Читать книгу The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War - Ali Ahmad Jalali - Страница 16
COMMENTARY
ОглавлениеDeciding where to ambush a long convoy is usually driven by geography, intent and escape routes. The Soviet/DFU convoy commander was primarily concerned with not being on the road at night and delivering the bulk of his cargo on time. He did not want to fight a long, involved battle with guerrillas. If the terrain at the ambush site is very constricted, the guerrilla may want to attack the head of the convoy and block the route with a combination of a roadblock and burning vehicles. If the convoy has armored vehicles and engineer vehicles concentrated to the front of the convoy, the guerrilla may want to attack the middle or tail of the convoy with the hope that the convoy commander will not divert a great deal of combat power back to deal with his attack. If the guerrilla is after supplies, the middle of the convoy is best if he can isolate a piece of the middle, since most convoys have a rear guard. In this case, the purpose of the ambush was to harass, not to capture supplies. The ambush site was fairly constricted due to the proximity of the river and road to the high ground, but it still allowed armored vehicles to turn around in the area. The ambush commander decided to attack toward the rear of the convoy, but far enough forward to avoid the rear guard.