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1.

Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William Mark Hohengarten (Boston: MIT Press, 1992), 7.

2.

Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 32-35.

3.

In Being and Time, Heidegger rebuilds the phenomenology of Husserl and asks the great ontological questions from within the world, that is, from within concrete “existential” circumstances under which the human being is thought. In Truth and Method, following Heidegger, Gadamer renews hermeneutics, which is anchored in a particular interpretive horizon, as the starting point of all knowledge. From the field of analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein departs from his early Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, claiming that language is actually a game characterized and determined by concrete contexts each with its own system of rules. Thus, in the Philosophical Investigations, the “second Wittgenstein” moves away from the positivist-logical idea of language, focusing instead on its pragmatic function immersed in contextual realities.

4.

Some historians, like María Briceño Pérez, dispute the credibility of the historical sources Miguel Otero Silva uses to support his assertions.

5.

The soldiers who followed Aguirre are called marañones, because their rebellion occurred on the Marañón River in the middle of the Amazon.

6.

Ingrid Galster, Aguirre o la posteridad arbitraria: La rebelión del conquistador vasco Lope De Aguirre en historiografía y ficción histórica (1561-1992) (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2011), 745.

7.

Galster, Aguirre, 745.

8.

Rolena Adorno, “Reconsidering Colonial Discourse for Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century Spanish America.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 28, no. 3 (1993): 139.

9.

One could even debate whether there is a historical truth, but this is not the objective of this work. As Lionel Grossman and Louis Mink have pointed out, a radical differentiation between literature and history persists in common sense and in the work of numerous historians dating from the late eighteenth century, in which the former is associated with fiction, imagination, and interpretation and the latter with objective truth and real data; see The Writing of History: Literary Form and Historical Understanding. Robert H. Canary and Henry Kozicki, ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), 129-30. Since the mid-twentieth century, however, this position has been criticized because it rests on several dubious assumptions. The idea of a unified universal history itself must be challenged; see The Writing, 149. Historical data does not generate a unified narrative structure by itself; rather, it is the historian who imposes one upon it, precisely through imagination; see The Writing, 136-37. Furthermore, for Kieran Egan, historians rely on their epistemological pre-understanding, or what Hayden White calls a “meta-history,” in discerning chains of historical cause and effect that lend meaning and coherence to their telling of the whole story; see The Writing, 41, 92. In this sense, to say that this study will work with the textual reality and the social imaginary does not imply that it will analyze a fictional world without any connection to reality. On the contrary, it implies that it is precisely the interpretative and imaginative dimension of the historical documents and their subsequent adaptations that will gradually become evident.

10.

Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 7.

11.

Levi-Strauss took Saussure’s linguistics and applied it to anthropology in such works as Structural Anthropology.

12.

Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Random House, 1993), 9.

13.

Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 94.

14.

Edward Said, Orientalism, 322.

15.

Gayatri Spivak revolutionized the field with her study of the subaltern, and Homi Bhabha did so with his concepts of hybridity, mimicry, and ambivalence. Almost simultaneously, in India, academic historians, among them Ranajit Guha, founded the domain of subaltern studies to question Eurocentric views and practices, especially in postcolonial societies.

16.

Enrique Dussel, 1492: El encubrimiento del otro: Hacia el origen del “mito” de la Modernidad (La Paz, Bolivia: Plural editors, 1994), 7.

17.

Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 195.

18.

Galster, Aguirre, 67.

19.

Galster, Aguirre, 72.

20.

Galster, Aguirre, 72.

21.

Walter Mignolo, “El pensamiento decolonial: desprendimiento y apertura. Un manifiesto” in Giro decolonial: Reflexiones para una diversidad epistémica más allá del capitalismo global, ed. Santiago Castro-Gómez and Ramón Grosfoguel (Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2007), 26.

22.

Julian Go, Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 59.

23.

Go, Postcolonial Thought, 61.

24.

Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 49.

25.

Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 7–8.

26.

See, for example, Silvan Tomkins and Paul Ekman. This perspective is called universalism.

27.

Keith Oatley, Emotions: A Brief History (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004), x.

28.

Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, trans. John Henry Freese (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 173.

29.

Toribio de Ortiguera, “Crónica,” in Lope de Aguirre: Crónicas, 1559–1561, ed. Mampel González, Elena, and Neus Escandell (Barcelona: Editorial 7 1/2, 1981), 109.

30.

Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, 173-75.

31.

Jan Plamper, The History of Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 13.

32.

Martha Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 14.

33.

Nussbaum, Anger, 27.

34.

Nussbaum, Anger, 21.

35.

Barbara H. Rosenwein, ed., Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

36.

Norbert Elias is considered the founder of what is now called the history of emotions. Elias escapes biological or cultural determinisms:

To be sure, the possibility of feeling fear, just like that of feeling joy, is an unalterable part of human nature. But the strength, kind and structure of the fear and anxieties that smoulder or flare in the individual never depend solely on his or her own “nature” nor, at least in more complex societies, on the “nature” in the midst of which he or she lives. They are always determined, finally, by the history and the actual structure of his or her relations to other people, by the structure of society; and they change with it.

See Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, trans. Edward Jephcott, ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010), 442

37.

Rosenwein, Anger's Past, 2–3.

38.

The majority of both Protestant and Catholic reformers emphasized carefully cultivated and tightly controlled moral behavior at the core of their projects.

39.

Plamper, The History of Emotions, 14.

40.

Andrés Kozel, Florencia Grossi, and Delfina Moroni, ed., El imaginario antiimperialista en América Latina (Buenos Aires, Arg.: CLACSO y Ediciones CCC, 2015), 13–14.

41.

Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23.

42.

Mignolo, Giro decolonial, 29.

43.

Plamper, The History of Emotions, 14.

44.

Plamper, The History of Emotions, 15.

45.

Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, 7.