Читать книгу Channeling Moroccanness - Becky L. Schulthies - Страница 9

As I repeatedly listened to my recording of this teatime interaction and other Fassi media engagements, I began to see this as a pattern of lamenting the failure of things designed to connect people.³ The mother, her nephew, and neighbor created a sameness between two practices: the likeness of familiar embodied hand motions (channel surfing and prayerbead supplication) across different kinds of routinized sociality encounters (between Muslim worship of God and Moroccan domestic media viewing). In doing so, they foregrounded one aspect, repetitive hand motions, to lament problematic relations to mediums designed for connection: prayerbeads and remote control televisions.⁴ This wasn’t just a familial critique of communicative failure; rather, they directed their lament both to themselves in that moment and to Fassis and Moroccans more broadly.

What does it mean to relate as Moroccans when there is widespread feeling of communicative failure? This book approaches the question by exploring how laments of communicative failure tied to language and media generated unrecognized projects of relational reform in urban Fez. Over the last decade, failure laments in Fez have focused on communicative channels, such as television or Whatsapp, mediums that they expected to bring people together in appropriate ways. But these mediums also included the language forms in which the media operated, such as standard Arabic (fuṣḥā), Moroccan dialect Arabic (darīja), French, and Tamazight, as well as ways of speaking like a storytelling rhymed prose register and collective Qur’anic recitation. Both media and language shared some of the same qualities as channels: they were to connect speakers and addressees, and they only became visible when they failed to connect Moroccans in the right ways. The Fassis among whom I worked had ideas about what social relations should be, based on a nostalgic view of what had been lost, but also what ought to be and had yet to be realized. You may think the opening episode was just language play and improvisation, a moment when a Fassi family marked similarities of troublesome practices to pass the time. After a decade of doing fieldwork in Morocco, I look back at this interaction as part of a larger pattern, one in which laments about loss of, or longing for, more effective communicative channels actually generated multiple projects of making Moroccanness, a sense of how they should relate as Moroccans. They also evoked ideologies about how communicative channels should work. These channels, or mediums, that they expected to connect people could range from objects such as devotional beads and remote controls to interactional forms such as languages and dress styles, media platforms like television news or WhatsApp group chats, and institutions such as public or Qur’anic schools. Although they viewed the mediums as forms of connection, they did not see them as unencumbered channels. They focused on the problematic aspects of the ways television or prayerbeads operated as channels in order to reform relationality. I argue that communicative laments about the failure of mediums to connect people properly have become key to Moroccanness.

In this introduction, I introduce why Fassis linked language mediums and mass media channels to social relationality, national identity, interactional work, and political projects. To do so, I explain how Fassis understood ideas such as Moroccanness, media, language, sociality, and politics and how that differs or overlaps with the ways scholars of language and media have been writing about these concepts. In the process I briefly introduce the Fassi perspectives of communicative channel failures I examine in the chapters of this book: both their ideas about the already realized breakdown of Fassi sociality and the anxiety-producing specter of future consequences. These perceptions of failure seem to have motivated multiple uncoordinated practices of communicative renewal, reform, and rejection. Chapter 1 introduces the Fassi linguistic soundscape, giving a sense of the context in which laments about communicative failure arose. Chapter 2 explores competing Fassi perspectives on what it meant to engage in public life through “literate listening” to news in Morocco and introduces the practice of distributed literacy. The language of news and literacy in Morocco is standard Arabic (fuṣḥā), which is different from everyday forms of Arabic. Despite modernist claims that literacy is reading and writing that leads to a secularized reasoning through individually acquired set of skills, some Fassis critiqued this visual path to reasoning and pooled the oral literacy skills of multiple family members in making sense of broadcast news. In Chapter 3 I continue to analyze how Fassis understood moral literacy through an oral storytelling register of rhymed prose revamped for civic education via television. Instead of relying on fuṣḥā, standard Arabic, to convey moral civic values such as gender equity, Moroccan television producers valorized a darīja (Moroccan Arabic) way of speaking, storytelling rhymed prose, to educate viewers. I demonstrate a channel and relationality ideology that shaped why viewers embraced the rhymed prose medium, but not the gender equity message. Chapter 4 examines the moral loading of connecting through written darīja (Moroccan Arabic) speech in media platforms such as billboards, books, social media, and newsprint. Until 2011, standard Arabic was the official language of Morocco according to the constitution and ideologically the variety to be used in written genres.⁵ In practice, Fassis wrote Arabic using a variety of linguistic forms and heard the relationality effects and politics of darīja writing differently depending on the media platform/channel in which they encountered it. In Chapter 5 I bring morality, literate listening, and sonic reading together to explore Fassi responses to the relationality of “Moroccan Islam,” a state-sponsored effort to reshape religious discourse and practices via language and media channels in the wake of “extremism.” Each of these chapters show that Fassis had different ideologies about how to relate, the role of channels in connecting Moroccans, and what practices they understood as the right kind of Moroccanness relationality.

