Читать книгу Protest on the Rise? - Adriaan Kühn - Страница 10

Tom Mannewitz

1. INTRODUCTION

In the early 21^st century two crises appear to dominate the political agenda of the European Union: the “Euro crisis”, unleashed by a global economic and financial crisis and embracing no less than four dimensions: a monetary crisis, a sovereign debt crisis, a bank crisis and an economic crisis. The second challenge facing the EU at the beginning of the 21^st century is the refugee – more neutral: – the migrant crisis, caused by the political, economic, and social instability of the Middle East, esp. the Maghreb and the Levante countries. The member states of the EU are affected by these crises to markedly different degrees: Whereas the Euro crisis has primarily affected the “PIGS states” in the south with leaping unemployment rates between eleven (Italy) and 24 percent (Spain), it was particularly Sweden and Germany which have been afflicted by flows of several million asylum seekers. At its peak time in 2015, for example, this crisis has led to no less than 1 million registered refugees in the Federal Republic.

Two crises, two European regions, one perspective: Here and there journalists, publicists, and scientists tend to frame the recent challenges in terms of economic, social and IR (international relations) questions (Betts & Collier, 2017; Bookstaber, 2017; Jones, 2016; Kingsley, 2017; Stiglitz, 2016). Even political science has put the genuinely domestic political facets of the crises in a second place (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2017; Grimmel & Giang, 2017; Zaun, 2017). However, it is particularly the political dimension which might affect liberal democracy and free society, even if one lets aside the challenges posed by international terrorism. Anti-elitist prejudices and xenophobic resentments, annoyance over Brussels and the general disenchantment with representative democracy are overtly exploited by populist movements and parties of various kinds. Unlike in countries such as Spain, where the populist left – e. g. Movimiento 15-M and Podemos – has reshuffled the pack, in Germany, it is right-wing populism in the shape of the Pegida movement and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) that currently rides on a long wave of success, as the respective organizations have proven to be capable of channelling social discontent in an effective manner. By this, a certain “normalization” has found its way into Germany’s political system: For decades the lack of a democratic party to the right of CDU/CSU has been regarded as a German specific by political scientists, attributed to the grim legacy of National Socialism. Parties such as the AfD were virtually believed to be inconceivable.

Against this backdrop, the chapter looks at the domestic causes of right-wing populism, xenophobia, and resentments: What were the general social or rather: political cultural preconditions of the protests and demonstrations such as Pegida or the hundreds of anti-asylum marches in Germany? What does Germany’s political culture look like nowadays and what did it look like before the migration crisis? Does the image political culture creates help in solving the puzzle of the recent right-wing protests and riots on Germany’s streets? The mere fact that extremism and populism are a democracy’s “normal pathology”, does not mean both do not deserve academia’s attention with respect to repression and prevention. Instead, their ascension further contributes to a barbarization of political manners, it complicates the formation of stable governments, destabilizes political coalitions, polarizes discourse and therefore undermines a democracy’s persistence (Hibbs, 1973; Powell, 1982, pp. 111–174).

2. VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL COMMUNITY

Let us take a look at Germans’ views on their political community. Maybe this explains why they have been so upset recently. And in fact: If there is an aspect of political culture in which Germany lags behind its European neighbours, it is national pride. Whereas immediately after unification in 1990 the sense of nationality has been expected to either become normal in European terms or to experience a boost of nationalism, the opposite turned out to be true: National pride in Germany had declined in the early 1990s and reached rock bottom in 1997, before it began to rise – but only gradually.

Figure 1: National pride in Germany. Sources: Eurobarometer (div. issues), European Values Study, Allbus 1996/1998.

On the one side, national pride has come to its former levels as recently as the late noughties, on the other it has never reached the level of the whole European Union – and probably never will. And this in turn is characteristic: Whenever one reads a comparative study on national pride, one will find that – despite all the ups and downs – compared to other European countries the sense of nationality always lags behind in Germany – particularly because of its national-socialist past, the political culture of later generations has apparently reacted to it in a slightly overcompensating way. However, this difference should not be overrated – when there is a European average, there will always be countries above and below it.

What is most surprising 25 years after unification, is the fact that East and West do not differ fundamentally in this respect any longer. What, however, they differ in, is the specific aspects they are proud of about Germany. West Germans usually mention political attributes, such as the constitution and the social state. What East Germans instead have in mind, is the “land of poets and philosophers”, that is, culture and literature, achievements in the academic world and in sports (Neller, 2009, pp. 75–76) – all in all rather unpolitical objects, indicating a worrying emergence of political detachment as a consequence of the lack of positive experiences with the political structures in Germany. It is – at least partially – filled with a widespread sentiment of attachment to the socialist GDR, which still about four out of ten East Germans feel close to (Neller, 2009, pp. 76–79).

