Читать книгу The History of Slaveholding Indians - Annie Heloise Abel - Страница 10

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The work of soliciting the military support of the Indians and, to a large extent, that of securing it, antedated very considerably the formal negotiation of treaties with their constituted authorities. Whether it be true or not, that Douglas H. Cooper, United States agent for the Choctaws and the Chickasaws, did, as early as April, 1861, begin to enroll his Indians for the service of the Confederate States, it is indisputable that, immediately upon receiving Secretary Walker’s communication408 of May thirteenth, he began to do it in real earnest and, from that time forward, gained his recruits with astonishing ease. There were many409 to recommend the employment of the Indians and some to oppose it. A certain F. J. Marshall, writing410 to Jefferson Davis from Marysville, Kansas, on the twentieth of May, mapped out a tremendous programme of activities in which Indians were to play their part and to help secure everything of value between the Missouri line and the Pacific coast. Henry McCulloch thought411 they might be used advantageously in Texas and on her borders. Pike believed412 not more than thirty-five hundred could be counted upon, maybe five thousand, but whatever the number, he would engage them quickly and provide them with the necessary equipment. He wanted also to employ413 a battalion of those Indians that more strictly belonged to Kansas. Presumably, then, he would not have confined Confederate interest to the slaveholding tribes. Others besides Pike were doubtless of the same mind. Marshall was, for instance, and southern emissaries were frequently heard of, north of the Neosho River. Henry C. Whitney, one of two United States special agents (Thomas C. Slaughter was the other), sent414 out to Kansas to investigate and with a view to relieve under congressional appropriation415 the distress among the Indians, caused by the fearful and widespread drouth of 1860, met416 with many traces of secessionist influence.417

The efforts of Cooper, coupled with those of Pike and McCulloch, in this matter of the enlistment of Indian troops, were soon rewarded. Chief Hudson’s proclamation of June fourteenth, besides being a declaration of independence, was a call for troops and a call that was responded to by the Choctaws with alacrity. A little more than a month later, the enlistment of Indians had so far advanced that McCulloch was able to speak418 positively as to his intended disposition of them. It was to keep them, both the Choctaw-Chickasaw regiment, which was then well under way towards organization, and the Creek, which was then forming, at Scullyville, situated fifteen miles, or thereabouts, from Fort Smith, as a check upon the Cherokees. Evidently the peace-loving element among the Cherokees was yet the dominant one. On the twenty-fifth of July, Cooper furnished further information,

The organization of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment of Mounted Rifles will be completed this week, but as yet no arms419 have been furnished at Fort Smith for them. I hope speedy and effectual measures will be taken to arm the people of this (Indian) Territory—the Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees.... The Choctaws and Chickasaws can furnish 10,000 warriors420 if needed. The Choctaws and Chickasaws are extremely anxious to form another regiment.

There seems to be a disposition to keep the Indians at home. This seems to me bad policy. They are unfit for garrison duty, and would be a terror to the Yankees.421

All this time, of course, Pike had been making progress with his treaties and undoubtedly simplifying Cooper’s task by embodying in those treaties the principles of an active alliance. These clauses from the Creek Treaty will illustrate the point:

Article I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship, and an alliance offensive and defensive, between the Confederate States of America, and all of their States and people, and the Creek Nation of Indians, and all its towns and individuals.422

Article XXXVI. In consideration of the common interests of the Creek Nation and the Confederate States, and of the protection and rights guaranteed to the said nation by this treaty, the Creek Nation, hereby agrees that it will, either by itself or in conjunction with the Seminole Nation, raise and furnish a regiment of ten companies of mounted men to serve in the armies of the Confederate States for twelve months, the company officers whereof shall be elected by the members of the company, and the field officers by a majority of the votes of the members of the regiment. The men shall be armed by the Confederate States, receive the same pay and allowances as other mounted troops in the service, and not be moved beyond the limits of the Indian country west of Arkansas without their consent.423

Article XXXVII. The Creek Nation hereby agrees and binds itself at any future time to raise and furnish, upon the requisition of the President, such number of troops for the defence of the Indian country, and of the frontier of the Confederate States as he may fix, not out of fair proportion to the number of its population, to be employed for such terms of service as the President may fix; and such troops shall always receive the same pay and allowances as other troops of the same class in the service of the Confederate States.424

Article XXXVIII. It is further agreed by the said Confederate States that the said Creek Nation shall never be required or called upon to pay, in land or otherwise, any part of the expenses of the present war, or of any war waged by or against the Confederate States.425

Article XXXIX. It is further agreed that, after the restoration of peace, the Government of the Confederate States will defend the frontiers of the Indian country, of which the Creek country is a part, and hold the forts and posts therein, with native troops, recruited among the several Indian Nations included therein, under the command of officers of the army of the Confederate States, in preference to other troops.426

Although John Ross had positively forbidden the recruiting of any force within the limits of the Cherokee country, that while nominally for home defense, should be in reality a reserve force for the Confederacy, he was unable to prevent individuals from going over, on their own responsibility entirely, to McCulloch; and many did go and are believed to have fought427 with his brigade at the Battle of Oak Hills, or Wilson’s Creek. That battle proved the determining point in this period of Cherokee history. It was a Confederate victory, and a victory gained under such circumstances428 that the watchful Indians had every reason to think that the southern cause would be triumphant in the end.

The dissensions429 among the Cherokee and the constant endeavors of the Ridge Party to develop public sentiment in favor of the Confederacy, to undermine the popularity of John Ross, and to destroy his influence over the full-bloods were, and there is no gainsaying it, the real causes of the ultimate Cherokee defection. The Battle of Wilson’s Creek was only the occasion, only the immediate cause, the excuse, if you please, and of itself could never have brought about a decision. Yet its effect430 upon Cherokee opinion was unquestionably great and immediate, and that effect was noticeably strengthened and intensified by the memory of other Federal reverses along the Atlantic seaboard, especially the more recent and more serious one of Manassas Junction, on the twenty-first of July.

Up to about that time, the neutral policy of John Ross seems to have received the endorsement of a majority of the Cherokee people. In the last days of June, the Executive Council had been called together and had, after a session of several days, publicly and officially approved431 of the stand the principal chief had taken to date. But events were already under way that were to make this executive action in no sense a true index to popular feeling. The secessionists were secretly organizing themselves, ready to seize the first opportunity that might appear. The full-bloods, or non-secessionists, were also organized and, under the name of “Pins,” were holding meetings of mutual encouragement among the hills. Encounters between the two factions were not infrequent and the half-breeds resorted to all sorts of expedients for persuading, or that failing, of frightening the full-bloods into a compliance with their wishes. They told them that the Kansas people had designs upon their lands (which was not altogether untrue), and that the Federal government would free their slaves and otherwise dispossess, degrade, and humiliate them. Such arguments had their effect and there was little at hand to counteract it, none in the memory of the past, none in the neglect and embarrassment of the present, none in the prospect of the future. There were no Federal troops, no new Federal assurances of protection. Agent Crawford, who was the only agent within reach, added his threats and his Confederate promises to those of the half-breeds. Then came the Battle of Wilson’s Creek with its disastrous Federal showing, and the exhausted resisting power of the Pins went down before the renewed secessionist ardor.

A meeting of the Cherokee Executive Council had been called for August first, and John Ross, Joseph Vann, James Brown, John Drew, and William P. Ross, all prominent non-secessionists, had attended it. On this occasion, a general, or mass, meeting of the Cherokee people was arranged for, in response to a public appeal, and the date for it was fixed for the twentieth of August.432 In the interval came the news from Springfield and another communication from Albert Pike.433

The convention which met at Tahlequah in August of 1861 ended in the secession of the Cherokee Nation. While it was in progress, the events of the last few months were gone over in thorough review and emphasis placed upon those of recent occurrence. The attendance at the convention was large.434 Both political factions were well represented and there seems to have been only a slight show of force, if any, from the secessionists. The Reverend Evan Jones is our authority for thinking that some “seventy or eighty of them appeared there in arms with the intention to break up the meeting;” but that only two of them succeeded in making any disturbance.435 In the course of the meeting, Agent Crawford put in an appearance and again asserted himself in behalf of the Confederacy. He “appeared on the platform,” says an eyewitness,

And stated that although for some time past he had been among the Cherokees acting as U. S. Agent, it had been by the advice and consent of the Confederate authorities, and with the understanding that when the proper time arrived he should declare himself the Agent of the C. S. A. That time had now come making this the proudest day of his life.436.

Such a confession of baseness seems hardly credible. The secessionist was entitled to his opinions touching the doctrine of state rights, for which a difference of view found its justification both in fact and in theory. He might even conscientiously believe in the righteousness of negro enslavement, inasmuch as it really did offer an easy solution of a labor problem; and moreover, would work under a benign paternalism, for the thorough, because so gradual, development of an inferior race; but by no standard of personal honor, or of moral rectitude could conduct such as Crawford’s be condoned.

John Ross had opened the meeting with an address in which he had defined its purposes and his own good intentions, both past and present. Personally, he seemed still inclined to maintain a neutral attitude but designing persons had made his position most difficult.437

... Our soil has not been invaded, our peace has not been molested, nor our rights interfered with by either Government. On the contrary, the people have remained at home, cultivated their farms in security, and are reaping fruitful returns for their labors. But for false fabrications, we should have pursued our ordinary vocations without any excitement at home, or misrepresentations and consequent misapprehensions abroad, as to the real sentiments and purposes of the Cherokee people. Alarming reports, however, have been pertinaciously circulated at home and unjust imputations among the people of the States. The object seems to have been to create strife and conflict, instead of harmony and good-will, among the people themselves, and to engender prejudice and distrust, instead of kindness and confidence, towards them by the officers and citizens of the Confederate States....

... The great object with me has been to have the Cherokee people harmonious and united in the full and free exercise and enjoyment of all their rights of person and property. Union is strength; dissension is weakness, misery, ruin. In time of peace, enjoy peace together; in time of war, if war must come, fight together. As brothers live, as brothers die. While ready and willing to defend our firesides from the robber and murderer,[Pg 221-223] let us not make war wantonly against the authority of the United or Confederate States, but avoid conflict with either, and remain strictly on our own soil. We have homes endeared to us by every consideration, laws adapted to our condition of our own choice, and rights and privileges of the highest character. Here they must be enjoyed or nowhere else. When your nationality ceases here, it will live nowhere else. When these homes are lost, you will find no others like them. Then, my countrymen, as you regard your own rights, as you regard the welfare of your posterity, be prudent how you act. The permanent disruption of the United States is now probable. The State on our border and the Indian nations about us have severed their connection from the United States and joined the Confederate States. Our general interests are inseparable from theirs, and it is not desirable that we should stand alone. The preservation of our rights and of our existence are above every other consideration. And in view of all the circumstances of our situation I do say to you frankly that in my opinion the time has now come when you should signify your consent for the authorities of the nation to adopt preliminary steps for an alliance with the Confederate States upon terms honorable and advantageous to the Cherokee Nation.438

Colonel Adair, Cherokee

After having received this most solemn of warnings, “and a few pertinent and forcible remarks from Colonel Crawford,” the meeting organized with Joseph Vann as president and William P. Ross as secretary. To effect a reconciliation between the contending factions and to decide upon some national policy that should be acceptable to the majority of the people, were, undoubtedly, the objects sought and so, after much discussion, a series of resolutions was adopted in which these ideas were given prominence as well as some of kindred importance. The resolutions asserted the legal and constitutional right of property in slaves and, in no doubtful terms, a friendship for the Confederacy. Yet the convention itself took no definite action towards consummating an alliance but left everything to the discretion of the constituted authorities of the nation, in whom it announced an unwavering confidence.

Whereas we, the Cherokee people, have been invited by the executive of the Cherokee Nation, in compliance with the request of many citizens, to meet in general meeting, for the purpose of drawing more closely the bonds of friendship and sympathy which should characterize our conduct and mark our feelings towards each other in view of the difficulties and dangers which have arisen from the fearful condition of affairs among the people of the several States, and for the purpose of giving a free and frank expression of the real sentiments we cherish towards each other, and of our true position in regard to questions which affect the general welfare, and particularly on that of the subject of slavery: Therefore be it hereby

Resolved, That we fully approve the neutrality recommended by the principal chief in the war pending between the United and the Confederate States, and tender to General McCulloch our thanks for the respect he has shown to our position.

Resolved, That we renew the pledges given by the executive of this nation of the friendship of the Cherokees towards the people of all the States, and particularly towards those on our immediate border, with whom our relations have been harmonious and cordial, and from whom they should not be separated.

Resolved, That we also take occasion to renew to the Creeks, Choctaws, Seminoles, Chickasaws, and Osages, and others, assurances of continued friendship and brotherly feeling.

Resolved, That we hereby disavow any wish or purpose to create or perpetuate any distinctions between the citizens of our country as to the full and mixed blood, but regard each and all as our brothers, and entitled to equal rights and privileges according to the constitution and laws of the nation.

Resolved, That we proclaim unwavering attachment to the constitution and laws of the Cherokee Nation, and solemnly pledge ourselves to defend and support the same, and as far as in us lies to secure to the citizens of the nation all the rights and privileges which they guarantee to them.

Resolved, That among the rights guaranteed by the constitution and laws we distinctly recognize that of property in negro slaves, and hereby publicly denounce as calumniators those who represent us to be abolitionists, and as a consequence hostile to the South, which is both the land of our birth and the land of our homes.

Resolved, That the great consideration with the Cherokee people should be a united and harmonious support and defense of their common rights, and we hereby pledge ourselves to mutually sustain our nationality, and to defend our lives and the integrity of our homes and soil whenever the same shall be wantonly assailed by lawless marauders.

Resolved, That, reposing full confidence in the constituted authorities of the Cherokee Nation, we submit to their wisdom the management of all questions which affect our interests growing out of the exigencies of the relations between the United and Confederate States of America, and which may render an alliance on our part with the latter States expedient and desirable.

And which resolutions, upon the question of their passage being put, were carried by acclamation. Joseph Vann, President.

Wm. P. Ross, Secretary.

Tahlequah, C. N., August 21, 1861.439

In making his plans, prior to the Battle of Wilson’s Creek, for effecting a junction with Price and coöperating with him and others in southwest Missouri, McCulloch acted, not under direct orders from Richmond, but from his own desire to take such a position opposite the Cherokee Neutral Lands, once so outrageously intruded upon by Kansas settlers and now being made the highway of marauders entering Missouri, as would make it appear to the Cherokees that he was there as their friend and as the protector of their interests. After the battle, he refused, and rightly in view of his own special commission, to accompany Price in his forward march towards the Missouri River. Instead he drew back into the neighborhood of the Cherokee boundary and there developed his plans for attacking Kansas, should such a course be deemed necessary in order to protect Indian Territory.

It was at this juncture that the Cherokees as a nation expressed their preference for the South and for the southern cause, moved thereto, however, by the peculiarities and the difficulties of their situation. The Executive Council lost no time in communicating440 to McCulloch the decision of the Tahlequah mass-meeting and their own determination to carry out its wishes by effecting an alliance with the Confederacy “as early as practicable.” They realized very clearly that this might “give rise to movements against the Cherokee people upon their northern border” and were resolved to be prepared for such an emergency. They, therefore, authorized the raising of a regiment of mounted men, home guards they were to be and to be so designated, officered by appointment of the principal chief, Colonel John Drew being made the colonel. It would appear that the nucleus of this regiment, and with a strong southern bias, had made441 its appearance prior to the Tahlequah meeting and the circumstance gave rise to the suspicion that the Cherokees had not been acting in good faith. After the war, the suspicion concentrated, very unjustly, upon John Ross and was made the most of by Commissioner Cooley at the Fort Smith conference; in order to accomplish, for reasons dishonorable to the United States government, the aged chief’s deposition.

Drew’s regiment of home guards was tendered to McCulloch and he agreed to accept it442 but not until after a treaty of alliance should have been actually consummated between the Cherokees and the Confederate States. Pending the accomplishment of that highly desirable object, McCulloch promised to protect the Cherokee borders with his own troops and confessed443 that he had already authorized the enlistment of another force of Cherokees under the command of Stand Watie, which had been designed to protect that same northern border but “not to interfere with the neutrality of the Nation by occupying a position within its limits.”

It is not easy to decide just when or by whom the use of Indians by the Federals in the border warfare444 was first suggested. As late as May twenty-second, Governor Charles Robinson of Kansas, in a letter445 to Superintendent Branch, protested against even so much as arming them, which would certainly indicate that a general use of their services had not yet been thought of or resorted to; but, in August, when Senator James H. Lane was busy organizing his brigade of volunteers for the defense of Kansas, he resolved,446 rather officiously, one might think, upon using some of the Kansas River tribes in establishing “a strong Indian camp near the neutral lands to prevent forage into Kansas” and arranged for a conference with the Indians at Fort Lincoln, his headquarters. Soon, however, a stay of execution was ordered447 until the matter could be discussed, in its larger aspects, with Commissioner Dole, to whom courtesy,448 at least, would have demanded that the whole affair should have been first submitted.

Dole was then in Kansas449 and before long became aware450 that General Frémont was also favoring the enlistment of Indians, or, at all events, their employment by the army in some capacity. He had approached Agent Johnson on the subject, his immediate purpose being to request Fall Leaf, a Delaware, “to organize a party of 50 men for the service of” his department. Agent Johnson called the tribe together and discovered that the chiefs were much averse to having their young men enlist. Dole inquired into the matter and assured451 the chiefs that a few braves only were needed and those simply for special service and that there was no intention of asking the tribe, as a tribe, to give its services. The chiefs refused consent, notwithstanding; but Fall Leaf and a few others like him did enlist.452 They were probably among the fifty-three Delawares, subsequently reported453 as having been employed by Frémont to act as scouts and guides. Fall Leaf attained the rank of captain.454 Superintendent Branch,455 be it said, and also Commissioner Dole,456 at this stage of the war, were strongly opposed to a general use of the Indians for purposes of active warfare. They knew only too well what it was likely to lead to. Indeed, the most that Dole had, up to date, agreed457 to, was the supplying the Indians with the means of their own defense when United States troops had shown themselves quite unavailable.

Dole’s opinion being such, it is scarcely to be supposed that he could have considered favorably Senator Lane’s idea of an Indian camp in the Cherokee Neutral Lands or the one, developed later, of an Indian patrol along the southern boundary of Kansas. Lane’s troubles, quite apart from his Indian projects, were daily increasing; and, considering the method of warfare indulged in by him and encouraged in his white troops, the same one that pro-slavery and free-state men had equally experimented with in squatter-sovereignty days, it would have been simply deplorable to have permitted him the free use of Indian warriors. Complaints458 of Lane and of his brigade, of their jayhawking and of their marauding were being made on every hand. Governor Robinson459 reported these complaints and endorsed them. Secretary Cameron, while making his western tour of investigation, heard460 them and reported them also. Lane attributed461 them to personal dislike of him, to envy, to everything, in fact, except their true cause; but we know now that they were all well-grounded. Yet, remarkable to relate, Lane’s influence with Lincoln and with the War Department suffered no appreciable decline. His suggestions462 were acted upon; and, as we shall presently see, he was even permitted to organize a huge jayhawking expedition at the beginning of the next year.

The mention of Lane’s jayhawking expedition calls to mind the conditions that made it seem, at the time, an acceptable thing and takes us back in retrospect to Indian Territory and to the events occurring there after the Tahlequah mass-meeting of the twenty-first of August. As soon as the meeting had broken up, John Ross despatched463 a messenger to Albert Pike to inform him of all that had happened and of the Cherokee willingness, at last, to negotiate with the Confederacy. It was arranged that Pike should come to the Cherokee country, taking up his quarters temporarily at Park Hill, the home of Ross near Tahlequah, and that a general Indian council should be called. A special effort was made to have the fragmentary bands of the northeast represented and Pike sent out various agents464 to urge an attendance. John Ross was also active in the same interest. He, personally, communicated with the Osages465 and with the Creeks466 by letter; but the Creeks,467 like Evan Jones,468 seem to have been incredulous as to Cherokee defection. They seem to have doubted the genuineness of the letter sent to them and made inquiries about it, only to be assured469 again and again by Ross that all was well and that he wished the Indians en masse to join the Southern States.

The council at Tahlequah, viewed in the light of its immediate object, was unusually successful. Four treaties were negotiated, one470 at Tahlequah itself, October seventh, with the Cherokees and three at Park Hill. Of these three, one471 was with four bands of the Great Osages, Clermont’s, White Hair’s, Black Dog’s, and the Big Hill, October second; another472 with the Quapaws, October fourth; and the third,473 on the same day, with the Senecas474 (once of Sandusky) and the Shawnees (once of Lewistown and now of the mixed band of Senecas and Shawnees). Hereditary475 chiefs alone signed for the Great Osages, the merit chief, Big Chief, being, apparently, not present. The notorious ex-United States agent, J. W. Washbourne,476 was very much in evidence as would most likely also have been the equally notorious and disreputable Indian trader, John Mathews,477 had he not recently received his deserts at the hands of Senator Lane’s brigade.

An accurate and connected account of the occurrences at the Tahlequah council, it is well nigh impossible to obtain. Some intimidation478 seems to have been used, and there was a report of a collision479 between the Ross and Ridge factions some days previous to the meeting. Drew’s regiment, which, when organized, had been placed as a guard480 on the northern border, escorted481 Commissioner Pike to Park Hill and later took up its station on the treaty ground. Some of Stand Watie’s Confederate forces were also in the neighborhood.482 In 1865, at the Fort Smith Council, held for the readjustment of political relations with the United States government, the Indians of the Neosho Agency gave483 a rather picturesque description of the way they had been prevailed upon to sign the treaty with the Confederate States. The real object of the Tahlequah meeting was evidently not revealed to them until they had actually reached the treaty ground. Agent Dorn had told them that they had to go to the meeting. They went and were there taken in hand by Pike who said,

If you don’t do what we lay before you, we can’t say you shall live happy.

The Indians

feeling badly, just looked on, and the white man went to work, got up a paper and said I want you to sign that. The Indian did not want to, but he compelled him. You know yourself that, under such circumstances, he would do anything to save his life....

Now that the history of the diplomatic relations between the Indian tribes and the Confederacy has been brought thus far, nothing seems more fitting than to return to the consideration of the Federal government and its representatives, its purposes, and its plans, beginning the account with the Indian Office and Commissioner Dole. Dole’s early attempt to prevail upon the War Department to resume its occupation of Indian Territory was followed up by the convincing letter of the thirtieth of May in which he likened the Indians to the Union element in some of the border states and ended by throwing the full responsibility for any disloyalty that might appear among them upon the Federal authorities; inasmuch as they had neglected and were still neglecting to give the support and protection that any ordinary guardian is bound in honor to give to his wards. Dole said in writing to Secretary Smith,

... Experience has shown that the presence of even a small force of federal troops located in the disaffected States has had the effect to preserve the peace, encourage the friends of the Union, and induce the people to return to their allegiance.

That this same result would be produced in the Indian country I cannot doubt, as they can have no inducement to unite with the enemies of the United States unless we fail as a nation to give them that protection guaranteed by our treaty stipulations, and which is necessary to prevent designing and evil-disposed persons from having free intercourse with them, to work out their evil purposes....484

Nothing came of Dole’s application and thus was exemplified, as often before and often since, a very serious defect in the American administrative system by which the duty of doing a certain thing rests upon one department and the means for doing it with quite another. It is surely no exaggeration to say that hundreds and hundreds of times the Indians have been the innocent victims of friction between the War and Interior Departments.

But if the authorities at Washington were indifferent to the Indian’s welfare, Senator Lane was neither indifferent to nor ignorant of the strategical importance of Indian Territory. With him the defence of Kansas and the means of procuring that defence were everything. Indian Territory and the Indian tribes came within the scope of the means. And so it happened that, while he was organizing his Kansas brigade, he commissioned485 a man, E. H. Carruth, who had formerly posed as an educator486 among the Seminoles, to communicate with the various tribes for the purpose of determining their real feelings towards the United States government and of obtaining, if possible, an interview between Lane and some of their accredited representatives. The interview was to take place “at Fort Lincoln on the Osage or some point convenient thereto.”487

Now a considerable portion of the Creek tribe was in just the right mood and in just the right situation to receive such overtures in the right spirit. That portion consisted of those who, after the treaty of July tenth had been negotiated in the manner already described, had rallied around Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la; and who, in a Creek convention that had been called for August fifth had declared that the chiefs, who had signed a treaty outside the National Council, had violated a fundamental law of the tribe and had thereby forfeited their administrative rank. The criticism applied to Motey Kennard and to Echo Harjo, the principal and the second chief respectively. Kennard, as we have seen, was the leader of the Lower Creeks and Harjo of the Upper. A further division in Creek ranks was now inevitable and it came forthwith, the Non-treaty Party, made up mostly of Upper Creeks, proceeding to recognize488 Ok-ta-ha-hassee Harjo (better known as “Sands”) as the acting principal chief of the tribe. It also betook itself westward so as to be as much as possible out of the reach of the secessionists. When once in a position of at least temporary security, it despatched Mik-ko Hut-kee (White Chief), Bob Deer, Jo Ellis, and perhaps others to Washington to confer with the “Great Father.”489

The Creek delegates, Mik-ko Hut-kee and his companions, went, on their way to Washington, northward through Kansas, saw Superintendent Coffin490 and, later, Lane’s agent, E. H. Carruth. This was about the second week of September and Carruth was at Barnesville, Lane’s headquarters. Carruth received the Creeks kindly, read sympathetically the letter491 that they brought from their distressed chiefs, Sands and Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, assured the equally distressed delegates of the continued fatherly interest of the United States government, and sent them on their way, greatly comforted. It was while these Creek delegates were lingering at Barnesville that Carruth made a special effort to induce the southern Indians generally to send representatives for an interview with Lane. He wrote personally to Ross,492 to the two Creek chiefs,493 and to the Wichita chief, Tusaquach,494 and, in addition, wrote to the Seminole chiefs and headmen495 and to the “loyal” Choctaws and Chickasaws.496

Presumably, Superintendent Coffin did not altogether approve of Senator Lane’s taking it upon himself to confer with the Indians who, after all, were officially Coffin’s charges; for, in October, we find him, likewise, planning for an intertribal conference to be held at Humboldt.497 It is rather interesting to look back upon all this and to realize, as perforce we must, that every plan for conferring with the southern tribes in the interests of the United States government, at this critical time, contemplated a meeting at some place outside of Indian Territory. Here were agents of the Indian’s “Great Father” offering protection to the red men and yet giving incontestable proof in the very details of the offer that they did not themselves dare to venture498 beyond the Kansas boundary. As a matter of fact, all such plans for a general conference came to nothing, although, as late as November, Lane had still the idea of one in mind. He was, at the time, hoping to meet the Indians at Leroy499 in Coffey County, Kansas, on the twenty-fourth. Lane also continued to advocate the use of the friendly Indians as soldiers. A little earlier, Agent Johnson had endorsed500 Lane’s plan in a letter to Commissioner Dole; but the coming of General Hunter upon the scene considerably affected the sphere of influence.

Dissatisfaction with Frémont on account of his extravagance, his haphazard way of issuing commissions, his tardiness, and, above all, his general military incompetence had crystallized in September; and, by orders501 of General Scott on the twenty-fourth of October, Hunter was directed to relieve him. Hunter reached his post in early November and almost immediately thereafter, either upon his own initiative or after consultation with someone like Coffin (it could hardly have been with Lane; for Lane had gone502 to Washington, or with Branch; for Branch was strongly opposed to the project intended), he telegraphed503 to the War Department “for permission to muster a Brigade of Kansas Indians into the service of the United States, to assist the friendly Creek Indians in maintaining their loyalty.” Evidently, the request was not granted,504 but duties akin to it were, by arrangement of President Lincoln, conferred upon Hunter which involved his assuming the responsibility of holding, if such a plan were feasible, an intertribal council so as to renew the confidence of the southern Indians in the United States government. A letter505 from Dole, outlining the plan, reveals an astonishing ignorance of just how far those selfsame Indians had gone in their defection, because of the loss of the confidence.

In the giving of these new duties to General Hunter, there was not the slightest intention of ignoring Senator Lane. In fact, Dole expressly mentioned that Lane had called for just such an Indian conference506 and suggested that, if Hunter’s military duties prevented his meeting the Indians in person, Lane might take his place, “provided he can be spared from his post.” The whole affair was incident to the reorganization that had recently, under general orders507 of the ninth of November, taken place in the Western Department, from which had resulted a Department of Kansas, separate and distinct from the Department of Missouri. The Department of Kansas included “the State of Kansas, the Indian Territory west of Arkansas, and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, and Dakota” and was to be under the command of Major-general David Hunter508 with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The idea governing this division of the old western department was, ostensibly, as Nicolay and Hay express509 it, that Kansas might be protected, Indian Territory repossessed, and Texas reached. As we shall presently see, a similar reorganization took place, about the same time, in the Confederate western service and for very much the same reason, the condition of the Indian country being a very large proportion of that reason. It is barely possible that, as far as the United States was concerned, Senator Lane’s recommendation510 of the ninth of October was almost wholly accountable for the change.

It was, undoubtedly, high time that something vigorous was being done to stay Confederate progress in Indian Territory. Indeed, events were happening there at this very moment that made all plans for an inter-tribal conference exceedingly out of date. The Confederate government had now a large Indian force511 in the field and expectations of an increase, provided the necessary arms512 were obtainable. On the twenty-second513 of November, by special orders514 from Richmond, Indian Territory had been erected into a separate military department and Albert Pike, now a brigadier-general, assigned to the command of it. For the present, however, things seem to have remained much as they were with McCulloch nominally in command and Cooper in actual charge. Moreover, long before Pike reappeared upon the scene, matters had come to an issue between the secessionist and unionist Creeks.

Determined not to allow themselves to be over-persuaded or intimidated by the secessionist element in their nation, the unionist Creeks, under Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, had withdrawn from active intercourse with the rival faction and, resisting all attempts of Cooper and others to inveigle them into an interview that might result in compromise, they had encamped at or near the junction of the Deep and North Forks of the Canadian River. Cooper resolved to attack them there and, for the purpose, gathered515 together an effective fighting force of about fourteen hundred men, all Indians except for a detachment of Texas cavalry. On the fifth of November, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la broke camp and took up the line of march for Kansas, hoping that, in Kansas, he and his followers would receive either succor or refuge. It has been estimated that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la’s force, at this time, was less than two thousand men and that it comprised, besides Creeks and Seminoles, some two or three hundred negroes. His traveling cortège was, however, very much larger; for it included women and children, the sick and the aged. Approximately half of the Creeks were on the move for pastures new. For many of them it was a second exodus.

Colonel D. H. Cooper reached the deserted camp of Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la on the fifteenth of November and, finding his enemy gone and locating his trail, moved himself in a slightly northeasterly direction towards the Red Fork of the Arkansas. He came up with the unionist Creeks at Round Mountain on the night of the nineteenth and an indecisive engagement516 followed, both sides claiming the victory. Under cover of darkness, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la managed to slip away and crossed into the Cherokee country where there were plenty of disaffected full-bloods to give him sympathy. It is more than likely that they had invited him there and had prepared for his coming. Cooper did not attempt to pursue the Creek refugees, having been called back to the Arkansas line, there to wait in readiness to reënforce McCulloch should the Federals make a forward march southward from Springfield, as then seemed probable. But that danger soon passed, passed even before Cooper had had time to take the post indicated or to leave his own camp at Concharta, after a brief recuperation. He was now free to follow up the meagre advantage of the nineteenth.

The next opportunity to crush Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la came in the Battle of Bird Creek [Chusto-Talasah, Little High Shoals, or the Caving Banks],517 fought December 9, 1861. On the twenty-ninth of the preceding month, a part of Cooper’s force had set out for Tulsey Town and an advance guard had been sent up the Verdigris in the direction of a place, called “Coody’s Settlement,” where Colonel John Drew with a detachment of his regiment of Cherokee full-bloods was posted. The orders were that Drew should effect a junction with Cooper’s main force and, on December eighth they were all encamped on Bird Creek in the southwestern corner of the Cherokee Nation. At this juncture, word came that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wished to treat for peace and Major Pegg, a Cherokee, with three companions was sent forward to confer with him. They found the Creek chief, surrounded by his warriors and ready for battle. It was evening and Colonel Cooper had scarcely heard the news of the Creek determination to fight when a message came that four companies of Drew’s regiment, horrified at the thought of fighting with their neighbors, had dispersed and gone over to Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la. The incident did not promise well for success on the morrow and the Battle of Bird Creek was another indecisive engagement, although the Creeks, eager and resplendent with their yellow corn-shuck badges, seem to have had all the advantage of position. Again they made their escape and again Colonel Cooper was prevented from following them, this time because he was exceedingly fearful lest the Cherokee desertion might have a lasting and disastrous effect upon the remaining Indian forces, particularly upon the small group that was all that was left of the original First Cherokee Mounted Rifles. Cooper’s personal opinion was, that the defection was widespread among the Cherokees and that it would be sheer folly to start out after Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la until more white troops had been added to the pursuing force, by way both of reënforcement and of encouragement.

Instead, therefore, of continuing northward, Colonel Cooper drew off in the direction of Fort Gibson and, from that point, sent for aid to Colonel James McIntosh at Van Buren. He then occupied himself with his own troops and prevailed upon John Ross to rally518 the Cherokees. It was now the nineteenth of December and the aged chief did his best to keep his people true to the faith that the nation had pledged in the treaty of the seventh of October. He recalled to their minds the fact that it was, by all odds, the best treaty that the Cherokees had ever secured, the one that gave them the fullest recognition of their rights as a semi-independent people, and he might have added with sad, sad truth that it was the best that they could ever hope to get. He made no such pessimistic reflection, however, but concluded,

It is, therefore, our duty and interest to respect it, and we must, as the interest of our common country demands it. According to the stipulations of the treaty we must meet enemies of our allies whenever the south requires it, as they are our enemies as well as the enemies of the south; and I feel sure that no such occurrence as the one we deplore would have taken place if all things were understood as I have endeavored to explain them. Indeed the true meaning of our treaty is, that we must know no line in the presence of our invader, be he who he may....519

Colonel Cooper then addressed520 the Indians and, after him, Major Pegg;521 but they were not convinced and many of them went home, positively refusing to march farther with the army.

Meanwhile Cooper’s call for reënforcements had reached McIntosh522 and, as the need seemed so urgent, McIntosh resolved to supply it and notified Cooper to that effect. Subsequently, he decided523 to take the field in person and to head a column, separate from Cooper’s. What induced him to do this, nobody can well say. Cooper always felt that the incompleteness of the victory over Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la, which was soon to come, was mainly attributable to the divided effort of the attacking force. In the two former engagements, Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la’s force, such as it was, untrained and miscellaneous, had greatly outnumbered the Confederate; but now the two were more equally matched in point of numbers and the chances of success were all on the southern side because of superior training and equipment, so Cooper was probably correct in his conjecture. McIntosh’s excuse524 for advancing precipitately and alone was, notwithstanding, very reasonable. The scarcity of forage made it expedient to march compactly; and the two generals had agreed, so McIntosh declared, when in conference at Fort Gibson, “that either force should attack the enemy on sight.”

The privilege of attacking Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la fell, under this arrangement, supposing it was made, to McIntosh, who had been able to push on in advance of Cooper. The Battle of Chustenahlah was fought in the early afternoon of December 26, 1861, and ended in what seemed the complete defeat of the Creeks. McIntosh reported that, although their position was strong, they were forced to retreat

To the rocky gorges amid the deep recesses of the mountains, where they were pursued by our victorious troops and routed in every instance with great loss. They endeavored to make a stand at their encampment, but their efforts were ineffectual, and we were soon in the midst of it. The battle lasted until 4 o’clock, when the firing gradually ceased....525

And then the Creeks fled, leaving practically everything in the shape of property behind them. Cooper came up and detachments of his troops pursued them almost to the Kansas line. The weather was bitterly cold, provisions scarce, the country rough and bleak. The pursuit took the form of a seven day scout; but the Creeks, no matter how great their dispersion, were headed straight for Walnut Creek, Kansas.

Their coming was anticipated. Hearing of their approach, Superintendent Coffin had directed526 all the agents527 under his charge to report to him for duty at a place on the Verdigris River called Fort Roe528 “about thirty-five or forty miles from Leroy and Burlington.” It was Coffin’s intention to meet the refugees upon their first arrival; but, as Commissioner Dole was expected soon to be at Fort Leavenworth, he thought it best to wait529 and consult with him. It does not seem to have been recorded on just what date the first of the Indian refugees crossed the Kansas line, but they were very soon crossing in great numbers and, by the time Coffin finally reached them, their condition was truly pitiable. They took up their station on the bare prairies between the Verdigris and the Arkansas Rivers and stretched themselves in almost hopeless confusion over about two hundred miles of country. Fortunately the land upon which they camped was Indian land, New York Indian land, and the few white men thereon were legally intruders and could not consistently object to the presence of the refugees. The numbers of the refugees were variously estimated. Starting with about forty-five hundred,530 they increased daily and at an astonishing rate; for the exodus of the Creeks was but the signal for the flight of other tribesmen from Indian Territory, of all those, in fact, who were either tired of their alliance with the Confederacy or had never been in sympathy with it and were only too eager to take the first chance to escape from it.

The suffering of the refugees, due to destitution and exposure, was something horrible to think upon. Superintendent Coffin had little to give them. He appealed to General Hunter for an allowance from the army supplies and Hunter sent down his chief commissary of subsistence, Captain J. W. Turner, to do what he could to relieve the distress. Hunter also sent Brigade-surgeon A. B. Campbell; for it was not simply food and clothing, that were needed and roof shelter, but medical attendance. As soon as possible, cheap blankets531 were furnished and some condemned army tents. The journey northward had been undertaken in the bitterest of cold weather. With a raw northwest wind beating in their faces,

And over the snow-covered roads, they travelled all night and the next day, without halting to rest. Many of them were on foot, without shoes, and very thinly clad.... In this condition they had accomplished a journey of about three hundred miles; but quite a number froze to death on the route, and their bodies with a shroud of snow, were left where they fell to feed the hungry wolves....

Families who in their country had been wealthy, and who could count their cattle by the thousands and horses by hundreds, and owned large numbers of slaves, and who at home had lived at ease and comfort, were without the necessaries of life.532

When, sometime in early December, Commissioner Dole heard of the resistance that the unionist Creeks were making to Colonel Cooper, he immediately applied once more, through the Secretary of the Interior, to the War Department for troops sufficient to assert Federal supremacy south of the Kansas line, his immediate object being, the strengthening of the force then opposed to Cooper. At the moment, Lane’s expedition was under consideration, Lane having managed to convince the Washington authorities, both congressional and administrative, that an expedition southward was absolutely necessary533 for the protection of the frontier.

Retreat of the Loyal Indians from the Indian Country

under A-poth-yo-ho-lo in the winter of 1861

Somewhat earlier, in fact in the late autumn, the non-secession Indians of various tribes had made their own appeal for help. They had made it to the United States government and also, a little later on, to the Indian tribes of Kansas. Along about the first of November, a mixed delegation534 of Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws had made its appearance535 at Leroy and, finding there the United States Creek agent, George A. Cutler, had consulted with him “in reference to the intentions of the Federal government regarding the protection due them under treaty stipulations.” Cutler advised the Indians to talk the matter over with Senator Lane and accompanied them to Fort Scott, Lane’s headquarters, for the purpose. Arriving there, they learned that Lane had gone to Washington and had left his command in charge of Colonel James Montgomery. Colonel Montgomery counselled with the Indians as Cutler had done and helped them to reach the decision that it would be best to proceed to Washington and lay their complaints before the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. At the same time, Montgomery notified536 President Lincoln of their intention.

Still accompanied by Agent Cutler, the delegation resumed its journey, going by way of Fort Leavenworth. There they conferred537 with General Hunter and left greatly strengthened in their resolution of proceeding to Washington; for Hunter, too, thought that such a trip might compel the government to realize the Indian’s very real distress and its own obligation to relieve it. We are fain to believe that General Hunter personally believed in the military necessity of securing Indian Territory even though he did do all he could to oppose the project of Senator Lane in the early months of 1862 and even though he did disapprove of the formation of the department of Kansas and his own assignment to it instead of to that of Missouri, which would have been his preference. If he at any time to date had wavered538 in his opinion as to the needs of the Indians and their legitimate claim upon the United States government for protection, Carruth’s letter of November twenty-sixth ought to have settled the matter, unless, indeed, its rather savage tone had created prejudice instead of working conviction as was intended.

... I have from the first believed it would be good policy to let loose the northern Indians, under the employ of government; it certainly would be better for the border States to have the Indian country for a battle ground than to have it remain a shelter for rebel hordes the coming winter....539

The visit of the Indians to Washington proved very opportune. By the twenty-seventh of December, they were back at Fort Leavenworth and considerably reassured. Superintendent Coffin had a council with them on the twenty-eighth “at the Fort to good satisfaction.” He says of his interview,

I gave them Presents of Pipes, tobacco, and Sugar, and they went on their way to Fort Scott rejoicing they seem to be in fine Spirits,540 but are at a Loss what to do for a living til Lanes Army goes down there into the Indian Territory they want very much to get Some of the Funds now due the Creeks....541

A more pathetic appeal, and one more immediately telling in its effects, was that made to the brother Indians of Kansas. It came direct from Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la and when it reached the Delawares found in them a ready response. It invited their coöperation542 in the war and asked for men and ammunition.543 This is the Delaware reply:544

We are much rejoiced to receive your letter by James McDaniel545 and David Balon. Our Agent has sent it to our great Father, the President, “at Washington,” and to Gen. Hunter at “Fort Leavenworth.” It gives us great pleasure to hear that you are good and true friends to the President, and to the Government of the United States. We hope you will continue to be their friend. If bad men of the South ask you to go to war against the President, stop your ears, don’t listen to them, they are your worst enemies, they are trying to destroy you and the Country.

Grand Children it does our hearts good, we rejoice to hear of the victories you have gained over your enemies of the Government under your brave leader Oputh-la-yar-ho-la.

Grand Children we are ready and willing to help you. Our brave Warriors are ready to spill their Blood for you, and are only waiting to hear from our great Father at Washington, we have asked of him the privaledge of going to your assistance, and hope that our request will be granted, we don’t wish to go to War against the wishes of our great Father the President. We have heard that the President will soon have a large Army in the Indian Country to protect you, that he has ordered Gen. Lane to march to your relief. We are confident that our great Father is able and will protect his red children—Grand Children we pray to the “great spirit” to protect you and keep you out of the hands of the bad men of the South, who are trying to destroy you and the Government—We have no fears as to the result of this war—the President has large Armies in the field that will conquer and punish the Rebels—We are proud of our Muscogee Children.

The United States government had already determined upon an expedition to the Indian country and, yielding to the importunities of Senator Lane, who represented General Hunter as in full accord with himself in the matter, had decided to use the Kansas Indians in the making up of the attacking force. It was well that the Indians had manifested a readiness to fight and that the Delawares, particularly, had overcome their previous aversion. The first official record of the fact that the decision to use the Kansas Indians had been reached appears to be a communication546 from Assistant Adjutant-general E. D. Townsend to Surgeon-general C. A. Finley, under date of December 31, 1861, notifying him that medical supplies would soon be needed for a force of about twenty-seven thousand men, about four thousand of whom were to be Indians, which was to be concentrated at an early day near Fort Leavenworth. On the third of January, Lane wrote547 to Hunter, informing him, as if at first hand and semi-officially, of the new plan. It is not to be wondered at that General Hunter took offence at the officiousness and presumption Lane displayed. In point of fact, it was a clear case of executive interference.

Now that it had, to all appearances, gained a long-desired object, the Indian Office lost no time in lending the War Department its hearty coöperation. Commissioner Dole was especially enthusiastic and, under instructions from Secretary Smith, prepared to go out to Kansas himself to help organize the Indians for army service. He also sent particulars548 of the new movement to Superintendent Branch and a circular letter549 to the agents of the central superintendency, detailing the advantages that would accrue to individual Indians should they enlist. Dole wrote these letters on the sixth of January and was then expecting to be in Leavenworth City for the making of final arrangements eight or ten days “hence.” He did not manage to get away, however, quite so soon; but the agents went to work immediately and, even before Dole arrived in Kansas, Agent Farnsworth, who had always been rather too eager for Indian enlistment, was able to report550 the initial steps taken. By the twenty-first of January,551 Dole was well on his way west. He reached Kansas in due season and there learned552 for the first time, that Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la had been completely overwhelmed, that the refugees were on the Verdigris, and that General Hunter was subsisting them. This was doleful news, indeed, and made the project of a southern expedition seem more and more expedient.

General Hunter had done the best he could to relieve the awful sufferings of the refugees; but, on the sixth of February, he was obliged to inform553 Dole that he could do no more, that he had practically reached the end of his resources, and that, after the fifteenth of February, the whole responsibility of subsisting the destitute Indians would have to fall upon the Interior Department. Dole was almost at his wits’ end. He had no funds that he could use legitimately for the need that had arisen. It was a case of emergency, however, and something certainly had to be done. Before the fifteenth of December arrived, additional reports554 came in from Superintendent Coffin, detailing distress. Under the circumstances it was necessary to act quickly and without congressional authorization. Dole telegraphed555 to Secretary Smith,

Six thousand Indians driven out of Indian territory, naked and starving. General Hunter will only feed them until 15th. Shall I take care of them on the faith of an appropriation?

He received a reply556 that should have been dictated, not so much in the spirit of generosity, as of simple justice:

Go on and supply the destitute Indians, Congress will supply the means. War Department will not organize them.

