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ОглавлениеLeft-wing anti-racists should think more about the fact that anti-Semitism is both a form of racism and a prejudice with its own specific characteristics.
—Dave Rich, The Left’s Jewish Problem
I
In recent years, Western countries have seen a sharp increase in both the incidence of antisemitic material on the web, social media, and elsewhere, and in actual attacks on Jews. In 2015, according to the Guardian newspaper, antisemitic incidents doubled over the previous year, reaching the highest level ever recorded in Britain. One of the incidents reported by the paper concerns a leaflet found among Israeli produce in a supermarket. It showed an image of the Israeli flag with the caption “The flag of Zionist racist scum,” and it read, “Deny the Holocaust? Of course there was a holocaust. What a pity Adolf and Co didn’t manage to finish the job properly!” Another involved an “identifiably Jewish man, cycling to synagogue, knocked off his bicycle, and when on the ground kicked, by a group of youths.”1
Also in Britain, 2016 saw a series of accusations of antisemitism in the Labour Party. This began with a highly publicized row among members of the Oxford University Labour Club, with allegations of a “poisonous” atmosphere, including constant reference to Jewish students as “Zionists” or “Zios.” In the words of the Independent newspaper, the club
became embroiled in an anti-Semitism row following the resignation of one of its chairs after the club decided to endorse Israel Apartheid Week in February.
Co-chair Alex Chalmers, a student at Oxford’s Oriel College, issued a strongly-worded statement on his Facebook page at the time in which he said he was stepping down from his position because a large proportion of both OULC and the student left in Oxford “have some kind of problem with Jews.”
Despite highlighting the benefits he received during his time with the OULC over the past two terms, Mr Chalmers said the club was becoming “increasingly riven by factional splits.” He added: “Despite its avowed commitment to liberation, the attitudes of certain members of the club towards certain disadvantaged groups was becoming poisonous.”2
In due course, as a result of the dependence of modern political life on social media, which lend extraordinary volume and publicity to the kind of remark formerly confined to sympathetic ears in smoke-filled rooms, the row spread to the Labour Party itself. By the middle of 2016, “up to twenty Labour members, including one MP [Member of Parliament] had been suspended or expelled due to alleged anti-Semitism and the party had conducted three different enquiries into anti-Semitism within its ranks.”3
In the United States, concerns about campus antisemitism echoing those voiced at Oxford have been heard for a number of years in connection with the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, aimed at “delegitimizing” Israel, that unites left-wing faculty with left and pro-Palestinian student groups. “In the U.S. more than 1,000 scholars on more than 300 college and university campuses across the country have endorsed an academic boycott of Israel.”4 In faculty members’ hands, the debate remains largely academic. But in the hands of students, the debate often becomes angry, violent, and threatening to Jews, as we shall see at more length in chapter 14.
Professors who use their university positions and university resources to promote campaigns to harm or dismantle the Jewish state and who encourage students to do the same, can contribute to the creation of a hostile and threatening environment for many Jewish students, who report feeling emotionally harassed and intimidated by their professors and isolated from their fellow students. Moreover, in light of the fact that no other racial, ethnic or religious group is currently being subjected by faculty to such pervasive harassment and intimidation, Jewish students experience this flagrant double standard as a kind of institutional discrimination that is antisemitic in effect if not in intent.5
Worse has occurred in France. The most newsworthy event of this kind in 2015 took place in early January when, coincidentally with the Charlie Hebdo massacres, an Islamist terrorist killed four shoppers—Yoav Hattab, Yohan Cohen, Philippe Braham, and François-Michel Saada—at a kosher supermarket in Paris. But that event, even then, formed part of a general pattern. According to the watchdog Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive (SPCJ), as reported in the International Business Times, 508 antisemitic incidents took place between January and May of that year. Almost a quarter of these were violent; the bulk of the rest took the form of death threats.
