Читать книгу The Battle of Waterloo - John Codman Ropes - Страница 9

Table of Contents

The army which was commanded by Field Marshal Blücher numbered about 124,000 men, and was thus composed:—47

Ist Corps: Zieten.
Four divisions of infantry,—
Steinmetz,—Pirch II.,—Jagow—Henckel	27,887		Men
One division of cavalry,—Röder	1,925		„
Artillery,—96 guns,—engineers, &c.	2,880		„
Total		32,692	„
IId Corps: Pirch I.
Four divisions of infantry,—
Tippelskirchen,—Krafft,—Brause,—Langen	25,836		„
One division of cavalry,—Jürgass	4,468		„
Artillery,—80 guns,—engineers, &c.	2,400		„
Total		32,704	„
IIId Corps: Thielemann.
Four divisions of infantry,—
Borcke,—Kämpfen,—Luck,—Stülpnagel	20,611		„
One division of cavalry,—Marwitz	2,405		„
Artillery,—48 guns,—engineers, &c.	1,440		„
Total		24,456	„
IVth Corps: Bülow.
Four divisions of infantry,— Hacke,—Ryssel,—Losthin,—Hiller	25,381		„
One division of cavalry,—
Prince William of Prussia	3,081		„
Artillery,—88 guns,—engineers, &c.	2,640		„
Total		31,102	„
Workmen, waggoners, &c., about		3,120	„
Grand Total		124,074	„
Leaving out the last item, we have an army consisting of 120,954 men.	Of these,
the infantry numbered		99,715	Men
„ cavalry „		11,879	„
„ artillery, 312 guns, numbered		9,360	„
Total as above		120,954	„

The headquarters of Zieten’s Corps were at Charleroi, of Pirch I. at Namur, of Thielemann at Ciney, and of Bülow at Liége. The first three of these places were near the frontier.

The Prussian army was mainly composed of veterans; even of the youngest soldiers most had seen service in 1813 or 1814. The corps-commanders were experienced officers, though only one of them, Bülow, had ever had an independent command. Bülow had in 1813 won the battle of Dennewitz against Marshal Ney. The troops were certainly not so inured to war as were those of Napoleon’s army, nor were they so well led; but they knew their trade, and were prepared for battle. Blücher himself was a veteran of the Seven Years’ War. He had seen more than fifty years of service. In the campaigns of 1806 and 1807 he had displayed conspicuous zeal and courage. In those of 1813 and 1814, although too old and infirm to assume all the tasks which ordinarily devolve on an army-commander, he had yet, with the assistance of his chief-of-staff, markedly increased his reputation. Nevertheless no one considered him a general of a high order of talent. His conceptions of strategy were crude and imperfect, and his blunders caused his command to be more than once badly defeated by Napoleon in the winter campaign in France in 1814. But Blücher was a thorough soldier, active, daring and resolute, and never was afraid of taking responsibility. He was moreover a great favorite with the army. He was animated by an almost insane hatred of Napoleon, and he entered on the work assigned to him by the allied powers with an eager determination that bordered upon ferocity. This spirit of his infused itself into the army;48 every man was ready to fight, and every man expected to beat in the end. His chief-of-staff, Gneisenau, was an able administrator, and relieved the old field-marshal from all attention to details.

The army commanded by the Duke of Wellington was a very heterogeneous body of troops. Although nominally divided into corps, after the fashion of the armies of the continent, this arrangement, being one which had never been adopted by the Duke before, was only imperfectly49 practised in the campaign of 1815. We shall get a better idea of the strength of Wellington’s forces if we enumerate them according to their different nationalities. Leaving out the troops employed on garrison duty at Antwerp, Ostend, Ghent and other places, estimated at 12,233 men,50 we find the forces available for the field to have been thus composed:—

