Читать книгу We, the People - Adolph Psy.D. Caso - Страница 6

The bulk of traditional legal opinions which throughout Europe have unfortunately been called laws are based on some remnants of an ancient conquering people's laws that a prince from Constantinople had had compiled only about twelve centuries ago. Later, they were mixed with Longobardian rituals; now they are gathered into encyclopedic-type volumes by private and little known interpreters of these laws. That our very men committed to uphold the lives and fortunes of other men should do so by obeying laws based on a single opinion of a Carpzov or on an ancient usage mentioned by a Claro, or administer punishments with irate complacency as suggested by a Farinaccio is indeed a prevalent practice today as it is pernicious. These laws–drainage of the most barbarous of centuries, are examined in this book for that part that deals with criminal procedure whose disorders I wish to expose to those entrusted in securing the public's pursuit of happiness, in a style which should keep away only the illiterate and the ignoramus.

My simple inquiry of truth, and my freedom from public opinions with which this book is written, are the result of the sweet and enlightened manner in which I govern myself. The great monarchs and the benefactors of humanity who rule over us, should love the truth set forth herein with little fanatical vigor by this little known philosopher, reacting only against those who turn to force or to cunning industry and not to reason. The present disorders for the one who well examines all the circumstances, are the satire and the reproach of the past centuries and not of our century or of its legislators.

Therefore, let those who wish to honor me with their criticism begin to do so by understanding first the purpose of this work; for, far from trying to diminish legitimate authority, I wish to increase it more by the power of thinking than by that of force, especially if in the eyes of mankind authority is based on gentleness and on humanity. The misunderstood criticism published against this book is based on confused notions; as a result, this criticism forces me to interrupt for a moment my arguments to the enlightened readers in order to close once and for all any access to the errors of a timid zeal, or to the calumnies of malicious envy.

Moral and political principles which regulate mankind come from three sources: revelation, natural law, and man-made conventions. In its main purpose, the first principle cannot be compared to the other two; but they resemble each other in this respect–they are conducive to our happiness. To consider the relationship of the last does not exclude those of the first two. On the other hand, though the first two are divine and immutable, they were changed by man's false religions and by man's arbitrary notions of vice and virtue that have existed in our corrupt minds. So it seems necessary to examine separately and without any other consideration that which is generated by pure human conventions, either expressed or supposed by common necessity and utility–the idea being that every faction and every moral system must necessarily come to some sort of agreement; for it will always be a praiseworthy enterprise to force the most obstinate and incredulous of men to conform to those principles that induce men to live in a society. There are, therefore, three distinct classes of virtue and of vice: religious, natural, and political. These three classes must never be in contradiction among themselves; but not all the consequences and the obligation derived from one may be derived from the others. Not everything demanded by revelation can be demanded by the natural law; nor anything demanded by the latter is demanded by the pure social law. But is very important to separate that which results from the convention; that is, from the express or tacit agreements of men, because such is the limit of that force that can be legitimately exercised among men, without a special mandate of the Supreme Being. Therefore, the concept of political virtue can unblemishedly be called variable; the one of natural virtue would always be clear and manifest if it were not for the imbecility and passions of men that obscure it; and the one of religious virtue is always both one and constant because it is revealed immediately by God Himself and preserved by Him.

It would therefore be an error to attribute to those who speak of social conventions with their consequences principles contrary either to the natural law or to revelation, because the latter two do not enter into the discussion. It would further be an error for the one who, on speaking about a state of war before discussing the state of society, would give it the Hobbesian's sense that the natural state precedes the political state, instead of taking it as a fact born out of the corruption of human nature and from the lack of an expressed sanction. It would be another error to blame a writer (as though he were committing a crime) who considers the emanations of the social contract, not admitting those very emanations prior to the contract itself.

Both divine and natural justice are their essence immutable and constant because the relation between two similar objects is always the same. But human or political justice, being but a relation between the action and the various states of the society, that relation can vary according as that action becomes necessary or useful to that society; nor can that relation be well discerned unless it is analyzed by the proper individuals in all its complicated and ever-changing relationships of civil combinations. As soon as these principles–essentially distinct from one another are confused, there is no longer any hope to conduct logical arguments on public matters. It is up to the theologians to establish the boundaries of the just and the unjust, for that which deals with the intrinsic evil or goodness of the act: the establishment of the rapport of the just and the unjust–that is, the utility and the harm done to the society, belongs to the individual who deals in public matters; for, an object can never be prejudicial to another, because everyone can easily see how much pure political virtue must give way to the immutable virtue emanated by God.

Whosever–I repeat–should wish to honor me with his criticism, should not begin by supposing that I stand for destructive principles of either virtue in general or of religion. I have already demonstrated that such are not my goals. And, instead of making me out an atheist or of being one having seditious tendencies, the critics should rather attempt to find me out a bad logician or a freshman politician. Do not tremble over each of the sentences that upholds human interests. The critic should convince me, on the other hand, either of the uselessness or of the political harm that could grow out of my principles, and demonstrate to me the advantages of traditional practices. I have given public testimony of my religious beliefs and of my submission to my sovereign with my answers to the "Notes and observations". To answer to ulterior writings similar to those "Notes" would be superfluous. But whoever will write to me with that decency normally expected of honest men and of those enlightened ones who will dispense with my having to prove the first two principles, of whatever character they may be, the critic will find in me a man who will make every effort to answer all the questions. And above all, the critic will find in me a peaceful lover of truth.