Читать книгу An Ethical Problem - Albert 1845-1916 Leffingwell - Страница 6

Upon no ethical problem of our generation is the public sentiment of to-day more uncertain and confused than in its attitude toward vivisection. Why this uncertainty exists it is not very difficult to discern. In the first place, no definition of the word itself has been suggested and adopted sufficiently concise and yet so comprehensive as to include every phase of animal experimentation. It is a secret practice. Formerly more or less public, it is now carried on in closed laboratories, with every possible precaution against the disclosure of anything liable to criticism. Quite apart from any questions of usefulness, it is a pursuit involving problems of the utmost fascination for the investigating mind—questions pertaining to Life and Death—the deepest mysteries which can engage the intellect of mankind. We find it made especially attractive to young men at that period of life when their encouraged and cultivated enthusiasm for experimentation is not liable to be adequately controlled by any deep consideration for the "material" upon which they work. Sometimes animal experimentation is painless, and sometimes it involves suffering which may vary in degree from distress which is slight to torments which a great surgeon has compared to burning alive, "the utmost degree of prolonged and excruciating agony." By some, its utility to humanity is constantly asserted, and by others as earnestly and emphatically and categorically denied. Confronted by contradictory assertions of antagonists and defenders, how is the average man to make up his mind? Both opinions, he reasons, cannot possibly be true, and he generally ranges himself under the banner of the Laboratory or of its enemies, according to his degree of confidence in their assertions, or his preference for the ideals which they represent.

Now, the object of all controversy should be to enable us to see facts as they are—to get at the truth. That difference of opinion will exist may be inevitable; for opinions largely depend upon our ideals, and these of no two individuals are precisely the same. But so far as facts are concerned, we should be able to make some approach to agreement, and especially as regards the ethical supremacy of certain ideals.

But first of all we need to define Vivisection. What is it?

Originally implying merely the cutting of a living animal in way of experiment, it has come by general consent to include all scientific investigations upon animals whatsoever, even when such researches or demonstrations involve no cutting operation of any kind. It has been authoritatively defined as "experiments upon animals calculated to cause pain." But this would seem to exclude all experimentation of a kind which is not calculated to cause pain; experiments regarding which all the "calculation" is to avoid pain; as, for example, an experiment made to determine the exact quantity of chloroform necessary to produce death without return of consciousness. The British Royal Commission of 1875 defined it as "the practice of subjecting live animals to experiments for scientific purposes," avoiding any reference to the infliction of pain; yet, so far as pertains to the justification of vivisection, the whole controversy may turn on that. Any complete definition should at least contain reference to those investigations to which little or no objection would be raised, were they not part of the "system." It should not omit reference, also, to those refinements of pain-infliction for inadequate purposes—also a part of a "system," and which, to very distinguished leaders in the medical profession, have seemed to be inexcusable and wrong.

Suppose, then, we attempt a definition that shall be inclusive of all phases of the practice.

"Vivisection is the exploitation of living animals for experiments concerning the phenomena of life. Such experiments are made, FIRST, for the demonstration, before students, of facts already known and established; or, SECOND, as a method of investigation of some theory or problem, which may be with or without relation to the treatment of human ailments. Such experiments may range from procedures which are practically painless, to those involving distress, exhaustion, starvation, baking, burning, suffocation, poisoning, inoculation with disease, every kind of mutilation, and long-protracted agony and death."

A definition of this kind will cover 99 per cent. of all experiments. The extreme pro-vivisectionist may protest that the definition brings into prominence the more painful operations; yet for the majority of us the only ground for challenging the practice at all is the pain, amounting to torment in some cases, which vivisection may involve. They are rare, some one says. But how do we know? The doors of the laboratory are closed. Of practices secretly carried on, what can we know? That every form of imaginable torment has at some time been practised in the name of Science, we may learn from the reports of experimenters themselves, and from the writings of men who have denounced them. It was Dr. Henry J. Bigelow, of Harvard University, the most eminent surgeon of his day, who declared that vivisection sometimes meant the infliction of "the severest conceivable pain, of indefinite duration," and that it was "a torture of helpless animals, more terrible, by reason of its refinement, than burning at the stake." Is the above definition of vivisection stronger than is implied by this assertion of Dr. Bigelow?

