendered it impracticable for General Irvine to execute that part of the plan which devolved on him, and about five hundred men, stationed in the lower end of Trenton, crossed the bridge, early in the action, and escaped down the river. The same cause prevented General Cadwallader from attacking the post at Mount Holly. With great difficulty a part of his infantry passed the river, but returned on its being found impossible to cross with the artillery.

General Washington, thinking it unadvisable to hazard the loss of the very important advantage already gained, by attempting to increase it, recrossed the river with his prisoners and military stores.

Nothing could surpass the astonishment of the British commander at this unexpected display of vigor on the part of the American General. His condition, and that of his country, had been thought desperate. He had been deserted by every man having a right to leave him, and two-thirds of the continental troops still remaining with him would be entitled to a discharge on the first of January. The spirits of the people were sunk to the lowest point of depression. New Jersey appeared to be subdued, and the best judges of the public sentiment thought that immense numbers in Pennsylvania also would not permit the sixty days allowed in the proclamation of Lord and Sir William Howe to elapse, without availing themselves of the pardon it proffered. Instead of offensive operations, the total dispersion of the small remnant of the American army was confidently anticipated.

Finding that he was contending with an adversary who could never cease to be formidable, and that the conquest of America was more distant than had been supposed, General Howe determined, in the depth of winter, to recommence active operations; and Lord Cornwallis, who had retired to New York, with the intention of embarking for Europe, returned to the Jerseys in great force for the purpose of recovering the ground which had been lost.

General Washington, finding himself, by a reinforcement of Pennsylvania militia, at the head of a force with which it seemed practicable to act on the offensive, determined to employ the winter in endeavoring to recover Jersey.

He directed Generals Heath and Maxwell to approach the British cantonments, while he again crossed the Delaware with his continental troops, and took post at Trenton. The regulars of New England were entitled to a discharge on the last day of December. With great difficulty, and a bounty of ten dollars, many of them were induced to renew their engagements for six weeks.

Jan. 1, 1777

The British were now collected in force at Princeton, under Lord Cornwallis. His Lordship advanced on the morning of the 2d of January; and, about four o’clock in the afternoon, his van reached Trenton. On its approach, General Washington retired across Assumpinck creek, which runs through the town. The British attempted to cross the creek at several places; but finding all the fords guarded, they desisted from the attempt, and kindled their fires. The Americans kindled their fires likewise, and a cannonade was kept up till dark.

The situation of General Washington was once more extremely critical. A few days of mild foggy weather had softened the ice in the Delaware, and rendered its passage very difficult. In his present situation, he would certainly be attacked early in the morning by an overwhelming force, which must render his destruction inevitable.

In this embarrassing state of things, he formed the bold design of abandoning the Delaware, and marching by a circuitous route along the left flank of the British army, into its rear at Princeton; and, after beating the troops at that place, to move rapidly on Brunswick, where the baggage and principal magazines of the British army lay under a weak guard.

This plan being approved by a council of war, preparations were made for its immediate execution. The baggage was removed to Burlington; and about one o’clock in the morning the army decamped silently, and took a circuitous road to Princeton, where three British regiments had encamped he preceding night, two of which commenced their march early in the morning to join the rear of their army. At sunrise, after proceeding about two miles, they saw the Americans on their left; and, immediately facing about, advanced upon their van, which was conducted by General Mercer. A sharp action ensued, which was not of long duration. General Mercer was mortally wounded, and the van was routed. But the fortune of the day was soon changed. The main body, led by General Washington in person, followed close in the rear, and attacked with great spirit. The British in turn were compelled to give way. The two regiments were separated. Colonel Mawhood, who commanded that in front, retired to the main road, and continued his march. The fifty-fifth regiment, which was on the left, being hard pressed, fled in confusion across the fields into a back road leading towards Brunswick. General Washington pressed forward to Princeton. The regiment remaining in that place took possession of the college,¹⁵ and made a show of resistance, but some pieces of artillery being brought up to play upon that building, it was abandoned, and the greater part of them became prisoners.

In this engagement, the British lost rather more than one hundred killed, and near three hundred prisoners. The loss of the Americans in killed was somewhat less; but in their number was included General Mercer, Colonels Haslet and Potter, Captains Neal and Fleming, and five other valuable officers.

On perceiving that the American army had decamped in the night, Lord Cornwallis marched with the utmost expedition to the protection of Brunswick, and was close in the rear of the Americans before they could leave Princeton.

The situation of General Washington was again perilous in the extreme. His small army was exhausted with fatigue, without blankets, and many of them barefooted. He was closely pursued by a superior enemy, who must necessarily come up with him before he could accomplish his designs on Brunswick. Under these circumstances, he abandoned the remaining part of his original plan, and took the road leading up the country to Pluckamin, where his troops took some refreshment. Lord Cornwallis continued his march to Brunswick; and General Washington, finding it impracticable to continue offensive operations, retired to Morristown, in order to put his men under cover, and give them some repose.

The bold, judicious, and unexpected attacks made at Trenton and Princeton had a much more extensive influence on American affairs than would be supposed from a mere estimate of the killed and taken. They saved Philadelphia for the winter; recovered the state of Jersey; and, which was of still more importance, revived the drooping spirits of the people, and gave a perceptible impulse to the recruiting service throughout the United States.

The firmness of Congress through the gloomy period which intervened between the loss of fort Washington and the battle of Princeton, give the members of that time a just claim to the admiration of the world and to the gratitude of their fellow-citizens. Undismayed by impending dangers, they did not, for an instant, admit the idea of surrendering the independence they had declared, and purchasing peace by returning to their colonial situation.

CHAPTER 7

The Army and Independence Maintained (January to July 1777)

American army inoculated.—State of the army.—Destruction of stores at Peekskill.—at Danbury.—Expedition to Sagg Harbor.—Camp formed at Middle Brook.—British move out to Somerset Court-House.—Return to Amboy.—Attempt to cut off the retreat of the American army at Middle Brook.—Lord Cornwallis skirmishes with Lord Sterling.—General Prescot surprised and taken.—The British army embarks.

