Читать книгу Hardness of Approximation Between P and NP - Aviad Rubinstein - Страница 6
ОглавлениеContents
Preface | |
Acknowledgments | |
PART I | OVERVIEW |
Chapter 1 | The Frontier of Intractability |
1.1 PPAD: Finding a Needle You Know Is in the Haystack | |
1.2 Quasi-Polynomial Time and the Birthday Paradox | |
1.3 Approximate Nash Equilibrium | |
Chapter 2 | Preliminaries |
Notation | |
2.1 Nash Equilibrium and Relaxations | |
2.2 PPAD and END-OF-A-LINE | |
2.3 Exponential Time Hypotheses | |
2.4 PCP Theorems | |
2.5 Learning Theory | |
2.6 Information Theory | |
2.7 Useful Lemmata | |
PART II | COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY |
Chapter 3 | Communication Complexity of Approximate Nash Equilibrium |
Our Results | |
3.1 Uncoupled Dynamics | |
3.2 Techniques | |
3.3 Additional Related Literature | |
3.4 Proof Overview | |
3.5 Proofs | |
3.6 An Open Problem: Correlated Equilibria in 2-Player Games | |
Chapter 4 | Brouwer’s Fixed Point |
4.1 BROUWER with ℓ∞ | |
4.2 Euclidean BROUWER | |
PART III | PPAD |
Chapter 5 | PPAD-Hardness of Approximation |
Chapter 6 | The Generalized Circuit Problem |
Our Results | |
6.1 Proof Overview | |
6.2 From Brouwer to ϵ-GCIRCUIT | |
6.3 GCIRCUIT with Fan-out 2 | |
Chapter 7 | Many-Player Games |
Related Works: Tractable Special Cases | |
7.1 Graphical, Polymatrix Games | |
7.2 Succinct Games | |
Chapter 8 | Bayesian Nash Equilibrium |
Chapter 9 | Market Equilibrium |
9.1 Why Are Non-Monotone Markets Hard? | |
9.2 High-Level Structure of the Proof | |
9.3 Adaptations for Constant Factor Inapproximability | |
9.4 Non-Monotone Markets: Proof of Inapproximability | |
Chapter 10 | CourseMatch |
10.1 The Course Allocation Problem | |
10.2 A-CEEI Is PPAD-Hard | |
10.3 A-CEEI ∊ PPAD | |
PART IV | QUASI-POLYNOMIAL TIME |
Chapter 11 | Birthday Repetition |
11.1 Warm-Up: Best ϵ-Nash | |
Chapter 12 | Densest k-Subgraph |
12.1 Construction (and Completeness) | |
12.2 Soundness | |
Chapter 13 | Community Detection |
13.1 Related Works | |
13.2 Overview of Proofs | |
13.3 Hardness of Counting Communities | |
13.4 Hardness of Detecting Communities | |
Chapter 14 | VC and Littlestone’s Dimensions |
14.1 Discussion | |
14.2 Techniques | |
14.3 Related Work | |
14.4 Inapproximability of the VC Dimension | |
14.5 Inapproximability of Littlestone’s Dimension | |
14.6 Quasi-polynomial Algorithm for Littlestone’s Dimension | |
Chapter 15 | Signaling |
15.1 Techniques | |
15.2 Near-Optimal Signaling Is Hard | |
PART V | APPROXIMATE NASH EQUILIBRIUM |
Chapter 16 | 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium |
Additional Related Work | |
16.1 Technical Overview | |
16.2 END-OF-A-LINE with Local Computation | |
16.3 Holographic Proof | |
16.4 Polymatrix WeakNash | |
16.5 From Polymatrix to Bimatrix | |
References | |
Index | |
Author Biography |