Читать книгу Las reestructuraciones de las sociedades de capital en crisis - Aurora Martínez Flórez - Страница 71
XI. SHORT COMPARISON WITH THE RULES PROVIDED BY THE EU DIRECTIVE ON RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORKS
ОглавлениеThe recent EU directive on preventive restructuring frameworks provides for a specific article dealing with the shareholders position in restructuring proceedings: art. 12 of the directive states that “1. Member States shall ensure that, where there is a likelihood of insolvency, shareholders and other equity holders with interests in a debtor may not unreasonably prevent the adoption or implementation of a restructuring plan which would restore the viability of the business”.
I. crisis code regulation seems to be compliant with this rule, providing a mechanism able to write down shareholders veto power –pursuant to company law– against the enforcement of an approved agreement with creditors. Even if, as mentioned above, such a mechanism is explicitly provided by the law only when the proposal for the agreement is applied by a creditor, while when it is applied by the debtor it is necessary to solve the problem of shareholders veto power with an interpretative solution.
The reform came in force on 1 March 2012 and it is inspired by the reorganization proceeding of Chapter 11 of USA bankruptcy code.
S. § 245 InsO. See also, about this one, Gräfin von Spee, Gesellschafter im Reorganisationsverfahren, Köln, 2014, 120 ff. and Pühl, Der Debt Equity Swap im Insolvenzplanverfahren, Köln, 2016, 80 ff. And for the Italian doctrine, Pinto, Concordato preventivo e organizzazione societaria, Riv. soc., 2017, 115 ff.; Vattermoli, Crediti subordinati e concorso tra creditori, Milano, 2012, 324 ftn. 60.
On the issue of extension of § 245 InsO to the shareholders, v. Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 120 and ftn. 766-767.
Pulgar Ezquerra, Preconcursalidad y reestructuración empresarial, Madrid, 2016; Benítez Pérez, La nueva de los Regulación Acuerdos de refinanciación, elderecho.com.
Portale, Il diritto societario tra diritto comparato e diritto straniero, Di Cataldo-Meli-Pennisi (eds.), Impresa e mercato. Studi dedicati a Mario Libertini, Milano, 2015, I, 546; Cariello, Sensibilità comuni, uso della comparazione e convergenze interpretative. Per una Methodenlehreunitaria nella riflessione europea sul diritto dei gruppi di società, RDS, 2012, 260 ff.
For a wider reconstruction of the principle mentioned in the text s., in Italian literature, Pinto, op. cit., 100 ff.; furthermore, s. Nigro, La società per azioni nelle procedure concorsuali, Colombo-Portale (directed by), Trattato delle società per azioni, Torino, 1993, 9**, 336; Ferri jr., Soci e creditori nella struttura finanziaria della società in crisi, Tombari (eds), Diritto societario e crisi d’impresa, Torino, 2014, 100; and in German literature, Schmidt, Das Insolvenzrecht mischt sich ein, ZHR, 174 (2010), 243 ff.; Müller, Der Verband der Insolvenz, Köln-Bonn-Berlin-Munich, 2002, 318 ff.
In Italy s. Maugeri, Partecipazione sociale e attività d’impresa, Milano, 2010, 394 ff.; Ferri jr., La struttura finanziaria della società in crisi, RDS, 2012, 480 ff.; D’Attorre, Le proposte di concordato preventivo concorrenti,Fallimento, 2015, 1168 ff.
Becker, Kooperationspflichten in der Konzerninsolvenz, Köln, 2012, 313; Prusko, Gesellschafterstellung Die in der Insolvenz, München, 2013, 142 ff.; Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 90 ff. and passim.
Bitter, Sanierung in der Insolvenz - Treue- Der Beitrag von und zum Aufopferungspflichten Sanierungserfolg, ZGR, 2010, 161 ff.; Verse, Anteilseigner und Insolvenzverfahren, ZGR, 2010, 302 ff.; Becker, op. cit., 314 ("Eingriffsmöglichkeit in die Anteils- Mitgliedschaftsrechte und der Gesellschafter wurde dadurch nich eröffnet"); Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 92 ff. an ftn. 588-589-590 and 593. The latter author points out the clear separation existing between corporate and Insolvenzrecht till to ESUG reform. See also Pinto, op. cit., 100 ff.; Sciuto, Adempimento» del concordato e programma societario, Di Cataldo-Meli-Pennisi (eds.), Impresa, cit., III, 1484 ff.