Jan. 1777

THE EFFECT of the proclamation published by Lord and General Howe, on taking possession of Jersey, was in a great degree counteracted by the conduct of the invading army. The hope that security was attainable by submission was soon dissipated. The inhabitants were treated rather as conquered rebels than returning friends. Whatever may have been the exertions of the General to restrain his soldiers, they indulged in every species of licentiousness. The loyalists as well as those who had been active in the American cause, were the victims of this indiscriminating spirit of rapine and violence. A sense of personal wrongs produced a temper which national considerations had been too weak to excite; and, when the battles of Trenton and Princeton relieved the people from the fears inspired by the presence of their invaders, the great body of the people flew to arms. Small parties of militia scoured the country, and were collecting in such numbers as to threaten the weaker British posts with the fate which had befallen Trenton and Princeton.

To guard against this spirit, the British General found it expedient to abandon the positions taken for the purpose of recovering the country, and to confine himself to New Brunswick and Amboy.

The militia and volunteers who came in aid of the small remnant of continental troops, enabled General Washington to take different positions near the lines of the enemy, to harass him perpetually, restrain his foraging parties,¹ and produce considerable distress in his camp.

In the midst of these operations, he came to the hazardous resolution of freeing himself and his troops from the fear of a calamity which had proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy.

The small-pox had found its way into both the northern and middle army, and had impaired the strength of both to an alarming degree. To avoid the return of this evil, the General determined to inoculate all the soldiers in the American service. This determination was carried into execution, and an army, exempt from the fear of a calamity which had, at all times, endangered the most important operations, was prepared for the next campaign. The example was followed through the country, and this alarming disease ceased to be the terror of America.

As the British army was divided between New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island, General Washington cherished hopes of being enabled to strike a decisive blow against some one of its divisions during the winter. The state sovereignties, which possessed all the real energies of government, were incessantly urged to fill their regiments and to bring their quotas into the field; but the inherent defects of the American system rendered it impracticable to collect a force competent to those vigorous operations which had been anticipated. Some of the State Assemblies did not even complete the appointment of officers till the spring. After these arrangements were made, the difficulty of enlisting men was unexpectedly great. The immense hardships to which the naked soldiers had been exposed; the mortality resulting from those hardships, and probably from an injudicious arrangement of the hospital department which proved to be the tomb of the sick, had excited extensive disgust to the service, and a consequent unwillingness to engage in it. A letter of the 4th of March, addressed to Congress, states that the whole effective force in Jersey fit for duty, was less than three thousand, of whom not quite one thousand were regulars. Still a war of skirmishes was kept up through the winter. The British foraging parties were often attacked to advantage; and these small successes, magnified by the press into victories, served to increase the confidence of the American soldiers in themselves, and to animate the people. Hopes were even entertained that, from the scarcity of forage, neither the British cavalry nor draft horses would be fit for service when the campaign should open.

As the season for active operations approached, fresh difficulties, growing out of the organization of the American system, disclosed themselves. Every state being exposed to invasion, the attention of each was directed to itself. The spirit incident to every league was displayed in repeated attempts to give to the military force such various directions as would leave it unable to effect any great object, or to obstruct any one plan the enemy might form. The patriotism of the day, however, and the unexampled confidence placed in the commander-in-chief, prevented the mischiefs this spirit is well calculated to generate. His representations made their proper impression, and the intention of retaining continental troops for local defence was reluctantly abandoned. The plan of raising additional regular corps, to be exclusively under state authority, was substituted for the yeomanry² of the country, as a more effectual and convenient mode of protecting the coasts from insult.

During the winter, General Howe kept his troops in their quarters. As the season for active operations approached, his first attention was directed to the destruction of the scanty supplies prepared by the Americans for the ensuing campaign. Peekskill on the Hudson, about fifty miles above New York, was generally the residence of the commander in the Highlands, and was used as a place of deposit for stores to be distributed into the neighboring posts.

Colonel Bird was detached up the river against this place, at the head of five hundred men, under convoy of a frigate and some smaller vessels. After completely destroying the magazines and barracks, he returned to New York.

An expedition was also projected against Danbury, a village on the western frontier of Connecticut, in which military stores to a considerable amount had been deposited. Governor Tryon, Major-General of the provinces in the British service, assisted by Brigadiers Agnew and Sir William Irskine, proceeded on this enterprise at the head of two thousand men.

On the 25th of April, the troops landed between Fairfield and Norwalk, and reached Danbury about two the next day. The village, with the magazines it contained, were consumed by fire, and early in the morning of the succeeding day, Tryon commenced his line of march towards his ships. The militia, however, had been alarmed, and assembled in considerable bodies to obstruct his retreat. General Wooster, who had resigned his commission in the continental army, and been appointed Major-General of the militia,³ fell into his rear with about three hundred men, while Arnold and Sullivan, then casually in Connecticut, gained his front at Ridgefield. Wooster attacked his rear with great gallantry, about eleven in the morning, but his troops were repulsed, and he was himself mortally wounded. Tryon proceeded on his march to Ridgefield, where he found Arnold already entrenched on a strong piece of ground. A warm skirmish ensued which continued nearly an hour, when Arnold was driven from the field. At break of day next morning, after setting fire to Ridgefield, the British resumed their line of march. About eleven in the forenoon they were again met by Arnold whose numbers were increased to a thousand men, among whom were some continental soldiers. A continued skirmishing was kept up till five in the afternoon, when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans attacked with great intrepidity, but were repulsed; and Tryon, availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops and returned to New York.

The loss of the British amounted to one hundred and seventy men. That of the Americans was stated at one hundred; but among these was General Wooster, lieutenant-Colonel Gould, and another field-officer, killed; and Colonel Lamb wounded.

This enterprise was not long afterwards successfully retaliated. The British had collected a considerable quantity of provisions and forage at Sagg Harbor, on the eastern end of Long Island. Believing this place to be completely secured by the vessels that were continually traversing the Sound, General Howe had confided its protection to a schooner⁴ carrying twelve guns, and a company of infantry.

