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Concerning proposition then, what has been stated will suffice, but as to how many ways (a thing may be predicated), we must discuss not only such things as are predicated in a different manner, but also we must endeavour to give their reasons; as not only that justice and fortitude are called good in one way, but what conduces to a good habit of body and to health in another way, but also that some things (are called so) from being certain qualities, but others from being effective of something, and not from themselves being certain qualities, and indeed in a similar manner in other things.

Whether however a thing is predicated multifariously, or in one way in species, we must investigate through these. First, we must consider in the contrary, if it is multifariously predicated, whether it differs in species or in name, for some things immediately differ even in names, as the grave is contrary in voice to the sharp, but in magnitude the obtuse. Therefore it is clear that the contrary to the sharp is predicated multifariously, but if this be so, the sharp also is, for according to each of these, the contrary will be different, since the same sharp will not be contrary to the obtuse and to the grave, but the sharp will be contrary to each. Again, to the heavy in voice, the sharp is contrary, but in weight, the light, so that the heavy is predicated ​multifariously since the contrary also is. Likewise to the beautiful in an animal, the ugly, but in a family, the depraved (is contrary), so that the beautiful is equivocal.

In some, indeed, there is no dissonance in the names, but the difference in them is at once palpable in species, as in white and black, for voice is said to be clear and obscure in the same manner as colour. In these, then, there is no dissonance in names, but their difference is at once evident in species, for colour and voice are not similarly called clear, and this is also evident from sense, for of things which are the same in species, the sense is the same; but we do not judge the lightness which is in voice, and that which is in colour, by the same sense, but one by sight, and the other, by hearing. So also the sharp and the obtuse in fluids and magnitudes, the one indeed by touch, the other by taste, since neither are these dissonant in names, neither in themselves nor in the contraries, for what is obtuse is contrary to each.

Again, we must consider if there is any thing contrary to the one, but nothing simply to the other; as, to the pleasure from drinking, the pain from thirst is contrary; but to that which arises from contemplating, that the diameter of a square is incommensurable with its side, there is nothing (contrary), wherefore pleasure is predicated multifariously. To hate, also, is contrary to the love which is mental, but nothing to that which subsists according to bodily energy, wherefore it is evident that to love, is equivocal. Besides, we must consider the media, if there is a certain medium of some, but not of others, or whether there is of both, yet not the same, as of white and black, in colour, the dark brown; but in voice, there is no medium, unless it be the hoarse, as ​some say that a hoarse voice is the medium; so that white is equivocal, and black in like manner; yet more, whether there are many media of some things, but one of others, as in the case of white and black; for in colours, there are many media, but in voice, one, viz. the hoarse.

Again, in that which is contradictorily opposed, we must consider if it is predicated multitariously, for if this is multifariously predicated, the opposite to this also will be enunciated multitariously; thus, not to see, is predicated in many ways; in one, not to have sight; in another, not to energize with the sight. Now if this is multifariously, to see, must necessarily be multifariously predicated; for to each (signification of the verb) not to see, there will be something opposed, thus to the not possessing sight, the possession of it, and to the not energizing with the sight, the energizing with it.

Further, we must remark this, in the case of those things, which are predicated according to privation and habit; for if the one, is multifariously predicated, the other is, also; thus, if to perceive, is predicated multifariously, both according to the soul and according to the body, to be deprived of sense, will be multifariously predicated, i. e. both according to the soul and the body. Nevertheless, that the particulars now mentioned, are opposed according to privation and habit, is evident, since animals are naturally adapted to possess each of the senses, viz. both according to the soul and according to the body.

We must look also to the cases, for if "justly" is predicated multifariously, "the just" also, will be multifariously predicated; for the just subsists according to each of those which are justly, thus if justly is predicated, both of judging according to one's own opinions, and also in a proper manner, the just is similarly. Likewise, if the healthy is multifariously, the healthily also, will be spoken multifariously, as if that is called "healthy," which produces, preserves, and signifies health, the "healthily" also, will be predicated either productively, or preservingly, or significantly. And in like manner in other things, when (the noun) itself is multifariously predicated, the case also derived from it, will be spoken in many ways, and if the case (the noun) itself besides.