The label social science has invented for this phenomenon is GDR-Nostalgia or – as the German word for Nostalgia contains the German word for East – “Ostalgie”, which allows a range of various interpretations, such as a defensive attitude concerning the own life in the GDR or disappointed expectations about the economic development or feelings of frustration over the democratic institutions and values. Nonetheless, these differences are not suited for an explanation of the recent upset of several strata in German society, not least because national pride is just about to become normal in European terms and attachment to the historical socialist GDR is constantly decreasing.

3. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST

So maybe trust might be important to bear in mind when one tries to comprehend the current right-wing upheaval. Social trust, that is trust in other members of the society, provides the foundation of social cooperation, for democratic attitudes and political participation, but also for efficient economic relations. Trust in political institutions in turn is known to be a well-known cornerstone of democracy’s empirical legitimacy, of general political interest and the willingness to act and live within the law as well as to engage politically. Taken all together, social and political trust seem to be promising candidates when it comes to the recently growing unrest in German society.

However, the data do no not bear out this conjecture: First of all, over the last years, more and more people have developed trust in their social environment – both in West and East Germany, with the East revealing an even stronger increase in social trust; and both parts of the country being typically European.

Figure 2: Social Trust in East Germany, West Germany, and Europe. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 149.

Trust in political institutions (parties, parliament, the government, police and the judicial system) turns out to be lower than trust in other people. However, we are witnessing an upward trend over the last few years. What is more, East German trust levels align more and more with West German trust levels – in sharp contrast with the rest of Eastern Europe, where trust in the political institutions has plummeted recently due to the absence of economic successes and the disillusionment with the real economical potential of democracy and its politicians.

Figure 3: Trust in Political Institutions. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 150.

What can clearly be appreciated in figures 4 and 5 is a trust hierarchy in Germany: “Regulative institutions” – that is the police, the courts, and the administrative body – constantly receive systematically more trust than institutions associated with parties and interests, that is the parliament, the government, and political parties.

Figure 4: Trust in “Regulative” and “Party Institutions”. Source: Zmerli (2012), p. 151.

What are the causes of this trust gap between “regulative” and “party institutions”? Rather than one single factor, a host of explanations comes into question. “Party-dominated institutions” reveal a higher degree of media coverage than regulative institutions; they are more prone to political conflict and susceptible to political controversies on the one side and compromises on the other. This is why trust in “regulative institutions” turns out to be not only higher but also more stable than trust in “party-dominated institutions” – in Germany as well as in most Western democracies. Thus, Germany is no exception. What would be problematic is constantly low trust in all political institutions, as this would lead to a shrinking legitimacy of democracy. This, however, is not the case.

Apart from this, we see a small trust gap between East and West Germany for all political institutions. Nonetheless, this should not worry us all too much, considering the fact that this gap is constantly closing. For example, the cohort born between 1972 and 1990 reveals a gap only when it comes to “regulative institutions”. And East and West Germans born after 1990 are completely identical when it comes to political and institutional trust (Gabriel et al., 2015, pp. 164–166).

Figure 5: Trust Hierarchy. Source: Gabriel et al. (2015), p. 165.

4. VIEWS ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

As to the attractiveness of democracy and its alternatives, the image is mixed: Looking at the scatter plot (figure 6), there is apparently no reason for concern, as when compared with other Western societies, Germany comes off very well. The figure contrasts the share of people who think democracy is a good thing (ordinate) and the share of people who think, a dictatorship (be it a one-man rule or a a military regime) would be a good idea (abscissa).

Figure 6: Democrats and Authoritarians. Source: Dalton and Shin (2014), p. 107.

It is therefore no exaggeration to state that systemic alternatives such as a military junta or a regime with a strong leader (whatever that means) have paled into societal insignificance – even though it deserves mention that despite the longer democratic tradition in the West and despite the much-cited prevalence of authoritarian values in the East, a strong leader attains more acceptance in West German states.

Figure 7: Popularity of Alternatives to Democracy. Sources: European Values Survey 2008 (V225-V227), ALLBUS 2008, Emnid-Survey from March 2010.

