Читать книгу The Art of War - baron de Antoine Henri Jomini - Страница 40

1. A general, selected from the general staff, engineers, or artillery, who has commanded a division or a corps d'armée, will, with equal chances, be superior to one who is familiar with the service of but one arm or special corps.

2. A general from the line, who has made a study of the science of war, will be equally fitted for the command.

3. That the character of the man is above all other requisites in a commander-in-chief.

Finally, He will be a good general in whom are found united the requisite personal characteristics and a thorough knowledge of the principles of the art of war.

The difficulty of always selecting a good general has led to the formation of a good general staff, which being near the general may advise him, and thus exercise a beneficial influence over the operations. A well-instructed general staff is one of the most useful of organizations; but care must be observed to prevent the introduction into it of false principles, as in this case it might prove fatal.

Frederick, when he established the military school of Potsdam, never thought it would lead to the "right shoulder forward" of General Ruchel,^[4] and to the teaching that the oblique order is the infallible rule for gaining all battles. How true it is that there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous!

Moreover, there ought to exist perfect harmony between the general and his chief of staff; and, if it be true that the latter should be a man of recognized ability, it is also proper to give the general the choice of the men who are to be his advisers. To impose a chief of staff upon a general would be to create anarchy and want of harmony; while to permit him to select a cipher for that position would be still more dangerous; for if he be himself a man of little ability, indebted to favor or fortune for his station, the selection will be of vital importance. The best means to avoid these dangers is to give the general the option of several designated officers, all of undoubted ability.

It has been thought, in succession, in almost all armies, that frequent councils of war, by aiding the commander with their advice, give more weight and effect to the direction of military operations. Doubtless, if the commander were a Soubise, a Clermont, or a Mack, he might well find in a council of war opinions more valuable than his own; the majority of the opinions given might be preferable to his; but what success could be expected from operations conducted by others than those who have originated and arranged them? What must be the result of an operation which is but partially understood by the commander, since it is not his own conception?

I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at head-quarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent.

What would have been the action of a council of war to which Napoleon proposed the movement of Arcola, the crossing of the Saint-Bernard, the maneuver at Ulm, or that at Gera and Jena? The timid would have regarded them as rash, even to madness, others would have seen a thousand difficulties of execution, and all would have concurred in rejecting them; and if, on the contrary, they had been adopted, and had been executed by any one but Napoleon, would they not certainly have proved failures?

In my opinion, councils of war are a deplorable resource, and can be useful only when concurring in opinion with the commander, in which case they may give him more confidence in his own judgment, and, in addition, may assure him that his lieutenants, being of his opinion, will use every means to insure the success of the movement. This is the only advantage of a council of war, which, moreover, should be simply consultative and have no further authority; but if, instead of this harmony, there should be difference of opinion, it can only produce unfortunate results.

Accordingly, I think it safe to conclude that the best means of organizing the command of an army, in default of a general approved by experience, is—

1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight, and of unshaken firmness in danger.

2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Blücher, aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon, a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.

Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of influencing military operations—viz.: that of a council of war at the seat of government—deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also, from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations, whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points, it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of directing the army—a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the scene of operations.

FOOTNOTES:

[4]

General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in order to form an oblique line.