Читать книгу The Crisis of Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One in the Government of the United States - Abel D. Streight - Страница 5

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In the government of nations there are, sometimes, crises of the most momentous importance. They either promote stability or terminate in ruin. The result depends upon the virtue and patriotism of the mass of the people, and the wisdom, prudence and unflinching firmness of their rulers and statesmen.

The United States of America are in the midst of just such a crisis at present, and nothing is more important than correct views with regard to that crisis on the part of the people. To aid in the dissemination of such views, in order to produce unity of action among all classes of the people is the object of this publication, in which we shall ignore mere partisanship and take large and patriotic and comprehensive views of the genius and principles of our government.

One of the gravest questions for the consideration of the people of this nation, and for their enlightened solution, has just arisen, that has ever been presented for an answer since the formation of our republican government. It is this: Has any State in the Union a right, under the present Constitution, peaceably to withdraw itself from that Union, for the purpose of setting up a separate, distinct, and, necessarily, conflicting nationality?

Very important is it that this question should be correctly answered in the present juncture, and that the people should be fully prepared to act understandingly. Vast and immeasurable results depend upon it.

If this vital question could be answered in the affirmative, as some seem to think, then would the federal compact, by which these States are held together, be a mere rope of sand, without strength or tenacity, subject to be ruptured by the slightest discord. Such a solution of the question, if acted upon practically, would carry us back to the old confederation, by the articles of which these States were connected in their associated capacity previous to the adoption of the present constitution. And what was that confederation? Merely a league of States, in which each individual member of that league was at liberty to act in her sovereign capacity, without any binding restrictions. Each individual member of that confederation could levy taxes, raise revenue, make alliances, declare war, make peace, and do whatever else she chose without consultation with the rest of the members, and without being held amenable for her action, except just so far as the general law of nations held her amenable. From that confederation she could at any time withdraw or secede, without being rebellious or traitorous to the other members.

Experience proved to the satisfaction of the wise, patriotic and far seeing fathers of the republic, that such a confederation was entirely ineffectual for the accomplishment of the great purposes for which it was formed. It possessed not the concentrated power of binding and irrepealable unity to protect the common flag of a common Union. It could not, therefore, command the respect and the honor of other nations, nor promote its own stability and permanence.

Is the present Union similar to that? Can a South Carolina, or a Massachusetts, or any other disaffected State withdraw or secede at will, as she could from the Old Confederation, and set up, if she choose, an independent nationality? No such thing. The present compact and constitution grew out of the absolute necessities consequent upon the inefficiency of the old confederation. They were established solely to prevent or obviate that inefficiency, and provide a common flag and a common government capable of commanding respect. An examination of the present Constitution will show that fact. We will, therefore, present those provisions of that instrument which have a direct bearing upon the decision of this question, and then show by the record how the fathers of that Constitution understood its powers, and how that understanding has been confirmed by all the precedents in the history of the government to the present time.

The very preamble of the Constitution itself shows that it was formed for the purpose of establishing a government stronger and more efficient than the old confederation. It is in these words:

“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”

Among other things, this preamble declares that the present constitution was “ordained and established” “in order to form a union more perfect” than existed under the provisions of the old confederation—a union that could not be dissolved at the pleasure or choice of any State or any number of States without the consent of three-fourths of the sovereign people. It conceded to a general government certain powers and rights, which were, of course, subtracted from the powers and rights of the separate State sovereignties, and these powers and rights were vested solely in the hands of a President, “a Congress of the United States,” and a Supreme Court created and elected according to the provisions of that constitution. And now, to understand this matter, what were those particular powers and rights which were thus abstracted from the separate State sovereignties and vested in a general government? They are very emphatically, clearly and forcibly declared in article I, section 8, of the constitution of the United States. They are thus expressed:

“The Congress shall have power—

“1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

“2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

“3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes;

“4. To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

“5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

“6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

“7. To establish post offices and post roads;

“8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

“9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations;

“10. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

“11. To raise and support armies; but no appropriations of money to that use, shall be for a longer term than two years;

“12. To provide and maintain a navy;

“13. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

“14. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

“15. To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia, according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

“16. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful buildings:—And

“17. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”

The powers enumerated in this section are very definite, and nothing we could say would make that fact appear more apparent. Now if these powers are conferred upon the general government by the common consent of all the States of the Union, or more especially by all the people of all the States, can any one State exercise any of those reserved powers? Most certainly not. But the framers of the constitution did not leave this to be inferred. They settled the question definitely in section ten. Here it is:

“1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

“2. No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what maybe absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tunnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.”