Haas, Mehr Gesellschaftsrecht im Insolvenzplan, NZG, 2012, 963; Bitter, op. cit., 162; Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 94, who speaks about sharehilders participation in the insolvent company as a mere Formalposition Eidenmüller, Kapitalgesellschaftsrecht im Spiegel der ökonomischen Theorie, JZ, 2001, 1051 and Noack, Unternehmensinsolvenz: Reorganization des rechtsträger oder bei Vertragsnachfolge übertragender Sanierung, in Festschrift für Röhricht, Köln, 2005, 455 ff. Among Italian law scholars, s. Ferri jr., Soci, cit., 95 ff. About the rule pursuant to which equity holders, such as "residual claimants", have the power to make business decisions, see: Angelici, La società per azioni, I. Principi e problemi, Trattato Cicu-Messineo, Milano, 2012, 22 ff.; Stanghellini, Le crisi d’impresa fra diritto ed economia, Bologna, 2007, 37; in USA, Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure, Oxford, 1996, 63 ff.
Frege/Nicht in Theiselmann-Restrukturierungsrecht, Köln, 2010, ch. 15, Rn. 103; Braun, Anteilseignerrechte im Eingriff Insolvenzplanverfahren, in FS Fischer, München, 2008, 54; Madaus, Keine Reorganisation ohne die Gesellschafter – von den Grenzen der Gläubigermacht in der Insolvenz, ZGR, 2011, 753; Bork, Sanierungsrecht in Deutschland und England, Köln, 2011, 239; Spetzler, Insolvenzrechtreform und Bankenreorganisation, KTS, 2010, 435. See also Becker, op. cit., 351 where it is stressed that the Kapitalherabsetzung is a constitutive element of Buchsanierung (s. nt. 1638 for the definition) and necessary to write down the Uberschuldung (precondition of the Insolvenzverfharen); Eidenmüller, Unternehmensanierung zwischen Markt und Gesetz, Köln, 1999, 294 ff. In Italy, Ferri jr., La struttura, cit., 479.
Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 96, ftn. 619-620 where references; Pinto, op. cit., 109 ff.
S. Ferri jr, La struttura, cit., 480; Stanghellini, Le crisi, cit., 319; Noack, Reorganization der nach neuem Schuldnergesellschaft Insolvenzrecht in FS Zollner, Köln, 1998, 419; Spetzler, op. cit., 436 ff.
Stanghellini, The corporate entity as a bankruptcy assets, paper delivered to the Bank of Italy as part of the symposium "The treatment of shareholders' rights in the insolvency of companies", 23 June 2016, who points out that the need to transfer assets from one company to another in a crisis situation can destroy value and can results in some costs, so it may be convenient for the best satisfaction of creditors to restructure the existing company in crisis; Pinto, op. cit., 110 ftn. 17. Even before ESUG, the German doctrine had tried to solve the problem of the power of veto of the equity holders against a restructuring solution of the crisis, setting out cooperation duties (Mitwirkungspflicht) based on corporate Treuepflicht, as an element of social participation, which would remain unchanged even in insolvency procedures (s. Becker, op. cit., 322 ff.).
S. Abriani, Proposte concorrenti, operazioni straordinarie e dovere della società di adempiere gli obblighi concordatari, Giust. civ., 2016, 365 ff.; D’Attorre, op. cit., 1163 ff.; Galletti, Le proposte concorrenti nel concordato preventivo, ilfallimentarista.it, 15 September, 2015; Vella, La contendibilità dell’azienda in crisi. Dal concordato in continuità alla proposta alternativa del terzo, ilcaso.it, 2016, 1 ff.
Stanghellini, La struttura finanziaria delle società per azioni al tempo della grande crisi, Carcano-Mosco-Ventoruzzo (eds), Regole del mercato e mercato delle regole. Il diritto societario e il ruolo del legislatore, Milano, 2016, 257 ff.: the legal entity becomes an asset for the creditors; Panzani, Le alternative al fallimento. Il concordato e gli accordi di ristrutturazione dopo il d.l. 83/2015,NDS, n. 21/2015, 25; D’Attorre, op. cit., 1164. See also Stanghellini, Le crisi, cit., 210; Guerrera-Maltoni, Concordati giudiziali e operazioni societarie di «riorganizzazione», Riv. soc., 2008, 33; Guerrera, Le competenze degli organi sociali nelle procedure di regolazione negoziale della crisi, Riv. soc., 2013, 1132; Ferri jr., Soci, cit., 95 ff.