The same article reports the Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives de France (CRIF) as having issued a statement to the effect that the SPCJ findings represent a small fraction of actual attacks in France, which, according to it, have reached “appalling levels.”6
The rise of attacks on Jews to these levels, moreover, has occurred very recently and very rapidly. “In France, for example, there had only been one recorded incident of anti-Semitic violence in 1998, but there were nine in 1999 accelerating to 116 in 2000 and 725 in 2002 (when 80% of all racist violence in France was directed against Jews).”7
Unsurprisingly, emigration has reached correspondingly high levels among France’s five hundred thousand Jews, many of whom are already refugees from persecution in the Near East. The number of French Jews emigrating to Israel between January and August 2015 was 5,100—25 percent more than the number (4,000) doing so in the same period in 2014.8
In Germany also, antisemitism has been growing again. In late 2019 Cardinal Reinhard Marx, archbishop of Munich and Freising, pledging that “Jews and Christians will never separate again,” warned against the renewed rise of anti-Jewish feeling. “He stressed that he was ‘very worried’ about the direction society is heading because there are ‘more and more blogs and ideologies from people that cannot be taught, who indulge in conspiracy theories and soon unite as a sounding board for … slogans of antisemitism.’ Marx went on to explain that the religious component of antisemitism is also playing a role in its rise.”9
The Jew hatred of the 1930s, apparently, is up and running again. It appears that Europe and—to an admittedly lesser degree—the United States, are once again frightening places, and at times dangerous ones, in which to be a Jew.
II
These developments have made it fashionable since the turn of the century to talk and write of a “new antisemitism.” Four things are “new” about it. First, it is not coming exclusively from the far-right websites and political groups across the Western world that continue to promote, and to glory in, antisemitism of highly traditional kinds. In addition, it now comes from groups on the political left and liberal left. Second, it is almost wholly motivated by hostility to the State of Israel. Third, those accused of it, unlike traditional antisemites of the political right, are generally extremely concerned to deny the justice of the accusation. They wish it to be understood that they are not hostile to Jews as such but merely to Zionism, and to Jews merely to the extent that the latter are Zionists—or in the terminology of Labour’s young ladies and gentlemen at Oxford, “Zios”—Jewish supporters, that is to say, of the right of the State of Israel to exist as a Jewish state. For the most part, they also argue that the accusation itself is politically disingenuous: a mere diversionary tactic designed to silence criticism of the evils perpetrated by Israel in the context of its long war with the Palestinians. Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, as a result of the attractions for the left of the new antisemitism (if antisemitism is in fact what it is), antisemitism has ceased to be a socially marginal phenomenon in the Western world. For half a century after the end of World War II, the recollection of the Holocaust made it socially suicidal to express open hostility to Jews, even when deeply felt. Antisemitism became in those years the province of an obscure minority of nasty little people who spent their time circulating nasty little pamphlets read only in their immediate circle. Since 2001, commentators without number have recorded the growth of a climate of opinion, not merely in sections of the media widely regarded as pillars of left liberal respectability—the BBC, the New York Times, the New Statesman, the London Review of Books—but at innumerable middle-class dinner tables, within whose bounds it is no longer unacceptable to be rude about “the Jews.”
The tone of this new liberal-left open season on Israel and its Jewish supporters was caught early on, in 2001, by a remark attributed to the French ambassador to the United Kingdom. According to Tom Gross, writing close to the time in the National Review,10 the affair began when Barbara Amiel, a columnist in the London Daily Telegraph,
revealed that at a reception at her house, the ambassador of “a major EU country” told guests that the current troubles in the world were all because of “that shitty little country Israel.”
“Why,” he asked, “should the world be in danger of World War Three because of those people?”
Within 24 hours, the British Guardian newspaper identified the ambassador in question as Daniel Bernard, France’s man in London and one of President Chirac’s closest confidants. (While Bernard has not admitted using these exact words, he hasn’t clearly denied doing so either.)
Several conservative columnists in the United States (where are those who profess to be liberal?) have condemned the ambassador for his “crude anti-Semitic remarks.”
What has not been properly noted in the U.S. media is that in the British and French media, it is not the French ambassador or anti-Semites who are being condemned, as one would expect, but Barbara Amiel and “those people.” As for Israel, it seems to be open season.
A piece in the Independent, for example, by one of the paper’s regular columnists (titled “I’m fed up being called an anti-Semite,” by Deborah Orr, December 21, 2001) described Israel as “shitty” and “little” no fewer than four times.
“Anti-Semitism is disliking all Jews, anywhere, and anti-Zionism is just disliking the existence of Israel and opposing those who support it,” explains Orr. “This may be an academic rather than a practical distinction,” she continues, “and one which has no connection with holding the honest view that in my experience Israel is shitty and little.”
III
It seems clear that Tom Gross, in this report, is of one mind with those he mentions as condemning the “crude anti-Semitic remarks” of Daniel Bernard. But is it—as he records Deborah Orr as complaining—in fact antisemitic to “dislike the existence of Israel,” and if so, why?