We need constantly to remember that vivisection is by no means a simple act. It may indicate investigations that require no cutting operation of any kind, and the infliction of no pain; or, on the other hand, it may denote operations that involve complicated and severe mutilations, and torments as prolonged and exquisite as human imagination can conceive. Experiments may be made, in course of researches, of very great interest and importance to medical science; and, on the contrary, they may be performed merely to demonstrate phenomena about which there is no doubt, or to impress on the memory of a student some well-known fact. They may be performed by men like Sir Charles Bell, who hesitated to confirm one of the greatest physiological discoveries of the last century, merely because it would imply a repetition of painful experiments; and they may be done by men like Magendie, who declared of his mutilated and tormented victims, that it was "DROLL to see them skip and jump about." It is because of all these differences that the majority of men have an indefinite conception of what they approve or condemn. The advocate of unrestricted vivisection sometimes tells us that experimentation implies no more pain than the prick of a pin, and that its results are of great utility to the human race; the antivivisectionist, on the other hand, may insist that such experimentation means inconceivable torment without the slightest conceivable benefit to mankind. Both are right in the occasional significance of the word. Both are wrong if one meaning is to answer for all varieties of experimentation upon living things.

Some years ago the attempt was made to obtain the view of animal experimentation held by certain classes of intelligent men and women. One view of the practice is that which regards it merely as a method of scientific research, with which morality has no more to do than it would have in determining in what direction a telescope should be pointed by an astronomer, or what rocks a geologist should not venture to touch. A statement embodying the views of those who favour unrestricted vivisection included affirmations like these:

"Vivisection, or experimentation upon living creatures, must be looked at simply as a method of studying the phenomena of life. With it, morality has nothing to do. It should be subject neither to criticism, supervision, nor restrictions of any kind. It may be used to any extent desired by any experimenter—no matter what degree of extreme or prolonged pain it may involve—for demonstration before students of the statements contained in their textbooks, as an aid to memory, … or for any conceivable purpose of investigation into vital phenomena. … While we claim many discoveries of value, … yet even these we regard as of secondary importance to the freedom of unlimited research."

This is the meaning of free and unrestricted vivisection. Its plainness of speech did not deter very distinguished physiologists and others from signing it as the expression of their views. One can hardly doubt that it represents the view of the physiological laboratory at the present day. Sixty years ago this view of vivisection would have found but few adherents in England or America; to-day it is probably the tacit opinion of a majority of the medical profession in either land. One may question whether any similar change of sentiment in a direction contrary to reform has ever appeared since Civilization began. We shall endeavor to show, hereafter, to what that change is due.

Absolutely opposed to this sentiment are the principles of what is known as "antivivisection." According to this view, all vivisection is an immoral infringement upon the rights of animals. The cruelties that accompany research will always accompany it, until all scientific experimentation upon animals is made a criminal offence. From a statement of opinion giving expression to this view, the following sentences are taken:

"All experimentation upon living animals we consider unnecessary, unjustifiable, and morally wrong. … Even if utility could be proved, man has no right to attempt to benefit himself at the cost of injury, pain, or disease to the lower animals. The injury which the practice of vivisection causes to the moral sense of the individual and to humanity far outweighs any possible benefit that could be derived from it. Dr. Henry J. Bigelow, Professor in the Medical School of Harvard University, declared that `vivisection deadens the humanity of the students.' Nothing which thus lowers morality can be a necessity to progress. … Painless or painful, useless or useful, however severe or however slight, vivisection is a practice so linked with cruelty and so pernicious in tendency, THAT ANY REFORM IS IMPOSSIBLE, and it should be absolutely prohibited by law for any purpose."

This is antivivisection. It is a view of the practice which has seemed reasonable to large numbers of earnest men and women whose lives in various directions have been devoted to the prevention of all kinds of cruelty, and to the promotion of the best interests of the race. When this view is maintained by men and women who oppose the killing of animals for purposes of food or raiment or adornment, or their exploitation in any way which demands extinction of life, it is entirely consistent with high ideals. It is against this view that the arguments of those who contend for vivisection, without restriction or restraint, are always directed.

But even among antivivisectionists there are, naturally, differences of opinion. For instance, the National Antivivisection Society, the principal organization of England, desires to see vivisection totally abolished by law; but, meanwhile, it will strive for and accept any measures that have for their object the amelioration of the condition of vivisected animals. On the other hand, the British Union for the Total Abolition of Vivisection will accept nothing less than the legal condemnation of every phase of such experiments. "Vivisection," the secretary of this society writes, "is a system, and not a number of isolated acts to be considered separately. Owing to its intricate and interdependent character and the international competition involved, USE CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM ABUSE." In other words, every conceivable phase of scientific experimentation upon living creatures, even if absolutely painless, should be made a legal offence.