The article states that "the proposal may provide for the intervention of third parties and, if the debtor has the form of a public company or a limited liability partnership, the increase of company legal capital with the exclusion or limitation of pre-emption right". The same rule is provided by the new article 90, paragraph 6, I. crisis c.
The regulation briefly described, introduced in the I. bankruptcy law since the 2015 reform, is substantially confirmed in the art. 118, paragraph 6, I. crisis c., which provides for the appointment by the court of a judicial officer with the powers necessary to enforce the approved agreement with creditors, including, in the case of a provision about a capital increase in the plan, to call the extraordinary general meeting and to exercise the voting rights for the shares of the majority shareholder.
D’Attore, op. cit., 1169, and most recently Brizzi, Proposte concorrenti nel concordato preventivo e governancedell’impresa in crisi, Giur. comm., 2017, I, 335 ff., ftn. 51. For the opinion of the application of the rule only to creditor proposals, s. Trib. Reggio Emilia, 28 June 2016, Fallimento, 2017, 1377 with critical note of Benedetti.
Fabiani, legal opinion pro veritate, 15 maggio 2017, unpublished, consulted for courtesy of the author, 41; Arato, Il concordato preventivo, Cagnasso-Panzani (directed by), Crisi d’impresa e procedure concorsuali, Torino, 2016, 3367.
Fabiani, op. cit., 43.
In Germany, the Insolvenzplan is one of the possible outcomes of the original Insolvenzverfharen, which can be applied by both the debtor and his creditors in case of insolvency or over-indebtedness, but only by the debtor in case of imminent insolvency (§ 18, Abs. 1, InsO); in France the ablative operations of old shareholders participations could be provided by the redressement that is a procedure the opening of which can be applied for either by the debtor and by creditors. See also art. 4, n. 4 EU draft of directive.
A. Rossi, Il contenuto delle proposte concorrenti nel concordato preventivo (prime riflessioni), ilcaso.it, 2015, 21; Maugeri, op. cit., 420; Lutter, Die Treupflicht des Aktionärs, ZHR, 1989, 449; Vitali, Profili di diritto societario delle «proposte concorrenti» nella «nuova disciplina del concordato preventivo, Riv. soc., 2016, 870 ff.
Marchetti, Sulla legittimità della reintegrazione del capitale azzerato con esclusione del diritto d’opzione deliberato a maggioranza e non con il voto unanime di tutti i soci, legal opinion pro veritate (mention by Stanghellini, Art. 2447, Abbadessa-Portale (directed by), Le società per azioni Milano, 2016, II), 9, which speaks about the fundamental interest to the conservation of the eterprise; Arato, op. cit., 3370. S. also Stanghellini, Le crisi, cit., 257 ff. that speaks about a possible “neo-istitutzionalistica” conception of social interest; Fabiani, op. cit., 33 ff. By contrast, Galletti, op. cit., 20. For more extensive references, Vitali, op. cit., 870 ff., ftn. 54.
Art. 2441 speaks about the interest "of the company" and not about the interest of the shareholders; s. also the Spanish ley concursal.
Pulgar Ezquerra, Holdout degli azionisti, ristrutturazione di impresa e dovere di fedeltà del socio, Dir. Fall., 2018, 47 ff.
Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 131 ff., ftn. 848 ff. S. also Thole, Gessellschaftsrechtliche Massnahmen in der Insolvenz, Köln, 2015, 92 ff.
Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 164 ff.
Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 194 ff.
For a different opinion from the one mentioned in the text, s. Altmeppen, Zur Rechtsstellung Gläubiger der im Konkurs Gestern und Heute, Festschrift für Hommelhoff, Köln, 2012, 19; Eidenmüller, § 225a, Kirchof-Eidenmüller-Stürner (hrsg), Münchener Kommentar zum Insolvenzornung, München, 2014, Rn. 50.
