Читать книгу The War History of the 1st/ 4th Battalion, 1914-1918 - Anonymous - Страница 8

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On the 2nd of May, 1915, Major Foley, Second Lieutenant Harris (Transport Officer), the Machine Gun Officer, and 104 other ranks and the whole of the Regimental Transport, entrained at BALLAST PIT SIDING, BEDFORD, at one o’clock in the morning, arriving at SOUTHAMPTON at 6 40 a.m., where they embarked on s.s. “ROSSETTI” and sailed at 4 30 p.m., arriving at HAVRE at 3 a.m. on the 3rd.

On the evening of that day, the rest of the Battalion entrained at BALLAST PIT SIDING in two trains, and travelled down to FOLKESTONE, where they arrived about midnight, and marched straight down on to the boat, s.s. “ONWARD,” which cast off at 1 30 a.m.

At last we were really on our way, after all the delays and waitings we were going overseas like the rest! And it had all been done so quickly that only now, as we stood on the darkened boat and watched the lights of England receding, did we begin to realise what it meant—this stealthy journey of nearly a thousand souls across the Channel, which many of us had never seen before, and which many were never to see again.

The Adjutant’s diary gives our strength (apart from the Advance Party) as follows:—

Lieut.-Colonel R. Hindle.

Captain and Adjutant C. C. Norman (R. Welsh Fusiliers.)

Captains Nickson, Booth, Hibbert, Peak, Whitfield, Crump, H. Parker, Widdows.

Lieutenants Ord (Signalling Officer), Smith, Rennard, Brindle, Moore, Gregson, Duckworth.

Second Lieutenants Houghton, Davies, Lindsay, Rogerson, P. Parker, Bryce-Smith, Craven.

Lieutenant and Quartermaster F. W. Baker.

Captain Derham (R.A.M.C.).

Rev. Powell, C. of E. Chaplain.

And 895 W.O.’s, N.C.O.’s, and Men.

The total strength of the Battalion on this date was (including attached) 31 Officers and 1,003 other Ranks.

No smoking or talking was allowed on deck during the passage, which was calm and without incident, and the boat drew alongside at BOULOGNE about 3 a.m., where we at once disembarked and marched about two miles to a canvas rest camp at OSTROHOVE. How strange everything looked in the early morning light, as we swung along against our instincts on the right-hand side of the pavé road, the French signs with which we grew so familiar later on, the grilles in the front doors, the smells!

On arrival at the camp we were soon told off to our tents, where we slept till eight, when we had breakfast. After breakfast most of us sent off our first Field Postcards to the folks at home, and cleaned up. We stayed in camp all day, resting and sunning ourselves, parading again at 6 30 p.m., when we marched to PONT DE BRIQUES Station, where we formed up in groups of 40 and waited for the train, which soon arrived from HAVRE with the Transport. Cattle trucks! However, we entrained, about 40 to a truck, and presently jolted off; we spent a very uncomfortable night!

On 5th May, about 2 30 a.m., we arrived at BERGUETTE, where we detrained and at 4 a.m. started to march to LILETTE, led by a “guide” who took us about two miles out of our way—a serious matter, on empty stomachs, to us who were still fresh from “the fleshpots of Egypt”; however, we got there, and went into billets of sorts, many preferring to sleep in the open, so villainously dirty were some of the outhouses. Here we found the 1/8th King’s Liverpools, the 1/4th King’s Own and Brigade Headquarters being at neighbouring places. All day and all night an almost continuous stream of motor vehicles went through, mostly laden with French troops in their picturesque blue and red. Battalion Headquarters was “chez M. Rousseau,” and the Officers’ Mess in a small estaminet. As we rested that day, we heard the distant guns for the first time, booming intermittently the whole day through.

On the 6th, about 7 15 p.m., we received orders to move, and marched out at 8 p.m. to LILLERS, where we joined the rear of the Brigade at 2 47 p.m. Here began the worst march that any of us remember, over strange uneven roads, in pitch darkness. To us, marching in rear of the whole Brigade, it seemed interminable; halts were irregular, and by the time “ten minutes’ halt” came along to us it was time to move again, and it was impossible to maintain a steady pace. Added to this someone had seen fit to billet from the front of the column instead of the rear, which held us up at each billeting village and prolonged the march considerably. The last mile nearly finished us, but we stumbled into CALONNE-SUR-LE-LYS at 4 a.m.—dead beat—and slept it off.

We had a pretty easy time for the next few days, as, beyond being required to be ready to move at an hour’s notice, we were left alone. The weather was fine, and many of us bivouacked; we did a little training, and tried to teach the local people a little sanitation, a word which apparently did not exist in their language. We, on the other hand, learnt that faggots and soil had a market value; one Company, taking soil from a heap in a field, were pounced on by the owner for taking “ma bonne terre” to cover someone else’s smelly midden, and he was quite rude about it. The Officers’ Mess was in a private house on the main street; one night when an al fresco concert was in progress to the great delight of the troops, a man passing on the road enquired what was going on, and received the laconic reply, “Officers’ rum issue!”

METEREN, 1915.

On the 8th we were visited by Sir Douglas Haig and the Divisional Commander.

The gunfire about eight or nine miles away increased on the 9th to what must have been a very heavy bombardment—no doubt the second Battle of LA BASSEE.

On the 11th blankets and Officers’ kits were allowed to be removed from the waggons on which they had hitherto been loaded, and the state of readiness was relaxed. Respirators for poisonous gas (the old gauze and wadding affairs) were issued. On the 13th there was a thunderstorm, accompanied by torrential rain, which did not add to the comfort of the campers.

Just after midnight on the 14th, orders to move arrived, and after breakfast we fell in and moved to the starting point by CALONNE CHURCH, whence we marched as a Brigade to METEREN. We arrived there at 2 p.m., and got into billets about 3, mostly on the east and north-east sides of the town, the Mess as usual in an estaminet, whose landlord thought fit to start emptying his midden soon after we arrived, causing one man to say to another, who seemed in low spirits, “What’s up, Tommy? Avez vous mal de midden?”

The country was different from CALONNE, where the ground was flat and intersected by ditches full of frogs which croaked all night; here it was undulating, and windmills and hop fields became features. On the south side of the town were a number of graves of Officers and Men who had fallen in the fighting there on 15th October, mostly Royal Warwicks and King’s Own—it was said that the Huns had mounted machine guns on the tower of the church, which commands the country to the south and west, and had simply mown them down. How difficult we found it then to realise the story, and how peaceful the little town seemed to us. The Adjutant took the opportunity of teaching the Officers a little field sketching—a branch of our training which had hitherto been crowded out. Courses in those days were few and far between, and though we had learnt in the Regiment many things of which some of the systematically trained Officers of later days were conspicuously ignorant, there were gaps in our knowledge.

Sunday was fine and hot, and all denominations had Church Parades. On Monday the Ninth Division marched through—what a fine lot they looked, and how we envied them “their cookers.” Why hadn’t we got cookers? And the old galling comparisons between the treatment of the Territorial Force and Kitchener’s Army were rubbed in once more. It is all dead now, but we had something to grouse at. On Tuesday, the 18th, we paraded at 8 p.m. for a night march, through VIEUX BERQUIN and NEUF BERQUIN to LA GORGUE, a suburb of ESTAIRES, where we arrived about 4 a.m. Not for months afterwards did most of us learn that we, the 51st Division, had been moved up by General French to be in reserve for the Second Battle of LA BASSEE.

The town was full of troops. Our men were billeted in breweries and factories; B and A Companies were in a shell-riddled Girls’ School; the Officers had difficulty in finding even a floor to sleep on, but at last most of them gravitated to one estaminet, where they fed on what they could get, and slept. An unforgettable incident rises to the mind. Lieutenant——, having disposed himself for slumber on three chairs and fallen asleep, tried to turn over and so rolled off—in one piece—on to the floor, where he lay immovable, only remarking, in injured tones: “I’m fed up with this —— War!”

On the 19th, the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers left us and went to ST. OMER, and 18 of our men were sent to the Tunnelling Company R.E.; this is mentioned because it was our first separation—we had been together, in the same sections even, with practically no change for months.

On the 20th we marched to billets in farms on the east side of LOCON; when we got there we found them occupied by a Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, who had been in action the night before and lost their Colonel, Sergt.-Major, and 67 other Ranks, so we formed up in a field opposite a large 18th century farm with a moat round it and stayed there all day; in the evening the Guards moved out and marched off with that inimitable swing of theirs, and we took over their billets—untouched farms within three miles of the line. Here we were close to the lair of a 9in. Howitzer—the only one on that front, it was said—which had been shelling the Hun all day.

The next day we set to work with zeal to clean up and put the sanitation right—covering middens to prevent flies breeding, building incinerators, and fixing up a water supply; we rather specialised in sanitation even in those days, when most people seemed rather to scoff at it. Late at night the 5th Gordons arrived and bivouacked in the field opposite.

On the 23rd, a very hot day, sanitary work continued, and surveys of the billeting area were carried out by Officers, and afterwards combined into a composite map; the next day Second Lieutenant Sutherland, of the 2nd Leicesters, two N.C.O.’s, and 11 men reported, to instruct us in trench work—needless to say we were keen for anything they could teach us, as we were eagerly looking forward to our first tour in the line. Yes, Reader, you may think this is a figure of speech, but it is not—we really were, and we sharpened our bayonets with zest on the old lady’s grindstone, and thought she must be a German spy because she tried to stop us!

All the same, we expected to stay where we were for a few weeks, and were a bit surprised to learn, after a lecture on trench work by Captain Burton, 39th Gharwalis (we were in the Indian Corps), that we were to go into the line on the 25th. We assembled on the road by Battalion Headquarters at 7 p.m. and marched to a Cemetery, where we were met by an Officer of the 1/7th Black Watch. He reported that the trenches we were to occupy were being shelled by the enemy, so we halted till 10 p.m., when we moved forward by platoons at 100 yards’ distance.

