Читать книгу A Brief Modern Chinese History - Haipeng Zhang - Страница 8

In addition to seriously damaging China’s sovereignty, the unequal treaties signed during the Opium War brought about deep changes in the country’s social economy. Drastic changes were obvious even in the everyday life of the Chinese. First, the five treaty ports, Guangzhou (Canton), Xiamen (Amoy), Fuzhou, Shanghai and Ningbo were located on the southeast coast of China. These ports witnessed great economic prosperity. Of these, Shanghai experienced some of the most dramatic changes. Shanghai was geographically larger than Fuzhou and Ningbo, both of which had slower economic growth. Xiamen was renowned for its trade with Taiwan and the countries in Southeast Asia; however, it was not an ideal commercial hub in the eyes of Western traders. Shanghai was the most popular because it was known for its convenience and also for its proximity to the provinces that sold the best silk and tea. From the mid-1850s, Shanghai accounted for over half of China’s international trade. For these reasons, the Western powers turned their attention to Shanghai in the wake of the Opium War. As a consequence, Guangzhou, which had been China’s center of foreign trade for quite a long time, was replaced by Shanghai.

The British Consul in Shanghai seized a piece of land and turned it into a quarter for the British, marking the beginning of the concession of Chinese land. Soon, France and the United States forced Qing’s government in Shanghai to sign a land lease agreement. Not long afterward, leased territory could be found in all treaty ports. At first, the Chinese government was given the right to intervene in the administrative and legal affairs on the leased land. However, the Western powers later excluded the Chinese authorities and made the land administratively and legally independent of China. The treaty ports on these lands then served as the bases for foreign powers to invade China. Within these territories, foreign companies allowed international trade as well as opium smugglers and human traffickers. Frederick Engels commented in an editorial for an American newspaper that the colonizers retained “not a little of the old plundering buccaneering spirit which distinguished our common ancestors of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.”25 Even the British Consul in Shanghai acknowledged that some foreigners in the colonized territories were “offscum of the European nations.”26

The Anglo-American capitalists were overjoyed that five ports had been created in the colonized territories after the war. The commander of the British forces complacently said he had opened a new world to British traders. He bragged to businessmen about how large the Chinese market was and how the entire production of all of Lancashire’s textile mills could not meet a single Chinese province’s demand. Some businessmen even dreamed that if one Chinese purchased one nightcap a year all of the manufacturers in the whole of England must produce at full throttle. Thus, the British traders shipped a huge amount of cotton textiles and manufactured goods, including tableware such as knives and forks that was rarely used by the Chinese.

Soon China was overflowing with British goods, which were overstocked in China, and, in 1846, the import of English goods began to decrease. Additionally, the low price of British textiles dealt a fatal blow to the traditional Chinese handicraft market. An increasing number of wealthy Chinese preferred to purchase foreign (machine-woven) cloth. In 1855, the total value of goods imported from Britain began to increase again while the traditional household textiles produced on the southeast coast of China began to decline sharply. Consequently, traditional Chinese handwoven cloth from these regions gradually began to disappear.

Opium smuggling was still being used by Western powers to economically exploit China. Of all the Anglo-American merchants seeking money in China, most were engaged in drug smuggling. Due to its failure in the First Opium War, the Qing government chose to remain silent about the opium smuggling. The Anglo-American drug traffickers, disguised as traders, took advantage of the situation. The smugglers expanded their operations northward from Guangzhou to Fengtian (present-day Liaoning). The amount of opium smuggled into China significantly increased each year. In 1843, it was approximately 43,000 chests; in 1855, more than 78,000 chests.27 In terms of market value, it was an increase from 10,000,000 silver dollars to 30,000,000. Qing’s problem of outflow of silver thus seriously worsened. China’s monetary system was inevitably affected. In 1838, one tael of silver was worth 1,600 coppers; four years later, 1,700; and, in 1849, 2,350. This posed a serious threat to China’s state finances and the everyday life of the Chinese.

During this time, the Chinese people tried their best to resist the colonialists. After the war, they grew increasingly patriotic. Xueshe (literally, study societies) played quite a significant role in mobilizing local residents to resist the British invaders. In March, 1847, the British launched a surprise attack on Hu’men, attempting to take the city of Guangzhou. Xueshe sent all able-bodied men to fight against them, forcing the British to retreat. Two years later, the (third) Governor of Hong Kong led some British troops in an attempt to enter into Guangzhou. Xueshe mobilized 100,000 residents to lie in wait for the enemy and forced the British back to Hong Kong.

The existing contradictions between social classes, and between bureaucrats and the people, in particular, were exacerbated by Qing’s failure in the Opium War. China’s last feudal dynasty was failing and even honest officials were unable to restore Qing’s government, to say nothing of the corrupt ones. To make matters worse, many officials in local governments intensified their ruthless exploitation of the common people and plunged poor peasants into despair. Consequently, the relationship between the government and the people deteriorated. In 1843, Qiying, one of the highest Qing governors, said, in one of his memoranda, that the government and the people might as well as have been enemies.28 By the 1850s, one of the best-known secret anti-Qing societies, Tian DiHui accused Qing officials of being more vicious and more ferocious than robbers and beasts, and promised to rescue the woe-struck people by eliminating all of the evil bureaucrats.29

Rebellions against Qing became increasingly fierce. In the south, China’s major rice-producing area, many refused to pay rent or grain levies. Such was the case in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, both of which were renowned for their high production of rice and served as one of the main sources of Qing’s revenue. Tenant farmers frequently stood up to oppose the high rents and levies. Struggles against the payment of levies particularly attracted those from the middle and lower echelons of rural society. A small number of landowners and educated men also played a significant role in organizing struggles. For example, in 1842, a wealthy man renowned for his philanthropic acts, led an anti-levy campaign in Hubei which developed into a rebellion against Qing. Two years later, another struggle against exorbitant grain levies emerged in Jiayi (in Taiwan) and Leiyang (in Hunan). Soon afterward, similar campaigns and struggles took place in Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Jiangxi.

The Qing government’s tough measures to crack down on the anti-rent/levy campaigns resulted in more armed rebellions. Some secret societies such as Tiandihui, or the Society of Heaven and Earth, became active in the south. Tiandihui’s counterpart in the north was Bailianjiao (the White Lotus Society), which had been almost entirely destroyed after the huge rebellions it instigated in several provinces. Tiandihui, however, continued to grow and became the largest and most powerful secret society in China. It aspired to restore the fallen Ming dynasty (1368–1644) and bring justice for the poor. In the first decade after the Opium War, Tiandihui reached into the provinces in the far south. According to some statistics, there were ten or so armed rebellions led by Tiandihui each year in the early Jiaqing reign (1796–1820). Late in the Daoguang reign (1820–1850) there were up to one hundred a year. Many of these rebellions were staged in the neighboring provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi and Hunan. The Qing government had no alternative but to invest much energy in repression. The result was a further decline in the economy and China gradually sank into a state of semi-colonialism and feudalism. It was against this backdrop of a desperate China that the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864) broke out.

1 Yang Xifu’s 杨锡绂1748 memorial to the throne—“Chou min shi shu 筹民食疏” (How to multiply the sources of food for the people), in the 45th part of Huangqing zouyi 皇清奏议 (A collection of memorials to the thrones of Great Qing).

2 Qian Weicheng 钱维城, “Yangmin lun 养民论” (How to more substantially benefit the people), in the 11th part of Huangchao jingshi wenbian 皇朝经世文编 (The Great Qing’s treatises regarding the betterment of statecraft).

3 For a more detailed discussion, see: Dai Yi 戴 逸, Qianlong di jiqi shidai 乾 隆 帝 及其 时 代 [The Emperor Qianlong and his time] (Beijing: People’s University Press, 1992), pp. 412–413.

4 Xiao Zhizhi 萧致治, Yapian zhanzheng shi 鸦片战争史 [History of the Opium War] (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Publishing House, 1996), vol. 1, p. 131.

5 Yan Zhongping 严中平, Xu Yisheng 徐义生, Yao Xianhao 姚贤镐, Sun Yutang 孙毓棠, Wang Jingyu 汪敬虞, Nie Baozhang 聂宝璋, Li Wenzhi 李文治, Zhang Youyi 章有义, and Luo Ergang 罗尔纲, eds., Zhongguo jindai jingjishi tongji ziliao xuanji 中国近代经济史统计资料选辑 [Selected statistics in regard to the history of modern Chinese economy] (Beijing: Science Press, 1955), p. 13.