The impression only alters when things are called as they are, namely a dictatorship. 5.3 percent of West Germans and 13.8 percent of East Germans prefer this kind of regime to a liberal democracy. Whether this points to an autocratic mentality in the East or a stronger social desirability effect in the West remains unclear. In any case, the most striking aspect is the strong appeal of a technocracy – that is a rule of experts, where economists, jurists, and social scientists have the say-so instead of elected politicians. This, in fact, is something we should worry about and something that might help in understanding the recent advancement of right-wing populist phenomena. On the one side, an expert rule does – as a matter of course – not qualify as a dyed-in-the-wool autocracy, a regime characterized by the lack of checks and balances. A technocracy, instead, would not come along with the abolition of free and fair elections or the monopolization of political power.

On the other side: 1) If it is a body of appointed experts, not elected politicians who exert political power over the demos, the chain of legitimacy is seriously damaged. Thus, from a normative point of view, an expert rule is a double-edged sword. 2) An expert rule converts the democratic “re-election mechanism” into a toothless tiger: Democracy rests upon the principle of accountability and the temporary use of power. In a technocracy, those who aim at being re-elected on a certain day do not exercise power, and those who exercise power – that is the experts – do not stand for re-election, which is why in this system the electorate lacks instruments to overcome irresponsive political decisions. Therefore, an expert rule is problematic with respect to its responsivity, too. 3) A technocracy cannot break the stalemate between “rational” decisions of the expert body on the one side and the public opinion on the other. Therefore, technocracies might end up in the insoluble paradoxical situation of a common good, yet unpopular policy, provoking large scale dissatisfaction and political unrest. Thus, an expert rule is also fraught with problems with respect to its persistence.

Why are technocracies so popular then? Their attractiveness is a consequence of three widespread misunderstandings. The first is: Political rule can and in fact must be freed from particular interests, from individual values, from power and irrationality. The second misunderstanding in society is that “good” political results (whatever that means) depend on the goodwill of the rulers, not the quality of political institutions. And the third challenge is the blatant lack of sound knowledge of the functional principles of representative democracy: In 1998 Germans were surveyed about their conceptions of parliamentarianism and their governmental system (Patzelt, 1998). 59 percent conceded to not know what federalism was, 14 percent made erroneous statements. 40 percent uttered mistaken ideas about the Bundesrat. 60 percent of the interviewees held the opinion that they get to hear of the Bundestag only insufficiently. 58 percent did not know where the parliament’s work takes place (besides the plenum). 33 percent favoured a presidential system over Germany’s parliamentarian one, which 21 percent deemed to be a deviation from the “normal” state. A majority of 57 percent could not come to terms with the fact that Germany’s government emerges from the parliament’s majority group. Two out of three respondents assumed that it is the opposition’s job to support the government; merely one out of two believed the critique of the government’s legislation to be a main task of the minority fractions. 54 percent of the respondents rejected party discipline categorically.

There exists another, more recent example that complements this impression. A recent survey by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (IfD) revealed that about 25 percent of the Germans expect political parties to champion their political objectives without fuss and quibble, and without making any compromises (Petersen, 2016, pp. 2–4). Among supporters of Die Linke and the AfD, the share was even four out of ten. From the complementary perspective: Only three out of ten respondents argued in favour of the free mandate, whereas seven out of ten interviewees wanted the members of parliament to do what the electorate wants them to do. And to make things worse, there is a widespread and politically fostered disgust for individual particular interests in the sphere of politics, especially in the shape of lobbying, as well as compromise solutions – both of them being peculiar to parliamentarian democracy. Against this backdrop, the disenchantment with parliamentarianism in Germany and the popularity of the rule of experts does not come as a surprise. Rather, they are appearantly a consequence of misunderstandings, knowledge gaps, and false expectations.

5. THE SPLINTERED RELATIONSHIP WITH POLITICAL EXTREMISTS

The relationship with political extremists might be telling not only with respect to the general social acceptance of anti-democratic propositions, but also with respect to the legitimacy of political participation rights: if political freedom is not supposed to be an empty platitude, it must apply to those – and especially those – who are under suspicion that they could go to the extremes when exercising their rights. And who better to be appropriate for this than political extremists? So in short, the willingness of a society to concede political liberties to extremists (national socialists, racists, communists, religious fanatics) provides information about a society’s level of political liberalness.

Basically, the situation is disillusioning. Polling data create the image of a somewhat prohibitive German mindset. A majority of more than 90 percent is willing to deny extremists their right of assembly – with the prominent exception of communists, anarchists and autonomists and the like, who come off fairly well.

