Читать книгу Society of Singularities - Andreas Reckwitz - Страница 20

The social logic of singularities encompasses not only the five aforementioned social entities but also the four practices of singularization that I have already discussed at some length: the practices, that is, of observation, evaluation, production, and appropriation. Because singularities are enacted in these ways, they are never fixed once and for all; rather, they are continuously being fabricated.

These four sorts of practices are only separated here for heuristic reasons, for at times they can be intertwined or even combined with one another (as when something is produced and received through the same practice). They can also be highly specialized and differentiated from one another, sometimes even coalescing into entire institutional complexes of their own. In general, it can be said that practices of singularization have existed in all types of society and at all times, though in late modernity their institutional scope has broadened considerably while processes of singularization (and the parallel processes of de-singularization) have become contentious and controversial to a large extent. Here, I will look specifically at these four types of practices and describe how they operate within the logic of singularities.

First, observation.³⁵ Within a social logic of singularities, something can be interpreted, for instance, as non-interchangeable and unique. As such, it first has to be recognized or discovered. For this to happen, it is fundamentally necessary for there to have developed, in the form of practices of observation, a cultural sensitivity to the inherent complexity and density of the particular. Whereas the logic of the general requires the knowledge and competence for classifying, subsuming, and abstracting things, the ascertainment of singular objects, subjects, spaces, etc., requires a level of cultural sensitivity that has both a cognitive and a sensory dimension. Typically, someone not only has explicit knowledge about singularities but is, rather, able to understand or “get,” in an instant, the density and inherent complexity of, say, a piece of music, a person, a city, or a belief.³⁶

A sense for the inherent complexity of singularities is not something that people are simply born with; instead, it is learned and cultivated (or neglected) in social environments.³⁷ Without any competence for recognizing singularity – regardless of whether the specific competence in question pertains to religion or art, everyday aesthetics or architecture – the social logic of singularities cannot exist. Practices of observing singularities can be passed on through processes of imitating and associating with certain social groups (to gain a sense for classical music, a youth subculture, a religious belief, a specific world of objects, etc.), and they can also be professionalized in institutions (as is the case, for instance, with architects and scholars of art). Under certain conditions, the socio-cultural processes of attribution in which something is understood to be a singularity can be clear and uncontroversial (think of the relics in traditional society), whereas, under other conditions, understanding what is singular can be highly contentious and the object of heated debate (the classic example in modernity is the question of what counts as a work of art). Furthermore, what is recognized by participants in one socio-cultural context as having inherent complexity may be regarded by outsiders as no more than an example of a general type, or might even seem entirely unintelligible. For the uninitiated who lack the necessary observational competence, it will be difficult to identify the unique qualities of Duke Ellington’s music, Michel Serres’ texts, or the natural beauty of Loch Lomond.

Second, evaluation.³⁸ Although observation and evaluation are two different sets of practices, they are often interconnected. Evaluations do not result in a neutral understanding of the matter being evaluated; rather, the latter is understood in a positive or negative light. In the social world, things are of course constantly being evaluated; in the social logic of singularities, however, the process of (e)valuation differs from that in the social logic of the general. In the latter, as I have already discussed, the goal of evaluation is to determine whether something corresponds or not to the desired standard – that is, to determine whether something can be regarded as normal and acceptable. There, singularities are negatively sanctioned, and the act of evaluation involves sorting things into dualisms, rankings, and scales.

In the logic of singularities, on the contrary, evaluation means ascribing value in a strict sense. It designates a praxis of valorization in whose context a singular entity acquires the status of being valuable (or not). Here, to evaluate is to certify. In general, the criteria defining what is desirable are inverted: now, the singular is valuable, while mere examples of the general seem profane and are devalued. Whereas rationalism is based on the distinction between the correct/normal (general) and the abnormal (particular), the main distinction of singularism is between the sacred (particular) and the profane (general), in which case the sacred should not be associated too closely with religious holiness but rather implies that something has been regarded as intrinsically valuable.³⁹ Of course, even formal rationalization ascribes value to things in the broadest sense, but it is concerned with functional or instrumental value – that is, with something’s utility or function according to a given order, ranking, or scale (and therefore I will avoid the term “value” in this context). In contrast, the logic of singularities valorizes entities in a strong sense by endowing them with a seemingly intrinsic worth, so that they appear to be valuable, good, and meaningful in their own right.

The central task of practices of valorization is now to determine which individual entities – things, people, places, etc. – should be recognized as singular. To this end, entire discursive universes and valorization techniques have been developed (think of the field of art criticism). Practices of valorization identify differences, and strong differences at that. On the one hand, they identify asymmetrical differences between the singular and the profane; on the other hand, they identify absolute (that is, non-gradual) qualitative differences between various singularities, each of which seems distinct from all others. As already mentioned, however, it is characteristic of late modernity for attempts to be made to reduce such complexity and to translate the absolute difference of singularities into the gradual differences of the general-particular (in the form of rankings, for instance), so that the sphere of valorization has taken on a multifaceted form.

What is relevant is this: practices of valorization not only singularize but also de-singularize. Not only do they ascribe value, they devalue as well. It is of the utmost importance to underscore that singularization is not a one-dimensional process and that it involves aspects of dominance. Practices of valorization elevate and reject things; they distinguish things while ensuring that others remain invisible. Processes of singularization regularly operate in tandem with processes of de-singularization. Entities that were once valorized as singular can lose this status later on. Moreover, it can happen (and it often does) that entities that strive for singularity, or whose singular nature is doubted, never achieve this status and vanish in the sea of the profane (or, under certain circumstances, are singularized as something negative). In societies in which the social logic of the particular was no more than a niche phenomenon, this was less consequential than it is in the late-modern society of singularities, where de-singularization generally means devaluation (if not uselessness as well). It is little surprise, then, that processes of valorization can tend to be enormously controversial.