It is quite impossible to try to convey in print the impression of one’s first march up to the line: one remembers the dark, strange road, broken trees, loose telephone wires, a long halt in a battered village, then on through interminable miles of breastworks manned by Canadians, crawling cautiously along in single file and breathless silence—then a halt, and platoons are sent off down various alleys, to find at the end a trench full of Scotsmen anxiously awaiting relief. The right of the Battalion rested on the QUINQUE RUE, the left on the road from RUE DE L’EPINETTE to FERME COUR D’AVOUE; A and D Companies and Machine Gun Section occupied the front line, No. 2 platoon having an advanced post about 200 yards in front of the main line; C was in support and B in reserve. The fire trench had only recently been built, and the forward bit had 18in. of water in it; no wire had been put up. The support trench was an old German trench about 300 yards to the left rear of the fire trench, while the reserve trench was again 200 yards behind the latter. The parapets were revetted with, and in some cases entirely built of, sandbags; dugouts—very sketchy—were built in the parados! The trenches were nowhere more than two feet deep, the rest of the cover being above ground; there were narrow communication trenches. Every house in the neighbourhood was in utter ruin, and the ground was a mass of shell holes. Equipment, rifles, ammunition, clothing, tins, both our own and enemy, were strewn everywhere, and dozens of bodies—chiefly of Scots Guards and Germans—lay about as they had fallen in the May Battle of Festubert; the stench was awful. Some old German trenches, not occupied by us, were interesting as showing the elaborate way they had dug themselves in. One dugout was a room about 15ft. square, with doors and a window, lined throughout with wood planking covered with cloth, and furnished with leather-covered chairs and a table; in one a quantity of feminine underclothing was found—what it was doing there could only be guessed.

Most of the above description is taken from the Adjutant’s journal, written at the time; all we saw that night was mud and sandbags. The Platoon which took over the forward trench had to wait for the Scots to climb out at the back, and then stepped down about two feet and found themselves in a good foot of muddy water. There was nothing for it but to wait till dawn; when it came we found ourselves in a shallow ditch, with only two rows of sandbags in front. Immediately to our front was a huge pile of black, red, and yellow sandbags, where the Germans had blocked and strengthened an old communication trench leading into our lines; their main line was further off—from 200 to 400 yards; behind us and in front were the dead bodies, also in our own parapet and under the duckboards of the communication trench, which was soon dubbed “Bluebottle Alley,” for as soon as the sun rose clouds of the loathsome insects filled the air and buzzed round our heads. To our front we could see in the distance the spire of VIOLAINES Church, and on our right was a new parapet, very high and thick, surrounding CANADIAN ORCHARD. We were puzzled and annoyed for some days by sniping from that direction, till one early morning we saw a Hun crawling from under that same parapet towards his own lines, but a rifle shot fired from a rifle which had belonged to one of the Scots Guards settled his hash and avenged the late owner of the rifle.

On the 26th we were shelled intermittently all day, and two men were wounded, our first casualties; in the evening two platoons were sent out and extended from the right of No. 2 Platoon at P 11 and started a trench to connect up with the Canadians. On the 27th we were again shelled intermittently, but no appreciable damage was done and we improved our positions greatly. We did not realise then that we had been put in to finish the consolidation of newly-taken ground—a pretty stiff beginning for raw troops. The night was exceptionally quiet—there was less shelling than usual and very little sniping; during the morning our fire trenches were shelled somewhat severely with shrapnel, and again in the afternoon, six men being wounded. As soon as it got dark, working parties went out to get on with the new trench to the right of P 11; the existing forward trench was strengthened and the R.E. put a footbridge across the ditch on our right front; it was very dark and there were no interruptions.

The next day we lost two men wounded by shell fire, which was pretty heavy. A working party of 200, with a covering party under Lieutenant Brindle, started a new trench from the new bridge towards the Canadians, and did good work in spite of bursts of shrapnel at intervals; during the night bearings were taken on gun flashes, and we located the enemy battery which was troubling us.

On the 30th the enemy fire—both shrapnel and H.E. (known in those days as “Jack Johnsons” or “Coalboxes”)—was heavier than usual; two years later such activity would have provoked a perfect hurricane of retaliation from our own guns, but in 1915 our gunners had nothing to throw away and no retaliation could be had. That night the working parties continued their work, and our guns at 12 15 a.m. and 2 15 a.m. fired a few shells. The enemy retorted with vigour, wounding Second Lieutenant Bryce-Smith and five men and killing one. The working parties were brought in at 1 a.m. The enemy fire died down about 3 30 a.m., but burst out afresh at 11 a.m., being directed chiefly on our fire trenches, which were damaged in several places.

On 1st June we carried out the usual programme, and were shelled fairly heavily during the afternoon; in these early days we had three or six men in every bay of the trench, and the wonder is that our casualties were not much greater than they were. On the 2nd we were relieved by 58th Vaughan’s Rifles, and marched back to billets at CORNET MALO, half a mile north-west of LOCON CHURCH. We went out by companies, and the leading men set off at about four miles an hour, with the result that those at the back of the long single file were running and stumbling and out of breath, and it was great good luck that we all reached the rendezvous; but we did, and after a short rest, tramped off by Companies to our billets, which we reached about 4 a.m. As each Company wheeled into its own farmyard a wild cheer went up, for there were our C.Q.M.S. and cooks, a brand new field cooker, like the ones we had seen and envied with the 9th Division, and, best of all, a meal—piping hot and ready. It took about one minute to get the Company formed in close column, arms piled, packs off and neatly dressed, and coffee served out.