6 Yan Zhongping 严中平, et al., eds., Zhongguo jindai jingjishi 中国近代经济史 [History of modern Chinese economy, 1840–1894] (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990), vol. 1, p. 18.

7 Institute of History (CASS), vol. 1 of Zhongguo jindaishi gao 中国近代史稿 [A draft history of modern China], in vol. 5 of Zhang Haipeng 张 海 鹏, et al., eds., Liu Danian quanji 刘 大 年 全 集 [Complete works of Liu Danian] (Wuhan: Hubei People’s Publishing House, 2016), p. 16.

8 (1)Karl Marx, “Free Trade and Monopoly,” New York Daily Tribune, September 25, 1858. Source: Marxists Internet Archive. Accessed at: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1858/09/25.htm.

9 For Lu Kun’s 卢 坤 memorandum, see: The First Historical Archives of China, Yapian zhan-zheng dang’an shiliao 鸦片战争档案史料 [Archives in regard to the Opium War] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987), vol. 1, p. 166.

10 For Xu Naiji’s 许乃济 memorandum, see: ibid., p. 202, p. 203.

11 See: vol. 1 of Yapian zhanzheng dang’an shiliao, p. 206.

12 See: vol. 1 of Xiao Zhizhi, Yapian zhanzheng shi, pp. 174–178.

13 For Huang Juezi’s 黄 爵 滋 memorandum to the throne, see: vol. 1 of Yapian zhanzheng dang’an shiliao, pp. 256–257.

14 Mao Haijian 茅海建, Tianchao de bengkui—Yapian zhanzheng zai yanjiu 天朝的崩溃—鸦片战争再研究 [The collapse of Celestial Dynasty: Reinvestigating the Opium War] (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 90–91.

15 For Lin Zexu’s 林则徐 (1785–1850) memorandum to the throne, see: vol. 1 of Yapian zhan-zheng dang’an shiliao, p. 361.

16 Lin Zexu, Lin Zexu quanji 林则徐全集 [Complete works of Lin Zexu] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 1959), p. 59.

17 Fan Wenlan 范文澜, Zhongguo jindaishi 中国近代史 [The history of modern China] (Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1949; reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House, 1989), vol. 1, p. 19.

18 Lin Zexu’s letter to Yao Chunmu 姚春木 and Wang Dongshou 王冬寿, in Dao Xian Tong Guang mingren shouzha 道咸同光名人手札 [A collection of personal letters of renowned people in the reigns of Daoguang, Xianfeng, Tongzhi and Guangxu (1821–1908)] (Taibei [Taipei]: Wen Hai Press Company, 1966), p. 14.

19 Liang Qichao 梁启超, Zhongguo jin sanbainian xueshushi 中国近三百年学术史 [Chinese scholarship: A tricentennial history] (Wuhan: Chongwen Publishing Company, 2015), p. 273.

20 Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794–1857), “Yuanxu 原叙” (Author’s preface), in vol. 1 of Haiguo tuzhi 海国图志 [Illustrated treatise on maritime kingdoms] (Changsha: Yuelu Press, 2005), p. 1.

21 Ibid., pp. 1–15.

22 Ibid., pp. 29–31.

23 Ibid., p. 31.

24 Ibid., p. 13, p. 18.

25 Frederick Engels, “A New English Expedition to China”, in vol. 15 of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Collected Works (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1986), p. 243.

26 Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857–1859 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1859), p. 56.

27 Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (New York, NY: Paragon Book Gallery, 1910), vol. 1, p. 556.

28 The Association of Chinese Historians and Qi Sihe 齐 思 和, eds., Yapian zhanzheng 鸦 片 战 争 [Collected primary sources: The Opium War] (Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguangshe, 1954), vol. 3, pp. 469–470.

29 Yang Song 杨松, Deng Liqun 邓力群 and Rong Mengyuan 荣孟源, eds., Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao xuanji 中国近代史资料选辑 [Selected primary sources about the modern Chinese history] (Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 115–116.