I use the term “Moroccanness” instead of Moroccan identity to highlight the interactional process of negotiating and debating what it meant for Fassis to connect as Moroccans. Why do I analyze Moroccanness, a sense of appropriate relationality, instead of individual identity work? Because the Fassis among whom I lived viewed Moroccanness as the contested labor of defining what kinds of social connection mattered. Rather than foregrounding their individual subjectivity, sense of self, or socialization into structures of feeling, I explore the ways communicative laments focused on their concerns about how failures were affecting their relationality—how they should relate as Moroccans. Fassis have long encountered other kinds of social connection through pilgrimage, migration, trade, colonialism, and tourism and have debated what kinds of connectedness to adopt or reject to be Moroccan (see Messier and Miller 2015 for a description of thirteenth-century traveler Ibn Battuta; Zhiri 2001 and Davis 2006 on the sixteenth-century writer al-Hasan al-Wazzan; Burke 2014 on nineteenth-century French colonial ethnographic writing; Bazzaz 2010 on early twentieth-century religiopolitical conflicts emerging from Fez; and Newcomb 2009 on Fassi women). Scholars have argued that social movements seeking to define Moroccanness, or renewal campaigns, have been central to the history of Morocco (Pennell 2013). There was nothing new in this concern, even if Fassis evoked a “tradition vs. modern” dichotomy to situate it. What I explore in this book is the focus, in the last decade, on appropriate use of communicative channels to influence Moroccan relationality in media, education, and religion contexts (see also Schulthies 2014a).

Perhaps this has emerged because Morocco’s past two kings have repeatedly emphasized Morocco’s social relatedness to multiple worlds: Morocco is a tree with African roots, its trunk in the Arab-Muslim world and its branches in Europe. This framing of Moroccanness as tied to African peoples, the Muslim ummah (community), Arabness (see Schulthies 2015), and European influences was often evoked in my fieldwork, but often as a point of debate rather than a consensus (see Episode 2 of this chapter). Fassis I encountered were also anxious about the failures of appropriate social connectedness and violence tied to North African migration to Europe, Syria, and the Arab Gulf. They keenly lamented the troubling transnational outcomes of communicative channel failure, even if they didn’t agree about them: terrorism, hooliganism, immorality, extremism, intolerance, endemic corruption, apathy, depression. And those laments generated political projects of Moroccanness, not just how to be a certain kind of person, but how to relate to each other within a nation-state sociality as lived in the specific urban context of Fez.

My training is in linguistic anthropology, which assumes that communication is always about something other than referring to things as they are in the world. Communication, like language, is multifunctional, doing many things at the same time: transferring information, creating a social relation, calling attention to itself, marking identities. Hence when I use the term “connection,” I don’t mean neat and tidy information transfer in an equal exchange sense. Instead, I explore kinds of contested socialization and intersubjectivity linked to a widespread ideology of nationwide communicative failure. Moroccanness, as I am using it, is not subjectivity as in the senses of self (perception, affect, thought, desire, fear) animating action (Ortner 2005, 31), but rather the ideologies and practices of social relatedness emerging from anxieties about the failure of communicative channels. In other words, I’m interested in how they practiced relatedness via communicative channels, or thought it should be practiced, not just what identity work was being done.