We rested all day, but in the evening moved to fresh billets between CALONNE and ROBECQ via the LA BASSEE CANAL. Lieutenant Gregson and 30 other ranks went to the new Grenadier Company, and Lieutenant Smith and four to the Trench Mortar class. Two days later, back we went to our old billets at CORNET MALO! That was a horrid march. Starting at 7 p.m., we marched 12 miles as ordered, but on arrival no one knew anything about us, and on enquiring at Brigade Headquarters it was discovered that a counter-order had been issued but had never reached us, so we had to turn about and retrace our steps to CORNET MALO, arriving at midnight. It was during this counter-march that we passed a Battalion of Highlanders, and one of them shouted: “What Battalion’s that?” Quick as thought came the answer in a tone of pitying contempt: “Battalion! This isn’t a Battalion; it’s a —— walking club!” Another Scots wit asked: “What are you chaps doing? Marching?” and got prompt answer: “Marching! No; we’re resting!”—as indeed we were, technically.

On the 7th Second Lieutenant Lindsay went to hospital with flu’; it was a sultry day and bathing was fashionable, both in the Canal and the clear streams, also the following day, till a thunderstorm with torrents of rain put a stop to it. Captain Parker also went to hospital about this time.

On 9th June we moved up to the trenches along the RUE DE BOIS, RUE DE L’EPINETTE, through FESTUBERT VILLAGE and down LE QUINQUE RUE for about 800 yards, and relieved the 1/7th Black Watch. FESTUBERT was the most badly-smashed village we had yet seen—there were remnants of barricades still standing in the streets—most of the houses were heavily sandbagged, and some had barbed wire round them. There was a house at the entrance to the village with all the front blown in and the furniture of the upper bedrooms hanging shakily—half in, half out. Where the Church had been, now only recognisable by the Crucifix which still stood unharmed, we turned to the left. (This description and the pages which follow were written by the late Captain Lindsay at the time, and have been inserted practically as he wrote them.)

THURSDAY, June 10th, 1915.

The day passed away very quietly; but there were two or three very heavy thunderstorms with torrential rains which rapidly converted the trenches—the communication trenches in particular—into quagmires. These communication trenches became very dirty, in no place being less than boot-deep and in many places thigh-deep in a pestilent liquid mud. The boards placed at the bottom of the trench were quite covered over, and, being extremely slippery, were mainly useful in leading the way to the deeper, wetter part of the trenches! Working parties at night in heavy rain had very great difficulty in making progress. The night was very dark, and the men were loaded with spades and hurdles and sandbags. Only a section of the working party under the command of Captain Crump managed to get through to the fire trench, and took three hours to do it—until midnight—distance not quite a mile! Working parties were under control of Engineers.

Lieutenant Hoit was admitted to hospital suffering from rheumatism. Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, Reserve Machine Gun Officer, took over the Machine Guns.

FRIDAY, June 11th, 1915.

Second Lieutenant Lindsay rejoined the Battalion.

The morning was finer, but the trenches were still very muddy. Three working parties were sent out in the morning to work in the open between the reserve and the support lines in the making of bridges across the ditches and of tracks through the long grass, of ramps in the trenches to facilitate climbing the parapet, and in clearing up the old German trench which lay in that area. The Germans shelled this old trench of theirs regularly, though it was not occupied.

The Battalion was relieved unexpectedly by the 1/7th Black Watch. Relief was completed by 10 45 p.m., and the Battalion marched back along the Canal to billets near LE CORNET MALO, in the wood to the south of that place. The march was a tiring one, but the men lasted out well, and billets were reached about 5 a.m.

SATURDAY, June 12th, 1915.

The day was passed in resting and cleaning up.

SUNDAY, June 13th, 1915.

Orders were received to return to the trenches we had left on Friday night, and relieve the Battalions which had relieved the 1/8th K.L. Irish and ourselves then. Though no order had been issued, we all knew that the Battalion was going up for an attack, and in anticipation of this the Officers, or as many as cared to do so, drew men’s uniforms from the Quartermaster’s Stores. Lieutenant Moore, hearing in hospital word of this impending attack, rejoined us. The Battalion marched off at 6 p.m., and relief was completed in the trenches about 1 a.m. This time we took over the fire and support trenches from the 1/6th Black Watch. We found the trenches very much drier than when we left them. There was some shelling at the time of relief. The dispositions of the Battalion (646 strong) were: B and C Companies in fire trenches, D Company in support, A Company in reserve.

Second Lieutenant Houghton and one man were wounded going up.

It is a queer sensation going up to one’s first battle. The bracing of the nerves to face the unknown—it is the essence of religion, voluntary self-sacrifice for a cause, made possible only by faith, and calling for the strongest effort of will to control the nerves. Happy the man who is not gifted with a vivid imagination—who, like Kipling’s oxen, can plod steadily along, living in the present—blind to the future. Those who fall do so at the moment of their highest endeavour; had they lived they had probably never risen so high again. Surely to them, if to anyone, is granted the peace which passeth understanding.

MONDAY, June 14th, 1915.