May 1777

General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, formed the design of surprising this party, which was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs. He crossed the Sound with one hundred and seventy men under convoy of two armed sloops, and landed near Southhold, whence the boats were conveyed across the land, about fifteen miles, into a bay where the troops re-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in the morning, four miles from Sagg Harbor, which place was completely surprised, and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time another division of the detachment secured the armed schooner, which, with the stores, were consumed by fire.

The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man, Colonel Meigs returned with his prisoners, “having transported his men by land and water ninety miles in twenty-five hours.” Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a resolution expressing their high sense of his merit.

The exertions made during the winter by the commander-in-chief to raise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful; but that steady and persevering courage which had supported himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year, did not desert him. Supposing that Burgoyne,⁵ would either attempt to seize Ticonderoga, and join General Howe on the Hudson, or would transport his troops by water to New York, whence the combined army would proceed to Philadelphia, he adopted his arrangements to meet and counteract either plan of operations. With a view to the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York, and Philadelphia, the troops of New England and New York were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at a camp to be formed in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that weak part of the Union.

As the recruits were collected, the camp at Morristown was broken up, and the army assembled, on the 28th of May, at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of commanding heights, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick. These heights afforded a full view of any movements which might be made by the enemy. On the 20th of May, the total of the army in Jersey, excluding cavalry and artillery, amounted to only eight thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. More than half these were recruits, who had never looked an enemy in the face.

General Washington, anticipating a movement by land towards Philadelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders for assembling an army of militia strengthened by a few continental troops, on the western bank of the Delaware, to be commanded by General Arnold, who was then in Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.

The first object of the campaign on the part of General Howe, was Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey; and to cross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for that purpose. If the Americans could be brought to an action on equal ground, victory was inevitable. Should Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over the Delaware, the object would be as certainly obtained. But it would be dangerous to attack him in his lines at Middlebrook; for although his camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such loss as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

An attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army collected on its western bank, while that commanded by General Washington in person remained unbroken on his flank and rear, was an experiment of equal hazard. It comported with the cautious temper of Sir William Howe to devise some other plan to which he might resort, should he be unable to seduce the American General from his advantageous position.

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manoeuvre General Washington out of his present encampment.

On the 12th of June, General Howe assembled the main body of his army at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to reach Philadelphia by land.

General Washington, believing this to be his design, posted a select corps of riflemen under Colonel Morgan, a partisan⁶ of distinguished merit, at Vanvichton’s bridge on the Raritan, to watch the left flank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it.

June 1777

Early in the morning of the 14th, Sir William Howe, leaving two thousand men in Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware, which reached Somerset Court-House and Middlebrook about the same time.

On receiving intelligence that his enemy was in motion, General Washington formed his army to great advantage on the heights in front of his camp. The troops remained in order of battle during the day; and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended. The Jersey militia took the field in great numbers, and joined General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton behind the Lowland hills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability was forming, which could co-operate with that under the immediate inspection of the commander-in-chief.

The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend his camp, but not to hazard an action on other ground. That of General Howe seems to have been, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from his strong ground, and tempt him to approach the Delaware in the hope of defending its passage. The motives which restrained Howe from marching through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware should such be his intention. In that event, he purposed to maintain the high strong grounds north of the road to be taken by his enemy, and to watch for any opportunity which might be used to advantage.

Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position, General Howe determined to withdraw from Jersey, and to embark his army for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the night of the 19th, he returned to Brunswick, and on the 22d to Amboy, from which place, the heavy baggage and a few troops passed into Staten Island on the bridge which had been designed for the Delaware.

On the march to Amboy, some sharp skirmishing took place with Morgan’s corps; but the retreat was conducted with such circumspection, that no important advantage could be gained.

In order to cover and co-operate with his light parties, General Washington advanced six or seven miles to Quibbletown, on the road to Amboy; and Lord Sterling’s division was pushed still further to Metucking meeting-house.

In the hope of bringing on an engagement, General Howe, on the night of the 26th, recalled his troops from Staten Island, and, early the next morning, made a rapid movement in two columns: the right, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch plains; and the left, led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by Metucking meeting-house. The left was to attack the left flank of the Americans at Quibbletown, while Lord Cornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook.

At Woodbridge, the right column fell in with an American party of observation, which gave notice of this movement. General Washington, comprehending his danger, put the army in motion, and regained the camp at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell in with Lord Sterling, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans lost three field-pieces and a few men; after which they retreated to the hills about the Scotch plains. Perceiving the passes in the mountains to be guarded, and the object of this skilful manoeuvre to be unattainable, the British general returned to Amboy, and crossed over to Staten Island.

General Washington was again left to conjecture the plan of the campaign. Intelligence had been received of the appearance of Burgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This strengthened the opinion, that the design of Howe must be to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Without abandoning his camp at Middlebrook, he made dispositions to repel any sudden attack on the posts in the Highlands.

While the General anxiously watched the motions of his adversary, an agreeable piece of intelligence was received from New England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure, he indulged himself in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp, and was remiss with respect to guards. Information of this negligence was communicated, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprize was executed with courage and address⁷ by Colonel Barton, of the Rhode Island militia.

On the night of the 10th of July, he embarked on board four whale-boats, at Warwick neck, with a party of about forty men, including Captains Adams and Philips. After proceeding about ten miles by water unobserved, he landed about midway between Newport and Bristol ferry, and, marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot, seized the sentinel at the door, and one of his aids. The General himself was taken out of bed, and conveyed to a place of safety.

The success of this intrepid enterprize diffused the more joy, because it was supposed to secure the liberation of General Lee.

Congress expressed a high sense of this gallant action, and presented Colonel Barton with a sword.

At last, the embarkation of the British army was completed; and the fleet put to sea.

