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It soon transpired that Price had no immediate intention of invading Kansas¹⁰⁸. For the present, it was

Footnote 105: (return)

In ridicule of Lane's fortifications, see Spring, Kansas, 275.

Footnote 106: (return)

As soon as the citizens, panic-stricken, were gone, the detachment which Lane had left in charge, under Colonel C.R. Jennison, commenced pillaging their homes [Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 130.]

Footnote 107: (return)

H.C. Whitney to Mix, September 6, 1861, Indian Office Consolidated Files, Neosho, W 455 of 1861.

Footnote 108: (return)

By the fifth of September, Lane had credible information that Price had broken camp at Dry Wood and was moving towards Lexington [Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 144].

enough for his purpose to have struck terror into the hearts of the people of Union sentiments inhabiting the Cherokee Neutral Lands, where, indeed, intense excitement continued to prevail until there was no longer any room to doubt that Price was really gone from the near vicinity and was heading for the Missouri River. Yet his departure was far from meaning the complete removal of all cause for anxiety, since marauding bands infested the country roundabout and were constantly setting forth, from some well concealed lair, on expeditions of robbery, devastation, and murder. It was one of those marauding bands that in this same month of September, 1861, sacked and in part burnt Humboldt, for which dastardly and quite unwarrantable deed, James G. Blunt, acting under orders from Lane, took speedy vengeance; and the world was soon well rid of the instigator and leader of the outrage, the desperado, John Matthews.¹⁰⁹

Footnote 109: (return)

(a)

FT. LINCOLN, SOUTHERN KANSAS.

Sept. 25, 1861.

HON. WM.P. DOLE, Com. of Ind. Af'rs

Dear Sir, We have just returned from a successful expedition into the Indian Country, And I thought you would be glad to hear the news.

Probably you know that Mathews, formerly an Indian Trader amongst the Osages has been committing depredations at the head of a band of half breed Cherokees, all summer.

He has killed a number of settlers and taken their property; but as most of them were on the Cherokee neuteral lands I could not tell whether to blame him much or not, as I did not understand the condition of those lands.

A few days ago he came up to Humbolt and pillaged the town. Gen. Lane ordered the home guards, composed mostly of old men, too old for regular service, to go down and take or disperse this company under Mathews.

He detailed Lieut. Col. Blunt of Montgomery's regiment to the command, and we started about 200 strong. We went to Humbolt and followed down through the Osage as far as the Quapaw Agency where we came up with them, about 60 strong.

Mathews and 10 men were killed at the first fire, the others (cont.)

As soon as Lane had definite knowledge that Price had turned away from the border and was moving northward, he determined to follow after and attack

Footnote 109: (return)

(cont.) retreated. We found on Mathews a Commission from Ben. McCulloch, authorizing him to enlist the Quapaw and other Indians and operate on the Kansas frontier.

The Osage Indians are loyal, and I think most of the others would be if your Agents were always ready to speak a word of confidence for our Government, and on hand to counteract the influence of the Secession Agents.

There is no more danger in doing this than in any of the Army service. If an Agent is killed in the discharge of his duty, another can be appointed the same as in any other service. A few prompt Agents, might save a vast amount of plundering which it is now contemplated to do in Kansas.

Ben. McCulloch promises his rangers, and the Indians that he will winter them in Kansas and expel the settlers.

I can see the Indians gain confidence in him precisely as they loose it in us. It need somebody amongst them to represent our power and strength and purposes, and to give them courage and confidence in the U.S. Government.

There is another view which some take and you may take the same, i.e. let them go—fight and conquer them—take their lands and stop their annuities.

I can only say that whatever the Government determines on the people here will sustain. The President was never more popular. He is the President of the Constitution and the laws. And notwithstanding what the papers say about his difference with Frémont, every heart reposes confidence in the President.

So far as I can learn from personal inquiry, the Indians are not yet committed to active efforts against the Gov. AUG. WATTLES.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Central Superintendency, W 474 of 1861.

(b)

SACK AND FOX AGENCY, Dec. 17th 1861.

HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Indian Affairs

Dear Sir: After receiving the cattle and making arrangements for their keeping at Leroy I went and paid a visit to the Ruins of Humboldt which certainly present a gloomy appearance. All the best part of the town was burnt. Thurstons House that I had rented for an office tho near half a mile from town was burnt tho his dwelling and mill near by were spared. All my books and papers that were there were lost. My trunk and what little me and my son had left after the sacking were all burnt including to Land Warrents one 160 acres and one 120. Our Minne Rifle and ammunition Saddle bridle, etc. … About 4 or 5 Hundred Sacks of Whitney's Corn were burnt. As soon as I can I will try to make out a list of the Papers from the (cont.)

him, if possible, in the rear. Governor Robinson was much opposed¹¹⁰ to any such provocative and apparently purposeless action, no one knowing better than he Lane's vindictive mercilessness. Lane persisted notwithstanding Robinson's objections and, for the time being, found his policies actually endorsed by Prince at Fort Leavenworth.¹¹¹ The attack upon Humboldt, having revealed the exposed condition of the settlements north of the Osage lands, necessitated his leaving a much larger force in his own rear than he had intended.¹¹² It also made it seem advisable for him to order the building of a series of stockades, the one of most immediate interest being at Leroy.¹¹³ By the fourteenth of September, Lane found himself within twenty-four miles of Harrisonville but Price still far ahead. On the twenty-second, having made a detour for the purpose of destroying some of his opponent's stores, he performed the atrocious and downright inexcusable exploit of burning Osceola.¹¹⁴ Lexington, besieged, had fallen into Price's hands two days before. Thus had the foolish Federal practice of acting in

Footnote 109: (return)

(cont.) Department [that] were burnt. As I had some at Leavenworth I cannot do so til I see what is there. As Mr. Hutchinson is not here I leave this morning for the Kaw Agency to endeavour to carry out your Instructions there and will return here as soon as I get through there. They are building some stone houses here and I am much pleased with the result. The difference in cost is not near so much as we expected but I will write you fully on a careful examination as you requested. Very respectfully your obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Southern Superintendency

[Indian Office Files, Southern Superintendency, C 1432 of 1861]

Footnote 110: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 468–469.

Footnote 111: (return)

—Ibid., 483.

Footnote 112: (return)

—Ibid., 490.

Footnote 113: (return)

—Ibid.

Footnote 114: (return)

—Ibid., 196; vol. liii, supplement, 743; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 147–148; Connelley, Quantrill and the Border Wars, 208–209, 295.

detachments instead of in force produced its own calamitous result. There had never been any appreciable coördination among the parts of Frémont's army. Each worked upon a campaign of its own. To some extent, the same criticism might be held applicable to the opposing Confederate force also, especially when the friction between Price and McCulloch be taken fully into account; but Price's energy was far in excess of Frémont's and he, having once made a plan, invariably saw to its accomplishment. Lincoln viewed Frémont's supineness with increasing apprehension and finally after the fall of Lexington directed Scott to instruct for greater activity. Presumably, Frémont had already aroused himself somewhat; for, on the eighteenth, he had ordered Lane to proceed to Kansas City and from thence to coöperate with Sturgis,¹¹⁵ Lane slowly obeyed¹¹⁶ but managed, while obeying, to do considerable marauding, which worked greatly to the general detestation and lasting discredit of his brigade. For a man, temperamentally constituted as Lane was, warfare had no terrors and its votaries, no scruples. The grim chieftain as he has been somewhat fantastically called, was cruel, indomitable, and disgustingly licentious, a person who would have hesitated at nothing to accomplish his purpose. It was to be expected, then, that he would see nothing terrible in the letting loose of the bad white man, the half-civilized Indian, or the wholly barbarous negro upon society. He believed that the institution of slavery should look out for itself¹¹⁷ and, like Governor Robinson,¹¹⁸ Senator Pomeroy, Secretary Cameron, John

Footnote 115: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 500.

Footnote 116: (return)

—Ibid., 505–506.

Footnote 117: (return)

—Ibid., 516.

Footnote 118: (return)

Spring, Kansas, 272.

Cochrane,¹¹⁹ Thaddeus Stevens¹²⁰ and many another, fully endorsed the principle underlying Frémont's abortive Emancipation Proclamation. He advocated immediate emancipation both as a political and a military measure.¹²¹

There was no doubt by this time that Lane had it in mind to utilize the Indians. In the dog days of August, when he was desperately marshaling his brigade, the Indians presented themselves, in idea, as a likely military contingent. The various Indian agents in Kansas were accordingly communicated with and Special Agent Augustus Wattles authorized to make the needful preparations for Indian enlistment.¹²² Not much could be done in furtherance of the scheme while Lane was engaged in Missouri but, in October, when he was back in Kansas, his interest again manifested itself. He was then recruiting among all kinds of people, the more hot-blooded the better. His energy was likened to frenzy and the more sober-minded took alarm. It was the moment for his political opponents to interpose and Governor Robinson from among them did interpose, being firmly convinced that Lane, by his intemperate zeal and by his guerrilla-like fighting was provoking Missouri to reprisals and thus precipitating upon Kansas the very troubles that he professed to wish to ward off. Incidentally, Robinson, unlike Frémont, was vehemently opposed to Indian enlistment.

Feeling between Robinson and Lane became exceedingly tense in October. Price was again moving

Footnote 119: (return)

Daily Conservative, November 22, 1861.

Footnote 120: (return)

Woodburn, Life of Thaddeus Stevens, 183.

Footnote 121: (return)

Lane's speech at Springfield, November 7, 1861 [Daily Conservative, November 17, 1861].

Footnote 122: (return)

For a full discussion of the progress of the movement, see Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 227 ff.

suspiciously near to Kansas. On the third he was known to have left Warrensburg, ostensibly to join McCulloch in Bates County¹²³ and, on the eighth, he was reported as still proceeding in a southwestwardly direction, possibly to attack Fort Scott.¹²⁴ His movements gave opportunity for a popular expression of opinion among Lane's adherents. On the evening of the eighth, a large meeting was held in Stockton's Hall to consider the whole situation and, amidst great enthusiasm, Lane was importuned to go to Washington,¹²⁵ there to lay the case of the piteous need of Kansas, in actuality more imaginary than real, before the president. Nothing loath to assume such responsibility but not finding it convenient to leave his military task just then, Lane resorted to letter-writing. On the ninth, he complained¹²⁶ to Lincoln that Robinson was attempting to break up his brigade and had secured the coöperation of Prince to that end.¹²⁷ The anti-Robinson press¹²⁸ went farther and accused Robinson and Prince of not being big enough, in the face of grave danger to the commonwealth, to forget old scores.¹²⁹ As a solution of the problem before them, Lane suggested to Lincoln the establishment of a new military district that should include Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas, and be under his command.¹³⁰ So anxious was Lane to be

Footnote 123: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 525, 526, 527.

Footnote 124: (return)

—Ibid, 527.

Footnote 125: (return)

Daily Conservative, October 9, 10, 1861.

Footnote 126: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 529.

Footnote 127: (return)

Daily Conservative, October 9, 15, 1861.

Footnote 128: (return)

Chief among the papers against Robinson, in the matter of his longstanding feud with Lane, was the Daily Conservative with D.W. Wilder as its editor. Another anti-Robinson paper was the Lawrence Republican. The Cincinnati Gazette was decidedly friendly to Lane.

Footnote 129: (return)

Daily Conservative, October 15, 1861.

Footnote 130: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 529–530. Lane outlined his plan for a separate department in his speech in Stockton's Hall [Daily Conservative, October 9, 1861]. (cont.)

identified with what he thought was the rescue of Kansas that he proposed resigning his seat in the senate that he might be entirely untrammelled.¹³¹ Perchance, also, he had some inkling that with Frederick P. Stanton¹³² contesting the seat, a bitter partisan fight was in prospect, a not altogether welcome diversion.¹³³ Stanton, prominent in and out of office in territorial days, was an old political antagonist of the Lane faction and one of the four candidates whose names had been before the legislature in March. In the second half of October, Lane's brigade notably contributed to Frémont's show of activity and then, anticipatory perhaps to greater changes, it was detached from the main column and given the liberty of moving independently down the Missouri line to the Cherokee country.¹³⁴

Lane's efforts towards securing Indian enlistment did not stop with soliciting the Kansas tribes. Thoroughly aware, since the time of his sojourn at Fort Scott, if not before, of the delicate situation in Indian Territory, of the divided allegiance there, and of the despairing cry for help that had gone forth from the Union element to Washington, he conceived it eminently fitting and practicable that that same Union element should have its loyalty put to good uses and be itself induced to take up arms in behalf of the cause it affected so ardently to endorse. To an ex-teacher among the Seminoles, E.H. Carruth, was entrusted the task of recruiting.

The situation in Indian Territory was more than

Footnote 130: (return)

(cont.) Robinson was opposed to the idea [ibid., November 2, 6, 1861].

Footnote 131: (return)

Official Records, vol. iii, 530.

Footnote 132: (return)

Martin, First Two Years of Kansas, 24; Biographical Congressional Directory, 1771–1903.

Footnote 133: (return)

Daily Conservative, November 1, 1861, gives Robinson the credit of inciting Stanton to contest the seat.

Footnote 134: (return)

Daily Conservative, October 30, 1861.

delicate. It was precarious and had been so almost from the beginning. The withdrawal of troops from the frontier posts had left the Territory absolutely destitute of the protection solemnly guaranteed its inhabitants by treaty with the United States government. Appeal¹³⁵ to the War Department for a restoration of what was a sacred obligation had been without effect all the summer. Southern emissaries had had, therefore, an entirely free hand to accomplish whatever purpose they might have in mind with the tribes. In September,¹³⁶ the Indian Office through Charles E. Mix, acting commissioner of Indian affairs in the absence of William P. Dole, who was then away on a mission to the Kansas tribes, again begged the War Department¹³⁷ to look into matters so extremely urgent. National honor would of itself have dictated a policy of intervention before

Footnote 135: (return)

Secretary Cameron's reply to Secretary Smith's first request was uncompromising in the extreme and prophetic of his persistent refusal to recognize the obligation resting upon the United States to protect its defenceless "wards." This is Cameron's letter of May 10, 1861:

"In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state that on the 17th April instructions were issued by this Department to remove the troops stationed at Forts Cobb, Arbuckle, Washita, and Smith, to Fort Leavenworth, leaving it to the discretion of the Commanding Officer to replace them, or not, by Arkansas Volunteers.

"The exigencies of the service will not admit any change in these orders." [Interior Department Files, Bundle no. 1 (1849–1864) War.]

Secretary Smith wrote to Cameron again on the thirtieth [Interior Department Letter Press Book, vol. iii, 125], enclosing Dole's letter of the same date [Interior Department, File Box, January 1 to December 1, 1861; Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 176], but to no purpose.

Footnote 136: (return)

Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 218–219.

Footnote 137: (return)

Although his refusal to keep faith with the Indians is not usually cited among the things making for Cameron's unfitness for the office of Secretary of War, it might well and justifiably be. No student of history questions to-day that the appointment of Simon Cameron to the portfolio of war, to which Thaddeus Stevens had aspirations [Woodburn, Life of Thaddeus Stevens, 239], was one of the worst administrative mistakes Lincoln ever made. It was certainly one of the four cabinet appointment errors noted by Weed [Autobiography, 607].

the poor neglected Indians had been driven to the last desperate straits. The next month, October, nothing at all having been done in the interval, Dole submitted¹³⁸ to Secretary Smith new evidence of a most alarmingly serious state of affairs and asked that the president's attention be at once elicited. The apparent result was that about the middle of November, Dole was able to write with confidence—and he was writing at the request of the president—that the United States was prepared to maintain itself in its authority over the Indians at all hazards.¹³⁹

Boastful words those were and not to be made good until many precious months had elapsed and many sad regrettable scenes enacted. In early November occurred the reorganization of the Department of the West which meant the formation of a Department of Kansas separate and distinct from a Department of Missouri, an arrangement that afforded ample opportunity for a closer attention to local exigencies in both states than had heretofore been possible or than, upon trial, was subsequently to be deemed altogether desirable. It necessarily increased the chances for local patronage and exposed military matters to the grave danger of becoming hopelessly entangled with political.

The need for change of some sort was, however, very evident and the demand for it, insistent. If the southern Indians were not soon secured, they were bound to menace, not only Kansas, but Colorado¹⁴⁰ and to help materially in blocking the way to Texas, New Mexico,

Footnote 138: (return)

Indian Office Report Book no. 12, 225.

Footnote 139: (return)

Dole to Hunter, November 16, 1861, ibid., Letter Book, no. 67, pp. 80–82.

Footnote 140: (return)

On conditions in Colorado Territory, the following are enlightening: ibid., Consolidated Files, C 195 of 1861; C 1213 of 1861; C 1270 of 1861; C 1369 of 1861; V 43 of 1861; Official Records, vol. iv, 73.

and Arizona. Their own domestic affairs had now reached a supremely critical stage.¹⁴¹ It was high time

Footnote 141: (return)

In addition to what may be obtained on the subject from the first volume of this work, two letters of slightly later date furnish particulars, as do also the records of a council held by Agent Cuther with certain chiefs at Leroy.

(a). LAWRENCE, KANSAS, Dec. 14th, 1861.

HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Ind. Affairs

Dear Sir, It is with reluctance that I again intrude on your valuable time. But I am induced to do so by the conviction that the subject of our Indian relations is really a matter of serious concern: as involving the justice and honor of our own Government, and the deepest interests—the very existence, indeed—of a helpless and dependent people. And knowing that it is your wish to be furnished with every item of information which may, in any way, throw light on the subject, I venture to trouble you with another letter.

Mico Hat-ki, the Creek man referred to in my letter of Oct. 31st has been back to the Creek Nation, and returned about the middle of last month. He was accompanied, to this place, by one of his former companions, but had left some of their present company at LeRoy. They were expecting to have a meeting with some of the Indians, at LeRoy, to consult about the proper course to be pursued, in order to protect the loyal and peaceable Indians, from the hostility of the disaffected, who have become troublesome and menacing in their bearing.

With this man and his companion, I had considerable conversation, and find that the Secessionists and disaffected Half-breeds are carrying things with a high hand. While the loyal Indians are not in a condition to resist them, by reason of the proximity of an overwhelming rebel force.

From them (repeating their former statements, regarding the defection of certain parties, and the loyalty of others, with the addition of some further particulars) I learn the following facts: Viz. That M Kennard, the Principal Chief of the Lower Creeks, most of the McIntoshes, George Stidham, and others have joined the rebels, and organized a military force in their interest; for the purpose of intimidating and harrassing the loyal Indians. They name some of the officers, but are not sufficiently conversant with military terms to distinguish the different grades, with much exactness. Unee McIntosh, however, is the highest in rank, (a Colonel I presume) and Sam Cho-co-ti, George Stidham, Chilly McIntosh, are all officers in the Lower Creek rebel force.

Among the Upper Creeks, John Smith, Timiny Barnet and Wm. Robinson, are leaders.

Among the Seminoles, John Jumper, the Principal Chief, is on the side of the rebels. Pas-co-fa, the second chief, stands neutral. Fraser McClish, though himself a Chickasaw, has raised a company (cont.)

for the Federal government to do something to attest its own competency. There was need for it to do that,

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) among the Seminoles in favor of the rebellion. They say the full Indians will kill him.

The Choctaws are divided in much the same way as the other Tribes, the disaffected being principally among the Half-breeds.

The Chickasaw Governor, Harris, is a Secessionist; and so are most, if not all, the Colberts. The full Indians are loyal to the Government, as are some of the mixed bloods also, and here, I remark, from my own knowledge, that this Governor Harris was the first to propose the adoption of concerted measures, among the Southern Tribes, on the subject of Secession. This was instantly and earnestly opposed by John Ross, as being out of place, and an ungrateful violation of the Treaty obligations, by which the Tribes had placed themselves under the exclusive protection of the United States; and, under which, they had enjoyed a long course of peace and prosperity.

They say, there are about four hundred Secessionists, among the Cherokees. But whether organized or not, I did not understand. I presume they meant such as were formerly designated by the term Warriors, somewhat analogous to the class among ourselves, who are fit for military duty, though they may or may not be actually organized and under arms. So that the Thousands of Indians in the secession papers, as figuring in the armies, are enormous exaggerations; and most of them sheer fabrications.

Albert Pike, of Little Rock, boasts of having visited and made treaty alliances with the Comanches, and other tribes, on behalf of the "Confederate States," but the Indians do not believe him. And, in blunt style, say "he tells lies."

They make favorable mention of O-poth-le-yo-ho-lo, an ex-Creek Chief, a true patriot of former days. But, it seems, he has been molested and forced to leave his home to avoid the annoyance and violence of the rebel party. There are, however, more than three thousand young men, of the warrior class, who adhere to his principles, and hold true faith and allegiance to the United States.

They say also that John Ross is not a Secessionist, and that there are more than four thousand patriots among the Cherokees, who are true to the Government of the United States. This agrees, substantially, with my own personal knowledge, unless they have changed within a very short time, which is not at all probable, as the Cherokees, of this class, are pretty fully and correctly informed about the nature of the controversy. And I may add, that much of their information is, through one channel and another, communicated to the Creeks, and much of their spirit too.

On the whole, judging from the most reliable information, I have been able to obtain, I feel assured that the Full Indians of the Creeks, Cherokees, Seminoles, and the small bands living in the Creek Nation, are faithful to the Government. And the same, to a great extent, is (cont.)

moreover, on recognizably loyal ground, causes for dissatisfaction among Kansas emigrant tribes to be

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) true of the Choctaws and Chickasaws. And were it not for the proximity of the rebel force, the loyal Indians would put down the Secession movement among themselves, at once. Or rather, they would not have suffered it to rise at all.

The loyal Indians say, they wish "to stand by their Old Treaties." And they are as persistent in their adherence to these Treaties, as we are, to our Constitution. And I have no doubt that, as soon as the Government can afford them protection, they will be ready, at the first call, to manifest, by overt action, the loyalty to which they are pledged.

They are looking, with great anxiety and hope, for the coming of the great army. And I have no doubt that a friendly communication from the Government, through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, would have a powerful effect in removing any false impressions, which may have been made, on the ignorant and unwary, by the emissaries of Secession, and to encourage and reassure the loyal friends of the Government, who, in despair of timely aid, may have been compelled to yield any degree of submission, to the pressure of an overwhelming force. I was expecting to see these Indians again, and to have had further conversation with them. But I am informed by Charles Johnnycake that they have gone to Fort Leavenworth and expect to go on to Washington. Hearing this, I hesitated about troubling you with this letter at all, as, in that case, you would see them yourself. But I have concluded to send it, as affording me an opportunity to express a few thoughts, with which it would hardly be worth while to occupy a separate letter.

Hoping that the counsels and movements of the Government may be directed by wisdom from above, and that the cause of truth and right may prevail, I remain with great respect, Dear Sir, Your Obedient Ser'v EVAN JONES.

P.S. I rec. a note from Mr. Carruth, saying that he was going to Washington, with a delegation of Southern Indians, and I suppose Mico Hatki and his companions are that Delegation, or at least a part of them.

I will just say in regard to Mr. Carruth that I was acquainted with him, several years ago, as a teacher in the Cherokee Nation. He afterwards went to the Creek Nation, I think, as teacher of a Government school, and I believe, has been there ever since. If so, he must know a good deal about the Creeks. Mr. Carruth bore a good character. I think he married one of the Missionary ladies of the Presbyterian Mission.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Southern Superintendency, J 530 of 1861.]

(b). Wichita Agency, L.D., December 15, 1861.

All well and doing well. Hear you are having trouble among yourselves—fighting one another, but you and we are friendly. Our (cont.)

removed and drastic measures taken with the indigenous of the plains.

The appointment of Hunter to the command of the

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) brothers the Comanches and all the other tribes are still your friends. Mode Cunard and you were here and had the talk with Gen. Pike; we still hold to the talk we made with Gen. Pike, and are keeping the treaty in good faith, and are looking for him back again soon. We look upon you and Mode Cunard and Gen. Pike as brothers. Gen. Pike told us at the council that there were but few of us here, and if any thing turned up to make it necessary he would protect them. We are just as we were when Gen. Pike was up here and keeping the treaty made with him. Our brothers the wild Comanches have been in and are friendly with us.

All the Indians here have but one heart. Our brothers, the Texans, and the Indians are away fighting the cold weather people. We do not intend to go North to fight them, but if they come down here, we will all wait to drive them away. Some of my people are one-eyed and a little crippled, but if the enemy comes here they will all jump out to fight him. Pea-o-popicult, the principal Kiowa chief, has recently visited the reserve, and expressed friendly intentions, and has gone back to consult the rest of his people, and designs returning.

Hoseca X Maria} Ke-Had-a-wah } Chiefs of the Camanches Buffalo Hump } Te-nah Geo. Washington Jim Pockmark

[Indian Office, Confederate Papers, Copy of a letter to John Jumper, certified as a true copy by A.T. Pagy.]

(c). LEROY, COFFEY CO., KANSAS, NOV. 4, 1861.

HON. WM.P. DOLE, COM'R INDIAN AFFAIRS,

Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir: Enclosed I send you a statement of delegation of Creeks, Chickasaw, and Kininola who are here for assistance from the Government. You will see by the enclosed that I have held a Council with them the result of which I send verbatim. They have travelled some 300 or 400 miles to get here, had to take an unfrequented road and were in momentary fear of their lives not because the secessionists were stronger than the Union party in their nation, but because the secessionists were on the alert and were determined that there should be no communication with the Government.

They underwent a great many privations in getting here, had to bear their own expenses, which as some of them who were up here a short time ago have travelled in coming and going some 900 miles was considerable.

I am now supplying them with everything they need on my own responsibility. They dare not return to their people unless troops (cont.)