For an in-depth reflection about the Spanish law s. Recalde Castells, The protection de los socios en los de Acuerdos refinanciación by conversión en capital de la deuda de la sociedad , Estudios sobre Derecho de Sociedades . Liber Amicorum Profesor Luis Fernández de la Gándara, coord. por Rodríguez Artigas- Esteban Velasco-Sánchez Alvarez, Madrid, 2016, 821 ff.
This is the result of the balance of interests underlying the rules introduced by the ESUG –which was the model for Italian rules–: s. Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 168 ff.
Tombari, Principi e problemi di «diritto societario della crisi», Riv. soc., 2013, 1138 ff.
Portale, Verso un diritto societario della crisi?, Tombari (eds), Diritto societario e crisi d’impresa, Torino, 2014, 4; Nigro, Riduzione o perdita del capitale di società in crisi, ilcaso.it, 2014, 10; Fabiani, op. cit., 31.
Guidotti, Urgent measures by bankruptcy (dl 27June 2015, n. 83): the changes to insolvency law and the provisions laid down in terms of competing proposals, ilcaso.it, 2015, 12; Benazzo, Crisi di impresa, soluzioni concordate e capitale sociale, Riv. soc., 2016, 241 ff.
Ex multis, Stanghellini, Le crisi, cit., 49 ff.
In this sense Paciello, paper for the annual conference of the Riv. dir. impr., Napoli, 29 January 2016, unpublished. S. also Maugeri, op. cit., 418.
The argument should not be considered peaceful. It is arguable, however, whether article 160, paragraph 2, l.b.l. provides for a rule similar to the absolute priority rule USA. S. the different opinions of Vattermoli, op. cit., 417 ff. and of Ambrosini, Le altre procedure concorsuali, Trattato di diritto fallimentare e delle altre procedure concorsuali, IV, Vassalli-Gabrielli-Luiso, (directed by), Torino, 2014, 203 ftn. 7; and also Benedetti, I finanziamenti dei soci e infragruppo alla società in crisi, Milano, 2017, 257 ff. It is also questionable whether the prohibition in art. 160, paragraph 2, l.b.l. is applicable to the creditors/shareholders relationships: on the contrary s. Ferri jr., Il trattamento dei creditori nel concordato tra competenze collettive e interessi individuali, Osservatorio del Diritto Civile e Commerciale, 2015, 377; Maugeri, op. cit., 400 ftn. 238.
A. Rossi, op. cit., 21, which therefore suggests the application of art. 2441 even in the cases provided by 163, paragraph 5, l.b.l.
Brizzi, Doveri degli amministratori e tutela dei creditori nel diritto societario della crisi, Torino, 2015, 231-232; Pacileo, Doveri informativi e libertà d’impresa nella gestione di una s.p.a. in «fase crepuscolare», Riv. dir. comm., I, 2016, when a 83 ftn. 37 additional references.
Brizzi, Doveri, cit., 232; Sfameni, Perdita del capitale sociale e bilancio straordinario, Milano, 2004, where at 65 ftn. 180 further references; De Luca, Riduzione del capitale ed interessi protetti. Un’indagine comparatistica, Riv. dir. civ., II, 2010, 595 ff.; Brizzi, Proposte, cit., 335 ff. As it is known, according to some law scholars it can be part of appropriate measures pursuant to art. 2446 Ic.c. not only the operations on the legal capital, but also other business decisions, and thus also the ones providing for solutions to overcome the crisis: s. Calandra Buonaura, Gestione dell'impresa e competenza dell'assemblea, Milano, 1985, 117 ff.; Abbadessa, L’assemblea: competenza, Abbadessa-Portale (directed by), Trattato delle società per azioni, Torino, 1994, 3*, 60 ff.; Abbadessa-Mirone, Le competenze dell'assemblea nelle s.p.a., Riv. soc., 2010, 282 ff.; Portale Rapporti fra assemblea e organo gestorio nei sistemi di amministrazione, Colombo-Portale (directed by), Il nuovo diritto delle società. Liber amicorum Gian Franco Campobasso, Torino, 2006, 2, 29 ff.; Guerrera, Le competenze degli organi sociali nelle procedure di regolazione negoziale della crisi, Riv. soc., 2013, 1126; Maugeri, Considerazioni sul sistema delle competenze assembleari nella s.p.a., Riv. soc., 2013, 406 ff.