CHAPTER 8

Battle and a Wise Determination to Avoid Battle: The Struggle for Philadelphia (July to September 1777)

General Washington marches towards the Delaware.—Takes measures for checking Burgoyne.—British army lands at the ferry on Elk River.—General Washington advances to the Brandywine.—Retreat of Maxwell.—Defeat at Brandywine.—Skirmish on the 16th of September.—Retreat to French Creek.—General Wayne surprised.—General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia.—Congress removes to Lancaster.

July 1777

WHILE THE British troops were embarking at New York, the utmost exertions were made by General Washington to strengthen the army of the north, which was retreating before Burgoyne. He not only pressed the Governors of the eastern states to reinforce it with all their militia, and hastened the march of those generals who were designed to act in that department, but made large detachments of choice troops from his own army, thus weakening himself in order to reinforce other generals, whose strength would be more useful.

On receiving intelligence that the British fleet had sailed, the American army, under his immediate command, commenced its march southward. On the 30th of July, the fleet appeared off the capes of Delaware, and orders were given for assembling all the several detachments in the neighborhood of Philadelphia. Scarcely were these orders given, when they were countermanded. An express brought the information that the fleet had sailed out of Delaware bay, and was steering eastward. On the 7th of August, it was again seen a few leagues south of the capes of Delaware; after which it disappeared, and was not again seen until late in that month, when it appeared in the Chesapeake.

The original design had been to proceed up the Delaware; but, on entering that bay, its obstructions were found to be so considerable, that this design was abandoned, and the resolution taken to transport the army up the Chesapeake. The fleet sailed up that bay, and proceeded up Elk river as high as it was safely navigable. On the 25th of August, the troops, estimated at eighteen thousand effectives, were landed at the ferry.

On the appearance of the fleet in the Chesapeake, the several divisions of the American army were again ordered to unite in the neighborhood of Philadelphia; and the militia of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, and the northern counties of Virginia, were directed to take the field.

The day before Sir William Howe landed, the American army marched through Philadelphia to the Brandywine. The divisions of Greene and Stephen were advanced nearer the head of Elk, and encamped behind White Clay creek. The militia of Maryland and Delaware, with Richardson’s continental regiment, were assembled in the British rear, under General Smallwood; and the militia of Pennsylvania were united with the main body of the army. It was estimated by General Howe at fifteen thousand, including militia; and his estimate did not far exceed their total numbers; but the effectives, including militia, did not exceed eleven thousand.

Morgan’s regiment of riflemen having been detached to the northern army, a corps of light infantry was formed for the occasion, and placed under General Maxwell.¹ This corps was advanced to Iron Hill, about three miles in front of White Clay creek.

The British army, on landing, encamped in two divisions—the one at Elkton, the other at Cecil Court-House. On the 3d of September, they formed a junction at Pencader, or Aiken’s tavern. On the march, Lord Cornwallis fell in with, and attacked Maxwell, who retreated over White Clay creek, with the loss of about forty men, killed and wounded.

The American army encamped behind Red Clay creek, on the road leading from the camp of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia.

On the 8th of September, General Howe made a show of attacking the Americans in front, while the main body attempted to turn their right flank. Perceiving his design, General Washington changed his ground early in the night, and crossing the Brandywine, took post behind that river at Chadd’s ford. General Maxwell occupied the hills south of the river, on the road leading over the ford. The militia under General Armstrong guarded a ford two miles below Chadd’s; and the right extended a few miles above, with a view to other fords deemed less practicable.

In the evening of the 9th, Howe moved forward in two columns, which united next morning at Kennet’s Square; after which his parties were advanced on the roads leading to Lancaster, to Chadd’s ford, and to Wilmington.

The armies were now within seven miles of each other, with only the Brandywine between them, which opposed no obstacle to a general engagement. This was sought by Howe, and not avoided by Washington. It was impossible to protect Philadelphia without a victory; and this object was deemed of such importance throughout America, and especially by Congress, as to require that a battle should be hazarded for its attainment.

In the morning of the 11th, soon after day, information was received that the whole British army was advancing on the direct road leading over Chadd’s ford. The Americans were immediately arrayed in order of battle for the purpose of contesting the passage of the river. Skirmishing now commenced between the advanced parties; and by ten, Maxwell was driven over the Brandywine below the ford. Knyphausen, who commanded this division, paraded on the heights, and appeared to be making dispositions to force the passage of the river.

About eleven, Colonel Ross of Pennsylvania brought the information that a large column, estimated by him at five thousand men, with many field-pieces, had taken a road leading from Kennet’s Square directly up the country, and had entered the Great Valley road, down which they were marching to the upper fords on the Brandywine.

On receiving this intelligence, Washington is said to have determined to detach Sullivan and Lord Sterling, to engage the left of the British army; and to cross Chadd’s ford in person, and attack Knyphausen. Before this plan, if formed, could be executed, counter intelligence was received inducing the opinion that the movement on the British left was a feint, and that the column which had made it, after making demonstrations of crossing the Brandywine above its forks, had marched down the southern side of that river to reunite itself with Knyphausen.

The uncertainty produced by this contradictory intelligence was at length removed; and about two in the afternoon, it was ascertained that the left wing, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, after making a circuit of about seventeen miles, had crossed the river above its forks, and was advancing in great force.

A change of disposition was immediately made. The divisions of Sullivan, Sterling, and Stephen, advanced farther up the Brandywine, and fronted the British column marching down the river. That commanded by Wayne remained at Chadd’s ford. Greene’s division, accompanied by General Washington in person, formed a reserve between the right and left wings.

The troops detached against Lord Cornwallis, formed hastily on an advantageous piece of ground, above Birmingham meeting-house. Unfortunately Sullivan’s division, in taking its ground, made too large a circuit, and was scarcely formed when the attack commenced.

About half-past four the action began, and was kept up warmly for some time. The American right first gave way. The line continued to break from the right, and in a short time was completely routed. The commander-in-chief pressed forward with Greene to the support of that wing; but before his arrival, its rout was complete, and he could only check the pursuit. For this purpose the tenth Virginia regiment commanded by Colonel Stevens, and a regiment of Pennsylvania commanded by Colonel Stewart, were posted advantageously to cover the rear of the retreating army. The impression made by their fire, and the approach of night, induced Sir William Howe, after dispersing them, to give over the pursuit.