Figure 8: Refusal of Extremists’ Participation Rights (Freedom of Assembly). Sources: ISSP 2004 (V16), 2006 (V8), 2008 (V32).

As to German society’s attitude about extremism, we see something about right wing and religious extremism political scientists call a “cordon sanitaire” – that is the widespread willingness to resolutely distance from extremism. The fact that there is such a cordon sanitaire regarding religious and right wing extremists comes as no surprise – because of the threat to inner security from Islamist terrorism on the one side and the long shadow of national socialism on the other. However, there is barely such a cordon sanitaire regarding left-wing extremists, which caused Wolfgang Rudzio to diagnose an “erosion of the demarcation” (Rudzio, 1988) in German political culture years ago.

What did he mean by that? Immediately after World War II, when the Cold War began to loom, West German political culture was determined by a “cordon sanitaire” against political extremisms of various provenances – be it national-socialist (due to the burden of history), or be it communist (due to the struggle of the two systems). This did not begin to change until the 1970s, when new social movements sprang up like mushrooms and positioned themselves against nuclear energy, against the re-armament of Germany, against the set structures of university etc. In the course of these events that had their media hour of birth in 1968 various social movements of the political left began to band together in order to form a strong force, among them organizations of a democratic kind and movements inspired by Marxism, Trotskyism, Maoism, anarchism and the like.

The alliances of these times have blurred the “cordon sanitaire” between democratic and anti-/semi-democratic organizations of the political left sustainably. That is why the perception of right-and left-wing extremism have diverged gradually ever since. Whereas political ambitions of national socialists, racists, and fascists are widely discredited in German society, the same does not hold true for those of anarchists, left-wing autonomists, and communists.

As to the legitimacy of political rights (the second aspect the charts furnish particular information about), the Germans appear to be easily stretched to their limits. It would not be exaggerated to say that they pursue some kind of “zero-tolerance policy”, characterized by rigour, narrow-mindedness and illiberalism, all of them being signs of a general insecurity in the face of anti-democratic threats. This insecurity in turn sows the seeds for a propensity to treat perceived threats, especially right-wing extremism, with prohibitions.

6. RIGHT-WING EXTREMIST ATTITUDES

The pronounced anti-right-wing attitude the surveys unveil appear to contrast sharply with the media coverage of 2014-2016. The reports and images have created the unmistakable impression of a swing to the right. Thus: Which impression reflects the social reality in a distorted way, which one is a correct mirror image? Is Germany’s political culture characterized by spreading far-right positions or rather by anti-right-wing-extremism? As we will see we have reason to believe that it is the latter.

What the media have covered in the last months – that is the Pegida protests in Dresden and other cities in Germany as well as several anti-asylum protests including violence against refugees – does not find its expression in the opinions and attitudes reported by large-scale surveys, with the “Mitte-Studie” being the most prominent one. Conducted by a research unit in Bielefeld under the direction of Andreas Zick and edited by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the study even recorded the sharpest drop in right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany in 2014. What is more, this trend has continued in 2016 – just when the migrant crisis has reached its climax.

What do they mean by “right-wing extremist attitudes”? The elements of the right-wing syndrome comprised all in all 18 items concerning (1) the approval of a dictatorship, (2) chauvinism, (3) xenophobia, (4) anti-Semitism, (5) social Darwinism as well as (6) the downplaying of National Socialism. Each dimension is represented by three indicators.

Figure 9: Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes. Source: Zick, Küpper, and Krause (2016), p. 139.

If one frequently reads newspapers or watches the TV news, it comes as a surprise that among the six dimensions of right-wing extremism, xenophobic and chauvinist attitudes have recently declined most dramatically. They were recorded with the approval of statements such as “Immigrants come to Germany in order to exploit its welfare state.” or “We should repatriate immigrants when jobs become scarce.” or “Germany is infiltrated with too many foreign influences.”

Nonetheless, the results should be interpreted carefully. In 2014 and 2016 a research group residing in Leipzig arrived at somewhat deviant results – with the identical 18 items. Compared with the data of 2009, they report a drop of right-wing extremism by only 3.3 percentage points (instead of 6.6 percentage points). In addition, according to their study there was even a slight increase in 2016 compared to 2014. It is especially the two dimensions the Bielefeld research group has identified as the most regressive ones the Leipzig group obtains somewhat different evidence for.

