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At the height of the man-power problem that was so cruelly felt in the last weeks of the War our own effectives in particular had been put to a terrible strain after the Chemin des Dames, where we lost 160,000 men. Especially as Foch, finally giving up the idea of awaiting the German attack in Flanders, had determined to embark on a policy of harrying the enemy. Our losses were infinitely more serious than those of the English, who still had enormous reserves on home soil, and who, when the time came for making use of them, had found it simpler to decrease their establishment at the very moment it was essential to augment it at any cost.

The President of the Republic was waiting till the situation was “desperate” to make a supreme effort. In the confusion of a reverse that had just cost them 200,000 men^[1] the English had unexpectedly and startlingly determined to suppress nine divisions (which they were in a position to reconstruct), and refused to alter a decision for which there was no justification. But I could not resign myself to anything that might compromise the issue of those terrible days. Already I had brought Mr Lloyd George, and even Sir Douglas Haig, to agree to an extension of the English front—which they had violently refused under the previous Ministries. The question was taken up shortly before my arrival at the Ministry, at the end of 1917, when it was discovered that the English were not occupying the whole extent of front allotted to them.

To be perfectly frank, I must acknowledge that, with regard to the suppressed English divisions, I did not confine myself to leaving their fate to Foch’s protests, which seemed to me lacking in vigour. Since I was refused the American contingents to fill up the lacuna in the British divisions, I determined to address myself direct to the British themselves, whom I imagined to be in possession of greater resources in effectives than they really had.

From a private letter, from a French officer of high rank, I take the following passages, which recall the details of what followed:

During the course of 1917, taking our stand on mathematical computations with regard to the extent of front occupied, the respective numbers of the French and English divisions, the density of the Germans in front of each sector, the losses sustained since the beginning of the War, the resources still available in France and in England, etc., we requested the English to extend their front to Berry-au-Bac. This evoked vehement opposition from Field-Marshal Haig, who threatened to resign if he was forced to extend his front a single inch. (At the moment it stretched down south to before Saint-Quentin.) In this way, always arguing and making no headway, we came to the Boulogne Conference (September 24 and 25, 1917), in which Mr Lloyd George, M. Painlevé, General Foch, and General Robertson took part. The question of the extension of the British front was discussed at Boulogne, and Mr Lloyd George accepted it in principle. (You may suppose that delays were not ruled out.) A fresh violent crisis with Haig, who renewed his threats of resignation. We went on arguing without result. It must be said that the War Office and the English General Headquarters were completely of the same adverse opinion on the question, and that we found the same unfavourable reception with General Robertson as we had with Haig. And, to sum up, we argued and argued and never got anywhere.

After your coming to power (November 17) things went more briskly, and on our side there was a firmer tone and more vigorous speaking. Your ideas on the subject were known in England and at the English G.H.Q., for already, before your coming to power, they had been put before the English public by Repington, after the visit he had paid you in the Rue Franklin on October 6, 1917.

The English, perceiving that this time they would have to submit, then proposed to have the zone that was held by the Third French Army (from Saint-Quentin to Barisis, facing the Saint-Gobain massif) taken over by the First American Army. General Pershing refused.

Furthermore the English informed us that in no circumstances would they extend as far as Berry-au-Bac, and we had a very distinct impression that if we continued to insist on Berry-au-Bac we should obtain nothing at all. We were obliged therefore to concentrate our efforts simply on the relief of the Third French Army.

In the end those efforts were crowned with success, thanks to a certain pressure brought to bear on Field-Marshal Haig from London and undoubtedly due to the clear, precise, and energetic fashion in which you expressed yourself to Mr Lloyd George on this subject. Much against the grain Field-Marshal Haig brought himself to accept the extension of English front from Saint-Quentin to Barisis, south of the Oise, and the First English Army (under Gough) relieved the Third French Army (under Humbert) between the 10th and the 20th of January. After this relief the front was divided up in the following fashion:

1.

Thirty-five kilometres held by the Belgians with twelve divisions.

2.

Two hundred kilometres held by the English with sixty-one divisions (in the line and in reserve, including two Portuguese divisions).

3.

Five hundred and thirty kilometres held by the French with ninety-nine divisions (in the line and in reserve).

At the end of March the defeat of the British Army cost 200,000 men. This was little calculated to ameliorate a difficult position with regard to man-power. Nine, or ten, divisions (authorities differ) were suppressed.

Mr Lloyd George, that complex personality whose Welsh astuteness could by turns assume the most varied aspects, has not always shown himself the intractable man of legend. He knows that there are times for being reasonable, and when the moment appears to him to have come he does not always refuse to compromise. I have every right to say this, for never have two men in critical debates looked more like going down one another’s throats.

A PAGE OF THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT

In the affair of the extension of the English front Mr Lloyd George, who had a powerful opponent to deal with in Sir Douglas Haig, perfectly understood the effort called for by the position. He is a man who thrives on fighting. That is what encouraged me to approach him direct, so as to move him to get Haig to re-establish the nine divisions that had been suppressed. So I tried quite simply to convince him, as I would have done with anyone else, and it must be supposed that I did not go about it too stupidly, since my attempt was successful.

To effect my object I addressed the following letter to the English Prime Minister:

The Prime Minister

Minister of War

May 16, 1918

Re Dispatch of English Reinforcements

to France

To Mr Lloyd George