When the action commenced on the American right, General Knyphausen crossed at Chadd’s ford, and forced a small battery which defended it. The defeat of the American right being known, the left also withdrew from its ground. The whole army retreated that night to Chester, and the next day to Philadelphia.

The loss sustained by the Americans in this action has been estimated at three hundred killed and six hundred wounded. Between three and four hundred, principally the wounded, were made prisoners. Among the wounded were General Lafayette,² and Brigadier-General Woodford.³ As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, their conduct was not uniform: some regiments, especially those who had served the preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness of veterans. Others gave way as soon as they were pressed.⁴

The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less than one hundred killed and four hundred wounded. As the Americans sustained very little injury in the retreat, this inequality of loss can be ascribed only to the inferiority of their arms.

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive; and Congress appeared determined to risk another engagement for the metropolis of America.

Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, General Washington re-crossed the Schuylkill, and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the intention of meeting and again fighting his enemy.

Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle; and on the two succeeding days advanced towards Chester, and also took possession of Wilmington, to which place his sick and wounded were conveyed.

Sept. 1777

On the 15th the American army, intending to gain the left of the British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence being received early next morning that Howe was approaching in two columns, Washington determined to meet and engage him in front.

Both armies prepared with alacrity for battle. The advanced parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain, which rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their muskets soon became unfit for use.⁵ Their cartridge-boxes had been so inartificially constructed as not to protect their ammunition,⁶ and very many of the soldiers were without bayonets.

The design of giving battle was reluctantly abandoned, and the retreat was continued all day and great part of the night through a most distressing rain, and very deep roads. A few hours before day the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where the alarming fact was disclosed, that scarcely one musket in a regiment could be discharged, and scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for war. The army retired to Warwick furnace, on the south branch of the French Creek, where a small supply of muskets and ammunition might be obtained in time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill.

The extreme severity of the weather stopped the advance of Sir William Howe for two days.

From French Creek, General Wayne⁷ was detached with his division into the rear of the British, to harass their march; while General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker’s Ferry, and encamped on both sides of Perkioming Creek.

General Wayne lay in the woods, about three miles in rear of the left wing of the British troops. The country was so extensively disaffected, that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his position and of his force. Major-General Grey was detached on the night of the 20th to surprise him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. The American piquets,⁸ driven in with charged bayonets, gave the first intimation of his approach. Wayne instantly formed his division; and while the right sustained the shock, directed a retreat by the left. He states his loss at one hundred and fifty killed and wounded. It probably amounted to at least three hundred. The British admit, on their part, a loss of only seven.

When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march to join Wayne, was within less than a mile of him; and, had he commanded regulars, might have given a different turn to the night; but his militia thought only of their own safety.

Some severe animadversions on this affair having been made in the army, General Wayne demanded a court-martial, which was unanimously of opinion “that he had done every thing to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant officer,” and acquitted him with honor.

Having secured his rear by compelling Wayne to take a greater distance, Sir William Howe marched to the Schuylkill, and encamped on the bank of that river from the first land ford up to French creek, along the front of the American army. To secure his right from being turned, General Washington moved higher up the river, and encamped with his left above the British right.

General Howe, relinquishing his purpose of bringing Washington to a battle, determined to pass the Schuylkill and take possession of Philadelphia. The whole army crossed without much opposition on the night of the 22d, and, proceeding on its march, encamped near Swede’s ford.

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia. Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in resisting, and the opinion of Congress, required a battle; but Washington came to the wise determination of avoiding one for the present. His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had not yet joined the army; the continental troops ordered from Peekskill were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General Dickenson, was also expected.

A council of war concurred in his opinion not to march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days of repose on their present ground.

The members of Congress separated on the 18th of September, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on the 27th. The British army entered Philadelphia on the 26th.

CHAPTER 9

A Stubborn Contest in the Middle Colonies (September to December 1777)

Measures to cut off the communication between the British army and fleet.—Battle of Germantown.—Attack on fort Mifflin.—On Red Bank.—The Augusta blown up.—General Washington takes post at White Marsh.—Fort Mifflin evacuated.—Fort Mercer evacuated.—The British open a communication with their fleet.—General Howe marches to Chesnut Hill.—Returns to Philadelphia.—General Washington goes into winter quarters.

Sept. 1777

TO PREVENT the co-operation of the fleet with the British army in Philadelphia, works had been erected on Mud island, a low marshy piece of ground near the junction of the Schuylkill with the Delaware, and at Red Bank, on the opposite Jersey shore, which were defended with heavy artillery. In the deep channel, under cover of these batteries, several ranges of frames, resembling chevaux-de-frise,¹ had been sunk, which were so strong and heavy as to destroy any ship that might strike against them. No attempt to open the channel could be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be obtained.

Other ranges of machines² had been sunk about three miles lower down the river; and some considerable works were in progress at Billingsport, on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to be provided with artillery. These works and machines were farther supported by two floating batteries, several galleys, a number of other armed vessels, and some fire-ships.³

The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance to these works. Cutting off the communication of General Howe with his fleet, they intercepted his supplies by water; while the American vessels in the river above fort Mifflin, the fort on Mud island, opposed obstacles to his foraging in Jersey; and General Washington hoped to render his supplies on the part of Pennsylvania so precarious as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.

These advantages were considerably diminished by the capture of the Delaware frigate.

Lord Cornwallis, the day after entering Philadelphia, commenced three batteries for the purpose of acting against any American ships which might appear before the town. While incomplete, they were attacked by two American frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas.⁴ The largest, the Delaware, being left by the tide, grounded, and was captured. This event was the more interesting, as it not only gave the British general the command of the ferry, and free access to the Jersey shore, but also enabled him to intercept the communication between the forts below and Trenton, from which place the garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.