The Battalion had been warned for an attack, and operation orders issued from the Brigade in the morning made this clear. With the object of gaining ground in the direction of RUE D’OUVERT, the Fourth Corps was to attack the German positions in the north. The 51st Division, the 7th Division, and the Canadian Division were to attack simultaneously.

Map No. 1

FESTUBERT

The 51st Division detailed the 154th Infantry Brigade, and the 154th Infantry Brigade the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (with 10 bombers) on the right, and the 1/6th Scottish Rifles (with 10 bombers), on the left, as assaulting troops. Besides these there were:—

I.	2 Officers, 7 N.C.O.’s, and 36 men from Grenadier Company.
II.	12 bayonet men from 1/4th North Lancashires.
	16 bayonet men from 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
III.	2 N.C.O.’s, 12 men of 1/4th North Lancashires, Blocking parties.
	1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
IV.	1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/4th North Lancashires, Carrying parties.
	1 N.C.O., 6 men of 1/6th Scottish Rifles.
V.	1 Sections as escort from the 1/4th North Lancashires.

(These North Lancashire details were found by D Company.)

The supporting Battalion was the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, less two platoons, whilst the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment was held in Brigade Reserve.

There was also a Trench Mortar detachment with two guns of the old “Archibald” type, under the command of Lieutenant Smith.

A working party of two platoons from the 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment was detailed to accompany one Section of the 2/2nd Highland Field Company R.E.

The attack by the Brigade was towards the houses on the road behind the German salient. At these houses a junction would be effected, if the attack was successful, with the 7th Division. The two attacks converged on this point. We were to obtain flanking fire from the rifles and machine guns of the 152nd Brigade in the trenches to our left. They in turn were to advance on the flank when we had consolidated our position.

The whole attack was timed for 6 p.m. on the 15th June, and was to be preceded by a 48 hours’ bombardment.

These, in brief, were the operation orders. We had been warned to show no signs of activity during this preliminary bombardment, which began about dawn, and was devoted chiefly to cutting the enemy’s barbed wire. Field guns bombarded this, whilst the heavier guns played on the enemy’s trenches, and the heaviest on the houses behind. The bombardment was not confined to our front, but extended all along the ridge to the south towards VIOLAINES. This village lay over the ridge, and only the church spire could be seen.

From the support trench, the view was of the usual kind, a flat Flanders plain, with ditches bordered by rows of pollard willows, and wrecked farmhouses with a few scattered trees. The plain very gradually rose to a sky-line, the Aubers ridge being especially marked on the right. The British bombardment was persistent and, from what we could see, effective, whereas the Germans only replied sporadically with some sharp bursts of shrapnel and some high explosive shell on the communication trenches, from which B and C Companies lost a few men. The bombardment continued all along the front, on both sides of us, all night with only two slight stoppages.

In reply to an enquiry from the artillery as to the amount of damage done to the wire by the artillery fire in our line of advance, Major Nickson replied that most of the wire had been destroyed. This was at 11 a.m. on the 15th June, 1915, and shrapnel was still bursting over it. Captain Norman reported to the same effect, and said that all stakes were gone, and such strips of wire as remained did not appear to be an obstacle to an advance. He added that the wire opposite the enemy’s main trench could not be observed clearly from our fire trench.

TUESDAY, 15th June, 1915.

The British bombardment continued as on the previous day, with the Germans still only occasionally replying. Very heavy artillery (9.2) was brought to bear upon the houses on the road to our immediate left front, some being set on fire. It was particularly interesting to watch this shelling, and to note the regularity and precision with which it was shifted from house to house. The wire and the German sap and the fire trenches were also kept under continual fire. An advanced mountain battery played on the enemy’s parapets.

B Company was withdrawn to the support trench to the right of D Company, whilst C Company moved to the right of the fire trench, making room for the charging company of the 1/6th Cameronians on their left. A Company was still in reserve.

Orders were received in the afternoon that the British bombardment would increase greatly in intensity at 5 30 p.m., and would continue so until 6 p.m. For this first half-hour, the guns would be concentrated on the enemy’s barbed wire. At 6 p.m. they would “lift,” i.e., increase their range on to the enemy’s fire trench and shell this solely for three minutes. At 6 3 the communication trenches would be bombarded for a minute, and the enemy’s main trench from 6 4 to 6 15. At 6 15 the guns would lift into the road, and would shell this intensely for half-an-hour, until 6 45. At 6 45 the artillery would form a barrage beyond the road.

At 5 30 promptly the bombardment became terrific. Shells whistled and shrieked overhead in enormous numbers. All the British artillery which was massed behind the line concentrated on the assaulting positions with rapid fire. There were also some French 75 batteries to help. Under this rain of shells B and D Companies moved up the communication trenches towards the fire trench from the supports, and A Company to the supports from the reserve line.

But while the British bombardment increased greatly in intensity, the German shelling, from being merely desultory, also became intense. High explosive shells, in salvoes of four, dropped upon the communication trenches, filling them, in many places, with earth and mud, and in some cases obliterating them. It became a task of extreme difficulty to move up to the firing line under this heavy fire. There were some dead and wounded in the trenches.