​We must regard too, the genera of the categories, as to name, whether they are the same in all things, since if they are not the same, it is evident that what is predicated, is equivocal; thus good in food is what produces pleasure, in medicine, what produces health, in the soul, to be of a certain quality, as temperate, or brave, or just, similarly also in the case of man. Sometimes indeed it is "the when," as the good in opportunity, for that is called good, which is in season: frequently also quantity, for instance, the moderate, for the moderate also is called good, so that good is equivocal. Likewise clearness in respect of body, is colour, but in voice, that which may easily be heard, and in like manner the acute, for the same, is not predicated in all things, after the same manner, for a rapid voice is called acute, as musicians say, who are conversant with numbers; but an angle is acute, which is less than a right angle, and a sword is acute, which has a sharp point.

We must also notice the genera, of those things which are under the same name, whether they are different and not subaltern, thus ὄνος is both an animal and a vessel, since the definition of them according to the name, is different, for the one will be said to be a certain kind of animal, but the other a certain kind of vessel. If however the genera are subaltern, the definitions need not be different, as of a crow, both animal and bird are the genus, when therefore we say, that a crow is a bird, we also say, that it is a certain kind of animal, so that both genera are predicated of it; likewise also when we say that a crow is a winged biped animal, we say that it is a bird, and thus then both the genera are predicated of the crow, and also the definition of them. This nevertheless does not occur in genera which are not subaltern, since neither when we speak of a vessel, do (we speak of) an animal, nor when (we speak of) an animal, (do we mean) a vessel.

Not only indeed must we observe whether the genera of the thing proposed, be different and not subaltern, but also in regard to the contrary, since ​if the contrary is predicated in several ways, it is evident that the proposition will be so too.

It is useful also, to regard the definition produced from the composite, as of a white body and white (i. e. clear) voice; for the property being taken away, it is necessary that the same definition should be left. Now this does not occur in equivocals, for instance, in the things now spoken of, for the one, will be body having such a colour, but the other, will be an audible voice; body, then, and voice being taken away, what remains is not the same in each, at least it would be necessary if white, were synonymous, that what is predicated in each (definition), should be (the same).

Frequently also in the definitions themselves, the equivocal, which is consequent, escapes us, wherefore, we must look to the definitions. Thus, if any one were to say, that what is significant and productive of health, is that which is symmetrically disposed with respect to health, we must not leave off, but consider what he calls symmetrically, in each, as if the one, were to be of such a kind, as to produce health, but the other, such as to signify, what is the quality of the habit.

Moreover, (we are to examine) whether they may not be compared according to the more, or similarly, as a light voice, and a light garment, and a sharp flavour, and a sharp voice, for these are neither called light nor sharp similarly, nor one, more than the other. So that the light, and the sharp, are equivocal, for every synonym is capable of comparison, since it will either be predicated similarly, or one more than the other.

Since however of things heterogeneous and not subaltern, the differences are also different in species, as of animal and science, (for the differences of these are diverse,) consider whether those things, which are under the same name, are the differences of different, and not of subaltern genera, as the acute (is the difference) of voice and magnitude, for voice, differs from voice, in acuteness, likewise also one mass, from another, so that the acute is equivocal, for these are the differences of diverse, and not of subaltern, genera.

​Again, (observe) whether of things under the same name, there be divers differences, as of the chroma which belongs to bodies, and of that which is in melodies, for of that which belongs to bodies, the differences are, that which diffuses, and that which condenses, the vision, but these are not the same differences of that which is in melodies, so that chroma is an equivocal word, for there are the same differences of the same things.

Once more, since species is not the difference of any thing, notice of those which are under the same name, whether one is species, but the other, difference, as bodily clearness is a species of colour, but vocal (clearness) is a difference, since voice differs from voice, in being clear.