| | | PAGE |
| Big guns more accurate at long range, because more regular | 94 |
| Big guns need less accurate range-finding, because the danger space is greater | 95 |
| Range-finding by bracket | 97 |
| The crux of sea fighting, changes of course and speed produce an irregularly changing range | 98 |
| In this sketch the black silhouette shows the position at the moment the torpedo is fired; the white silhouette the position the ship has reached when the torpedo meets it | 107 |
| Plan of Sydney and Emden in action | 158 |
| Plan of the action between the British battle-cruisers and the German armoured cruisers | 199 |
| Plan of action between Kent and Nürnberg, and of that between Cornwall and Glasgow and Leipzig | 207 |
| The action off Heligoland up to the intervention of Commodore Goodenough’s Light Cruiser Squadron | 235 |
| The action off Heligoland. The course of the battle-cruisers | 239 |
| The Dogger Bank Affair. Diagram to illustrate the character of the engagement up to the disablement of Lion | 249 |
| The official plan of the Battle of Jutland. Note that the course of the Grand Fleet is not shown to be “astern” of the battle-cruisers, but parallel to their track | 295 |
| Position of the opposing fleets at 3:30 P.M. | 298 |
| The first phase; from Von Hipper’s coming into view, until his juncture with Admiral Scheer | 301 |
| The second phase; Beatty engages the combined German Fleet, and draws it toward the Grand Fleet | 309 |
| Sketch plan of the action from 6 P.M. when the Grand Fleet prepared to deploy, till 6:50 when Admiral Scheer delivered his first massed torpedo attack | 332 |
| Jutland Diagrams. Third phase | at end of book |