The difficulty of answering these questions is elegantly and simply exposed in an article published in the “Magazine” section of the BBC Television News website for April 29, 2016. The article, titled “What’s the Difference between Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism,” begins, “The UK Labour Party has been at the centre of a row over anti-semitism, including its relationship to anti-Zionism. What do these two terms actually mean?” It then answers its own question by offering two definitions, heralded by bullet points intended, no doubt, to set the definitions off as sufficiently authoritative to be beyond further debate.
•Anti-Semitism is “hostility and prejudice directed against Jewish people” (OED).
•Zionism refers to the movement to create a Jewish state in the Middle East, roughly corresponding to the historical state of Israel, and thus support for the modern state of Israel. Anti-Zionism opposes that.
If one takes these definitions at face value, it becomes very difficult to see how a mere anti-Zionist could, in reason, be accused of antisemitism. According to the BBC’s definition, “anti-Semitism” is the name of an emotion, one of “hostility and prejudice” (that is to say, unreasoning dislike), directed against “Jewish people” per se. Anti-Zionism, on the other hand, is a (presumably reasoned) political position of opposition, not to “Jewish people” in general, but simply to the existence of the State of Israel. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the subsequent article is sympathetic to Ken Livingstone, Vicki Kirby, Gerry Downing, and others at that time recently expelled from the Labour Party, and generally skeptical concerning the validity of the accusations of antisemitism brought against them. The piece concludes with the following respectably anodyne verdict that echoes very much in line with the BBC’s standard editorial stance of sympathy for the Labour Party, and more generally for liberal opinion on Israel, in the face of right-wing accusations of Jew hatred: “Few would deny there are anti-Semites who call themselves anti-Zionists, or that it’s possible to criticise Israel without being a racist or a bigot. But agreement on how exactly the two relate appears elusive.”
In effect, this BBC guide to the dispute comes to much the same conclusion as the report by the Labour politician Shami (shortly afterward Baroness) Chakrabarti into antisemitism in the party: that while “hostility and prejudice against Jewish people” may be present in a minority of individual Labour members, such hostilities are not shared by the vast majority of Labour opponents of Israel.
IV
Is the anti-Zionism now popular in liberal-left circles across the Western world, then, actually antisemitic or not? If so, in what ways and to what extent? These are among the central questions that I propose to address in this book.
On the face of it, as we have just seen, much depends on what one takes antisemitism to consist in—on what phenomena one takes the word to cover. On the definition above, tagged “OED” (Oxford English Dictionary) by the BBC’s unnamed journalist, matters are simple enough: “antisemitism” is the name of an emotional state: of “hostility and prejudice” toward individual Jews considered as Jews. Reasoned political opposition toward the continued existence of a state is surely to be distinguished from unreasoning hostility toward individual Jews, even when the state in question happens to be a Jewish state. Hence, anti-Zionism cannot in the nature of things be considered antisemitic; QED.
But are matters as simple as that? I was at first unable to locate the definition that the BBC cites with the tag “OED” in any of the various shorter print editions of that dictionary accessible to me. The mystery was solved when it was pointed out to me11 that the BBC’s definition comes from the online version of the OED and is in fact the first definition that appears in the online entry. The definition given in the complete, and therefore presumably definitive, print version of the OED12 is rather different. It reads, in part (omitting examples of usage): “Anti-Semitism. Theory, action or practice directed against the Jews. Hence anti-Semite, one who is hostile or opposed to the Jews, anti-Semitic.”
According to this longer and more considered definition, antisemitism, though it may consist of individual hostility to Jews, can take other forms. In particular, it can take the form of practices, actions, or theories. These are all, as it happens, things characteristic of collective or political life. Political parties—and for that matter, citizens committed to a common liberal political or moral outlook—evidently can and do subscribe to theories, engage in practices, or put into effect actions—all of which, according to the full OED definition, may be (or may not be; it remains to be seen, case by case) antisemitic.
In light of the complete OED’s more considered definition, then, the simple retort to the BBC’s and Baroness Chakrabarti’s suggestion, that—in effect—antisemitism is one thing and anti-Zionism another, would seem to be that what the term antisemitism covers in everyday English is not one thing but rather a variety of things.
V
Of the OED’s triad—theory, action, practice—the most important is, plainly, theory. In politics, after all, theory, in the form of an analysis of how society functions, and hence of how it might for the best be changed or conserved, is a major factor both in the direction of day-to-day political practice and in the choice of favored outcomes.