With this approbation in hand, Dole went to work, purchased sufficient supplies on credit, and appointed557 a special agent, Dr. William Kile of Illinois, who had been commissioned558 by President Lincoln to act on Lane’s staff and was then in Kansas as Lane’s brigade quartermaster, to attend to their distribution. Meanwhile, the attention of Congress had been called to the matter and a particularly strong letter of Dole’s, describing the utter misery of the exiles, was read in the Senate February 14, in support of a joint resolution for their relief.559 It was intended originally to apply only to the loyal Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws but had its title changed later so as to make it include the Choctaws. On the third of March, Congress passed560 an act providing that the annuities of the “hostiles,” Creeks, Chickasaws, Seminoles, Wichitas, and Cherokees, should be applied, as might be necessary, to the relief of refugees from Indian Territory. It was expressly stipulated in this enactment561 that the money should not be used for other than Indian Territory tribes.

Secretary Smith’s telegram, as the reader has probably already observed, had given to Dole a small piece of information that was not of slight significance, signifying as it did a change of front by the War Department. The War Department had rescinded its former action and had now refused to organize the Indians for service. The objections to Lane’s enterprise must have been cumulative. Before the idea of it had embraced the Indians and before it had become so closely identified with Lane’s name and personality, in fact, while it was more or less a scheme of McClellan’s, Hunter had interposed562 objections, but purely on military grounds. His force was scarcely equal to a movement southward. Subsequently, Halleck interposed objections likewise and his reasons,563 whatever his motives may have been, were perfectly sound, indeed, rather alarmingly so, since they broadly hinted at the miserably local interests involved in the war in the west and the gross subordination of military policies to political. Then came Lane with energy like the whirlwind, a local politician through and through. He had absolutely no respect for official proprieties and the military men, opposed to him, were men of small calibre. He reached Kansas, joyfully intent upon putting into immediate effect the power that Lincoln had conferred upon him, only to find that there stood Hunter, fully prepared to contest authority with him. The Adjutant-general had written564 Hunter that Lane had not been given a command independent of his own and that, if he so desired, he might conduct the expedition southward in person. In the evening of the twenty-sixth, Lane reached Leavenworth, and the very next day, Hunter issued general orders565 that he would command in person. Taken aback and excusably indignant, Lane communicated566 at once with John Covode and requested him to impart the news to the President, to Stanton567 and the new Secretary of War, and to General McClellan.

Official sensitiveness was unquestionably at the bottom of the whole trouble, yet Lincoln was very largely to blame for having yielded to Lane’s importunities. He frankly said that he had wished to keep the affair out of McClellan’s hands as far as possible.568 He hoped to profit by the services of both Hunter and Lane; but, if they could not agree, then Lane must yield the precedence to Hunter. He must report for orders or decline the service.569 Military men, stationed in the west, and civil officers of Kansas were all prejudiced against the “Lane Expedition.”570 They expected it to be nothing but jayhawking and marauding of the worst description. The Indians, however, were deeply disappointed571 when a halt came in the preparations. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la personally addressed a communication572 to Lincoln. He wanted nobody but Lane to command the expedition. Pending a settlement, Dole ordered573 Coffin574 to desist from further enrollment. Secretary Stanton was declared opposed to the use of Indians in civilized warfare.575 Soon the orders for the expedition were countermanded with the understanding, explicit or implied, that it should later proceed under the personal direction of General Hunter.

The military situation in the middle west and the great desire on the part of the Confederacy to gain Missouri and to complete her secession from the old Union necessitated, at the opening of 1862, a thorough-going reörganization of forces concentrated in that part of the country. Experience had shown that separate and independent commands had a tendency to become too much localized, individual commanders too much inclined to keep within the narrow margin, each of his instructions, for the good of the service as a whole to be promoted. It was thought best, therefore, to establish the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2576 and to place in command of it, Major-general Earl Van Dorn. The district was to comprise all of Louisiana north of the Red River, all of Indian Territory proper, all of Arkansas, and all of Missouri west of the St. Francis. Wise in the main, as the scheme for consolidation unquestionably was, it had its weak points. The unrestricted inclusion of Indian Territory was decidedly a violation of the spirit of the Pike treaties, if not of the actual letter. Under the conditions of their alliance with the Confederacy, the Indian nations were not obliged to render service outside of the limits of their own country; but the Confederacy was obliged, independent of any departmental reörganization or regulations, to furnish them protection.

Almost the first thing that Van Dorn did, after assuming command of the new military district, was to write,577 from his headquarters at Jacksonport in eastern Arkansas, to Price, advising him that Pike would shortly be ordered to take position in southwestern Missouri, say in Lawrence County near Mt. Vernon, “with instructions to coöperate with you in any emergency.” Van Dorn was then laboring under the impression that Pike’s force consisted of a majority of white troops, three regiments, he thought, out of a brigade of eight or nine thousand men, whereas there was only one white regiment in the whole Indian department. Colonel Cooper complained578 that this latter condition was the fact and insisted that it was contrary to the express promises made, by authority,579 to the Choctaws and Chickasaws when he had begun his recruiting work among them the previous summer. Had Van Dorn only taken a little trouble to inquire into the real state of affairs among the Indians, he would, instead of ordering Pike to bring the Indian regiments out of Indian Territory, have seen to it that they stayed at home and that danger of civil strife among the Cherokees was prevented by the presence of three white regiments, as originally promised. At this particular time as it happened, Pike was not called upon to move his force; for the order so to move did not reach him until after the Federals, “pursuing General Price, had invaded Arkansas.”580

It proved, however, to be but a brief stay of execution; for, as soon as Van Dorn learned that Price had fallen back from Springfield, he resolved581 to form a junction with McCulloch’s division in the Boston Mountains and himself take command of all the forces in the field. He estimated582 that, should Pike be able to join him, with Price’s and McCulloch’s troops already combined, he would have an army of fully twenty-six thousand men to oppose a Federal force of between thirty-five and forty thousand. Pike was duly informed583 of the new arrangement and ordered584 to “hasten up with all possible dispatch and in person direct the march of” his “command, including Stand Watie’s, McIntosh’s, and Drew’s regiments.” His men were to “march light, ready for immediate action.”585 The outcome of all these preparations was the Battle of Pea Ridge586 and that battle was the consummation, the culminating point, in fact, of the Indian alliance with the Southern Confederacy. It was the beginning of the end. It happened just at the time when the Richmond legislators were organizing587 the great Arkansas and Red River superintendency,588 which was intended to embrace all the tribes with whom Albert Pike had made his treaties. Albert Pike retired from Pea Ridge to his defences at Fort McCulloch, angry and indignant that the Indians had been taken out of their own country to fight the white man’s battles. His displeasure was serious; for the Indian confidence in the Confederacy depended almost wholly upon the promises and the assurances of the Arkansas poet.