But we are not driven to accept one or the other of these definitions of animal experimentation. A third view of vivisection exists, which differs widely from either of these opposing ideals. Instead of taking the position of the antivivisectionist that ALL scientific investigations involving the use of animals, should be legally prohibited, it maintains that distinctions may, and should, be drawn, and that only the abuses of vivisection should be condemned by law. It asks society neither to approve of everything, nor to condemn everything, but to draw a line between experiments that, by reason of utility and painlessness, are entirely permissible, and others which ought assuredly to be condemned. It makes no protest against experimentation involving the death of an animal where it is certain that consciousness of pain has been abolished by anaesthetics; but it condemns absolutely the exhibition of agony as an easy method of teaching well-known facts. The utility of certain experiments it does not question; but even increase of knowledge may sometimes be purchased at too high a price. From a statement of this position regarding vivisection, drawn some years since, the following sentences may be of interest:

"Vivisection is a practice of such variety and complexity, that, like warfare between nations, one can neither condemn it nor approve it, unless some careful distinctions be first laid down. … Within certain limitations, we regard vivisection to be so justified by utility as to be legitimate, expedient, and right. Beyond these boundaries, it is cruel, monstrous, and wrong. … We believe, therefore, that the common interests of humanity and science demand that vivisection, like the study of human anatomy in the dissecting-room, should be brought under the direct supervision and control of the State. The practice, whether in public or in private, should be restricted by law to certain definite objects, and surrounded by every possible safeguard against license or abuse."

This is a statement of what is meant by vivisection reform. Every unprejudiced mind can see at once that it is not the same as antivivisection. Is it the enemy of science? The leading name affixed to this declaration of principles was that of the late Herbert Spencer, the chief apostle of modern science. Is it against the interests of education? It was signed by eleven presidents of American universities and colleges, and by a large number of men closely connected with institutions of learning. Is it antagonistic to medical science and art? The statement received the endorsement of twice as many physicians and surgeons as were favourable to experimentation upon animals without any restriction or restraint; and among these physicians favourable to reform were men of national reputation. No one should expect that men whose sole profession is experimentation of this character would approve of any limitations to their activity in any direction; but they constitute only a small fraction of human society. Outside their ranks we may be confident that there are very few, at all acquainted with the subject, who will not concede that in the past many things have been done in this exploitation of animal life which are greatly to be deplored. Is there, then, no method of prevention? Are we simply to fold our hands and trust that the humaner instincts of the present-day vivisector, working in the seclusion of his private laboratory, will keep him free from all that we regret in the vivisection of the past? Or must we, on the other hand, ask for the total condemnation of every experiment, because some are cruel and atrocious?

This is the platform of the Restrictionist. It cannot—except by perversion of truth—be regarded as antivivisection, for there is not a single society in England or America, devoted to the interests of that cause, which would acknowledge these views as in any way representative of its ideals; but it is the expression of sentiments which formerly were almost universally held by the medical profession of England. Yet the advocates of unrestricted vivisection have never been willing to consider this position, and, in controversy, invariable fall back upon arguments applicable only to the views of those who would abolish vivisection altogether.

There is yet another position to be taken; it is the attitude of unconcern. From vast numbers nothing better can be expected. The man who is utterly indifferent to the unnecessary agony accompanying the slaughter of animals for food, or to the cruelties of sport, or the woman whose vanity demands sacrifices of animals at the cost of incalculable suffering, will take little or no interest in the question of vivisections; nor is complicity with other phases of torment and cruelty alone responsible for the indifference which so generally exists. In every age, from the twilight of earliest savagery down to the present time, the vast majority of human beings have been inclined, not to doubt, but to believe, and especially to believe those who claimed superior knowledge in matters of Life and Death. This tendency to unquestioning faith has been the support of every phase of injustice, of cruelty, and of wrong. It has led to innumerable men and women of education and refinement to remit all questions of animal experimentation to the vivisector and his friends, precisely as they would have done had they lived three centuries ago, and had it been theirs to decide on the morality of burning a witch. On the other hand, the alliance between the laboratory and the medical profession, their mutual endeavour to stifle criticism and to induce approval of all vivisection whatever, has given rise to a new spirit of inquiry. A moral question is never absolutely decided until it is decided aright. If the problem of vivisection is ever settled, it will be due, not to the influence of those who advocate unquestioning faith in the humaneness of the average experimenter, who decline inquiry, and who rest satisfied with their ignorance, but rather to those who, having investigated the question for themselves, have given all their influence for some measure of reform. In questions of humanity, even the unwisdom of enthusiasm that tends toward reform is far better than indifference and unconcern.

The ignorance of history, shown often by the advocates of unlimited vivisection, is a singular phenomenon. The beginnings of this controversy are not without interest. Let us glance at them.