It seems equally clear that antisemitism is in one of its standard forms a theory. It is the theory, or political fantasy, that Jews are conspiratorially organized to exercise secret control over the world in order to pervert the energies of non-Jewish society into the service of sinister Jewish ends. Antisemitism of this type peddles, among many other delusive notions, the idea that “the Jews” are the real agents behind vast and dangerous forces threatening world peace.
In pursuit of that thought, let us return for a moment to Ambassador Bernard’s unwise remarks at Barbara Amiel’s reception. While the phrase “that shitty little country Israel” might be considered undiplomatic, I do not, myself, find it particularly antisemitic. One might be led to say the same thing of England, or even of France, neither of them particularly large tracts of territory by global standards, and both of them well equipped with local habits and customs highly irritating to foreigners, doubtless including some ambassadorial ones.
What I do find antisemitic about Bernard’s remarks, and profoundly so, is the thing he then went on to say, which practically no contributor to the chorus of indignation at the time seems to have noticed. Once again I cite Gross’s report: “‘Why,’ he asked, ‘should the world be in danger of World War Three because of those people?’”
On the sour breath of this question can be detected the authentic odor of antisemitism in the mode of theory, or better, political fantasy. At the point when it was asked, in 2001, there was as compared to many moments in the preceding half-century little need to worry about an outbreak of “World War Three.” So far as any dangers to peace existed in embryo, they involved powers far greater than Israel and conflicts for the most part remote from the Middle East: the possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, of a recrudescence of the recent wars in the territories of the former Yugoslavia, the threat posed by a nuclear-armed North Korea, and so on. But to Jacques Chirac’s ambassador to London, these perfectly genuine threats to world peace paled into insignificance beside the imaginary one posed by “those people”: the Jews.
Antisemitism of this kind, the kind that poses as an explanatory theory about who really possesses the power to determine world events, is among other things, the lethal kind—the kind that accounts for the Holocaust. One does not, after all, set out to extirpate a people from the face of the earth because one happens to dislike or despise them on an individual basis. One takes such a step because one sees them as constituting, collectively, a threat so serious that it can be countered in no other way than by their total removal from the world scene. Hitler and his circle did not set the Final Solution in motion because they viewed Jews individually as a tribe of hucksters and vulgarians given to pushing their noses into social circles in which they neither belonged nor were welcome. They did so because they seriously believed the real enemy of the Third Reich to be not America, or the British Empire, or the Soviet Union but the vast Jewish conspiracy that, they supposed, secretly controlled these—only seemingly independent—powers through its control of world capitalism.
As we shall see, it is nowadays widely believed in mainstream liberal circles that that kind of antisemitism was a delusion peculiar to the German National Socialist Party—one that largely disappeared with its fall and survives today only in a few obscure neo-Nazi groupuscules. Those who believe this believe in consequence that the only kind of antisemitism we need to bother about nowadays is what I shall call—to distinguish it from the theoretical kind—“social” antisemitism: the kind that indeed consists, in the words of the BBC’s version of the OED, in “hostility and prejudice directed against Jewish people” taken individually. It is this that persuades them, as we have just seen, that the anti-Zionism currently so popular on the liberal left of Western politics can have nothing to do with antisemitism.
It is often asserted, both by Jews and by others, that social antisemitism has greatly declined in Western societies over the seventy years that have elapsed since the end of World War II. That is broadly—though somewhat patchily—true. What I shall argue in this book, however, is that social antisemitism is by no means the only kind we have to worry about today. As I shall show in what follows—and as many others have noted—antisemitism as a political fantasy concerning the mysterious, demonic, and conspiratorial power of “the Jews” to determine world events has enjoyed a political rebirth since September 2001. All that has changed is that “Zionism”—understanding by that term the State of Israel together with its Jewish supporters (though not, as we shall see, its far more numerous non-Jewish ones)—has taken over, in effect, the role traditionally assigned in antisemitic theory to the world Jewish conspiracy. In that new form, antisemitism as a delusive political theory is once again as active in the political life of the West as it has been at any time over the past two millennia.
Unfortunately, that political rebirth has taken place chiefly on the left. The left has, of course, its own traditions of antisemitic theorizing. These theories were specific to the left and in any case not particularly active or influential during the greater part of the twentieth century. But what the French ambassador’s remark exemplifies, as we shall see in what follows, is a straightforward transfer from one end of the political spectrum to the other of what used to be the exclusively right-wing fantasy that the Jews are to be blamed for most of the evils besetting the world and, among other things, for being the main force pushing the world toward war.