Department of Kansas was open to certain objections, no doubt; but, to Lane, whose forceful personality had

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) are sent with them and they assure me the moment that is done, a large portion of each of the tribes will rally to the support of the Government and that their warriors will gladly take up arms in its defence.

I write to you from Topeka and urge that steps be taken to render them the requisite protection. I am satisfied that the Department will see the urgent necessity of carrying out the Treaty stipulations and giving these Indians who are so desirous of standing firm by the Government and who have resisted so persistently all the overtures of the secessionists, the assistance and protection which is their due. I am informed by these Indians that John Ross is desirous of standing by the Government, and that he has 4000 warriors who are willing to do battle for the cause of the Union.

They also inform me, that the Washitas, Caddos, Tenies, Wakoes, Tewakano, Chiekies, Shawnees, and Kickapoos are almost unanimously Union. Gen. Lane is anxious to do something to relieve the Union Indians in the southern tribes, by taking prompt and energetic steps at this time—it can be done with little expense and but little trouble, while the benefit to be derived will be incalculable. Let me beg of you and more that the matter be laid before the Department and the proper steps be taken to give the Indians that protection which is their due and at the same time take an important step in sustaining the supremacy of the Government. Your obedient Servant, GEO.A. CUTLER, agent for the Indians of the Creek agency.

ENCLOSURES

At a Council of the Creeks, held at Leroy in Coffey County, Kansas, at the house of the Agent of said Indians, Maj. Geo. A. Cutler, who was unable to visit their Country owing to the rebellion existing in the Country, the following talk was had by the Chiefs of said nation, eight in number—Four Creeks, Two Seminoles, Two Chickasaws.

Oke-Tah-hah-shah-haw-choe, Chief of Creek Upper District says, he will talk short words this time—wants to tell how to get trouble in Creek nation. First time Albert Pike come in he made great deal trouble. That man told Indian that the Union people would come and take away property and would take away land—now you sleep, you ought to wake up and attend to your own property. Tell them there ain't no U.S.—ain't any more Treaty—all be dead—Tell them as there is no more U.S. no more Treaty that the Creeks had better make new Treaty with the South and the Southern President would protect them and give them their annuity—Tell them if you make Treaty with southern President that he would pay you more annuity and would pay better than the U.S. if they the Indians would help the Southern President—Mr. Pike makes the half (cont.)

impressed itself, for good or ill, upon the trans-Missouri region, it was, to say the least, somewhat

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) breeds believe what he says and the half breeds makes some of the full blood Indians believe what he says that they (the Indians) must help the secessionists. Then that is so—but as for himself he don't believe him yet. Then he thought the old U.S. was alive yet and the Treaty was good. Wont go against the U.S. himself—That is the reason the Secessions want to have him—The Secessionists offered 5000$ for his head because he would not go against the U.S. Never knew that Creek have an agent here until he come and see him and that is why I have come among this Union people. Have come in and saw my agent and want to go by the old Treaty. Wants to get with U.S. Army so that I can get back to my people as Secessionists will not let me go. Wants the Great Father to send the Union Red people and Troops down the Black Beaver road and he will guide them to his country and then all his people will be for the Union—That he cannot get back to his people any other way—Our Father to protect the land in peace so that he can live in peace on the land according to the Treaty—At the time I left my union people I told them to look to the Beaver Road until I come. Promised his own people that the U.S. Army would come back the Beaver Road and wants to go that way—The way he left his country his people was in an elbow surrounded by secessions and his people is not strong enough against them for Union and that is the reason he has come up for help—Needed guns, powder, lead to take to his own people. Own people for the Union about 3350 warriors all Creeks—Needed now clothing, tents for winter, tools, shirts, and every thing owned by whites—wants their annuity as they need it now—The Indians and the Whites among us have done nothing against any one but the Secessionists have compelled us to fight and we are willing to fight for the Union. Creek half breeds joined secessionists. 32 head men and leaders-27 towns for the Union among Creeks

Signed: Oke-tah-hah-shah-haw Choe his X mark.

Talk of Chickasaw Chief, Toe-Lad-Ke

Says—Will talk short words—have had fever and sick—Secessionists told him no more U.S. no more Treaty—all broken up better make new Treaty with Secessionists—Although they told him all this did not believe them and that is reason came up to see if there was not still old U.S.—Loves his country—loves his children and would not believe them yet—That he did not believe what the Secessionists told him and they would not let him live in peace and that is the reason he left his country—The secessionists want to tie him—whip him and make him join them—but he would not and he left.

100 warriors for secession—

2240 do " Union

(cont.)

disconcerting, not because Lane was hostile to Hunter personally—the two men had long had a friendly acquaintance

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.) The secessionists plague him so much talk he asks for his country that the army go down and that is what his people wants same as Creek and Seminole—Have seen the agent of the Creeks but have not seen our agent but want to see him—wants agent sent—He has always done no wrong—Secessionists would not let him live in peace—and if have to fight all his people will fight for Union—That is all the chance that he can save his lands and property to children—by old U.S. and Treaty—Chickasaw—Seminoles and Creeks all in no difference—all for the Union—all want annuity and have had none for some time—Now my Great Father you must remember me and my people and all our wants. Signed: TOE-LAD-KE, his X mark.