British:
Nine brigades of infantry,—
Maitland (Guards),—Byng (Guards),— Adam,—Mitchell,—Halkett,— Johnstone,—Kempt,—Pack,—Lambert	20,310		Men
Three brigades of cavalry,—
Somerset (Guards),—Ponsonby,—Vandeleur	3,578		„
Six regiments contained in four brigades
Dörnberg,—Grant,—Vivian,—Arentsschildt,— composed of British troops and those of the King’s German Legion	2,335		„
Artillery,—102 guns	5,030		„
Total British force,		31,253	„
King’s German Legion:
Two brigades of infantry,—Duplat,—Ompteda	3,285
Add men on detached service	16
		3,301
Cavalry:
Five regiments contained in the four brigades of Dörnberg, Grant, Vivian and Arentsschildt.	2,560		„
Artillery,—18 guns	526		„
Total King’s German Legion		6,387	„
Hanoverians:
Five brigades of infantry,— Kielmansegge,—Halkett,—Best,—Vincke,—Lyon	13,788
One brigade of cavalry,—Estorff	1,682
Artillery,—12 guns	465
Total Hanoverians		15,935	„
Dutch-Belgians:
Seven brigades of infantry,—
Bylandt,—Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar,51— Ditmers,—d’Aubremé,—Hauw,—Eerens,—Anthing	24,174
Three brigades of cavalry,—
Trip,—Ghigny,—Merlen	3,405
Artillery,—48 guns	1,635
Total Dutch-Belgians		29,214	„
Brunswickers:
Two brigades of infantry,— Buttlar,—Specht	5,376
Two regiments of cavalry,—	922
Artillery,—16 guns	510
Total Brunswickers		6,808	„
Nassau Contingent: Kruse.
One regiment of infantry: three battalions		2,880	„
Engineers, sappers, miners, waggon-trains and staff-corps		1,240	„
Total disposable army in the field		93,717	„
Of these the
Infantry numbered	69,829
Cavalry „	14,482
Artillery „ 196 guns	8,166
Engineers, waggon-trains, &c.	1,240
		93,717	„
Or, according to nationality,
the British numbered	31,253
„ King’s German Legion	6,387
„ Hanoverians „	15,935
„ Dutch-Belgians52 „	29,214
„ Brunswickers	6,808
„ Nassau contingent	2,880
„ Engineers, &c.,	1,240
		93,717	„

This army was organized, as we have said above, into two corps and a reserve, in addition to which was a large body of cavalry, and a small force of reserve artillery. There were six (so-called) British divisions in the army, only one of which, the 1st, Cooke’s, was composed entirely of British troops,—the Guards; the others contained troops of the King’s German Legion and Hanoverians. To each of these divisions were attached two batteries. Six troops of horse-artillery were attached to the cavalry.

The 1st and 3d British divisions, those of Cooke and Alten, with the 2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions of Perponcher and Chassé, composed the 1st Corps under the Prince of Orange. They covered the front of the army from Quatre Bras to and beyond Enghien, occupying the country in and around Nivelles, Roeulx, Soignies and Braine-le-Comte. They numbered 25,233 men, with 48 guns.

The 2d and 4th British divisions, those of Clinton and Colville, with the 1st Dutch-Belgian division of Stedmann, and Anthing’s Indian brigade, constituted the 2d Corps under Lord Hill. They continued the line of the army to the north and west, occupying the country in and around Ath, Grammont and Audenarde. They numbered 24,033 men, with 40 guns.

The Reserve, or rather that portion of it destined for service in the field, and not counting the troops on garrison-duty, was under the immediate direction of the commander-in-chief. It was composed of the 5th and 6th British divisions, those of Picton and Cole, of the Brunswick Corps under the Duke of Brunswick, and of the Nassau contingent under General Kruse. They numbered 20,563 men, with 64 guns.

The British and King’s German Legion cavalry was composed of seven brigades, the whole under Lord Uxbridge. They numbered 8,473 men. To this corps were attached, as has been stated, six horse batteries. This cavalry was stationed mainly in rear of the 2d Corps, near Ninove and Grammont; but one brigade under General Dörnberg was at and in the neighborhood of Mons.

The Hanoverian, Brunswick and Dutch-Belgian cavalry were attached respectively to the various divisions of these troops. They numbered 6,009 men, with one horse-battery of 8 guns.

To recapitulate:—
1st Corps: Prince of Orange	25,233	Men
2d Corps: Lord Hill	24,033	„
Reserve	20,563	„
Lord Uxbridge’s cavalry corps	8,473	„
Other Cavalry	6,009	„
Artillery—196 guns	8,166	„
Engineers, &c.	1,240	„
Total as above given	93,717	„

Of this miscellaneous force the Duke relied really only on his English troops and those of the King’s German Legion, a corps raised originally in Hanover, which had for many years belonged to the English crown. These troops had served in the Peninsula for several years with great credit. The Hanoverian contingent, strictly so called, was composed of very raw troops, and the same was true of the Dutch-Belgians. Little was known about the Brunswickers and Nassauers. The fidelity of many of the allied troops was strongly suspected, as they had been raised in countries which had for the past few years been subject to France, and the sympathies of the soldiers were supposed to be with Napoleon.53 The Duke’s opinion of his army is well known. He considered it the poorest he had ever led.54 Very possibly he may have underestimated its quality; but certain it is that the force which he commanded was a very heterogeneous collection of troops, that they had never acted in the field as an army before, and that the character and steadiness of a considerable number were, on account of either disaffection or inexperience, gravely doubted by their commander.