Sept. 30

The expected reinforcements, except the state regiment and militia from Virginia, being arrived, the American army amounted to eight thousand continental troops and three thousand militia. With this force General Washington determined to approach the enemy, and seize the first opportunity of attacking him. The army took a position on the Skippack road, about sixteen miles from Germantown. The British line of encampment crossed this village near its centre, and Lord Cornwallis, with four regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. Colonel Stirling had been detached with two regiments to take possession of the fort at Billingsport and destroy the works, after which service he was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from Chester to Philadelphia. For the security of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown.

General Washington determined to avail himself of this division of the British force, and to attempt to surprise the camp at Germantown. His plan was to attack both wings in front and rear at the same instant.

The divisions of Sullivan and Wayne, flanked by Conway’s brigade, were to march down the main road, and attack the left wing; while General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, should turn its left flank and attack in the rear. The commander-in-chief accompanied this column.

The divisions of Greene and Stephens, flanked by M’Dougal’s brigade, were to take a circuit by the Limekiln road, and attack the right wing.

The militia of Maryland and Jersey, under Generals Smallwood and Forman, were to march down the old York road, and, turning its right, to fall on its rear.

The division of Lord Sterling, and the brigades of Nash and Maxwell, formed the reserve.

Parties of cavalry were silently to scour the roads, and to keep up the communication between the heads of the several columns.

Oct. 4

The army moved from its ground about seven in the afternoon, and before sunrise the next morning, the advance of the column led by Sullivan drove in a piquet. The main body followed close in the rear, and engaging the light infantry and the fortieth regiment, forced them to give way. Though closely pursued, Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, with five companies, threw himself into a large stone house belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood directly in the way of Wayne’s division, and poured on the Americans an incessant and galling fire⁵ from the doors and windows.

After some unsuccessful and bloody attempts to carry the house by storm, and battering it with field artillery, which was too light to make any impression on its walls, a regiment was left to observe the party within it, and Wayne moved forward, passing to the left of the house.

In rather more than half an hour after Sullivan had been engaged, the left wing came also into action, and drove the light infantry posted in front of the British right from its ground. While pursuing the flying enemy, Woodford’s brigade, which was on the right of this wing, was arrested by a heavy fire from Chew’s house, directed against its right flank. The brigade was drawn off to the left by its commanding officer, and the field-pieces attached to it were ordered to play on the house, but were too light to be of service. The advance of that brigade being thus retarded, this part of the line was broken, and the two brigades composing the division of Stephens were not only separated from each other, but from the other division which was led by General Greene in person. That division, consisting of the brigades of Muhlenberg and Scott, encountered and broke a part of the British right wing, entered the village, and made a considerable number of prisoners.

Thus far the prospect was flattering. Had the American troops possessed the advantages given by experience, there is yet reason to believe that the hopes inspired by this favorable commencement would not have been disappointed. But the face of the country, and the darkness of the morning produced by a fog of uncommon density, co-operating with the defective discipline of the army, and the derangements of the corps by the incidents at Chew’s house, blasted these flattering appearances.

The grounds over which the British were pursued abounded in small and strong inclosures, which frequently broke the line of the pursuer’s army. The two divisions composing the right wing had been separated at Chew’s house, and immediately after their passing it, the right of the left wing was stopped at the same place, so as to cause a division of that wing also. The darkness of the morning rendered it difficult to distinguish objects; and it was impossible for the commander-in-chief to learn the situation of the whole, or to correct the confusion which was commencing. The same cause which obstructed the re-union of the broken parts of the American army, also prevented their discerning the real situation of the enemy, so as to improve the first impression.

The attacks on the flanks and rear which formed a part of the original plan, do not appear to have been made.

These embarrassments gave the British time to recover from the consternation into which they had been thrown. General Knyphausen, who commanded their left, detached two brigades to meet the right of Sullivan, which had penetrated far into the village, before his left, which had been detained at Chew’s house, could rejoin him; and the action became warm in that quarter. The British right also recovered from its surprise, and advanced on that part of Greene’s division which had entered the town. After a sharp engagement these two brigades began to retreat, and those who were most in advance were surrounded and compelled to surrender. About the same time the right wing also began to retreat. It is understood that their ammunition was expended.

Every effort to stop this retrograde movement proved ineffectual. The division of Wayne fell back on that of Stephens, and was for some time mistaken for the enemy. General confusion prevailed, and the confidence felt in the beginning of the action was lost. With infinite chagrin General Washington found himself compelled to relinquish all hope of victory, and to turn his attention to the safety of his army. The enemy not being sufficiently recovered to endanger his rear, the retreat was made without loss under cover of the division of Stephens.

In this battle about two hundred Americans were killed, near three times that number wounded, and about four hundred made prisoners. Among the killed was General Nash, of North Carolina; and among the prisoners was Colonel Matthews of Virginia, whose regiment had penetrated into the centre of the town. The loss of the British, as stated in the official return, did not exceed five hundred, of whom less than one hundred were killed. Among the latter, were General Agnew and Colonel Bird.

The American army retreated about twenty miles to Perkiomen creek, where a small reinforcement, consisting of about fifteen hundred militia, and a state regiment, was received from Virginia; after which it again advanced towards Philadelphia, and reoccupied the ground from which it had marched to fight the battle of Germantown.

The attention of both armies was now principally directed to the forts below Philadelphia.

A garrison of continental troops was placed in the fort at Red Bank, called fort Mercer, which commanded the channel between the Jersey shore and Mud island, and afforded protection to the American flotilla. The militia of Jersey were relied upon to reinforce this garrison; and also to form a corps of observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing⁶ the place.

Oct. 1777

General Howe was indefatigable in his preparations to attack fort Mifflin from the Pennsylvania shore. He erected batteries at the mouth of the Schuylkill, which were silenced by Commodore Hazlewood; but a detachment crossed over Webb’s ferry into Province Island in the following night, and constructed a slight work opposite fort Mifflin, from which they were able to throw shot and shells into the barracks. This was attacked at daylight by three galleys and a floating battery, and the garrison surrendered. While the boats were bringing off the prisoners, a large body of British troops reoccupied the fortress. The attack was renewed by the flotilla, without success; and two attempts made by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to storm it, entirely failed. In a few nights, works were completed on the high ground of Province Island, which enfiladed⁷ the principal battery of fort Mifflin.