In short, I shall argue in this book that those who presently complain of a revival of antisemitism in sections of the British Labour Party, in American academia, and for that matter in the wider drift of liberal opinion in the Western world do not for a moment, pace the BBC, suppose that problem to consist only in the entertaining, by individuals who may or may not happen to be on the left, of private attitudes of “hostility and prejudice” toward anybody who happens to be Jewish.
On the contrary, they take it to consist also, and most importantly, in a revival, largely on the left this time, of antisemitic theory: of belief in the ancient fantasy of a collective Jewish threat to non-Jewish interests.
In the minds of the believers, that threat consists primarily in the supposed hidden conspiratorial power of the Jewish community to dominate world events; the commitment of the community to the exercise of darkly demonic powers in the service of purely sectional Jewish interests; and more seriously still, in what believers imagine to be the collective recalcitrance of the Jewish community toward the very moral and political values that believers find most reasonable and compelling.
VI
The subject of the book is that fantasy: its extraordinary persistence over the centuries; its remarkable ability to transform and adapt itself, like some strange virus of the mind, in order to speak afresh to the concerns and anxieties generated by new historical circumstances; the functions it serves in non-Jewish culture and political life; and finally the reasons for its extraordinary recrudescence in liberal-left circles in the twenty-first century.
If we are to get clear about the nature of the recurrent delusion that “the Jews are to blame” for what are virtually always in reality failures and deficiencies of the non-Jewish world, we need to examine that delusion’s nature and content in relation to other kinds of prejudice, including other forms of antisemitic prejudice. This is the business of part I of this book: “Varieties of Antisemitism.”
Chapter 3, “Problems of Definition,” addresses these questions directly. But because questions of definition are best approached on the back of concrete and clearly described examples, chapters 1 and 2 introduce the formal arguments of Chapter 3 by offering two real-life examples of political discourse dominated by very different versions of the fantasy, the first taken from the Charter of the Islamist organization Hamas, the second drawn from American academic debate about the uniqueness of the Holocaust.
Part II—“Why the Jews?”—addresses the question of why the strange collection of beliefs constituting what I shall here call “political antisemitism” should have attached itself to the Jews, rather than to any other diasporic people.
The first four chapters (6–9) of part III return to the question of whether “anti-Zionism” and BDS are antisemitic movements, and if so, in what ways and to what extent. They argue that the burden of proof should be shifted from questions of motive to questions of fact. If antisemitism can manifest as fraudulent theory, then the issue of antisemitism in political discourse comes to turn, not on the motives or emotional dispositions of those who disseminate it, but on the alignment, or lack of it, between discourse and fact. If the various accounts of the nature and history of Israel on which the two movements depend for their ideological legitimacy are simply and straightforwardly true, then, indeed, we are dealing with legitimate political criticism. If, on the other hand, they systematically defy belief, to the extent of representing merely the results of a sustained attempt to cut, stretch, and deform the facts to fit the procrustean bed provided by the traditional categories of antisemitic theory, then the latter is the enterprise to which they belong, and there’s an end of the matter. This therefore becomes the central issue addressed in these chapters.
Those active in anti-Zionism and BDS are, almost without exception, academics, students, or university-educated people employed in politics, the arts, charitable organizations, or public service. If, as I argue, political antisemitism is an inextricable element in both, then that fact alone raises the larger question, already opened in part II, of why, in the history of the West over many centuries, antisemitism of the theoretical, pseudo-explanatory kind has exercised such a hold over the minds of intellectuals. That question occupies chapter 10.
chapter 10 serves, among other things, to provide, after the long intervening discussion in part III of the history and politics of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, a bridge between part II and part IV (“Judaism Defaced”), and thus to return the argument of the book from the narrow concerns of chapters 6–9 to the wider issues of the nature and functions of political antisemitism across the centuries broached in chapters 1–5.