This section plainly and positively prohibits the States from doing certain things without the consent of Congress. They can neither contract alliances, collect revenue, coin money, nor engage in war in their capacity of States.

To guard the powers of the general government from encroachment on the part of the States, and to preserve them intact and unimpaired, the President of the United States, as the chief Executive officer of the government, takes this oath:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

We have thus far enumerated some of the powers delegated by the Constitution to the federal government in the precise language of that constitution, and have shown that the chief executive of the government is sworn to exercise those powers by enforcing the constitution, and, of course, the laws, &c., which are made under its sanction and by its authority.

This constitution was adopted by a vast majority of the people of every State in the Union—adopted too with the understanding that it was perpetually binding—adopted without any proviso for withdrawal or secession in case of dissatisfaction—adopted when it was known that, even to amend it, either two-thirds of both houses of Congress must “propose amendments, or two-thirds of all the State Legislatures unite in an application to call a convention of States for proposing amendments,” and that, when such amendments were proposed, they must “be ratified” by “the legislatures of three-fourths of all the States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof.” This shows clearly and conclusively that our fathers considered that they were establishing a government indissoluble—a government for all time, incapable of disruption by separate State action or by the violence of local faction.

In the strong light of these facts how are we to regard the present attitude of South Carolina? As treasonable and rebellious to rightful authority, which she herself assisted to establish. She has no right whatever, under the existing compact, to withdraw herself from the Union, or to annul that compact into which she voluntarily entered, when she adopted that constitution. By that adoption she forever signed away such a right—voluntarily she sets her signature to a compact having no such proviso of choice. If she secede then—if she break, or attempt to break, that compact, she engages in a revolution, and revolution is rebellion—revolution is treason. Of that capital crime she, or rather her citizens, are even now guilty. “What constitutes treason? The constitution defines it in Article 3, Section III:

“1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

“2. The congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.”

Now has not South Carolina “levied war?” Has she not collected armies to resist the United States? Has she not obstructed the collection of the revenue of the nation? Has she not even taken the fortifications and arsenals and confiscated the property of the United States? All these things has she done, and if this be not “levying war”—if this be not “treason”—rank “treason,” I know not what is. And yet, strange as it may seem, there are men in all the States so wedded to party that they encourage and justify South Carolina in her mad secession schemes, and by so doing give “aid and comfort” to the sworn “enemies” of the United States. Did they ever think that they too are traitors, and that they are as legally deserving of a halter as the madest secession hotspur of South Carolina?

Like the old tories of the revolution, they are, however, but few in the Northern States, and their number, thanks to the intelligence of the people, is rapidly growing less. Soon will there be but one sentiment in all sane minds upon this subject. All will see that this Union must be preserved, unbroken by rebels, and traitors be brought to condign punishment, unless we would insanely jeopardise all for which our fathers fought and bled and died upon the battle fields of the revolution.

To aid in creating a healthy public sentiment upon this important subject, I will now give some of the arguments in favor of the Union and of the present constitution, advanced by some of the early fathers of the republic. To do this, I shall first draw largely from certain political papers, entitled the “Federalist,” written while the adoption of the present constitution was pending, and addressed to the people of the State of New York, to explain the principles of the new constitution, and to enforce the propriety and necessity of its adoption. They were the united productions of John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton, three brilliant political lights.

In the first eight numbers of these papers the dangers of foreign force and influence, and of war between the States, and the effects of internal war in producing standing armies unfriendly to liberty, were portrayed in a very masterly manner. Several other papers follow from which I quote largely, as they are just as appropriate now to show the benefits of a stable and consolidated Union, and the evils of disunion, as then: