Читать книгу The Fleets at War - Archibald Hurd - Страница 4

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The declaration of war against Germany, followed as it was by similar action against Austria-Hungary, was preceded by a sequence of events so remarkable in their character that if any British writer had made any such forecast in times of peace he would have been written down as a romantic optimist.

Owing to a series of fortunate circumstances, the British Fleet—our main line of defence and offence—was fully mobilised for war on the morning before the day—August 4th at 11 p.m.—when war was declared by this country, and we were enabled to enter upon the supreme contest in our history with a sense of confidence which was communicated to all the peoples of the British Empire. This feeling of assurance and courage furnished the best possible augury for the future.

Within a fortnight of diplomatic relations being broken off with Germany, and less than a week after Austria-Hungary by her acts had declared her community of interest with her ally, the British Navy, without firing a gun or sending a single torpedo hissing through the water, had achieved four victories.

 (1) Germany’s elaborate scheme to produce a feeling of panic in this country—hence the army of spies, who took advantage of our open hospitality, using the telephone and providing themselves with bombs and arms, had failed.

 (2) Germany’s over-sea commerce was strangled.

 (3) British trade on the seas began to resume its normal course owing to the growing confidence of shipowners and shippers.

 (4) The British Expeditionary Force, as detailed for foreign service, had been transported to the Continent under a guarantee of safety given by the British Fleet.

These successes were due to the influence of sea-power. Confidence in the Navy, its ships and men, and a belief in the competency of Mr. Winston Churchill and Prince Louis of Battenberg and the other Sea Lords, and the War Staff, steadied the nerve of the nation when it received the first shock. Apparently the crisis developed so swiftly that there was no time for effective co-operation between the German spies. All the mischievous stories of British reverses which were clumsily put in circulation in the early period of hostilities were tracked down; for once truth was nearly as swift as rumour, though the latter was the result of an elaborately organised scheme for throwing the British people off their mental balance. It was conjectured that if a feeling of panic could be created in this country, a frightened nation would bring pressure to bear on the naval and military authorities and our strategic plans ashore and afloat would be interfered with. A democracy in a state of panic cannot make war. The carefully-laid scheme miscarried. Never was a nation more self-possessed. It had faith in its Fleet.

In the history of sea power, there is nothing comparable with the strangulation of German oversea shipping in all the seas of the world. It followed almost instantly on the declaration of war. There were over 2,000 German steamers, of nearly 5,000,000 tons gross, afloat when hostilities opened. The German sailing ships—mostly of small size—numbered 2,700. These vessels were distributed over the seas far and wide. Some—scores of them, in fact—were captured, others ran for neutral ports, the sailings of others were cancelled, and the heart of the German mercantile navy suddenly stopped beating. What must have been the feelings of Herr Ballin and the other pioneers as they contemplated the ruin, at least temporary ruin, of years of splendid enterprise? The strategical advantages enjoyed by England in a war against Germany, lying as she does like a bunker across Germany’s approach to the oversea world, had never been understood by the mass of Germans, nor by their statesmen. Shipowners had some conception of what would happen, but even they did not anticipate that in less than a week the great engine of commercial activity oversea would be brought to a standstill.

By its prompt action on the eve of war in instituting a system of Government insurance of war risks, Mr. Asquith’s administration checked any indication of panic among those responsible for our sea affairs. The maintenance of our oversea commerce on the outbreak of hostilities had been the subject of enquiry by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. When war was inevitable, the Government produced this report, and relying on our sea power, immediately carried into effect the far-reaching and statesmanlike recommendations which had been made, for the State itself bearing 80 per cent. of the cost of insurance of hull and cargoes due to capture by the enemies. Thus at the moment of severest strain—the outbreak of war—traders recognised that in carrying on their normal trading operations overseas they had behind them the wholehearted support of the British Government, the power of a supreme fleet, and the guarantee of all the accumulated wealth of the richest country in the world. None of the dismal forebodings which had been indulged in during peace were realised. Traders were convinced by the drastic action of the Government and by the ubiquitous pressure of British sea power on all the trade routes that, though some losses might be suffered owing to the action of German cruisers and converted merchantmen, the danger was of so restricted a character and had been so admirably covered by the Government’s insurance scheme that they could “carry on” in calm courage and thus contribute to the success of British arms. Navies and armies must accept defeat if they have not behind them a civil population freed from fear of starvation.

Even more remarkable, perhaps, than either of these victories of British sea power was the safe transportation to the Continent of the Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service. Within a fortnight of the declaration of war, while we had suffered from no threat of invasion or even of such raids on the coast as had been considered probable incidents in the early stage of war, the spearhead of the British Army had been thrust into the Continent of Europe.

It is often the obvious which passes without recognition. The official intelligence that the Expeditionary Force had reached the Continent fired the imagination of Englishmen, and they felt no little pride that at so early a stage in the war the British Army—the only long-service army in the world—should have been able to take its stand beside the devoted defenders of France and Belgium.

It is, of course, obvious that the army of an island kingdom cannot leave its base except it receive a guarantee of safe transport from the Navy. The British Army, whether it fights in India, in Egypt, or in South Africa, must always be carried on the back of the British Navy. If during the years of peaceful dalliance and fearful anticipation it had been suggested that, in face of an unconquered German fleet, we could throw an immense body of men on the Continent, and complete the operation within ten days or so from the declaration of war, the statement would have been regarded as a gross exaggeration. This was the amazing achievement. It reflected credit on the military machinery; but let it not be forgotten that all the labours of the General Staff at the War Office would have been of no avail unless, on the day before the declaration of war, the whole mobilised Navy had been able to take the sea in defence of British interests afloat.

We do well not to ignore these obvious facts, because they are fundamental. The Navy must always be the lifeline of the Expeditionary Force, ensuring to it reinforcements, stores, and everything necessary to enable it to carry out its high purpose. That the Admiralty, with the approval of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, felt itself justified in giving the military authorities a certificate of safe transport before the command of the sea had been secured indicated high confidence that when the German fleet did come forth to accept battle the issue would be in no doubt, though victory might have to be purchased at a high price.

Nor was this all. Thanks to the ubiquitous operations of the British Navy, the Government was able to move two divisions of troops from India, and to accept all the offers of military aid which were immediately made by the Dominions. It was realised in a flash by all the scattered people of the Empire that the Fleet, with its tentacles in every sea, maintains the Empire in unity: when “the earth was full of anger,” the seas were full of British ships of war.

H.M.S. King George V. Photo: Cribb, Southsea.

KING GEORGE V CLASS.

KING GEORGE V, CENTURION, AUDACIOUS, AJAX.

Displacement: 23,000 tons.

Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 5.

Astern fire:	Broadside:	Ahead fire:
4 13·5in.	10 13·5in.	4 13·5in.

It was in these circumstances that the war opened. Every incident tended to remind the people of the British Isles and the subjects of the King who live in the far-flung Dominions and those who reside in the scattered Crown Colonies and Dependencies of the essential truth contained in the phrases which had come so trippingly to the lips in days of peace. Men recognised that the statement of our dependence upon the sea as set forth in the Articles of War was a declaration of policy which we had done well not to ignore:

“It is upon the Navy that, under the good Providence of God, the wealth, prosperity and peace of these islands and of the Empire do mainly depend.”

How true these words rang when, in defence of our honour, we had to take up the gage thrown down by the Power which claimed supremacy as a military Power and aspired to primacy as a naval Power. Those who turned to Mr. Arnold White’s admirable monograph on “The Navy and Its Story,” must admit that this writer, in picturesque phrase, had set forth fundamental facts:

“Since the first mariner risked his life in a canoe and travelled coastwise for his pleasure or his business, Britain has acquired half the seaborne traffic of the world. She relies on her Navy to fill the grocer’s shop, to bring flour and corn to our great cities and to keep any possible enemy at a distance. So successfully has the British Navy done its work that many generations of Englishmen have grown up without hearing the sound of a gun fired in anger. Every other nation in Europe has heard the tramp of foreign soldiery in the lifetime of men still living and felt the pain and shame of invasion.

“Five times in the history of England the British Navy has stood between the would-be master of Europe and the attainment of his ambition. Charlemagne, Charles V., Philip II. of Spain, Louis XIV. of France, and Napoleon—all aspired to universal dominion. Each of these Sovereigns in turn was checked in his soaring plans by British sea power.”

When the British peoples awoke to the fact that they owed it to themselves and their past to join in humbling another tyrant, they gained confidence in the task which confronted them from the glorious record of the past achievements of those who, relying upon command of the sea, had crushed in the dust the mightiest rulers that had ever tried to impose their yoke on humanity.

H.M.S. Orion. Photo: Sport & General.

ORION CLASS.

ORION, CONQUEROR, MONARCH, THUNDERER.

Displacement: 22,500 tons.

Speed: 22 knots; Guns: 10 13·5in., 16 4in.; Torpedo tubes: 3.

Astern fire:	Broadside:	Ahead fire:
4 13·5in.	10 13·5in.	4 13·5in.

In a spirit of calmness, patience and courage the British people took up the task which their sense of honour forced upon them all unwillingly. Glancing back over the record of naval progress during the earlier years of the twentieth century we cannot fail to recognise that, in spite of many cross currents and eddies of public opinion, fate had been preparing the British peoples, all unconsciously, for the arbitrament of a war on the issue of which would depend all the interests, tangible and intangible, of the four hundred and forty million subjects of the King—their freedom, their rights to self government, their world-wide trade, and that atmosphere which distinguishes the British Empire from every other empire which has ever existed. In the years of peace men had often asked themselves whether a new crisis would produce the men of destiny to defend the traditions we had inherited from our forefathers. While peace still reigned, they little realised that the men of destiny were quietly, but persistently, working out our salvation. When the hour struck England was fully prepared, confident in her sea power, to take up the gage in defence of all the democracies of the world against the tyrant Power which sought to impose the iron caste of militarism and materialism upon nations that had outgrown mediæval conditions.

If we would realise the bearing of British naval policy in the years which preceded the outbreak of war, we shall do well to cast aside all party bias and personal animosities and study the sequence of events after the manner of the historian who collates the material to his hand, analyses it without fear or favour, and sets down his conclusions in all faithfulness. Pursuing this course we are carried back to the year 1897. Since the German Emperor had ascended the throne in 1888, he had endeavoured to communicate to his subjects the essential truths as to the influence of sea power upon history which he had read in Admiral Mahan’s early books. His educational campaign was a failure. In spite of all the efforts of Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine, the Reichstag refused to vote increased supplies to the Navy. At last, when he had been finally repulsed, first by the Budget Committee and then by the Reichstag itself, Admiral von Hollmann retired admitting defeat. The Emperor found a successor in a naval officer who, then unknown, was in a few years to change radically the opinion of Germans on the value of a fleet. Born on March 19th, 1849, at Custrin, and the son of a judge, Alfred Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the Naval Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for the torpedo organisation and the tactical use of torpedoes in the German Navy—a work which British officers regard with admiration.[1] Subsequently he became Inspector of her Torpedo Service, and was the first Flotilla Chief of the Torpedo Flotillas. Later he was appointed Chief of the Staff at the naval station in the Baltic and of the Supreme Command of the German Fleet. During these earlier years of his sea career, Admiral Tirpitz made several long voyages. He is regarded as an eminent tactician, and is the author of the rules for German naval tactics as now in use in the Navy. In 1895 he was promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral, and became Vice-Admiral in 1899. In 1896 and 1897 he commanded the cruiser squadron in East Asia, and immediately after became Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy Office. In the following year he was made a Minister of State and Naval Secretary, and in 1901 received the hereditary rank of nobility, entitling him to the use of the honorific prefix “Von.”

[1] German Sea Power: Its Rise, Progress and Economic Basis, by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle (London: John Murray 1913).

With the advent of this sailor-statesman to the Marineamt, the whole course of German naval policy changed, and in 1898 the first German Navy Act was passed authorising a navy on a standard which far exceeded anything hitherto attained. It provided for the following ships:

THE BATTLE FLEET
19	battleships (2 as material reserve).
8	armoured coast defence vessels.
6	large cruisers.
16	small cruisers.
FOREIGN SERVICE FLEET
Large Cruisers
For East Africa	2
For Central and South America	1
Material reserve	3
Total	6
Small Cruisers
For East Asia	3
For Central and South America	3
For East Africa	2
For the South Seas	2
Material reserve	4
Total	14
1	Station ship.

This dramatic departure in German naval policy aroused hardly a ripple of interest in England. Then occurred the South African War, the seizure of the “Bundesrat,” and other incidents which were utilised by the German Emperor, the Marine Minister, and the official Press Bureau, with its wide extending agencies for inflaming public opinion throughout the German Empire against the British Navy. The ground having been well prepared, in 1900 the naval measure of 1898, which was to have covered a period of six years, was superseded by another Navy Act, practically doubling the establishment of ships and men. This is not the time, nor does space permit, to trace the evolution of German naval policy during subsequent years or to analyse the successive Navy Acts which were passed as political circumstances favoured further expansion. The story—and it is a fascinating narrative in the light of after events—may be read elsewhere. The fact to be noted is that the British peoples generally viewed the early indications of German naval policy without suspicion or distrust. Most men found it impossible to believe that any Power could hope to challenge the naval supremacy which had been won at such great sacrifice at the Battle of Trafalgar, and which the British people had continued to enjoy virtually without challenge throughout the nineteenth century.

Happily, the hour when preparations had to be made, if made at all, to maintain in face of any rivalry our sea command, produced the man. In the autumn of 1901 Lord Selborne, then First Lord of the Admiralty, paid a special visit to Malta to discuss the naval situation with a naval officer with whose name not a thousand people in the British Isles were then familiar. Sir John Fisher had, as recently as 1899, taken over the command of the Mediterranean Squadron; he had already made a great name in the service as a man of original thought and great courage, possessing a genius for naval politics and naval administration. He had represented the British Navy at the Hague Peace Conference, but he might have walked from end to end of London, and not a dozen people would have recognised him. In the following March, thanks to Lord Selborne, he became Second Sea Lord, and a naval revolution was inaugurated. Elsewhere I have recapitulated the remarkable Navy of the renaissance of British sea power.[2]

[2] Fortnightly Review, September, 1914.

First, attention was devoted to the personnel. New schemes of training for officers and men and for the Naval Reserve were introduced. A new force—the Royal Fleet Reserve—was established, consisting of naval seamen and other ratings who had served afloat for five years or more; a Volunteer Naval Reserve was initiated; steps were taken to revise the administration of the naval establishments ashore, and to reduce the proportion of officers and men engaged in peace duties, freeing them for service in ships afloat. On the anniversary of Trafalgar in 1904, after a short period in command at Portsmouth in order to supervise personally the reforms in training and manning policy already introduced, Sir John Fisher—Lord Fisher as he is now known—returned to the Admiralty as First Sea Lord. Instantly, with the support of Lord Selborne and Mr. Balfour, then Prime Minister, to whom all honour is due, the new Board proceeded to carry into effect vast correlated schemes for the redistribution of the fleets at sea and the more rapid mobilisation of ships in reserve, the reorganisation of the Admiralty, and the re-adjustment of our world naval policy to the new conditions in accordance with a plan of action which the new First Sea Lord had prepared months in advance.

Our principal sea frontier has been the Mediterranean. It was necessary to change it, and the operation had to be carried out without causing undue alarm to our neighbours—at that time we had no particular friends, though the foundations of the Entente were already being laid. Without asking your leave from Parliament, the great administrative engine, to which Lord Fisher supplied fuel, proceeded to carry out the most gigantic task to which any Governmental Department ever put its hand. Overseas squadrons which had no strategic purpose were disestablished; unimportant dockyards were reduced to cadres; ships too weak to fight and too slow to run away were recalled; a whole fleet of old ships, which were eating up money and adding nothing to our strength, were scrapped; the vessels in reserve were provided with nucleus crews. With a single eye to the end in view—victory in the main strategical theatres—conservative influences which strove to impede reform were beaten down. With the officers and men taken out of the weak ships, and others who were wrenched from comfortable employment ashore, a great fleet on our new frontier was organised.

In the preamble to the German Navy Act of 1900 it had been stated:

“It is not absolutely necessary that the German Battle Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its striking force against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority of strength, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.”

Lord Fisher had not studied the progress of the German naval movement without realising that in this passage was to be found the secret of the strategic plan which the German naval authorities had formed. With the instinct of a great strategist, he reorganised the whole world-wide machinery of the British Navy, in order to suit the new circumstances then developing.

The war in the Far East had shown that changes were necessary in the design of British ships of all classes. The First Sea Lord insisted that the matter should have immediate attention, and a powerful committee of naval officers, shipbuilders, and scientists began its sittings at the Admiralty. The moment its report was available, Parliament was asked for authority to lay down groups of ships of new types, of which the “Dreadnought” was the most famous. In the preceding six years, sixteen battleships had been laid down for Great Britain, while Germany had begun thirteen; our sea power, as computed in modern ships of the line, had already begun to shrink. Secretly and rapidly, four units of the new type—the “Dreadnought,” with her swift sisters, the “Indomitable,” “Inflexible,” and “Invincible”—were rushed to completion. No battleship building abroad carried more than four big guns; the “Dreadnought” had ten big guns, and her swift consorts eight.[3] Thus was the work of rebuilding the British Fleet initiated. Destroyers of a new type were placed in hand, and redoubled progress was made in the construction of submarines, which Lord Fisher was the first to realise were essential to this country, and were capable of immense development as offensive engines of warfare. We gained a lead of eighteen months over other Powers by the determined policy adopted.

[3] It is officially admitted by the United States Navy Department that it had prepared plans for a ship similar in armament to the Dreadnought in 1904, and was awaiting the approval of Congress before beginning construction. American officers had come to the same conclusions as to the inevitable tendency of battleship design as the British Admiralty.

Owing to the delay imposed by the necessity of obtaining the consent of Congress, the United States lost the advantage; in the exercise of its powers, the British Admiralty acted directly the designs of the new ships were ready.

Just as the task of rebuilding the Fleet had been initiated, a change of Government occurred, and there was reason to fear that the stupendous task of reorganising and re-creating the bases of our naval power would be delayed, if not abandoned. In Lord Fisher the nation had, fortunately, a man of iron will. Though Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, above all things desirous of arresting the rivalry in naval armaments, was Prime Minister, and Lord Tweedmouth was First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Fisher, supported by his colleagues on the Board, insisted on essentials. Delays occurred in German shipbuilding, and the Admiralty agreed that British shipbuilding could be delayed. In 1906, 1907, and 1908 only eight Dreadnoughts were begun. Subsequent events tend to show that this policy was a political mistake, though we eventually obtained more powerful ships by the delay. Germany was encouraged to believe that under a Liberal Administration she could overtake us. Between 1906 and 1908 inclusive we laid down eight large ships of the Dreadnought type; and Germany laid down nine, and began to accelerate her programme of 1909.

Then occurred a momentous change in British affairs. Lord Tweedmouth, after the famous incident of the German Emperor’s letter, retired from office (1908), and his place was taken by Mr. Reginald McKenna, who was to show that a rigid regard for economy was not incompatible with a high standard of patriotism. In association with the Sea Lords, he surveyed the naval situation. In the following March occurred the naval crisis. Germany had accelerated her construction, and our sea power was in peril. The whole Board of Admiralty determined that there was no room for compromise. Mr. McKenna, it is now no secret, found arrayed against him a large section of the Cabinet when he put forward the stupendous programme of 1909, making provision for eight Dreadnoughts, six protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and a number of submarines. The naval crisis was accompanied by a Cabinet crisis, in spite of the fact that Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Secretary, gave the naval authorities his full support. Unknown to the nation, the Admiralty resigned, and for a time the Navy had no superior authority. This dramatic act won the day. The Cabinet was converted; the necessity for prompt, energetic action was proved. The most in the way of compromise to which the Board would agree was a postponement in announcing the construction of four of the eight armoured ships. But from the first there was no doubt that, unless there was a sudden change in German policy, the whole octette would be built. When the programme was presented to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey gave to Mr. McKenna their wholehearted support; either the Government had to be driven from office, or the Liberal Party had to agree to the immense commitment represented in the Navy Estimates. The programme was agreed to.

This, however, is only half the story. Neither the Government nor the Admiralty was in a position to tell the country that, though all the ships were not to be laid down at once, they would all be laid down in regular rotation, in order that they might be ready in ample time to meet the situation which was developing. Perhaps it was well in the circumstances that this fact was not revealed. Public opinion became active. The whole patriotic sentiment of the country was roused, and the jingle was heard on a thousand platforms, “We want eight and we won’t wait.” The Admiralty, which had already determined upon its policy, remained silent and refused to hasten the construction of the ships. Quietly, but firmly, the Board resisted pressure, realising that it, and it only, was in possession of all the facts. Secrecy is the basis of peace as well as war strategy. The naval authorities were unable to defend themselves by announcing that they were on the eve of obtaining a powerful weapon which could not be ready for the ships if they were laid down at once. By waiting the Navy was to gain the most powerful gun in the world.

In order to keep pace with progress in Germany, it was necessary to lay down two of the eight ships in July, and be satisfied with the 12-inch guns (projectile of 850 lbs.) for these units. The construction of the other six vessels was postponed in order that they might receive the new 13·5-inch gun, with a projectile of about 1,400 lbs. Two of the Dreadnoughts were began at Portsmouth and Devonport Dockyards in the following November, and the contracts for the remaining four were not placed until the spring, for the simple reason that the delivery of the new guns and mountings and their equipment could not be secured for the vessels, even if their hulls were started without a moment’s delay. Thus we obtained six battleships which are still unique; in no other Navy is so powerful a gun to be found to-day as the British 13·5-inch weapon. In 1910 and in 1911 Mr. McKenna again fought for national safety, and he won the essential provision for the Fleet. He risked his all in defence of our sea power. He was probably during those years of struggle the most unpopular Minister the Liberal Party ever had. What has been the sequel of his tenacity and courage and patriotism? What has been gained owing to the bold front which Lord Fisher presented, as First Sea Lord, supported by his colleagues? Sixteen of the eighteen battleships and battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought type, the fifteen protected cruisers, and the sixty destroyers, with a group of submarines, which the Board over which Mr. McKenna presided secured, constituted the spearhead of the British Fleet when the crisis came and war had to be declared against Germany in defence of our plighted word.

With the addition of one more chapter, this story of the renaissance of British sea power is complete. In the autumn of 1911, over seven years after Lord Fisher had begun to shake the Navy into renewed life, encouraged Sir Percy Scott in his gunnery reforms, and brought to the Board the splendid intellect of Sir John Jellicoe, Mr. Winston Churchill replaced Mr. McKenna as First Lord. Thus the youngest statesman of the English-speaking world realised his ambition. Lord Fisher, under the age clause, had already been compelled to vacate his seat on the Board, retiring with a peerage, and his successor, Sir Arthur Wilson, was also on the eve of retirement. Mr. McKenna had to be freed to take over the Welsh Church Bill and to place his legal mind at the service of the country at the Home Office. He had done his work and done it well. Mr. Winston Churchill proved the ideal man to put the finishing touches to the great task which had been initiated during Lord Selborne’s period of office. Perhaps the keynote of his administration is to be found in the attention which he devoted to the organisation of the War Staff, the elements of which had been created by former Boards, and the readjustment of the pay of officers and men. No service is efficient for war in which there exists a rankling feeling of injustice. The rates of pay of officers and men were revised and increased; facilities were opened up for men of the lower deck to reach commissioned rank. About 20,000 officers and men were added to the active service of the Fleet. At the same time with the ships provided by former Boards, the organisation of the ships in Home waters was placed on a higher standard of efficiency, particular attention being devoted to the organisation of the older ships so as to keep them efficient for war. The Naval Air Service was established, and its development pressed forward with all speed. Thus the work of reform and the task of changing the front of the British Navy had been brought to completion, or virtual completion, at the moment when Germany, by a concatenation of circumstances, was forced into a position where she had to fight the greatest of sea Powers, or admit the defeat of all her ambitions.

A study of the sequence of events which immediately preceded the outbreak of hostilities is hardly less interesting than the earlier and dramatic incidents which enabled us to face the supreme crisis in our history with a measure of assured confidence. On March 17th, 1914, Mr. Winston Churchill spoke in the House of Commons on the Navy Estimates. It is common knowledge that he had just fought a stern battle in the Cabinet for adequate supplies, and it was assumed at the time, from various incidents, that he had been compelled to submit to some measure of retrenchment. He received, however, Cabinet authority to ask Parliament for the largest sum ever devoted to naval defence—£51,500,000. In the course of his speech on these Estimates he made the announcement that there would be no naval manœuvres in 1914. He stated:

“We have decided to substitute this year for the grand manœuvres—not, of course, for the numberless exercises the Fleet is always carrying out—a general mobilisation of the Third Fleet.[4] We are calling up the whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve for a period of eleven days, and those who come up for that period will be excused training next year, and will receive £1 bounty in addition to their regular pay.

“We have had a most admirable response. 10,170 men, seamen, and others, and 1,409 marines, are required to man the ships of the Third Fleet. We have already, in the few days our circular has been out, received replies from 10,334 men volunteers, and from 3,321 marines. I think that reflects great credit on the spirit of the Reserve generally, and also reflects credit upon the employers, who must have greatly facilitated this operation all over the country. I hereby extend to them the thanks of the Admiralty.

“This test is one of the most important that could possibly be made, and it is really surprising to me that it has never been undertaken before. The cost, including the bounty of £1, will be about £50,000. Having no grand manœuvres yields a saving of £230,000, so there is a net saving on the substitution of £180,000.”