Talk of Seminole Chief, Choo-Loo-Foe-Lop-hah-Choe

Says: Pike went among the Seminoles and tell them the same as he told the Creek. The talk of Pike he did not believe and told him so himself—Some of my people did believe Pike and did join the secessionists also he believed the old U.S. is alive and Treaty not dead and that is the reason he come up and had this talk—Never had done any thing against Treaty and had come to have Great Father protect us—Secession told him that Union men was going to take away land and property—could get no annuity old U.S. all gone—come to see—find it not so—wants President to send an agent don't know who agent is—wants to appoint agent himself as he knows who he wants. Twelve towns are for the Union

500 warriors for the Union

100 do " Secession

All people who come with Billy Bowlegs are Union—Chief in place of Billy Bowlegs Shoe-Nock-Me-Koe this is his name—Need everything that Creeks need—arms clothing, etc. etc. wants to go with army same way and same road with Creek—This is what we ask of our Great Father live as the Treaty says in peace—and all Seminole warriors will fight for the Union. This is the request of our people of our Great Father They need their annuity have not had any for nearly a year and want it sent.

Signed: CHOO-LOO-FOE-LOP-HAH-CHOE, his X mark.

We the Chiefs of the three nations Creeks, Chickasaws and Seminoles who are of this delegation and all for the Union and the majority of our people are for the Union and agree in all that has been said by the Chiefs who have made this talk, and believe all they have said to be true—

OKE-TAH-HAH-SHAH-HAW-CHOE his X mark Creek

WHITE CHIEF his X mark Creek

BOB DEER his X mark Creek

PHIL DAVID his X mark Creek

(cont.)

with each other¹⁴²—but because he had had great hopes of receiving the post himself.¹⁴³ The time was now drawing near for him to repair to Washington to resume his senatorial duties since Congress was to convene the second of December.

To further his scheme for Indian enlistment, Lane had projected an inter-tribal council to be held at his own headquarters. E.H. Carruth worked especially to that end. The man in charge of the Southern Superintendency, W.G. Coffin, had a similar plan in mind for less specific reasons. His idea was to confer with the representatives of the southern tribes with reference to Indian Territory conditions generally. It was part of the duty appertaining to his office. Humboldt¹⁴⁴ was the place selected by him for the meeting; but Leroy, being better protected and more accessible, was soon substituted. The sessions commenced the

Footnote 141: (return)

(cont.)

TOE-LAD-KE his X mark Chickasaw

CHAP-PIA-KE his X mark Chickasaw

CHOO-LOO-FOE-LOP-HAH-CHOE his X mark Seminole

OH-CHEN-YAH-HOE-LAH his X mark Seminole

Witness: C.F. Currier W. Whistler

LEROY, COFFEY CO. KAN., Nov. 4 1861.

I do certify that the within statement of the different chiefs were taken before me at a council held at my house at the time stated and that the talk of the Indian was correctly taken down by a competent clerk at the time.

GEO.A. CUTLER, Agent for the Creek Indians.

[Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Southern Superintendency, C 1400 of 1861.]

Footnote 142: (return)

Their acquaintance dated, if not from the antebellum days when Hunter was stationed at Fort Leavenworth and was not particularly magnanimous in his treatment of Southerners, then from those when he had charge, by order of General Scott, of the guard at the White House. Report of the Military Services of General David Hunter, pp. 7, 8.

Footnote 143: (return)

Daily Conservative, November 13, 1861.

Footnote 144: (return)

Coffin to Dole, October 2, 1861, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1861, p. 39.

sixteenth¹⁴⁵ of November and were still continuing on the twenty-third.¹⁴⁶ It had not been possible to hold them earlier because of the disturbed state of the country and the consequent difficulty of getting into touch with the Indians.

Upon assuming command of the Department of Kansas, General Hunter took full cognizance of the many things making for disquietude and turmoil in the country now under his jurisdiction. Indian relations became, of necessity, matters of prime concern. Three things bear witness to this fact, Hunter's plans for an inter-tribal council at Fort Leavenworth, his own headquarters; his advocacy of Indian enlistment, especially from among the southern Indians; and his intention, early avowed, of bringing Brigadier-general James W. Denver into military prominence and of entrusting to him the supervisory command in Kansas. In some respects, no man could have been found equal to Denver in conspicuous fitness for such a position. He had served as commissioner of Indian affairs¹⁴⁷ under Buchanan and, although a Virginian by birth, had had a large experience with frontier life—in Missouri, in the Southwest during the Mexican War, and in California. He had also measured swords with Lane. It was in squatter-sovereignty days when, first as secretary and then as governor of Kansas Territory, he had been in a position to become intimately acquainted with the intricacies of Lane's true character and had had both occasion and opportunity to oppose some of that worthy's autocratic and thoroughly lawless

Footnote 145: (return)

Daily Conservative, November 17, 1861.

Footnote 146: (return)

—Ibid., November 23,1861.

Footnote 147: (return)

Denver was twice appointed Commissioner of Indian Affairs by Buchanan. For details as to his official career, see Biographical Congressional Directory, 499, and Robinson, Kansas Conflict, 424.

maneuvers.¹⁴⁸ As events turned out, this very acquaintance with Lane constituted his political unfitness for the control that Hunter,¹⁴⁹ in December, and Halleck,¹⁵⁰ in the following March, designed to give him. With the second summons to command, came opportunity for Lane's vindictive animosity to be called into play. Historically, it furnished conclusive proof, if any were needed, that Lane had supreme power over the distribution of Federal patronage in his own state and exercised that power even at the cost of the well-being and credit of his constituency.