Law scholars mention articles 2446, paragraph 1 and 2447 I.c.c., theratio of which is precisely the need to involve members in initiatives about enterprise restructuring at least for information purposes; and the art. 2476, comma 2, c.c. (Brizzi, Doveri, cit., 231-232, which recalls Sfameni, op. cit., 18; Pacileo, op. cit., 79 ff., ftn. 29); s. also art. 2484, paragraph 1, no. 2) and 6), 2487, paragraph 1, lett. c) c.c. In general, for the informative function of the calling of the shareholders meeting about the mandatory capital reduction s. Miola, La tutela dei creditori ed il capitale sociale: realtà e prospettive, Riv. soc., 2012, 298; Stanghellini, Director's Duties and the Optimal Timing of the Insolvency. A Reassessment of the "recapitalize or liquidated" Rule, Benazzo-Cera-Patriarca, Il diritto delle società oggi. Innovazioni e persistenze, Torino, 2011, 761 ff.). All of those rules are assumed to be able to give content to the parameters of fairness and diligence in the management of companies in crisis (Sfameni, op. cit., 63 and nt. 176, Brizzi, Doveri, cit., 234 and ftn. 228 and 229 for since last. ref.; Pacileo, op. cit., 81).
In Germany s. §§ 49 Abs. 2, GmbHG and 91, Abs. 1 AktG, which impose an obligation to call the shareholders meeting if the financial statements prepared at the end or during the year shows the loss of half of the share capital. It is deemed, moreover, that pursuant to § 49, Abs. 3, GmbHG the shareholders meeting must be called when it appears in the interest of society. S. Bork, Pflichten Geshäftsführung in der Krise und Sanierung, ZIP, 2011, 107 ff.; Schmidt, Schmidt-Uhlenbruck (hrsg.), Die Gmbh in Krise, Sanierung und Insolvenz, Köln, 2016, 381; BGB, 20 February 1995- II ZR 9/94, GmbHR, 1995, 300; Seibt, § 49, Scholz, GmbHG, Köln, 2010, Rz. 23: managers should take any strategic decision, not imposed by law, in accordance with the shareholders. For more references to the Spanish doctrine and USA s. Pacileo, op. cit., 81 nt. 33.
The expression is used by Stanghellini, Le crisi, cit., 178 ff.
On this point, see Benazzo, op. cit., 241 ff.; Fabiani, op. cit., 40. As it is claimed in the text are consistent with the reflection of Pühl, op. cit., 135.
S. Benedetti, I finanziamenti, cit., Ch. II.
"Without prejudice to article 173, the court, heard the debtor and the judicial commissioner, may revoke directors, and appoint a judicial officer by setting the duration of his assignment and granting him the power to make all acts necessary to enforce the proposal, including, if this proposal provides for an increase of the legal capital of the debtor, to call extraordinary general meeting of shareholders for the resolution of the capital increase and to exercise the voting rights in this one" Substantially identical the formulation of the new art. 118, paragraph 6, I. crisis c.
Abriani, op. cit., 365 ff.; principles, 58, cit.; Draft, op. cit., 72-73.
Bozza, op. cit., 70; Lamanna, La legge fallimentare dopo il “Decreto sviluppo”, Milano, 2012, 34; Arato, op. cit., 3776, which, however, points out that the application of article 185, paragraph 6, l.b.l. only in case of competing proposals creates an unreasonable unequal treatment.
Bertacchini, La conversione dei crediti in azioni negli accordi di ristrutturazione dei debiti e nei piani attestati di risanamento nel quadro della legge fallimentare riformata, Banca, borsa tit. cred.,2014, 1, 181 ff.
Sacchi, Le operazioni straordinarie nel concordato preventivo, Arato-Domenichini (directed by), Le proposte di legge per una riforma della legge fallimentare, Milano, 2017, 44 ff.; Abriani, Proposte concorrenti, operazioni straordinarie e dovere della società di adempiere agli obblighi concordatari, Relazione tenuta al Convegno Imprese e mercato della crisi di impresa: nuovi percorsi del “diritto fallimentare”, Venezia, Grand Hotel Molino Stucky, 29 novembre 2015; principles, 58, cit.; Vitali, op. cit., 870 ff. For a different view from the one proposed in the text v. Pezzano, Commento all’art. 185, Aa.Vv., La nuova riforma del diritto concorsuale, Torino, 2015, 319 ff.
