Читать книгу The Notion of Authority - Alexandre Kojève - Страница 8

Preliminary Remarks

It is a curious fact that the problem and notion of authority have been little studied. Questions pertaining to the transfer of authority and its genesis have been the main concern, while the actual essence of this phenomenon has rarely attracted any attention. However, it is obviously impossible to tackle political power or even the structure of the state without knowing what authority is as such. A study of the notion of authority, albeit provisional, is therefore essential, and must precede any study of the question of the state.

To say that theories of authority are lacking is not to say that they are nonexistent. If we forget about variants, we can say that four distinct (essentially different and irreducible) theories have been proposed in the course of history:

1. The theological or theocratic theory: primary and absolute Authority belongs to God; all other (relative) authorities are derived from it. (This theory was elaborated mainly by the Scholastics, but the partisans of ‘legitimate’, not to say hereditary, monarchy also claim it as their own.)

2. Plato’s theory: ‘Just’ or ‘legitimate’ authority is based on, and emanates from, ‘justice’ or ‘equity’. Any authority that has a different character is only a pseudo-authority that is in reality nothing other than (more or less brute) force.

3. Aristotle’s theory, in which the justification for authority is found in wisdom, knowledge, and the possibility of anticipating, of transcending the immediate present.

4. Hegel’s theory, which reduces the relationships of authority to that of master and slave (of victor and vanquished), the former having been ready to risk his life to be recognised while the latter has chosen submission over death.

Unfortunately, only the last theory has received comprehensive philosophical elaboration, developed not only on the level of phenomenological description but also that of metaphysical and ontological analysis. The remaining theories have not gone beyond the level of phenomenology, and are not, moreover, in any way complete even in this department. (It must be said that Hegel’s theory has never been truly understood and that it was very quickly forgotten. Thus, Hegel’s most important successor – Marx – completely neglected the problem of Authority.)

All four theories are exclusive. Each of them acknowledges only one type of Authority (namely, the one it describes), and sees in the other ‘authoritarian’ phenomena nothing other than a manifestation of pure and simple force.

Note: There is, certainly, yet another ‘theory’ of Authority, which sees in the latter nothing but a manifestation of force. But we shall see later on that Force has nothing to do with authority, being even its direct opposite. Reducing Authority to Force is therefore simply either to deny or ignore the existence of the former. It is for this reason that we have not listed this erroneous opinion among the theories of Authority.

In order to be able to judge and criticise these theories (indeed to understand them in the proper sense of the word), one would have to start by drawing up a comprehensive list of all phenomena that could be filed under the rubric ‘Authority’ and see if these phenomena correspond (in whole or in part) to one (or several) of the proposed theories.

Theories for which there are no corresponding phenomena are to be rejected as false. As for the remaining ones, we must see whether they account for all or only part of the phenomena.

To this end, the phenomena of Authority must be subjected to a phenomenological analysis with a view to unearthing ‘pure phenomena’, that is to say, those that are irreducible to one another (or showing, in the case of ‘compound’ phenomena, the ‘pure’ elements of which they are made up).

If we find ‘pure’ phenomena that none of the suggested theories account for, further theories must then be formulated.

In other words, the phenomenological analysis (A, I) must answer the question ‘What is it?’ addressed to all phenomena that in a manner of speaking we qualify ‘instinctively’ as authoritarian. It must reveal the essence (the idea: das Wesen) of Authority as such, as well as the structure of this ‘essence’, that is to say, the various irreducible types of its manifestation (while ignoring ‘accidental’ variations caused by simple divergences in local and temporal conditions of the realisation of Authority as such).

But phenomenological analysis can carry out its function only on condition of being truly complete. We must be certain that all possible types of Authority have been enumerated and that each one of them has been decomposed into truly simple elements that are irreducible to other elements.

This is possible, however, only if the analysis is systematic; that is why we must necessarily move beyond the phenomenological plane and rise to the metaphysical level.

The metaphysical analysis (A, II) relates the phenomenon of Authority to the fundamental structure of the objectively real World. In this way, it allows us to see whether the described phenomena correspond to all possibilities provided by the World, and whether a given phenomenon has a simple or compound metaphysical origin.

Finally, the ultimate justification of the theory founded on, and guaranteed by, the metaphysical analysis can derive only from an even more profound analysis, which penetrates down to the ontological level.

The ontological analysis (A, III) studies the structure of Being as such, and it allows us to understand the whys and wherefores of the (metaphysical) structure of the real World. This same structure, for its part, allows us to classify and analyse systematically (on the phenomenological level) the phenomena in question that appear in this World.

Note: In all these three analyses, the notion of God must be used, even assuming that the latter does not exist, being nothing other than a ‘myth’. Since the ‘believer’ has always attributed to God the maximum of authority, it is therefore in Him that this phenomenon can be studied as if under a microscope. We shall avoid applying to Man what we discover in God. And it is precisely if God is nothing more than a ‘myth’ that the analysis of divine Authority is in fact an analysis of human Authority: without realising it, Man projects onto God what he discovers – more or less unconsciously – in himself, in such a way that he can be studied while studying ‘his’ God.

The theory of Authority that results from this triple analysis will be fully guaranteed and justified. It might serve in turn as a starting point for various deductions (B).

The theory will have, first of all, political applications (B, I). Assuming that every state presupposes and is based on Authority, the theory of the State can be deduced from the theory of Authority.

Secondly, the theory of Authority will have ethical applications (B, II). A correct and justified theory will make it possible to defend Authority and the State (and more specifically, therefore, the authoritarian State) against moral or moralising critiques deduced from non-political notions. In other words, the theory of Authority will make possible the deduction of a specifically political ethics, which would be essentially different from the ‘private’ morality that is generally the basis of attempts to criticise Authority in its being and in its acts.

Finally, the theory of authority will have psychological applications (B, III). Knowing what Authority is, the way Man and men must be acted on can be deduced so as either to engender or to maintain an Authority.

In what follows, all these questions can only be sketched out. I make no claim to lay down a definitive and complete theory of Authority. We must rather formulate problems and indicate general directions towards their resolution.