When Congress began its second session in December, the fight against Lane for possession of his seat in the Senate proceeded apace; but that did not, in the least, deter him from working for his brigade. His scheme now was to have it organized on a different footing from that which it had sustained heretofore. His influence with the administration in Washington was still very peculiar and very considerable, so much so, in fact, that President Lincoln, without taking expert advice and without consulting either the military men, whose authority would necessarily be affected, or the civil officials in Kansas, nominated him to the Senate as brigadier-general to have charge of troops in that state.¹⁵¹ Secretary Cameron was absent from the city

Footnote 148: (return)

Robinson, op. cit., 378 ff., 424 ff.

Footnote 149: (return)

Official Records, vol. viii, 456.

Footnote 150: (return)

—Ibid., 832.

Footnote 151: (return)

The Leavenworth Daily Conservative seemed fairly jubilant over the prospect of Lane's early return to military activity. The following extracts from its news items and editorials convey some such idea:

"General Lane of Kansas has been nominated to the Senate and unanimously confirmed, as Brigadier General, to command Kansas troops; the express understanding being that General Lane's seat in the Senate shall not be vacated until he accepts his new commission, which he will not do until the Legislature of Kansas assembles, next month. He has no idea of doing anything that shall oblige Governor Robinson and his appointee (Stanton) (cont.)

at the time this was done and apparently, when apprised of it, made some objections on the score, not so much of an invasion of his own prerogative, as of its probable effect upon Hunter. Cameron had his first consultation with Lane regarding the matter, January second, and was given by him to understand that everything had been done in strict accordance with Hunter's own wishes.¹⁵² The practical question of the relation of Lane's brigade to Hunter's command soon, however, presented itself in a somewhat different light and its answer required a more explicit statement from the president than had yet been made. Lincoln, when appealed to, unhesitatingly repudiated every suggestion of the idea that it had ever been his intention to give Lane an independent command or to have Hunter, in any sense, superseded.¹⁵³

The need for sending relief to the southern Indians, which, correctly interpreted meant, of course, reasserting authority over them and thus removing a menacing and impending danger from the Kansas border, had been one of Lane's strongest arguments in gaining his way with the administration. The larger aspect of his purpose was, however, the one that appealed to Commissioner Dole, who, as head of the Indian Bureau, seems fully to have appreciated the responsibility that

Footnote 151: (return)

(cont.) who has been in waiting for several months to take the place."—Daily Conservative, January 1, 1862.

"Rejoicing in Neosho Battalion over report that Lane appointed to command Kansas troops."—Ibid., January 4, 1862.

"General Lane will soon be here and General Denver called to another command."—Ibid., January 7, 1862.

Footnote 152: (return)

Cameron to Hunter, January 3, 1862, Official Records, vol. liii, supplement, 512–513.

Footnote 153: (return)

Martin F. Conway, the Kansas representative in Congress, was under no misapprehension as to Lane's true position; for Lincoln had told him personally that Lane was to be under Hunter [Daily Conservative, February 6, 1862].

assuredly rested in all honor upon the government, whether conscious of it or not, to protect its wards in their lives and property. From the first intimation given him of Lane's desire for a more energetic procedure, Dole showed a willingness to coöperate; and, as many things were demanding his personal attention in the West, he so timed a journey of his own that it might be possible for him to assist in getting together the Indian contingent that was to form a part of the "Southern Expedition."¹⁵⁴

The urgency of the Indian call for help¹⁵⁵ and the

Footnote 154: (return)

Lane's expedition was variously referred to as "the Southern Expedition," "the Cherokee Expedition," "the great jayhawking expedition," and by many another name, more or less opprobrious.

Footnote 155: (return)

Representations of the great need of the Indians for assistance were made to the government by all sorts of people. Agent after agent wrote to the Indian Office. The Reverend Evan Jones wrote repeatedly and on the second of January had sent information, brought to him at Lawrence by two fugitive Cherokees, of the recent battle in which the loyalists under Opoethle-yo-ho-la had been worsted, at the Big Bend of the Arkansas [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Southern Superintendency, J 540 of 1862]. In the early winter, a mixed delegation of Creeks and others had made their way to Washington, hoping by personal entreaty to obtain succor for their distressed people, and justice. Hunter had issued a draft for their individual relief [ibid., J523 of 1861], and passes from Fort Leavenworth to Washington [ibid., C1433 of 1861]. It was not so easy for them to get passes coming back. Application was made to the War Department and referred back to the Interior [ibid., A 434 of 1861]. The estimate, somewhat inaccurately footed up, of the total expense of the return journey as submitted by agents Cutler and Carruth was,

"11 R.R. Tickets to Fort Leavenworth by way of New York City

$48 $ 528.00

11 men $2 ea (incidental expenses) 22.00

2½ wks board at Washington $5 137.50

Expenses from Leavenworth to Ind. Nat 50.00

Pay of Tecumseh for taking care of horses 25.00

—————

[Ibid., C 1433 of 1861]. $ 960.50"

Dole had not encouraged the delegation to come on to Washington. He pleaded lack of funds and the wish that they would wait in Fort Leavenworth and attend Hunter's inter-tribal council so that they might go back to their people carrying definite messages of what was to be done (cont.)