	Bielefeld Group	Leipzig Group
Approval of a Dictatorship	3.6	5.0
Chauvinism	12.5	16.7
Xenophobia	7.7	20.4
Anti-Semitism	2.4	4.8
Social Darwinism	2.0	3.4
Downplaying of National Snocialism	2.0	2.1

Table 1: Varying Results 2016. Sources: Zick et al. (2016), p. 131; Decker, Kiess, and Brähler (2016), p. 37.

The gaps between both studies point to three facts: 1) Opinions, such as those indicating right-wing extremism, are highly volatile. That is they vary substantially over time. One cannot expect such a syndrome to develop gradually and slowly. Rather, the trend line is – among others – a response to political, social, and economic development. 2) The results we get depend to a considerable degree on the methods we use. Social scientists tend to underestimate the fact that it makes a great difference whether we use face-to-face (Leipzig group) or telephone interviews (Bielefeld group). That is the reason why instead of taking survey results at face value (no matter where they come from), we should probably pay more attention to longitudinal trends. 3) The items and topics both studies have queried are normatively charged to a substantial degree. For this reason, some respondents might be afraid of getting isolated or stigmatised with their genuine opinion. As a consequence, they seek refuge in socially desirable answers. Therefore, the situation in Germany might not be as satisfactory as the polling data suggest prima facie. The election results of ambivalent parties such as the AfD as well as survey data concerning political taboos confirm the necessity of a cautious interpretation of survey data on delicate issues.

7. THE ROLE OF TABOOS

In 2013 and in 2015 the IfD asked German citizens for taboo issues in society – in 2015 with a special focus on the refugee crisis. What were the results? Maybe the most revealing number was 43, because no more than 43 percent took the view that you can express your opinion freely when it comes to the migration crisis. Quite the contrary, in fact: a majority of 57 percent felt a certain pressure to conform (Köcher, 2015, pp. 8–9).

In 2013, when the institute dedicated a separate survey to taboos, people were, among other things, confronted with a range of statements and asked to evaluate each of them on two dimensions: 1) Should a respective statement be forbidden (upper bars in figure 10)? 2) Does a respective statement represent a social taboo, that is: does one burn his/her tongue when he/she offers his/her opinion this way (lower bars in figure 10)? Both items focussed on the actual extent of social intolerance on the one side and the perceived extent of social intolerance on the other.

It comes as no surprise that xenophobic, anti-Semitic and sexist statements have been considered to be the “hot potatoes” by the majority of respondents. They have the sense that you get stigmatised when you say things such as “Most reports on concentration camps and the Jews in National Socialism are exaggerated.” or ”Black people are less intelligent than white people.” or “Homosexuality is a disease.” or “A woman’s place is in the kitchen.” These statements are not supported by a majority of Germans, but are regarded as morally obliging by the majority, who feels subject to a certain pressure to conform.

Figure 10: True and Perceived Intolerance. Source: Petersen (2013), p. 6.

The most problematic aspect from a democratic point of view occurs with issues where the majority only imagines political pressure, that is: they think certain statements stigmatise its speaker, whereas in fact it does not. Why is this problematic? It is problematic because these issues become systematically underrepresented in political debate since the majority is in the mistaken belief of a taboo. This holds true for five statements concerning gender roles and xenophobia, including the following phrases: “Homosexuality is a disease.”, “Women are less qualified for leading positions than men.” and “Immigrants take away national jobs.”

All these statements represent intolerant attitudes: racism, sexism, chauvinism and the like. So at the end of the day: Why should we thwart social mechanisms that put a stop to such world views by silencing illiberal persons? The point is that not only the respective statements are stigmatized, but also the attitudes and the people behind them. This, in turn, does not make resentments and prejudices disappear. It only makes people say what they think on the quiet. In the long run it prevents an open debate on such attitudes, but also on widespread fears, stereotypes, prejudices etc. As a result of this, democracy is deprived of its largest comparative advantage over autocracies: its ability to learn and to adapt.

8. GERMAN POLITICAL CULTURE AS A HABITAT OF RIGHT-WING PROTEST?

Several aspects of Germany’s political culture may serve as pieces in the puzzle of the recent right-wing upheavals in the guise of Pegida and anti-asylum marches in East Germany as well as the overall rise of the populist AfD. However, there are at least just as many pieces that fail to fit in this puzzle: Although 25 years after unification Germans still lag behind their European neighbours when it comes to national pride, over the last few years they are constantly making up ground: Germany is currently becoming a typical EU state. What is more, trust in fellow citizens and in political institutions is growing, too – even though with differences between the “regulative” and “party-dominated sphere”. Third, democracy as a whole is considered to be highly legitimate, with genuinely autocratic alternatives being far from widely popular. Finally, considering all aspects, political-cultural differences between East and West are noticeably decreasing – particularly through generational change.