Antisemitism as a delusive theory concerning the collective power and guilt of the Jews usually includes one or more items drawn from a small collection of equally ill-founded beliefs concerning the nature of the Jewish religion and outlook itself. The business of part IV (chapters 11–13) is to examine in some detail the three most salient of these beliefs. According to the first of these, Judaism, the supposedly crabbed fabric of grotesque medieval absurdities and rationalizations to which observant Jews are widely supposed to cling with irrational fanaticism, is a primitive religion, a religion of vengeance rather than love, long since superseded by the “new covenant” of Christianity or the rise of Islam. According to the second, the religious and moral law (halakah) at the center of Judaism is a tissue of absurd and arbitrary rules to which the observant Jew abandons his power to direct his own life according to his own reason. The function of these laws is, it is supposed, merely to bind Jews into a closed community in moral isolation from the rest of the human race; a community, whose crabbed “particularism,” according to the third of the beliefs to be examined in part IV, stands in stark contrast to the generous universalism characteristic of both Christianity and the moral philosophies of the Enlightenment.
There is much more charged by antisemites to the account of the Jews, but these three historically prominent accusations will do to be going on with. They are childish and, for anyone with the least acquaintance with actual Jewish life and thought, childishly easy to refute. But without a clear sense of what makes them absurd, it is difficult to emancipate the mind fully from the influence of antisemitic fantasy in its role as a body of pseudo-explanatory theory.
Finally, it is a main contention of this book that the fantasy of exceptional Jewish power and guilt, while a good deal more harmful to Jews than to non-Jews, is also harmful to non-Jews. It corrupts institutions and political parties, encourages bad political and administrative decisions, sometimes at the highest level, and generally darkens counsel. These matters are touched on, more cursorily, no doubt, than they deserve, in the three chapters of part V (“Antisemitism as a Problem for Non-Jews”) that conclude the book.
Ten years ago, I published one of the earliest books to appear on “the new antisemitism.”13 In that book, I argued, among other things, that the primary, the originating habitat of antisemitism is not, or not only, the individual mind but in addition and more centrally, the public consciousness manifest in what I there called climates of opinion. The implication of that shift of focus, I suggested, was that we should move from treating antisemitism as a quirk of individual psychopathology to treating it as a type of social or cultural pathology, and therefore as something for which responsibility, and at least the basic tools required for understanding and resistance, may reasonably be regarded as generally shared.
The object of the present book is, in effect, to take up that thought again but this time to develop it a good deal further and more systematically than was possible in 2006. It is not merely that my thoughts on these matters have changed and developed a good deal over the intervening years. Over the past decade, a substantial academic and extra-academic literature of remarkably high quality has grown up around the topic, the work of a formidable collection of academics and media commentators, not to mention major political figures of the calibre of Manuel Valls, until recently prime minister of France, Irwin Cotler, lately attorney general of Canada, or the former Soviet dissident and later Israeli cabinet minister Natan Sharansky in Israel. To this recent body of work, either to borrow or to dissent, I shall be making constant and extensive reference in what follows. If that to any extent proves helpful in making this literature better known to the general reading public, I shall be well content.
NOTES
1. Robert Booth, “Antisemitic Attacks in UK at Highest Levels Ever Recorded,” The Guardian, Thursday, February 5, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/antisemitic-attacks-uk-community-security-trust-britain-jewish-population.
2. Aftab Ali, “Oxford University Labour Club Co-chair, Alex Chalmers, Resigns Amid Anti-Semitism Row,” The Independent, Wednesday February 17, 2016, https://www.independent.co.uk/student/news/oxford-university-labour-club-co-chair-alex-chalmers-resigns-amid-anti-semitism-row-a6878826.html.
3. Rich 2016, 239.
4. Rossman-Benjamin 2015, 218.
5. Rossman-Benjamin 2015, 230–31.
6. Michael Kaplan, “Attacks on France’s Jews Surge amid Concerns of Rising Anti-Semitism in Europe,” International Business Times, July 13, 2015, https://www.ibtimes.com/attacks-frances-jews-surge-amid-concerns-rising-anti-semitism-europe-2006003.
7. Marcus 2015, 148, citing Wistrich, Lethal Obsession, 323–24.
8. Itamar Eichner, “French Immigration to Israel Surges in Summer of 2015,” Ynet News.com, June 17, 2015, https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4669430,00.html.
9. Ilanit Chernick, “German Cardinal: Antisemitism Is an Attack on Us All,” Jerusalem Post, November 4, 2019, https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Antisemitism/German-Cardinal-Antisemitism-is-an-attack-on-us-all-606821.
10. Tom Gross, “A Shitty Little Country,” National Review, January 10, 2002, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-gross011002.shtml.
11. By one of my Indiana University Press editors, Katelyn Klingler, to whom my thanks are due.
12. The Compact Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (London: BCA, by arrangement with Oxford University Press, 1994), 60. Complete text reproduced micrographically.
13. Harrison 2006.