All this was in all probability known to Napoleon, and served as the basis of his expectations, as we shall see later on.

Of the principal officers of this motley force, it is not necessary to say much. The Prince of Orange, who commanded the 1st Corps, though an officer of experience, had not distinguished himself as a general. Lord Hill, who led the 2d Corps, was a very valuable man, whose merit had been thoroughly ascertained in the Peninsula. Sir Thomas Picton had a well-won reputation as a man of energy, courage, and capacity in all the positions in which he had served. Then there were many junior officers of great merit.

The Duke himself was in the prime of life, having just passed his forty-sixth birthday. He had never met Napoleon before, but he had often met and defeated his Marshals. His career had been one of almost uninterrupted success. His experience in the field against French soldiers had been large, and he was for this reason peculiarly fitted for the work he had now in hand. He had shown very varied ability. His military imagination, if one may use such a word, may not have been large, but he had few equals in the faculty of making up his mind what it was best to do under ascertained circumstances. His decisions were always dictated by practical reasons. He never allowed sentiment to hinder the exercise of his common sense. He could advance or retreat, fight or decline to fight, with equal ease,—with him it was a mere question of what it was best under the circumstances to do. Though esteemed a cautious officer, he had shown over and over again that he possessed not only courage and firmness, but that in daring, and in coolly taking great risks, he was equal to any emergency. His hold on his army, that is, on his own troops, was perfect. In ability, reputation, and in social rank, his preëminence among the officers of the British army and the King’s German Legion was cheerfully acknowledged, and over these parts of his army he exercised a perfect and unquestioned control. And his long experience in dealing with his Spanish allies had given him an uncommon facility in administering the affairs of such a composite body of troops as he was now to command.

These three armies were curiously different in their internal economy. Napoleon, as we have said before, expected from his high officers a sort of coöperation. The “Correspondence of Napoleon” is full of long and confidential letters to his marshals, written during his campaigns, explaining the situation, stating his own intentions at length, giving them not only orders to be executed, but suggestions for their guidance in case of the happening of certain contingencies. We shall see excellent specimens of these letters in the course of this narrative. Napoleon had been for years constantly in the habit of directing complicated movements, in which the active and intelligent comprehension of his main object and purpose on the part of his lieutenants who were operating at a greater or less distance from him, was essential to success. Hence these elaborate communications, in which the style of the military order is but barely preserved, and in which the effort of the writer to impart all the information in his power to his correspondent and to give him an intelligent and precise knowledge of the objects of the campaign, is very evident.

In the English army there was nothing of this sort. Obedience, not coöperation, was what Wellington required, and it was all he needed. Operating as he did on a much smaller scale than Napoleon, his simpler methods were quite adequate to his wants. It is needless to say that such a relation as that which existed between Napoleon and his old companions in arms, who had begun their careers with him in Italy or Egypt, never existed to the least extent in the English service.

The Prussian army was managed differently from either the English or French. Baron Müffling, who was the Prussian attaché at the headquarters of the Duke of Wellington, says:—55

“I perceived that the Duke exercised far greater power in the army he commanded than Prince Blücher in the one committed to his care. The rules of the English service permitted the Duke’s suspending any officer and sending him back to England. * * * Amongst all the generals, from the leaders of corps to the commanders of brigades, not one was to be found in the active army who had been known as refractory.

“It was not the custom in this army to criticise or control the commander-in-chief. Discipline was strictly enforced; every one knew his rights and his duties. The Duke, in matters of service, was very short and decided.”

It is clear that Baron Müffling had seen a very different state of things prevailing in the Prussian service,56 where it would seem that advice was sometimes thrust upon the general-in-chief, and even criticism was not silent. Perhaps the fact that the Prussian army was always organized in corps, and that the chiefs of corps and all the other high officers were men of an equal social rank, rendered it hard to conduct matters according to the far more soldierly ways prevailing in the English service. Whatever may have been the reason, however, such would seem to have been the fact in the early part of this century.