Communication, as understood by my Fassi friends, was not just social connection facilitated by linguistic and media technologies. The Fassis among whom I worked viewed communicative media and language as central elements of social relations on multiple scales: familial, interpersonal, intraurban, national, coreligionist, and transnational. Communication was tied to moral ways of knowing and being through social interaction (see Chapters 2, 3, and 5). However, they didn’t agree about what moral ways of knowing, and being connected as Moroccans, meant. Fassis shared with me various perspectives: that media was a tool of consumerism, secularist politics (see Episode 2 in this chapter), Muslim extremism, or state-directed political apathy (see Episode 2 in this chapter). Each of these critiques evoked an embedded assumption that media should connect Moroccans. Even the state-run media and its quasi-privatized stations articulated an explicit connection ideology: media and modernization or development ideology, in which communicative channels should be mobilized to create modern citizens (Lerner 1958). After the 2004 media reform law, designed to shift national media from state to private control and expand independent television and radio domains, media production continued to operate with state political oversight (Zaid 2015): media should educate the public as much as entertain; media should promote state policies for the listening/viewing Moroccan public; and commercial advertising should be clearly articulated as separate from informational and entertainment programming. Whether seeking to promote consumer-citizens, civic engagement, or literacy, maintaining political power, or providing leisure, media was about moral relationality.

Many communication scholars have critiqued this ideal of media as social connection. Mattelart argued that the field of communication technology was born within European nation-state “modernizing” projects, striving to create a universal social bond, enlightened rationality, social regulation, and technosocial development in the service of capitalism (Mattelart 1996).⁶ Latin American theorist Jesús Martín Barbero has argued that even the terms “media,” “communication,” and “information” have become objects, powerful entities with mystical powers to dupe the masses, extend state and corporate power, or liberate through active reception practices (Barbero 1987; see Zaid 2015 for an analysis of Moroccan media ideologies). In each of these scholarly frameworks, communication was a medium for connection, though not a neutral channel. The term had problematic baggage. Briggs and Hallin have labeled these ideologies about the relationship between discursive practices and social relations “communicability” and argued that we need to explore the everyday ideological explanations of how communication is produced, circulated, and received in order to understand the way power works (2007, 45). This book is one such attempt to explore everyday Fassi understandings of communication as failing to connect Moroccans appropriately and how that shaped political and social projects. As I hope to show, their notions of what that meant varied quite a bit.

The Fassi perspectives about communicative failure I describe in this book could be viewed as reproducing these state-led modernizing ideologies of communication and language as social connection and “modernization” tools or handmaids of capitalist elite control. That certainly appears in some perspectives expressed by Fassis when they criticize “the media” for failing to make good Moroccan citizens. But the kind of social connection Fassis described did not always fit the modernist models of societal progress, consumer citizens, or universal rationality described in European and American media and communication scholarship. In fact, they often sought to articulate themselves in opposition to notions of universal rationality (Schulthies 2013), or an inevitable march toward social progress (Schulthies 2014a; see also Newcomb 2017). Certainly, they had idealized models of sociality that informed their laments of communicative failure (which I describe in more detail throughout this book). Their lived understandings of mediated connection both engaged and reworked modernist ideas, through which emerged critiques such as distributed literacy (Chapter 2), wisdom of the unschooled (Chapter 3), graphic-sonic social mediascapes (Chapter 4), and Moroccan Islam as tolerant social progress (Chapter 5). They engaged and evoked multiple communicative ideologies in their efforts to shape Moroccanness. As presented in Chapters 2 and 4, there were different kinds of “listening subjects”: people who set themselves up as critics of communicative channel failure in order to advance their notion of appropriate moral relationality. Moroccan listening subjects drew on aspects of European communication and media ideologies, but also incorporated other media and relationality traditions. This was not a straightforward process of identifying a communicative theory origin, but rather a selective appropriation and deployment, what I like to call a calibration, of multiple rationales in the practice of social relating in a climate of perceived communicative failure.