The aids expected from the Jersey militia not being received, Colonel Angel of Rhode Island, with his regiment, was ordered to Red Bank; and Lieutenant-Colonel John Goune of Virginia, with about two hundred men, to fort Mifflin.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, Admiral Howe⁸ sailed for the Delaware; but his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October. The ships of war and transports which followed, came up from the 6th to the 8th, and anchored from New Castle to Reedy Island. It was not till the middle of the month, that the frigates in advance of the fleet could make a narrow and intricate passage through the lower impediments sunk in the river. In the meantime the fire from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected from it; and General Howe perceived that greater exertions would be necessary for the reduction of the works than could be safely made in the present relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, he withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia, as preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on forts Mercer and Mifflin.

After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by the ships of war. Several rows of chevaux-de-frise had been sunk about half a mile below Mud island, which were protected by the guns of the forts, as well as by the moveable water force. To silence these works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of the obstructions in the channel.

On the 21st of October, Colonel Count Donop, at the head of twelve hundred Hessians, crossed the Delaware at Philadelphia, with orders to storm the works at Red Bank. Late in the evening of the 22d, he appeared before the fort, and attacked it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal resolution. The outer works, being too extensive to be manned by the garrison, were used only to gall the assailants while advancing. On their near approach, the Americans retired within the inner entrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy and destructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound; and Lieutenant-Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the same time. Lieutenant-Colonel Minsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his troops, and returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the assailants was estimated at four hundred men. That of the Americans amounted to only thirty-two in killed and wounded.

The ships having been ordered to co-operate with Count Donop, the Augusta and four smaller vessels passed the lower line of chevaux-de-frise opposite Billingsport, and lay above it, waiting for the assault. The flood tide setting in as the attack commenced, they moved with it up the river. The obstructions sunk in the Delaware, having in some degree changed its channel, the Augusta and the Merlin grounded a considerable distance below the second line of chevaux-de-frise; and a strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide, that they could not be floated by the flood. The next morning, their situation was discovered, and four fire-ships were sent to destroy them, but without effect. Meanwhile, a warm cannonade was kept up on both sides, in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found impracticable to extinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out, the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire; after which the Augusta blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.

Congress expressed its high sense of the merits of Colonel Greene, of Rhode Island, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, who had commanded in the forts; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who had commanded the galleys, and presented a sword to each of those officers.

This repulse inspired sanguine hopes that the posts on the Delaware might be defended so long as to induce the evacuation of Philadelphia. But their condition did not justify this confidence.

Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of Jersey to the Delaware, General Washington determined to strengthen the garrisons by further drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were detached to be divided between them, and General Varnum’s brigade was ordered to take a position near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of both forts. The hope was entertained, that the appearance of a respectable continental force might encourage the militia to assemble in greater numbers.

In this state of things, intelligence was received of the successful termination of the northern campaign;⁹ in consequence of which, great part of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne might be drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. Colonel Hamilton¹⁰ was dispatched to General Gates, to make the proper representations to that officer, and to urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance, to send immediately the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army of the middle department.

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable part of the northern army had joined that officer; but that Gates had detained four brigades at Albany, for an expedition intended to be carried on in the winter against Ticonderoga.

Having made arrangements with Putnam for the immediate march of a large body of continental troops, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany, for the purpose of remonstrating with General Gates against retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country. Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He would not be persuaded that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed to reinforce General Howe; and insisted, that by a sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in the power of the enemy, should Albany be left defenceless, to destroy the valuable arsenal at that place, and the military stores captured with Burgoyne.

After obtaining, by repeated remonstrances, an order directing three brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam, and found the troops which had been ordered to join General Washington, still at Peekskill. The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility of taking that place; and he does not appear to have made any great exertions to divest himself of a force which might enable him to accomplish an object that would give so much splendor to his military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion had insinuated itself among the soldiers that their share of service for the campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go into winter quarters. Great discontent, too, prevailed concerning their pay, which the government had permitted to be more than six months in arrear; and, in Poor’s brigade, a mutiny broke out, in the course of which a soldier, who was run through the body by his captain, shot the officer dead before he expired. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money of the Governor of New York, to put the troops in motion; and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. But delays retarded their arrival until the contest for the forts on that river was terminated.

The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large battery on Province Island, of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders, and two howitzers of eight inches each,¹¹ opened early in the morning of the 10th of November, upon fort Mifflin, at the distance of five hundred yards, and kept up an incessant fire for several days. The block-houses were reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down;¹² most of the guns disabled, and the barracks battered in every part so that the troops could not remain in them. They were under the necessity of working and watching through the night; and, if in the day a few moments were allowed for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which incessant rains had rendered a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by General Varnum every forty-eight hours; but his brigade was so weak that half the men were constantly on duty.

In the hope that the place might be maintained till reinforcements should arrive from the northern army, General Washington ordered that it should be defended to the last extremity; and never were orders better executed.

Several of the garrison were killed, and among them Captain Treat, a gallant officer who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a contusion on his hip and arm, which compelled him to give up the command, and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished merit, who served as engineer, reported that the place was still defensible, but the garrison was so worn down with fatigue, and so unequal to the extent of the lines, that he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry them by storm. The command was taken first by Colonel Russell, and afterwards by Major Thayer; and the artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a floating battery which opened on the morning of the 14th was silenced in the course of the day.

Nov. 15

The defence being unexpectedly obstinate, the besiegers brought up their ships as far as the obstructions in the river permitted, and added their fire to that of the batteries. The brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant, and a sloop-of-war,¹³ were brought up the middle channel, between Mud and Province islands, which had, unperceived by the besieged, been deepened by the current, in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel; and taking a station within one hundred yards of the works, not only kept up a destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them; while the musketeers from the round-top¹⁴ of the Vigilant, killed every man that appeared on the platform.