Sketch Map of Trenches

At 6 p.m. precisely C Company charged from the fire trench. The leading platoon was a composite one, made up from Nos. 9 and 12 for strength, and under the command of Second Lieutenant Parker; No. 10 Platoon under Second Lieutenant Craven followed at 100 yards’ distance, and No. 11 under Second Lieutenant Davies followed this. They had to climb the parapet, and, under a withering fire, form to the left flank slightly and then charge. They did this almost perfectly in line, and were in possession of the trench inside three minutes. Their losses were chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire. This must have been principally from the main trench, and not the advanced trench of the salient, since they found most of the Germans there sheltering in dugouts; these were dealt with by bombing parties. The bombers worked in two groups: (a) (right) 1/5th Royal Lancaster Regiment under Lieutenant Taylor, and (b) 1/6th Scottish Rifles under Lieutenant Hay (left group). These bombing parties, supported by the various parties told off to them, did magnificent work, and penetrated right through the road to a much greater distance than ever the assaulting battalions reached.

Roughly it may be said that the centre of the attack was L 8 as marked on the map. The two leading platoons of C Company, with their left directing the whole attack, charged the German T-head sap directly in front, and taking that in the rush, swept to the German fire trench. On their left were the 1/6th Scottish Rifles also charging.

When the trench was won, comparatively easily, the Germans holding up their hands and pleading for mercy, the bombing parties extended outwards, down past Z 1, K 6, and Z 4. Their orders were to push ahead as far as possible, since the 7th Division, as detailed, would be attacking at the same time. Another party was to break off up towards the German main trench at X 7. The other main party of bombers went towards L 10 up the communication trench—which was also a firing trench facing M 4—at L 10 they split off, one towards L 9 and the other down the main German trench. These bombers actually went beyond the road so fast that their bayonet men could not keep up with them. They mostly ran along the top of the trench, with the German and British Artillery both bombarding the lines all this time very heavily indeed.

Red screens were used to show the furthermost points reached by the infantry, to enable the artillery to support. The bombing parties carried red flags, and a red rocket was to be fired when the infantry reached the houses on the road at L 11. (The artillery had set these houses on fire, and they afforded a good landmark.) But the artillery observers could see nothing because of the tremendous smoke and dust cloud, which hid the whole area from their view. All telephone communication was very soon smashed up, and messages had to be sent by relays of orderlies. Lieutenant Ord at L 8 was in charge of this.

The course of the battle becomes a little obscure. The next supporting Company was B, but Captain Peak, for some time reported missing, has lately been reported dead, and there is no connected account of what actually happened to this Company. At this period the German artillery redoubled in intensity on the deploying Companies, and whereas C Company had suffered chiefly from rifle and machine gun fire, B and D and A Companies suffered from shrapnel and high explosive. B Company seems to have reinforced C Company on the right. B Company men say they had to cross a deep ditch with barbed wire entanglements at the bottom. (This must have been the ditch marked in front of the German fire trench at Z 1). Here, they say, Captain Peak was killed on the barbed wire in front of the trench.

D Company, coming up the now very badly damaged communication and fire trench, was sent to reinforce the line in the left of the centre of the attacking line across the sap and the fire trench, and then along the edge of the communication trench towards L 10. Both B and D Companies moved to support in lines of platoons, through a gap in the trench, under extremely heavy artillery fire.

Meanwhile the attack had swept on, past the German trench, up along the German communication trenches. There were a great number of casualties from rifle fire from the German main trench and enfilading machine gun fire from somewhere about X 7 or Z 2. But the attack swept on and must have carried the main trench, already bombed, but for being pulled up suddenly by uncut barbed wire, which lay concealed in the long grass on the German (east) side of the ditch which runs parallel to the German main trench, south-east from L 10. The attacking line was then within 30 yards of the trench. More enfilade fire came from one of the houses at L 11 on the road. This house must have had a good number of machine guns in it.

The position therefore about 7 p.m. was this:—

Barbed wire marked in red wavy line.

Red line marks approximate centre of attack.

The Scottish Rifles were attacking on our left with their right resting on the British sap head at L 8. Their advance was checked by uncut barbed wire which ran along the northern edge of the communication trench, very early on, and they lay in the open under galling and very heavy fire, losing heavily in attempting to cut it, but were compelled to advance along the communication trench. At 7 p.m. when the advance was checked, they were in this communication trench, which they were holding. Once a part of the German salient, it faced obliquely the British trench at M 4; it was also a fire trench, being very narrow, with numerous traverses and some dugouts about Z. The uncut wire here in front of this trench prevented any further advance by them. All their officers except one were casualties. The result of this forced change of front by them was the formation of an angle at L 10 in the line of attack, they themselves facing north, whilst the Loyal North Lancashires faced east or perhaps north-east.

The ditch in which C Company lay, now reinforced by D on the left and B on the right, with A coming up from reserve, was bordered by a row of pollard willows. On the left it was comparatively dry, with a slight protecting bank on the east (German) side; but the further it went to the right the more of a quagmire it became. In some places on the right it was thigh-deep in water. It ran parallel to the German trench along the road, at about 30 yards’ distance from it. It afforded comparative security after the advance because of the slight cover to be obtained in it, and because it was too near the German trench to allow artillery fire to be brought to bear. C Company had brought up one sandbag per man and one shovel to every three men, with 20 wirecutters to the Company, and B and A Companies had brought up three sandbags per man and a pick or a shovel carried slung with spun yarn, per man, but some of these were lost in the advance, and only a few men came up with them all.

The Battalion entrenched itself in this ditch line as best it could. It was rapidly going dark. A Company, as it came up, was sent to the right of the line to strengthen and extend it and to get into touch with the 7th Division, and several parties were sent out to the right to find them, but fruitlessly. Entrenching in a waterlogged ditch with the entrenching tool was slow work. At dusk the 1/4th King’s Own sent up a Company to reinforce, under the command of Captain Barrow; Major Nickson was in command of the front line. The Colonel had been wounded earlier in the evening, and Major Foley took over command and established his headquarters in the German fire trench opposite L 8.

About 11 p.m. there was a slackening of the German fire, both artillery and rifle. The German artillery fire had been directed chiefly against our supports and reserves, and was particularly violent at L 8. Some of our wounded had been collected there, and were looked after there all night by Sergeant-Major Farnworth.

By this time, in the front line, a machine gun had been placed in position about L 10. The trench junction there had been blocked by sandbags. It was at this point (L 10) that the Scottish Rifles were in touch with us. It was found impossible, because of lack of material, to block the further trench (X 7), and accordingly the line we held in the ditch was bent back to the right to protect that flank. The line was a bad one. There was a conference of Officers held by Major Nickson. Both flanks were in the air. We were not in touch with the 7th Division, and enfilade rifle fire was coming from the right flank, though fairly weak. The ditch was waterlogged, and too wide in places and clearly marked by the row of pollard willows. Spades and picks and sandbags were lacking. There were no bombs left, and no bombers. (There were two advanced bomb reserves of 1,000 bombs each near L 8, but no one knew where these were. The bombers sent to reinforce the original party were shelled heavily on the road to the reserve trenches, and out of 33 only five were unwounded.) Impossible to entrench ditch. Therefore proposed line about 20 yards back in the open. This meant beginning afresh without tools. Men too crowded in line. There were no Verey lights. Artillery support had ceased about 8 45 because of uncertainty as to the actual position of the attacking Battalions. Major Nickson sent back word to Major Foley explaining this and asking for instructions. In the meantime the German counter-attack began, and prevented instructions arriving.

It was about midnight when the Germans began to throw up flares in great numbers. They had been shelling L 10 and the (German) captured salient for some time before. Their counter-attack proper began by bombing at L 10 so severely that the machine gun there was damaged and put out of action, and the connection with the Cameronians broken. Almost at the same time, the Germans began to bomb down the right communication trench (X 7), and followed this by throwing bombs across the open. There was no means of replying, and no cover to be had anywhere in the ditch. To stay there would have meant the wiping out of those in the line; enfilade fire came from both flanks—on the right from the German main trench at K 7, and on the left from L 9; the Scottish Rifles in the German communication trench were enfiladed down the whole length by artillery and rifle fire. Orders were given, therefore, to retire from the position.

At the point Z (see map) a mixed body of men lined the shell craters and held up the Germans for about two hours, losing heavily. This point Z, which lay on the German side of their fire trench, was an absolute mass of wrecked dugouts. These men finally retired, in the mist of the morning, towards the sap south-west of L 8. In the retirement all the attacking Battalions were mixed up. The sap at L 8 was held by a composite company: 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires, 1/6th Scottish Rifles, 1/4th Royal Lancaster Regiment, Grenadier Guards, 1/8th Liverpool Irish, but the Germans, probably because of their check at Z, did not push their counter-attack on to the British lines.

The attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the support trenches about 4 a.m. on the 16th, the men in the sap about 6 a.m., and the lines were taken over by the 1/8th K.L. Regiment (Irish).

Motor machine guns under Captain Hammond, D.S.O., to left of L 8, stayed up through the attack and for four days afterwards.

The casualties were heavy.

The Colonel was wounded at the beginning of the attack, when near L 8. Almost at the same time the Adjutant, Captain Norman, was severely wounded. He advanced with the leading platoon and was on the parapet of the German trench when he was wounded by, it is said, an officer hiding in a dugout.

In C Company, Second Lieutenant P. Parker, who was in command of the charging platoon was seriously wounded, Second Lieutenant Craven was wounded in the leg, and Second Lieutenant Davies, who, wounded slightly twice, would go on, was fatally wounded and died on the field.

In B Company, Captain Peak was reported killed, as previously mentioned, but was posted missing, as there was no definite news of what actually happened to him. Lieutenant Moore was wounded in the wrist, and Captain Crump blown up and injured by a shell.

In D Company, Captain Hibbert was last seen directing the platoons through the gap in the fire trench. After that no news can be obtained of what happened to him, and he was posted missing. Captain Whitfield was seriously wounded in the thighs by shrapnel and died in hospital at Boulogne. Second Lieutenant Rawsthorn, in charge of the machine guns, was killed by shell when leading his team across the open to the German trenches. Lieutenant Brindle was hit on the head and in the arm.

In A Company, Lieutenant Smith[C] was in charge of the trench mortar team during the bombardment, firing from the fire trench. When the order to charge was given, Lieutenant Smith rushed forward with his gun, and was seriously wounded when carrying it across the open. He died in hospital at Lillers two days later, and was buried there.

The Officers who came through the fight unhurt were Major Foley, Major Nickson, Captain Booth, Captain Widdows, Lieutenant Rennard, Lieutenant Ord, Lieutenant Duckworth, Second Lieutenant Lindsay.

Second Lieutenant Rogerson was away at General Headquarters attending a Machine Gun Course, and Lieutenant Gregson was attached to the Grenadier Company at the time.

The casualties among the men were heavy, especially among the N.C.O.’s.[D] They were:—

Killed	26
Wounded	266
Missing	110
Total	402

It must be assumed that most of the missing are killed. The list therefore stands with a high ratio of killed to wounded.

The respective strengths of the Companies on June 30th, according to Orderly Room returns, were:—

A Company	146
B Company	99
C Company	149
D Company	126
Total	520

15 Officers on strength. The effective rifle strength was 358.

The German trenches after the two days’ bombardment were in a bad state. In many places they had been completely destroyed, and when we took them we found them piled deep with German dead. The dugouts, which had been made in the parados, seemed whole, but were full of dead and wounded, probably the work of the bombers. The communication trench was also partially destroyed, and littered with German dead. The whole series of trenches were full of German equipment in great confusion. Like our trenches, they were built of sandbags, but their communication trench was very deep and well traversed, and was probably intended to serve as a fire trench against M 4. There was an abandoned German machine gun in the fire trench in a stretcher carriage, which could not be moved. There was a good amount of German equipment outside the trench about the point Z. This place was the wildest spot, a mass of shell holes and fragments of works. The German barbed wire was very strong, of abnormal thickness in closeness and strength of spikes and in the wire itself. The ditch in front of the sap was heavily wired under the water. The German casualties must have been very heavy. The artillery Officers said they caught the reinforcements coming up on the road first with the 4.5 howitzers, and later with the 9in. guns. Bombers say something of what they saw there, but not all of them agree on the point. The trenches were occupied at the time of the attack by Bavarians, it is said. The counter-attack was made by the reserve Division of the Prussian Guards.

The British trenches suffered severely too. In the morning L 8 was a wreck, most of the trench battered down, and the communication trench, which was revetted with hurdles, also badly damaged. The trench was saved in many cases, though, by the hurdles bending and not collapsing as sandbag revetting would have done. It was at L 8 that the brunt of the firing was. In some places there the trench lines were completely obliterated, and in very many places so badly damaged as to need extensive repair before being of much use again.

The British report of June 16th, as issued by the Press Bureau, read:—

“Yesterday evening, we captured the German front line of trenches east of Festubert, on a mile of front, but failed to hold them during the night against the strong counter-attacks delivered by the enemy.”

The communique issued at the German Main Headquarters says, according to the “Daily Telegraph”:—

“Wednesday.

“Again influenced by Russian defeats, the French and English yesterday attacked with strong forces of men at many points on the Western front.

“On the other hand, two attacks of four English Divisions between the roads of Estaires—La Bassée and La Bassée Canal completely collapsed. Our brave Westphalian regiments and reinforcements, consisting of portions of our Guard, repulsed the attacks after desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy suffered heavy losses. We captured several machine guns and one mine-throwing howitzer.”

JUNE 16th, 1915–JUNE 21st, 1915.

The Battalion regathered at LE TOURET and was given breakfast there from the cookers which had been brought up, with a rum issue. The roll was called, and only 243 men answered it.[E] We moved off about 10 a.m. In spite of their exhausted condition and their heavy losses, the men marched well and in good spirits, singing for the first half-hour of the journey, but a halt was made just before reaching billets for the purposes of a rest. The day was very hot and close. The march was resumed about 4 30 p.m., and billets at LE CORNET MALO were reached about 5 30 p.m. Billets were of the usual type—barns with adjacent orchards.

Lieutenant Ord was admitted to hospital on June 17th. The men were very exhausted, and the days passed in resting and cleaning-up and reorganising. All the Companies needed reorganising. B Company was without an Officer until Lieutenant Gregson came back from the Bomb School on June 19th. There was a great shortage of N.C.O.’s, since most of them were casualties. B, C, and D Companies had an average of five or six each, and A Company was not much better. Platoons were very weak in strength. A few odd men rolled up during the first few days. One, Corporal Smalley, of D Company, came in from the German lines wounded, with German field dressings on his wounds.

The system of Officers messing by Companies had to be abandoned, and a Battalion mess was reinstituted. This system was abandoned on the 9th July, when three messes were constituted: Headquarters, A and B, and C and D, when out of the trenches.

Brigadier-General Hibbert inspected the Battalion, together with the 1/8th Liverpool Regiment, on June 18th, and conveyed to Officers and Men the appreciation of himself and of the Corps Commander for the services they had rendered. He said that though the attack had failed in its immediate object, yet it had been instrumental in attracting to itself reinforcements which might otherwise have been directed against the French, attacking further south. The G.O.C. Division held an inspection on June 19th, and conveyed to us a message from Field-Marshal Sir John French, congratulating the Brigade on the fight it had made.