S. art. 6.2, lett. c) of the law for the reform of the Italian bankruptcy legislation n. 155/2017, which introduced the duty of company bodies to enforce companies' approved proposal "without specification about its origin from the debtor or creditors”.
Abriani, Proposte, cit., 386 ff.
Ferri jr., Soci, cit., 101; Pinto, op. cit., 131 ff.
Pinto, op. cit., 130.
Principle 58, cit. Moreover, the conclusion of the text seems implicitly acknowledged in art. 6.2, lett. b) L. 155/2017, where the application of the mechanism to enforce the agreement approved by creditors and confirmed is extended to every proposal approved without any specification about its content. S. also art. 118, paragraph 6, I. crisis c. But for an partial different opinion, Pinto, op. cit., 132 ftn. 57..
The observation applies, for ex., to the reduction of share capital required before the increasing of the legal capital provided by the proposal.
D'Attorre, op. cit., 1170 ff.
Pinto, op. cit., 137, who also refers (in nt. 65) to recital 29 of the EU draft directive of 22 November 2016, where we can read: "the legitimate interests of the shareholders and other holders of capital instruments should be protected, Member States should ensure that members can not unjustifiably block the adoption of a restructuring plan that could lead to the debtor towards the recovery".
Such a choice is fully justified because equity holders have not the same interests in comparison with the creditors, so that their exclusion from the vote is the result of the necessary existence of an Interessengemeinschaft to justify the application of the majority voting mechanism. For further study on the matter, s. Benedetti, I finanziamenti, cit., Ch. II. Please note that different the legal systems (Germany, the proposed EU Directive) admit the shareholders vote with creditors for the approval of agreed solutions of the crisis.
But v. also art. L661-1, n. 6a F. c. comm. (French code de commerce).
Before the changes introduced with more recent reform of I.b.l., s. Trib. Bologna, 17 November 2011, ilcaso.it; Trib. Rome, 7 July 1999, Fallimento, 1999 12; Cass., 6 November 2013, n. 24970; 26 July 2013, 13284 (both on DeJure.it). As after the Decree 83/2015 the agreement with creditors can impact on the position of the shareholders, it becomes inevitable to consider them as "any interested party" who have the power to apply for an opposition against judicial confirmation (and s. Ferri jr., Soci, cit., 104). S. also D’Attorre, op. cit., 1164; Fabiani, Riflessioni sistematiche sulle addizioni legislative in tema di crisi d’impresa ”Nuove leggi civ. comm., 2016, 21 ftn. 29; contra Bozza, op. cit., 7 nt. 11.
S. Sacchi, op. cit., 43, who, given the particular kind of judgment of the court in the event of opposition by shareholders (in comparison with the one applied by the creditors), thinks that it is necessary the introduction of a specific discipline for the opposition of equity holders; Ferri jr., La struttura, cit., 488, prior to the 2015 reform, which clearly distinguish the aim of the opposition applied by shareholders in comparison with the one applied by the dissenting creditors; s. also D'Attorre, op. cit., 1171; Vitali, op. cit., 870 ff.
Vitali, op. cit., 870 ff.
Recently Arato, op. cit., 3712 ff.
That is, if the shareholder can prove that he could receive a better treatment in an alternative solution of the crisis, since his shares keep a residual value that in case of bankruptcy liquidation they might perceive (s. Ferri jr., La struttura, cit. 479; Abriani, Dalle proposte alle domande concorrenti, Calvosa (direct by), Crisi d’impresa e insolvenza: prospettive di riforma, Pisa, 2017,111 ff.).
A remedy of this kind could, indeed, raise doubts –also shared by the German law scholars– because of the allocation of capital resources to the equity holders at the expense of the preferential satisfaction of creditors. Such doubts, however, have to be considered surmountable, because the choice of reserving part of the company's value to shareholders is subject to the approval of creditors and would not results in any breach of the rules pursuant to art. 160, paragraph 2, l.b.l. or of the principles governing the allocation of corporate assets: s. Ferri jr., La struttura, cit., 486; Maugeri, Participazione, cit., 396.
The above mentioned article provides that the judicial officer has the power to perform all acts necessary for the enforcement of the agreement with creditors "including the exercise of voting rights in the shareholders meeting". On the rules, s. Arato, op. cit., 3768 ff.
So Fabiani, Riflessioni, cit., 37 ff.; Arato, op. cit., 3371; Vitali, op. cit., 879 ff.