Major Thayer applied to the Commodore¹⁵ to remove these vessels; and six galleys were ordered on the service; but they returned without attempting any thing. Their report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province Island, as to be unassailable.

It was apparent that the fort could be no longer defended; and on the night of the 16th, the garrison was withdrawn; soon afterwards a detachment from Province Island occupied the ground that had been abandoned.

The day after receiving intelligence of the evacuation of fort Mifflin, the commander-in-chief deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox, to confer with General Varnum, and the officers at fort Mercer, on the practicability of continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel. Their report was favorable; but a council of naval officers had already been called by the commodore, in pursuance of a request made by the commander-in-chief, previous to the evacuation, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station, or to assist in preventing the chevaux-de-frise from being weighed by the ships of the enemy.

General Howe had now completed a line of defence from the Schuylkill to the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived in the river at Chester. These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in Jersey for the reduction of fort Mercer, without weakening himself so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. He detached Lord Cornwallis in the morning of the 17th, with a strong body of troops, who formed a junction with the reinforcement from New York, at Billingsport.

General Washington communicated the movement of Lord Cornwallis to General Varnum, with orders to defend fort Mercer to the last extremity; and, with a view to military operations in that quarter, ordered one division of the army to cross the river at Burlington, and despatched expresses to the troops who were marching from the north by brigades, directing them to move down the Delaware, on the northern side. Major-General Greene was selected for this service. But before Greene could cross the Delaware, Lord Cornwallis approached fort Mercer, and the place was evacuated.

Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory would restore the Jersey shore, and his instructions to General Greene indicated the expectation that he would be in a condition to fight Lord Cornwallis.

That judicious officer feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by fighting on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British, unexpectedly augmented by the reinforcement from New York, exceeded his, even counting his militia as regulars; and he determined to wait for Glover’s brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival Lord Cornwallis took post on Gloucester Point, entirely under cover of the guns of the ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions he had collected, for Philadelphia.

Believing that Lord Cornwallis would immediately follow his magazines, and that the purpose of Sir William Howe was to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered General Greene to re-cross the Delaware and to join him.

Thus, after one continued and arduous struggle of more than six weeks, the British army secured itself in the possession of Philadelphia, by opening a free communication with the fleet.

The opinion that Sir William Howe meditated an attack on the American camp, was confirmed by unquestionable intelligence from Philadelphia. On the 4th of December, Captain M’Lane, a vigilant officer on the lines, discovered that this design was to be immediately carried into execution, and communicated his discovery to the commander-in-chief. On the evening of the same day, General Howe marched out of Philadelphia with his whole force; and, about eleven at night, M’Lane, who had been detached with one hundred chosen men, attacked his van with some success at Three-Mile run, on the Germantown road. He hovered on the front and flank of the advancing army until three next morning, when the British encamped on Chesnut Hill, in front of the American right, and distant from it about three miles. The Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, had also engaged the advanced light parties of the enemy. The general was wounded, and the militia dispersed.

The range of hills on which the British were encamped, approached nearer to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward.

Having passed the day in reconnoitring the right, Sir William Howe changed his ground in the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right, took an advantageous position in front of the American left. The next day he inclined still farther to his right, and approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing a general engagement to be approaching, Washington detached Gist, with some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to attack the flanking and advanced parties. A sharp action ensued, in which Major Morris, of Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan’s regiment, was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties attacked were driven in; but the enemy reinforcing in numbers, and Washington, unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground which was the scene of this skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat.

Sir William Howe continued to manoeuvre towards the flank and in front of the left wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter, Washington made such change in the disposition of his troops as the occasion required; and the day was consumed in these movements. In the course of it, the American chief rode through every brigade of his army, delivering his orders in person, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the bayonet, in the use of which weapon their higher ground would give them the advantage, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words. The dispositions of the evening indicated an intention to attack him next morning; but, in the afternoon, the British suddenly filed off from their right, and retreated to Philadelphia.

The loss of the British in this expedition rather exceeded one hundred men. It was sustained chiefly in the skirmish of the 7th, in which Major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met uncovered by works, with equal numbers. The effective force of Sir William Howe has been since stated by Mr. Stedman,¹⁶ who then belonged to his army, to have amounted to fourteen thousand. The American army consisted of precisely twelve thousand one hundred and sixty-one regular troops, and three thousand two hundred and forty-one militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies occupied heights fronting each other, neither could attack without giving its adversary some advantage in the ground; an advantage which neither seemed willing to relinquish.

The return of Sir William Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action, after marching out with the avowed intention of fighting, is the best testimony of the respect he felt for his adversary.

The cold was now becoming too intense for an army, neither well clothed, nor sufficiently supplied with blankets, longer to keep the field. It had become necessary to place the troops in winter quarters; and the selection of a position had been a subject of serious reflection. They could not be placed in villages without uncovering the country, or exposing them to the hazard of being beaten in detail.

To avoid these calamities, it was determined to take a strong position in the neighborhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from the Delaware above and below that city; and there to construct huts in the form of a regular encampment. A strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the Schuylkill, between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was selected for that purpose; and before day, on the morning of the 11th of December, the army marched to take possession of it. Lord Cornwallis had been detached on the morning of the same day to forage on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had dispersed a brigade of Pennsylvania militia under General Potter, and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights opposite Matson’s ford, and had posted troops to command the defile called the Gulf, just as the van of the American army reached the bank of the river. These positions had been taken without any knowledge of the approach of the American army, for the sole purpose of covering the foraging party.

Apprehending that General Howe had taken the field with his whole army, Washington moved rather higher up the river for the purpose of discovering the real situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia; and, in the course of the night, the American army crossed the river.

Here the commander-in-chief communicated to his army the arrangements intended for the winter. He expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct, exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships inseparable from their situation, and assured them that those hardships were not imposed by caprice, but were necessary for the good of their country.

The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of the army were extreme. They were, however, soon diminished by the erection of logged huts, which formed comfortable habitations, and satisfied men long unused to the conveniences of life.