You might ask why I am focusing on a national relationality (Moroccanness) rather than a religious (Muslim or Jewish), ethnic (Amazigh or Arab), or situationally salient connection (such as neighborhood, hometown), especially since my research was in a specific context: Fez. All of those kinds of sociality occurred in the interactions I analyzed, but during the last decade, Fassis evoked the national scale as a ground within or against which they related other kinds of social relatedness in my study of media interactions. This was partially because most of the Fassis among whom I worked engaged national media outlets and press agencies regularly, despite widespread access to transnational media for more than three decades (see Abu-Lughod 2005 for a similar argument with regard to Egyptians), and local radio, newspaper, and internet sites since 2004. Even if they rejected the assumptions of colonial nation-state formations embedded in national media outlets (identifying themselves within the Muslim, Arab, Amazigh, and African worlds), Fassis still expressed themselves in relation to the nation-state framing of Moroccanness. We’ll see this clearly in the chapters that follow, where Fassis debate what kinds of listeners can participate in civic life via news consumption; whether gender parity as a civic virtue can emerge from a rhyming register of old folks; what forms of writing Moroccan Arabic (notice the national framing) in social media and books are doing politically; and what kinds of clothing, speech, and comportment bundles should be adopted as the Moroccan model of Islamic practice.

It may seem like a contradiction that a widespread pattern of lamenting communicative channel failure led to multiple politically uncoordinated Moroccanness relationality projects—but that is the core set of practices and perspectives I explore in this ethnography. These laments didn’t follow a scholarly-identified genre of “song punctuated with sobs and words … to evoke audience sympathy” at moments of shock and sorrow (Wilce 2007, 124). Instead, I came to recognize these longing and loss expressions as calibrations of Moroccanness.⁷ They also evoked media ideologies (expectations about what media is or should do, Gershon 2010b), and communicative ideologies (modalities of connection, Keane 1995) in their laments of what was and should be.

These social acts of Moroccanness in Fez were both conscious, mundane, and routinized. In her study of the social work of talk among clients in an urban Chicago addiction recovery program, Carr noted that social workers taught participants to use specific ways of speaking to demonstrate their sobriety. Only when they used language properly did therapists view clients as honest in their recovery; the clients subsequently were granted access to critical legal services and economic aid. In the process, clients’ heightened awareness of what some forms of speaking could do improved their performance skills so that they could flip the script and use it against the system (Carr 2011, 196). This meta-awareness was not about the clients’ abilities to articulate or describe the social work of sobriety talk, but rather a conscious, acquired, embodied practice like manual muscle memory of riding a bicycle—the ability to adjust their talk to do things.

I viewed Fassi communicative laments as similarly conscious, mundane, embodied efforts to shape Moroccan relationality and ways of being by attending to connective mediums—modes of language use (such as listening and writing), ways of speaking associated with specific kinds of persons (registers), and ways to engage the more widely known electronic and print media channels. Rather than furthering the discourse about Morocco’s conflict between liberal secularists and religious conservatives, this ethnography shows the subtle range of ideologies and practices evoked in Fassi homes to calibrate appropriate Moroccan relationality and political consciousness. In these laments of communicative failures, Fassis linked medium deficiencies (whether human or electronic) to specific kinds of connectedness and sociality. Many Moroccans lamented communicative failure as a social problem, as I will describe in episodes throughout this book, but they did not always mean the same things. The sedimentation of these similar though slightly different social acts of connection gave the appearance of a unitary phenomenon: Moroccanness. In practice, it permitted a range of connection work to be recognized as Moroccan and the furthering of conscious yet sometimes unrecognized forms of relationality projects in Fez. My interlocutors didn’t call their comments about communicative failures laments in the sense of a speech genre, but rather a longing for better times, better skills, and better interactions that had been lost or somehow never developed during their lifetime.⁸ Specifically, I understood these laments as pointing toward Fassi perceptions of communicative channel failures and important ways ideologies about media and language shaped Moroccan relationality projects.

In this book, I explore Moroccan engagements with media channels and phatic labor, the layering of mundane social action designed to strengthen social bonds with earnest critique, affective reasoning, and emergent, negotiated ways of knowing. In each chapter, I introduce laments about communicative channel failures that precipitated Moroccanness projects by the state and several Fassi calibrations of those Moroccanness efforts. I saw these laments as ways of speaking, listening, and being that created Moroccanness, the feeling of participating in the ongoing formations of Moroccan public relationality, even when my Fassi interlocutors differed considerably in their expressions of what connecting as Moroccans was or should have been. Nevertheless, I make the case that in the aggregate, these laments allow a range of connection forms to be recognized as Moroccan, and indeed for a quasi-unitary phenomenon of Moroccanness to cohere.