The avoidance of abusive capital increase is one of instrument to protect the shareholders mentioned by Recalde Castells, op. cit., 821 ff.
About the Anfechtungsrechtlichen Rechtsschutz s. Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 155; Pühl, op. cit., 111-112.
Defined as the value which belongs to the shareholder after the liquidation of the company or that provided by § 199, S. 2, InsO. The use of this criterion makes it very exceptional the cases where it can be shown that the shares incorporate a residual value, of which equity holders may not be expropriated through the compulsory execution of the agreement with creditors.
Defined as the value of the Anteile after the the reorganization to which the company is subjected. S. Spetzler, op. cit., 446 and Verse, op. cit., 311; Maugeri, Participazione, cit., 395 ss.; Gräfin von Spee, op. cit., 120 ff. and 158 ff.; Kleindiek, Debt- Equity-Swap im Insolvenzplanverfahren in FS Hommelhoff, Köln, 2012, 558; and Pühl, op. cit., 322 ff.
A confirmation for the argument mentioned in the text can be drawn, moreover, from the regulation of the bail-in for the bank: this one includes the principle according to which no creditor or shareholder must sustain losses greater than those that would have suffered if the institution had been dismissed with ordinary insolvency proceedings (art. 87, Legislative Decree 180/2015) (for transposability of the principle provided for the bail-in to the shareholders involved in a agreement with creditors, s. Presti, The bail-in, Banca, impresa, società, 2015, 345 ftn. 15 and 348 nt. 22, where it proposes an assimilation of the procedure for the resolution of banking crises to an arrangement with creditors which provides for the going concern of the business [346 ff.]).
The interpretation accepted in Germany and France regarding the condition for activation of the protection of shareholders can also be transposed into our system, because the problem we are facing is the same and the regulations about the procedures agreed with creditors in the different legal system are similar. For the interpretation accepted in the text of the criterion of “pratically viable alternatives”, s. Ambrosini, op. cit., 246 ff.; Pirisi, L’omologazione del concordato, Cagnasso- Panzani (direct by), Crisi d’impresa e procedure concorsuali, cit., 3707; Rivolta-Pajardi, Art. 180 l.fall., Bocchiola-Paluchowski (by), Codice del fallimento, Milano, 2013, 2011; Zanichelli, I concordati giudiziali, Torino, 2010, I, 477 ff.; Censoni, Autonomia negoziale e controllo giudiziale nel concordato preventivo, Aa.V.v.,Autonomia negoziale e crisi d’impresa, Milano, 2010, 519.
Galletti, op. cit., 4 ff.; in a similar sense s. also Vermeille Les effets pervers du dispositif du projet de loi "Macron" relatif à l'Eviction des actionnaires en continuation plan: les limites d'une réforme incremental du droit des Faillites, Trimestrielle Revue du Droit Financier (RTDF), No. 1, 2015, 34 ss. See also Pühl, op. cit., 337 ff. on the basis of what the report says all'ESUG (reg-ESUG, BT-Drs, 17/5712, 32).
It can happen, therefore, that the debtor is insolvent, and nevertheless the agreement with creditors can results in an "expropriation" of shareholders: S. Ferri jr., La struttura, cit., 479; Galletti, op. cit., 4 ff.; Bozza, op. cit., 8; Vitiello, Le proposte concorrenti nel concordato preventivo: le possibili soluzioni alle primissime questioni interpretative, ilfallimentarista.it, 4 December 2015. Fabiani, L’ipertrofica legislazione concorsuale fra nostalgie e incerte contaminazioni ideologiche, 8, ilcaso.it, and Panzani, Introduzione, Ambrosini (by), Il diritto della crisi d’impresa dopo la riforma del 2015, Padova, 2018, 12, who argue that the insolvent company is worthless.
S. Vitiello, op. cit.; D’Attorre, op. cit., 1164; Lamanna, La miniriforma (anche) del diritto concorsuale secondo il decreto «contendibilità e soluzioni finanziarie», n. 83/2015: un primo commento, P. II, ilfallimentarista.it, 11 dicembre 2015.
Principle 58, cit; Abriani, Dalle proposte, cit. 111 ff.
For more detalis s. Ferri jr., Ristrutturazioni societarie e competenze organizzative, to be published.