What, then, explains the recently growing unrest? We see stupendous knowledge gaps, misunderstandings, and unrealistic expectations concerning parliamentarian democracy (especially in view of the necessity of political bargaining, the principle of representation, the crucial role of interests and lobbying as a cornerstone of democratic pluralism). All this facilitates illegitimate normative yardsticks as well as reservations about the values and institutions of constitutional democracy – be it that political extremists (esp. from the right) are a priori denied their participation rights (whereas left-wing extremists are not); be it that political propositions, such as the rule of experts, that allure with allegedly rational and objective politics, grow in popularity (the same, by the way, holds true for direct democracy which is also frequently brought into position against the putative failures of representative democracy).

All this speaks for the continuous spreading of vehement reservations about several elements of constitutional democracy. Elections as well as checks and balances themselves are presumably excluded from this development, but the application of participation rights, the principles of the rule of law¹ as well several democratic procedural functions are not. What is gaining ground is not the classical denial of the democratic constitutional core or “extremism”, as we know it from the 20^th century, but a certain “democratic scepticism”. It accepts the democratic “skeleton” (institutions) but it is at odds with its “flesh” (several procedural principles): the free mandate, lobbying, candid political controversy, pressure-group politics, and compromise solutions.

In the long run this scepticism appears to be one of the major threats to democracy as we know it, as it could alter the institutions of constitutional democracy for the worse. In the short run, it is the perceived pressure of political conformity that could damage democracy as it profits parties such as the AfD, which create the image of a taboo-buster and ventilate dubious conceptions of democracy. What is the relationship of these political-cultural developments and the recent right-wing upheaval? To cut a long story short: The mentioned developments have paved their way in the East first – just where right-wing populism has gained a foothold.

This has, of course, to do with the past before 1989/90: the socialist-authoritarian legacy in the minds, the survival of paternalistic attitudes, the lack of democratic experience, the political, social, and economic side effects of East Germany’s transformation in the 1990s. At the same time, it would be an illegitimate oversimplification to exclusively blame the socialist past for making it hard for democratic values and tolerance to immigrants to strike roots in East Germany’s political culture. There is a second factor that comes in when we talk about the attitudes towards cultural diversity, xenophobia und pluralism. And that is the substantial lack of intercultural contacts in the East: Up to the present day the share of people with a migrant background is significantly lower in the East than in the West. The roots of this – again – trace back to the time before 1989. The democratic West not only allowed immigrants to settle in Germany but promoted this kind of labour migration already in the 1950s in order to stimulate what later has become the economic miracle of post-war Germany. The socialist East instead restricted migration to the ideologically necessary minimum with socialist countries (e. g. Vietnam). What is more, it made sure to rigorously segregate the autochthonous populace from the migrants and to provide for their outbound passage. As we know from a range of sociological studies, in the long run nothing reduces racist prejudices and resentments so sustainably as intercultural contacts. From another perspective: There is no better soil for xenophobia than the enduring absence of contacts with strangers.

All in all, this tells us that although a great deal has been achieved 25 years after re-unification, it will take some time before all political-cultural differences between East and West fade away, especially regarding attitudes towards immigrants. The current political challenges such as the rise of the AfD, Pegida and anti-asylum marches are nothing but a direct result of the clash of East German political culture with the current refugee crisis. This challenge will certainly not disappear overnight, which is why politicians would be well-advised not to rail against East Germany every time people rally against refugees and their camps. Such a strategy would strengthen their sentiment of being forgotten by the political class as well as their disenchantment with politics. Instead, politicians should try to seriously attend to the matters of the people, to their anti-immigrant claims, to their racism. That does not mean these demands should be implemented, but rather listened to. A people cannot be expected to become open-minded, pluralistic, and unprejudiced by choice from one day to another. A cursory look at the political elite’s reactions of the last months, however, does not put one in an overly optimistic mood. Pegida and AfD’s offerings close a representational gap in the political system: A considerable amount of citizens does not feel represented by “their” parties and politicians any longer. The recent refugee crises certainly did not evoke this gap, but it brought this gap into the minds of many and was the final straw.

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¹ Countless studies emphasize the willingness of a growing share of people to sacrifice elements of the rule of law or basic rights of some social groups for inner security or jobs (Mannewitz, 2015).