Читать книгу The Historiography of Generative Linguistics - András Kertész - Страница 15

That there is enormous uncertaintyuncertainty regarding the application of the KuhnianKuhnian term ›scientificscientific revolutionrevolutionscientific‹ to linguistics is well illustrated not only by the change in KoernerKoerner, E.F. Konrad’s views already mentioned and to be discussed later in the present work, but also by the way NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J. revised his own views. Newmeyer has been in argument with Koerner for decades, and while the views of both of them have taken various turns, Newmeyer typically argues against Koerner’s opinions. The changes in Newmeyer’s views are especially interesting because many consider him the ›official historian‹ of generative linguistics, who effectively represents ChomskyChomsky, Noam’s interests (see e.g. MatthewsMatthews, Peter H. 1993: 208, TomalinTomalin, Marcus 2008: 13, 16; LakoffLakoff, Robin 1989, MurrayMurray, Stephen O. 1994, HarrisHarris, Randy Allen 1993a etc.). Although Newmeyer used the term ›Chomsky’s revolution‹ in the first edition of his book Linguistic Theory in America, he did not clarify in what sense Chomsky’s appearance has in fact been revolutionaryrevolutionary (Newmeyer 1980). However, he did cite KuhnKuhn, Thomas S. (1970)[1962] in the second edition (Newmeyer 1986a: 36–37). Subsequently, Newmeyer modified his approach in the paper in which he responded to Koerner (1983) and in which he rejected the term ›scientific revolution‹ in the Kuhnian sense (Newmeyer 1986b; for more on this, see also Section 3.1.1.1). He argues for the following thesis:

(T4)	Syntactic StructuresSyntactic Structures triggered a scientificscientific revolutionrevolutionscientific in the sense of LaudanLaudan, Larry (1977) rather than in the KuhnianKuhnian (1970) sense and thus led to a new ›research tradition‹researchtradition.

NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J.’s first argument supporting (T4) is that ChomskyChomsky, Noam’s Syntactic StructuresSyntactic Structures has brought intellectual innovation into linguistics. When attempting to justify the intellectually revolutionaryrevolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures, Newmeyer partly relies on the same factors as KoernerKoerner, E.F. Konrad (1978) (see Section 2.1.1.1) without, however, referring to the ›climate of opinionclimate of opinion‹. As further factors he mentions

 the revolutionaryrevolutionary importance of the central role of syntax;

 related to the central role of syntax, the interdisciplinary nature of the ›revolution‹, which has brought – first and foremost – psychology and philosophy within its scope; as well as

 the successful adaptation and synthesis of the progressive elements of American structuralismstructuralism.

According to his second argument, Syntactic StructuresSyntactic Structures was revolutionaryrevolutionary from a sociologicalsocial perspective as well, but it is problematic that historiographers use conflicting criteria to separate revolutionary from non-revolutionary achievements and that »[p]aradoxiocally, however, the sociological transformationtransformation of the field has not been accompanied by a corresponding success on the part of generative grammarians in achieving institutional power« (NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J. 1986b: 2). Newmeyer admits that generative linguistics does not meet two necessary requirements of KuhnianKuhnian revolutionrevolutionKuhnians. First, he approvingly quotes PercivalPercival, W. Keith (1976a: 289), according to whom generative linguistics has not been generally accepted within the discipline. He concludes »if KuhnKuhn, Thomas S. is correct, no (scientificscientific) revolutions have occurred in linguistics. […] the ›Chomskyan revolution‹, if there was one, was not a ›Kuhnian revolution‹.« (Newmeyer 1986b: 6, emphasis added). Second, the appearance of Syntactic Structures had not been preceded by a crisiscrisis:

The Chomskyan revolution failed to meet KuhnianKuhnian conditions in another respect. For KuhnKuhn, Thomas S. (74–5), a revolution is in part a response to ›crisiscrisis‹ – to a situation in which, in the ›typical‹ case, there is ›a profound failure in the normal problem-solving activity‹. Yet far from being in a state of crisis, post-BloomfieldianBloomfieldian structuralismstructuralism in 1957 was enjoying a period of unprecedented optimism, in which it was believed that the fundamental questions of linguistic analysis had all been solved (see NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J. 1980: 1–3). It is rather puzzling, then, that so many commentators, generativist and non-generativist alike, have taken the Chomskyan revolution to exemplify Kuhn’s conception of a scientificscientific revolutionrevolutionscientific […] (Newmeyer 1986b: 7, footnote 6; emphasis added).1

Based on these factors, however, NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J.’s conclusion is not that Syntactic StructuresSyntactic Structures did not trigger a revolution, but that it did, although in a non-KuhnianKuhnian sense.2 In answer to the question of what criteria scientificscientific revolutionrevolutionscientifics are based on, he claims LaudanLaudan, Larry (1977: 137–138) provided the correct criterion. Laudan uses the term ›research traditionresearchtradition‹, which is analogous to the Kuhnian term ›paradigmparadigm‹. In Laudan’s view, it is not at the point at which the entire discipline – or at least a definitive part of it – accepts a certain research tradition that a scientific revolution takes place. Rather, a revolution takes place when a research tradition attracts enough attention to make scholars within the field take it seriously, in the sense that they either accept it or consider it a rival. With reference to HymesHymes, Dell (1964: 25), Newmeyer points out that transformationaltransformation generative grammargrammar had become the reference point of research within linguistics by the beginning of the 1960s, and thus it completely conforms to Laudan’s criterion. It has become an accepted routine to explicitly reject ChomskyChomsky, Noam’s theorytheory when alternative approaches are introduced. Therefore, if Laudan’s view is correct, then the Chomskyan revolution has taken place in linguistics in the Laudanian sense (Newmeyer, 1986b: 7–8):

We know that there was a Chomskyan revolution – but not because every linguist in the world was at one time, or is now, a generative grammarian. There was a Chomskyan revolution because anyone who hopes to win general acceptance for a new theorytheory of languagelanguage is obliged to show how the theory is better than ChomskyChomsky, Noam’s. Indeed, the perceived need to outdo Chomsky has led him to be the most attacked linguist in historyhistory (NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J. 1986b: 8).

NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J.’s third argument is that the number of ChomskyChomsky, Noam’s followers radically increased and these followers gained significant positions at an increasing rate. He maintains, however, that contrary to appearances, Chomsky and his followers did not have real influence, since:3

 there are numerous opportunities for students at American universities to continue their studies within non-generative linguistics;

 generative linguists receive only a modest amount of funding;

 the Linguistic Society of America was not controlled by the generativists.4

In sum, NewmeyerNewmeyer, Frederick J. (1986b) offers the following solution to (P):

(SP4)

The basic terms of the historiographyhistoriography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic StructuresSyntactic Structures are ›scientificscientific revolution‹revolutionscientific and ›research tradition‹researchtradition, its central hypothesis is (T4) and its framework is LaudanLaudan, Larry (1977).